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ABSTRACT
This thesis investigates the discourses of world kinship that are bound up in the founding 
documents of the United Nations such as the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights. These discourses have constituted a sense o f mission for the United 
Nations throughout its history. Building a human family from the fragmentary reality of 
world politics has become a widely stated purpose not just of the UN, but of politicians and 
NGOs through into the contemporary period.
In light o f the impracticability of these sentiments, the thesis aims to trace their origins, 
meanings, and continued appeal. Beginning with the planning process of the United 
Nations, I show how the UN resulted from a highly exclusive State Department enterprise. 
The small planning circle believed that the organisation should be imbued with the most 
visionary ideals. Today the discursive landscape favours such statements as the ideal of the 
family of nations much less, and yet such discourse remains a resource for those seeking an 
idealistic vision of world politics.
I argue that kinship discourse endures because of its particular cognitive facility, but that its 
continued usage is problematic. Kinship discourses may be used flexibly to draw 
boundaries between in-groups and the ‘Other’ in world politics in ways that enable us to 
reconceptualise Schmittian decisionism. Further, understanding usages of kinship discourse 
presents us with an image of a world which is sometimes incapable o f defining its interests 
and identity coherently. While being potentially useful tools for engineering emotive 
consensus, the modes o f discourse employed are Western in nature and can easily slip into 
registers which are seriously counter-productive to UN projects. Thus, a case may be made 
that the UN, and world politics in general, will eventually rethink the notion that a ‘human 
family’ is the ultimate goal of international life.
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PART ONE — The U N  and Universal Discourse:
Problems and Approaches
INTRODUCTION - Putting the UN’s Moral Vision in Question
“... i f  our system is indeed the best, and my religion the truest, then keep me faithful to both of them, and bring 
the rest of humanity to adopt the same way of life...
“today’s world of strife is like a powder keg. In such a volatile environment, we need to do everything we can to 
keep differences, rivalries, hatred and ignorance from erupting into violence. But even that, vital as it is, is not 
enough... (T)he Alliance (of Civilisations) gives us a chance. A  chance to consign identity-based divisiveness to 
the past — something we should have done long ago. A  chance to recognise our common humanity before it is 
too late.,z
The will to eradicate difference in the global inter-relation o f human beings or to nullify the 
perceived ‘problems’3 that difference creates, are recurrent dreams in the history o f world 
politics. As an entreaty to a divine power, a credo for a national sense of self, or a basis for 
political manifesto making, difference has been commonly addressed by war-makers and 
peace-makers alike as a problem to be solved, a divide that seems to demand to be bridged. 
For instance, the expansion of the sphere of Roman influence by military force was followed 
up by the policy of remaking the barbarian tribesmen o f Gaul, Bithynia or Britain into 
dependable Roman citizens. The tutelary and missionary aspects of European colonialism 
from the Spanish conquest of the Americas through to nineteenth century religious 
expeditions in Africa and East Asia were invigorated by the same transformative zeal4. As 
Tacitus mockingly notes in his description of the transformation of the culture of Britain, the 
‘gift’ of the ‘civilisation’ of the powerful is arguably imperium through uniformity: “(A)nd so the 
population was gradually led into the demoralising temptations of arcades, baths, and
1 More, T. (1961) T h e  Utopian Prayer’ in Utopia p l28
2 Ban, K-M. (2009) ‘Speech o f the Secretary General to the Istanbul Forum of the UN Alliance o f Civilisations, 
6th April 2009, SG/SM /12173.’ Available at: h ttp : //www.un.orp-/News/Press/docs/2009/sgsm l2173.doc.htm. 
Accessed on 10/05/2009.
3 See, for instance, Inayahtullah, N. and Blaney, D. (2004) International Relations and the Problem o f Difference. 
Medina, J. (2003) ‘Identity Trouble: Disidentification and the Problem o f Difference’ in Philosophy & Social 
Criticism, 29(6), p655-680, or for a more political and feminist approach, Armour, E. (1999) Deconstruction. 
Feminist Theology, and the Problem o f Difference: Subverting the Race/Gender Divide.
4 See, for instance, Comaroff, J. and Comaroff, J. (1991) O f Revelation and Revolution: Christianity. Colonialism 
and Consciousness in South Africa Vol 1.
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sumptuous banquets. The unsuspecting Britons spoke of such novelties as ‘civilisation’, when 
in fact they were only a feature of their enslavement.”5
Power, and particularly power which confers a feeling o f absolute, hegemonic or moral 
authority, has the tendency to fuel such a will to uniformity, to integrate the ‘other’ into the 
group, to bestow upon them the gifts and insights which propelled the powerful to their 
exalted position. Following Todorov’s presentation of the dilemma of the ‘other’ in The 
Conquest of America, the conquistador is either a Las Casas or a Cortes, a converter or a killer, 
whose zeal may not be as jaded as that of Tacitus. The encounter, as Todorov describes, was 
filtered through two possible beliefs. Either ‘difference’ between the Spanish and the Indians 
was take as a mirage, the natives thus being ripe for transformation into Catholic subjects; or, 
on the other hand, if  the natives’ alterity was perceived as being insurmountable, then, as 
Cortes asked: “(W)ho can deny that the use of gunpowder against pagans is the burning of 
incense to Our Lord?”6
This binary logic is certainly helpful though not definitive. A significantly varied spectrum of 
responses to the other is observable, even within the period of the Spanish Conquest for 
instance. As Inayahtullah and Blaney sensibly point out, “the truly difficult work is to sort out 
the similarities and differences among processes of proletarianizing, feminizing, racializing, 
and.. .indianizing others.”7 In the encounter between powerful groups and weaker groups we 
are shown the potential range of human narrative practices, and that breadth is made all the 
more apparent, by the hubristic sense o f self that often comes with power.
The focus o f the present investigation is on perhaps the most imposing attempt yet made to 
‘bring the rest of humanity to adopt the same way o f life’, through the development of the 
universal moral project instantiated in the founding o f the United Nations. Reflecting upon 
the increasingly fragile situation in Europe in the 1930s, the American Academy of Political 
and Social Science produced a series of yearly collections o f articles by mainly American 
authors, debating the failure o f “the American pattern of the European peace settlement of
5 Cornelius Tacitus, P. (1948) transl. Mattingly, H., The Agricola and The Germania p73
6 Todorov, S. (1984) The Conquest of America: The Question o f the O ther p i 51
7 Inayahtullah, N. and Blaney, D. (2004) International Relations and the Problem of Difference p.x
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1919”8 and the vast array o f plans for a new peace that American scholars and politicians 
were already preparing for Europe. As one writer put it, this drive for peace planning in a war 
that had yet to begin (and in which most Americans in the late 30s and early 40s had no 
intention o f being involved), was arguably demonstrative o f “the puritanical devotion of 
Americans to quick solutions...and...other plans for saving humanity.”9 Planning by the US 
government for what would become the United Nations began in 1939, two years before 
America would decide to enter World War Two.
The outcome o f the planning procedure was a set o f documents closely modelled on the 
American Declaration o f Independence and the United States Bill of Rights. The UN Charter 
and the UN Declaration of Human Rights in particular represent a grand manifesto 
purporting to provide “for the first time in history, a universal creed”10 for the improvement 
of humanity. As well as the establishment of an ‘enlightened’ sense o f ‘mission’ in preserving 
peace, developing a common standard o f human rights, and bringing the benefits o f liberty 
to the colonial territories of the European Empires, the international machinery of the 
United Nations and its auxiliary bodies has long been discussed in terms of reinforcing and 
making more inclusive, a community, or ‘family’ of nations. The UN founding documents 
are monuments in a discourse which argues for the need for and the existence of, not only 
common human values and purpose, but also common substance and moral truth. They 
claim, by their very desire to apply to all human life, to represent the pinnacle of political 
goals, and an unsurpassable vision for the human future.
The first major thrust of this thesis is to examine the logical drive to universalism manifest in 
the rhetoric and doctrine o f the United Nations, the second thrust is to explain the 
significance o f metaphorisation of universal assimilationist rhetoric in terms of worldly 
kinship. The contribution o f this work then, is a species o f intellectual history of the UN, 
though not quite in the same vein as the UN’s own ‘Intellectual History Project’. While the
8 Rappard, W. (1940) ‘Why Peace Failed’ in When War Ends. Annals o f the American Academy o f Political 
and Social Science, p i
9 Borchard, E. (1936) ‘The Various Meanings of International Cooperation’ in The Attainment and Maintenance 
o f World Peace. Annals o f the American Academy o f Political and Social Science, p i 22
10 Feller, A. (1953) United Nations and World Community p30
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works published by this project11 and various international organization scholars12 look at the 
UN’s intellectual contributions to global politics in the form o f concrete norms, agreements 
or changes in policy established through some branch of UN endeavour, my focus is instead 
on a broader level of analysis. The concern of this thesis is that level of discourse which sits 
above the technical workings o f UN bodies month by month or year by year. It is those 
statements of global vision, unity, notions of a desirable ‘human family’ - discourses which 
seem to encompass almost everything, but whose concrete meaning and referents are 
difficult to determine.
Along with Ricoeur, I take the stance that, when the investigator’s focus moves from 
linguistic analysis to discourse analysis, “the issue is no longer the form o f the metaphor...nor 
even just the sense of metaphor...but the reference o f metaphorical statement as the power to 
‘redescribe’ reality.”13 Ricoeur further insists, “(T)he metaphorical ‘is’ at once signifies both ‘is 
not’ and ‘is like’. If  this is really so, we are allowed to speak of metaphorical truth, but in an 
equally ‘tensive’ sense o f the word ‘truth’.”14 This notion of ‘tension’ inherent in metaphorical 
descriptions coincides with Vico’s maxim that human beings make their world in those 
instances or thought projects when complete understanding is lacking - ‘homo non intelligent fit 
omnia*. As Vico states, “when he (man) does not understand, he makes (things) out of 
himself.”15 As suggested above, the difficulty of grasping the vast totality o f human political 
relations lends itself to metaphorical encapsulation harbouring a disjunction between the all- 
encompassing scope of statements of the world-as-family, and the lack of clarity of what 
such a notion really entails.
Forming notions that the world may be conceptualised in terms of family is a particular way 
of ‘organising our view’16 of global politics which demands explanation both in terms of how 
such a metaphor works and what it does when it is employed. Part o f the method of
11 See U N IH P publications such as Jolly, R. Emmerij, L. and Weiss, T. (2001) Ahead of the Curve? UN Ideas and 
Global Challenges. Jolly, R., Emmerij, L., and Weiss, T. (2005) The Power o f UN Ideas: Lessons from the First 
60 Years and Jolly, R. Emmerij, L. and Weiss, T. (2009) UN Ideas That Changed the World.
12 See for instance, MacFarlane, N. and Khong, Y.F. (2006) Human Security and the UN: A Critical History
13 Ricoeur, P. (2003) The Rule o f Metaphor: Multi-Disciplinary Studies o f the Creation o f Meaning in Language
p5
14 Ibid. p6
15 Vico, G. (1999) New Science, translated by Marsh, D. p i60
16 This formulation o f the work of metaphor is attributable to Max Black and his seminal article ‘Metaphor’ in 
Black, M. (1962) Models and Metaphors: Studies in Language and Philosophy
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providing such explanation is enabled by what James Fernandez recognises as the most 
important contribution of social anthropology to the study of metaphor, namely the 
“insistence upon the role of culture in the formation o f metaphoric models with which 
various peoples reason.”17 In other words, aspects of the usage of metaphor may be 
organised with relation to the values culturally placed upon components within the 
metaphor, in this instance, the meanings of ‘family’ within the Western culture that gave rise 
to UN rhetoric.
By virtue o f its designation as the foremost (ideally) non-partisan international authority on 
matters of human welfare, the United Nations has been conceived as carving out a role of 
moral authority within world politics18. The very fact o f this authority places great importance 
on understanding the role of the grand visions of world unity held out by the UN in shaping 
the aims and practice of international politics. Further importance is added by the fact that 
this discourse, formally adopted in the UN founding documents has widely diffused and is 
today replicated time and again by political figures, the media and NGOs, as will be shown in 
later chapters. Metaphors o f kinship — notions of the ‘human family’, the ‘family of nations’, 
‘international brotherhood’ and so on — are a prevalent way of representing grand visions of 
world unity. I argue that such statements are of greater metaphorical import than other 
notions o f unity - partnership, community and so on. They imply shared substance rather 
than simply alliance and thus speak not of the uniting of a world of different entities, but 
embody an envisioning of a world without difference. In this respect, they are among the most 
unrealistic of visions of the future.
I propose that the individualistic discourses of the post-Enlightenment West have suppressed 
the realm of kinship to a subservient position within cultural system of values. It is the 
private, feminised, insignificant partner to the masculinised world of economic and political 
action. This suppression leads us to assume that when we metaphorise politics in terms of 
kinship, this is meaningless linguistic felicity, that such assertions have no character or
17 Fernandez, J. (1991) ‘Introduction: Confluents o f Inquiry’ in his edited volume, Beyond Metaphor: The Theory 
o f Tropes in Anthropology p9
18 See for instance, Kille, K. (2007) The UN Secretary-General and Moral Authority: Ethics and Religion in 
International Leadership or Vanden Heuvel, W.J. (2000) T h e  United States and the United Nations: The Moral 
Authority to  Preserve Peace’ in Kennedy, M., Hoxie, R.G., and Repland, B. (2000) The Moral Authority of 
Government
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meaning o f their own other than an unequivocal positivity allied to notions o f care and 
nurturance. Rather, I contend that the persistent reappearance of kinship in political 
discourse — from the ‘family’ o f nations, to the human family, to international brotherhood 
or sisterhood — is significant for processes o f dividing as well as uniting the world. Rather 
than being a side-issue, kinship is both a tremendously powerful way of conceiving of, and 
making patterns of, inclusion and exclusion in politics. Kinship discourses are highly 
politically significant because o f the way that kinship as a symbol is constructed within 
Western social forms of knowledge. The sphere of kinship is conceived as the anti-political, 
anti-economic sphere. By holding out world-kinship as a future ideal we avoid practical 
consideration of present discordance within political life. Further, as Keally McBride argues, 
kinship, prefigured as the opposite of contractual, political relations, helps support the 
continuation of the self-serving liberal capitalist world which it symbolically opposes19. 
Kinship cannot be the Utopian ‘alternative’ without the existence of that fractious political 
status quo by which it is defined. Thus, the idea of world-kinship (as symbolically conceived) 
logically supports the existence of the current order of self-interested politics and economics. 
Were that order not to exist, kinship could not have the positive valuation it enjoys in 
formulations such as the UN’s mobilisation o f the notion of the human family.
The paradoxical quality of these discourses prompts the set of investigations o f this thesis. 
On the one hand, the use o f these metaphors in attempting to elide difference is vague, self- 
deluding and in some ways, presents a hoped-for state of international relations that might 
well be said to be impossible to reach and out of touch with present or historical conditions. 
These paradoxes raise the central questions to be tackled in the main empirical chapters:
1) How did the ‘universal’ ideals of kinship and brotherhood of the UN founding documents 
come to exist through the design process o f the organisation?
2) Are such ideals as the human family as self-evident or useful in the work o f contemporary 
UN staff as the planners of the organisation imagined they would be?
3) What are the typical modes o f using kinship discourse to speak about world unity?
4) How do these metaphors compare with other ways o f envisioning the world? What work 
are they employed to do?
19 McBride, K. (2005) Collective Dreams: Political Imagination and Community ch4.
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5) Why do such metaphors make sense in certain contexts but not others, and why do they 
continue to hold appeal given their vagueness and Utopianism?
6) What cultural and historical meanings are embedded in such kinship metaphors?
7) Given their vagueness and ethnocentricity, how useful an ideal is ‘human kinship’ in 
today’s globalised world? Do we need more practical visions of world unity?
These questions are opened out more fully in the following two chapters. Chapter One 
introduces the universal ideals of the UN, and the paradoxes thrown up by speaking in 
universal terms in a divided world. It also opens the discussion of trajectories of thought that 
have inspired the UN master discourses, and the ways o f relating to the world and the ‘other’ 
that are embodied therein. The latter parts of the chapter put forward in brief the argument 
that thinking of the world as kin and non-kin is not only cognitively and socially cohesive in 
Western modes o f thought, but crucial as a mode o f dealing with graded and ambivalent 
distinctions in a complex international sphere of allies and enemies. Chapter Two puts 
forward the philosophical and anthropological theory which underpins the gathering and 
analysis o f the subsequent historical and political data.
The original contribution o f the thesis stems from the novel methodological approaches 
taken to the analysis of the idea of the family of nations and associated concepts. The set of 
inquiries, while rooted in IR topics are very much anthropological and philosophical in 
nature. Questioning the notions of the family of nations at the heart of the UN project does 
not lead into an institutional history as such, or into specific study o f the effectiveness of 
particular UN policies20. Even the works of the UN Intellectual History Project21 do not 
address the broadest social and philosophical assumptions which underpin the possibility of 
such an organisation existing in its present form. This is one gap that this thesis intends to 
fill. In looking at how and why the West believes in and uses the notion of the world-as- 
family, the UN is actually only a case-example. It is a critical example because, at the end of 
the Second World War, the Western world embedded this quixotic world family metaphor as
20 See, for instance, Luard, E. (1982) A History o f the United Nations. Vol 1..Yoder. A. (1993) The Evolution o f 
the United Nations System 2nd ed., Alger, C. F. (ed.) (1998) The Future o f the United Nations System: Potential 
for the Twenty-First Century
21 For instance, Jolly, R., Emmerij, L., and Weiss, T. (2001) Ahead o f the Curve? UN Ideas and Global 
Challenges. Jolly, R., Emmerij, L., and Weiss, T. (2005) The Power o f UN Ideas: Lessons from the First 60 Years 
and Jolly, R., Emmerij, L., and Weiss, T. (2009) UN Ideas That Changed the World
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the grandest goal of the overarching world organisation that has become a global moral and 
political authority. Thus, rather than being a critique of, or laudatory for the UN based on 
practical assessment of its values and policies, my analysis is based upon the philosophical, 
political and social implications of this core goal of world-kinship which lies behind the UN’s 
projects.
A second key contribution the thesis makes is in looking at the notion of kinship as a 
mechanism for espousing universal projects and values which actually divide the world. 
Several attempts at rethinking the work of Carl Schmitt have taken place in recent decades22, 
but kinship discourses as principles of distinction have yet to be coherently addressed. This 
thesis fills that gap, suggesting that Western modes of conceiving of kinship as a social and 
anti-political ideal lend great flexibility to kinship as a way o f making political decisions. 
Kinship can be used to exclude, but at the same time offer the potential for re-incorporation 
into the in-group. The multiplicity o f ways of ‘being’ kin in Western formulations renders the 
Schmittian moment of decision unstable. ‘Kinship’ is defined both as a ‘natural’ marker of 
unchanging substance but also as a relationship based on behaving according to the character 
o f relations expected of kin. Thus, decisions of inclusion and exclusion may be ambivalent 
and incomplete.
In the second part of the thesis, Chapter Three presents a detailed archival investigation of 
the history o f the founding of the United Nations, and the derivations of the discourses 
embodied in its great texts. From this point in the thesis, empirical evidence is laid out to 
answer the above questions and advance the following key arguments. In this historical 
chapter, I highlight the very limited group of actors involved in the production o f a vision 
that was purportedly derived from a global will. I argue that the ‘universal’ values o f the UN 
were not produced through global consultation and dialogue, but that instead a systematic 
process o f limiting external contributions to the planning process was made by the Roosevelt 
government. From this small circle, the conviction that the UN needed potent, emotive 
ideology to succeed and inspire the world was imbued into the founding documents.
22 For instance, Mouffe, C. (1999) (ed.) The Challenge o f Carl Schmitt. Meier, H. (1998) transl. Brainard, M. The 
Lesson o f Carl Schmitt: Four Chapters on the Distinction between Political Theology and Political Philosophy. 
Odysseos, L. and Petito, F. (2007) (eds.) The International Political Thought o f Carl Schmitt: Terror. Liberal War 
and the Crisis o f Global Order
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Naturally the languages chosen reflected the Western, Christian backgrounds of most of the 
contributors.
Chapters Four to Six display original contemporary research focusing on the two principal 
strands o f inquiry. Chapter Four looks at how UN officials themselves administer the global 
vision of the UN, and considers the disjunction between the feeling of the UN planners that 
kinship values were required at the centre of the organisation to motivate members, and the 
counter-productivity o f such rhetoric in UN bureaucratic work today. Chapters Five and Six 
look at the political rhetoric used by the UN, NGOs and politicians in recent crises where 
attempts have been made to transform the edges of ‘civilisation’ to bring more peoples 
within the scope o f membership of the ‘family’ of nations. These chapters map the contours 
of the overall discourses of human unity, comparing, for instance, usage o f the now- 
hegemonic notion of ‘international community’ with kinship metaphors. Chapter Five looks 
at a humanitarian crisis in the shape of the conflict in Darfur between 2003 and 2005, where 
notions of responsibility to protect part of the human family were deployed. Chapter Six 
investigates the incarceration of terrorism suspects at Guantanamo Bay and modes of 
speaking of the limits of a putative human rights community or family. Here I show how the 
niches within discourse where kinship is deployed are quite specific. General, aspirational, 
and emotive statements are made and kinship performs a double movement of affirming the 
values of the in-group while contrasting these against the injustices perceived beyond that 
group. This said, I argue that Schmitt’s logic of decisionism may be reformed as outlined 
above, by considering the ambivalent character of distinctions made on the basis of kinship.
Chapter Seven explains in depth the relations of kinship to politics, and of kinship to the 
development in individual persons of the consciousness o f social distance and the other. In 
particular, the characteristics of Western kinship that give meaning to the metaphorical 
connection between ‘family’ and ‘humanity’ are laid out. This discussion leads to the 
aspiration o f the concluding Chapter Eight to form a constructive set of critiques of the 
deployment of kinship rhetoric in world politics. If we wish to explain vague feelings of 
commonality we must explain not only our desires to express these feelings, but also the 
mechanisms o f language and social logic that enable ambiguity and imprecision to further the 
applicability o f our practices of metaphor. It is the shortcomings of these practices, as well as
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our failure to understand our drives to metaphorise the world in the ways we do, (to dream 
our dreams of world community, say) that cripple our universal projects, such as the UN, 
with ego- and ethno-centrism.
I argue thus that there are political and philosophical difficulties with envisioning world- 
making in terms of building kinship. This is a project which cannot be operationalised. These 
languages are anti-political, lulling the world away from confronting political discord or from 
addressing the conflict between liberal and communitarian impulses in the UN project. Such 
discourse, associated with colonial discourse of patriarchal patronage and religious idealism, 
lends negative symbolic capital to the UN around the world. Such discourse, I argue, shows 
the propensity in world politics to fall back on comforting ideational templates. Lest we 
should hold faith in the theorist’s ability to define the interests of his or her subject of study, 
the following work on these vague and impossible discourses of kinship shows us a picture 
of world which is sometimes unable to define its own interests, values and principles in a 
coherent way even using the most ‘inspirational’ o f languages at its disposal.
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CHAPTER ONE - World Kinship Discourse, Selves and 
Others, and the UN’s Global Order
1.1 The US and the UN Founding Documents: Self-Evident Truths and 
Carpe Diem Politics
In the contemporary world, where uni-polar American hegemony has become the status quo, 
it is perhaps easy to forget the uncertain nature of the rights and visions outlined in the 
Charter of the United Nations. In this document and the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights23, a language of equal human rights, the preservation o f peace, national sovereignty, 
good neighbour politics, a reliance upon bureaucratic practice, and the exemplary role of the 
United States become manifest in a form proclaiming a universal set of truths. It can often 
seem in the Western world that everyone has agreed upon these ‘self-evident’ truths. 
However, when they are hastily invoked as part of the reason for interventionist wars for the 
purpose o f regime-change, it acts to bring home to us what an attempt to engineer consensus 
and unity in the international can really mean.
It is important to remember that the confident, optimistic, indeed hubristic tones of the UN 
founding documents were not indicative of the popular perception of world politics in the 
mid forties. Indeed, as Carl Friedrich pointed out in 1948, the mood among the Western 
powers (the founts of the philosophical grounding of the UN) “contrast(ed) with the 
mentality after World War I. Then, overwhelming public sentiment.. .held that the war ‘to 
end all wars’ had been won for good.”24 He presents a Gallup poll conducted in July 1946 
wherein, in answer to the question “Do you believe there will be a (world) war in the next 25 
years?”, 50% of French people, 48% of British people, and 69% of Americans responded in 
the affirmative.25 That such a set of documents could be produced and signed amid such 
general pessimism attests both to the paradoxically closed nature of the process of planning 
these articles of universal values, and to the desperate war-weariness of most of the nations 
of the world, most of whom had little input into the documents they would sign at San 
Francisco in 1945.
23 See Appendices A and B, respectively UN Charter and the UN Declaration o f Human Rights. In particular, the 
preambles and initial articles of the two documents are instructive.
24 Friedrich, C.J. (1948) Inevitable Peace p3
23 Ibid.
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The American domination of the planning of the League of Nations and the United Nations, 
ensured that values supposedly representative of the whole world, were given to the world by 
one powerful nation. Indeed many American authors on the eve of World War Two were by 
no means timid about proclaiming national desire to “apply the principles of our 
Constitution to the world”26 and to “prepare the people o f the world for some such miracle 
as happened in Philadelphia in 1787.”27 As if to suggest that like a lackadaisical pupil, Europe 
had been 150 years too slow to catch on to simple principles, Clyde Eagleton wrote in the 
early months of World War Two: “(L)ike the United States under the Articles of 
Confederation, nations have learned that it is not so bad to work together in a common 
system.. .the next step (for humanity as a whole) is obviously that which the Confederation took 
when it transformed itself into a stronger system.”28
The founding documents of the UN are the final expression of an increasingly confident 
American desire to build a new world order based upon principles of liberty and equality and 
a notion o f the rights of man stemming not only from the desire to right the injustices of two 
world wars, but to bring the values of the American Revolution to the rest of the world. So 
thorough was the planning procedure for a “desirable world order”29 in the State 
Department, and so early did it commence (September 1939), that when in 1941 the Atlantic 
Charter was signed, even the British were hopelessly out of touch with what was underway in 
Washington. The British government sent a missive to the State Department shortly after the 
meeting o f Churchill and Roosevelt with reference to the possibility of co-operation on a 
post-war international juridical structure. As Secretary o f State Cordell Hull notes in his 
memoirs, the Department had to reply with a note letting the British know, to their 
annoyance, that their idea for an international juridical organisation would be subsumed 
within the State Department’s world organisation plan which by 1941 had already been two 
years in development30. By the time the Dumbarton Oaks conference was organised in 1944, 
the State Department’s modestly titled ‘Tentative Proposals’ constituted “the only detailed
26 Page, R. (1940) ‘Designs for a World Order’ in When War Ends, Annals o f the American Academ y o f  
Political and Social Science, p54
27 Ibid. p56
28 Eagleton, C. (1940) ‘Peace Means More Than Political Adjustment’ in When War Ends. Annals o f the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science, p41
29 The words are those o f Leo Pasvolsky in a memo to Secretary o f State, Cordell Hull in September 1939, 
quoted in Schlesinger, S. (2004) Act o f Creation: The Founding o f the United Nations p35
30 Hull, C (1948) The Memoirs o f Cordell Hull Vol. II p!631
20
and fully developed agenda paper.”31 The British assented without many queries to what had 
been outlined and the Russians submitted a paper that was utterly overridden as it proposed 
that “talks should be limited to a proposed organization devoted exclusively to security.”32 
The founding texts of the UN display both a concern with the interconnectedness of a family 
of nations, and also a notion that there is a universal ‘human’, a standard for the lives of 
every person and the common values that each nation should strive to ensure for its people. 
The Declaration of Human Rights encapsulates these twin strands best in proclaiming that 
“the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of 
freedom.”33
1.2 Discourses of World Community and the Human Family -  Historical 
Sediments
With the European powers shattered, the United States found itself in the position to lead the 
Western world (and by implication the whole world) for the first time in 1919. Recognition of a 
truly global role for the United States dawned. As Schlesinger argues, the American political 
paradigm began quickly shifting from a past moulded by “prid(ing) itself on its .. .distance 
from the conflicts and corruption o f Europe”34 to a present marked by interdependence with 
Europe. Woodrow Wilson himself regarded the United States as the “chief interpreter to the 
world of those democratic principles, which can rid the world of injustice and bring peace and 
happiness.”35 While it may be claimed that the institutional model for the UN, the League of 
Nations, was a case where “the President’s principles conquered Europe,”36 it was not merely 
the idiosyncratic desire of one idealist. Rather, as Rob Kroes recounts, in the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth century as their power came to eclipse that o f the British Empire, 
Americans conceived of their own relation to their frontiers, to the ‘others’ beyond the 
border, to their mission in the world, as an “impetuous forward march of universalism, the 
universalism of human equality and human rights, symbolizing America as the usher o f a new
31 Donovan, F. (1966) Mr. Roosevelt’s Four Freedoms: The Story Behind the UN Charter p i06
32 Ibid. p l0 4
33 See Appendix B, United Nations Universal Declaration o f Human Rights (1948)
34 Schlesinger, S.C. (2004) Act o f Creation: The Founding of the United Nations p l7
35 Bell, H.C.F. (1945) Woodrow Wilson and the People p253
36 Rappard, W. (1940) ‘Why Peace Failed’ in When War Ends. Annals o f the American Academy o f Political 
and Social Science, p4
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world order.”37 As confidence grew and a sense of Europe’s moral bankruptcy increased 
through the years of warfare between 1914-1918, the desire to preserve the mythical ‘city on 
the hill’ behind the walls of Monroe Doctrine isolation was replaced by a briefly flourishing 
desire to give the benefits of American liberty to the world.
The Senatorial decision not to join the League plunged the USA back into isolationism. 
Meanwhile, the failings of the League to prevent, for instance, the Ruhr crisis of 1923, lent 
scepticism to grand supra-national projects. Throughout the isolationist 1920s, public 
commentators and scholars in the United States such as John Dewey and Walter Lippmann 
debated the viability of the concept of democracy, initially in a domestic context, and later 
with reference to the potential for world community. Dismayed by the control o f ‘Big 
Business’ over government in an age of rapid industrial, capitalistic expansion, Lippmann in 
particular lamented the disintegration o f the connection between the public and government. 
“Common interests” he claimed, “very largely elude public opinion entirely.”38 Dewey, on the 
other hand looked upon the disconnect between the public and government as only a 
temporary problem. He looked to the gradual process o f greater interconnection made 
possible by more efficient transport and communication as one possible way to turn the face- 
to-face interactions which build the spirit of local communities into the bedrock for a sense 
o f a ‘global public’. He hoped for “a diffuse and seminal intelligence”39 based on global 
communication to help to build a ‘Great Community’ in the world at large.
The fallout o f the Great Depression brought the hopeful notion of a community of nations 
back to the fore in democratic states faced suddenly with expansionary nationalism from 
fascist states. Throughout the thirties, this notion became more prevalent in the public 
speeches of Franklin Roosevelt. Crisis upon crisis assailed the League of Nations, particularly 
the Japanese invasion o f Manchuria, Italian aggression in Abyssinia and Hitler’s 
demilitarisation of the Rhineland. What began as another Monroe Doctrine set of statements
37 Kroes, R (2000) Them and Us: Questions of Citizenship in a Globalizing World pl5. Kroes’ argument is well 
accepted and is rehearsed here only for the sake o f providing acknowledgement o f the cultural sediment present
in the minds o f the generation who would plan the League and the UN. O ther work on the topic o f American
Exceptionalism at this point can be found in Voss, K. (1993) The Making o f American Exceptionalism: the 
Knights o f Labor and Class Formation in the Nineteenth Century
38 Lippmann, W. (1922) Public Opinion p310.
39 Dewey, J. (1927) The Public and Its Problems p217/8
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in praise o f the unity of the New World against the failings of the Old, was expanded into a 
genuine discourse of world unity. The crises caused by aggressive nationalism, prompted 
Roosevelt’s struggle to motivate the American people to come to terms with the fact that the 
Monroe Doctrine of an unassailable haven protected by oceans, was now outdated.
In order to convince a recalcitrant public, we see Roosevelt beginning to employ a discourse 
that has remained at the heart of the American consciousness since its founding. In his 
famous ‘Quarantine Speech’40 from 1937, he likened the Japanese to an “epidemic of physical 
disease” and urged the world to quarantine them in order to protect the health of the 
international community and for the “maintenance of international morality.”41 This sounded 
like too much of an ‘entanglement’ to American ears and was greeted with open hostility. His 
annual message to Congress in 1939 was veined through with a steely resolve that masked a 
growing desperation at the American people’s belief in their hemispheric refuge. At this 
point, we see the re-emergence of a discourse that FDR would surely have known was the 
best way to motivate the public. He called the United States “the last best hope o f earth”42 
and laid out his plan to be an arbitrator in global conflicts, but with no practical 
commitments towards peacekeeping. His Christmas message to the Pope stressed his 
appraisal o f the increasing interconnectedness of humanity and he began to refer openly in 
1940 to isolationism as “a helpless nightmare.”43
Over time and through this growing reaction within his administration to the isolationism 
hanging over his country, Roosevelt had set the State Department, under Cordell Hull and 
Sumner Welles, to covertly bring about the mechanism of a US-driven interconnected world 
order. In addition to the peace-keeping that had been the intention of the League of Nations, 
they sought ways of organising economic re-ordering and international trusteeship at the 
moment o f an anticipated wave of decolonisation. The Four Freedoms speech encapsulated
40 The full text o f the speech, given at Chicago on October 5th 1937, is available at: 
http: /  / www.sagehtstory.netAvor!dwar2/ docs /F D  ROuar.htm. Accessed on 10/12/2009.
41 Donovan, F. (1966) Mr. Roosevelt’s Four Freedoms: The Story Behind the UN Charter p i5
42 Ibid. p i 6
43 Ibid. p l9 . Roosevelt envisaged the end result o f isolationism as a “nightmare o f a people lodged in prison, 
handcuffed, hungry, and fed through the bars from day to day by the contemptuous, unpitying masters o f other 
continents.” See, Address at the University o f Virginia, Charlottesville, VA, June 10th 1940. Available at: 
http: /  / www.presidency.ucsb.edu / \vs / mdcx.phpPpid^ 15965. Accessed on 10/12/2009.
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what Roosevelt saw as the United States’ traditional “faith in freedom under the guidance of 
God.” “Freedom”, he said, “means the supremacy of human rights everywhere.”44
Through this period we note these same discourses appearing in American media culture and 
in academic and public debates. A collection o f speeches and broadcasts was organised 
throughout the mid-to-late 1930s by Nicholas Murray Butler, the President o f the Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, under the rubric of the ‘Family of Nations’. Statesmen 
from around the world took part in annual Armistice Day broadcasts to argue for the 
common identity of man and the rhetoric of Roosevelt’s policy re-emerges in some of their 
contributions. Richard B. Bennett, the Foreign Minister o f Canada, made this comment in 
the Armistice broadcast of 1934 reflecting the ‘Good Neighbor’ policy outlined initially the 
year before45: “(S)ecurity based on armaments inevitably means war. Security based on good 
will and friendly, neighbourly relations, such as exist on this Continent of North American, 
insures peace.”46 Further, we note in Butler’s own 1937 speech at the Carnegie Endowment’s 
European Committee in Geneva, the discourse the Roosevelt would use in 1939/40 of the 
Western Hemisphere as an example to the rest of the world. Butler spoke of the need to 
begin a ‘worldwide federal experiment’ rather than to continue with the divisive building of 
nations. He comments: “(I)t is interesting for an American to be able to point out that from 
the history o f the United States may be found both guidance and encouragement in pursuit 
o f this ideal.”47
What Butler refers to is the period between 1781 and 1789 in American history, a time when, 
he claims, “every single problem with which the world is faced today presented itself in the 
lives of those 3,000,000 people organized into thirteen conflicting and competing states.”48 
The federalisation of America during those years is, for Butler, a “lesson which we of the 
American states can take to our brothers across the sea to show them how.”49 It is almost a 
duplicate of the discourses present in the speeches and writings o f Roosevelt’s
44 Donovan, F. (1966) Mr. Roosevelt’s Four Freedoms: The Story Behind the UN Charter p26
45 See Roosevelt, F. (1933) Tirst Inaugural Address’ Washington DC, 4th March 1933. Available at: 
h ttp : // v^vw.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/fdr-first-inaug.html. Accessed on 01/12/2009.
46 Butler, N.M. (1938) The Family o f Nations: Its Need and Its Problems p i 13
47 Ibid. p362
48 Ibid. p363
49 Ibid. p365
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administration50, and echoes the discourses of revolution from those years in the late 
eighteenth century. The linkage between the twentieth century and the eighteenth here exists 
in the voices o f the writers before the Second World War. Their connections o f their own 
experience to elements of American national myth are not direct reproductions of 
eighteenth century ideas. The fact that linkages are made however, alerts us to the fact that 
articles of discourse and meaning within discourse are indeed recyclable even given the 
disparate web of differences and continuities that relate the two periods.
In his preface to the pamphlet, ‘Common Sense’, Thomas Paine makes a forceful statement 
of the global intent and vision of the trans-Atlantic radicals. “The cause o f America is in a 
great measure the cause of all mankind.”51 The invigorating discourse of common humanity 
informs Paine’s greatest work, and is the bedrock o f his thought. Without wishing to draw 
too stark a conclusion, the British imperial system - positing a ‘natural’ distinction between 
classes of people, and between rulers and subjects - is the antithesis o f Paine’s viewpoint. 
Paine’s utter rejection of the hierarchical social systems of Europe is neatly expressed when 
he asks, “who is there in the world but man?”52 It is difficult to overstate just how remarkable 
a statement Paine is making, all the more so given his matter-of-fact tonality. Indeed, prior to 
the American and French Revolutions, most societies across temporal and cultural space had 
operated with strict concepts of internal differentiation that overshadowed a discourse of 
human commonality, if it were indeed, present. Such a discourse of intrinsic and common 
humanity which Paine helped popularise, was, Sturzo points out, something largely confined 
to the texts o f religion. It speaks almost prophetically, addressing itself to the widest flock of
all. The initial seeds of the conception of a common humanity in the Western world lie in
Christianity53 and infuse directly into the US Declaration of Independence in the primary 
claim that that “all men are created equal.. .(and).. .are endowed by their Creator with certain 
unalienable Rights.”54 The Roman world for instance, could have no comparable notion as
50 See for instance Roosevelt, F. (1937) ‘Quarantine Speech’, Chicago on October 5th 1937, available at: 
h ttp : // www.sagehistory.net/\vorldwar2/docs/FD RO uar.htm . Accessed on 10/12/2009. Roosevelt, F. (1940) 
Address at the University o f Virginia, Charlottesville, VA, June 10th 1940. Available at: 
http: /  Avwwpresidcncy. ucsb.edu Avs / index.php?pid=15965. Accessed on 10/12/2009.
51 Paine, T. (1976) Common Sense ed. Kramnik, I. p68
52 Paine, T. (1984) The Rights o f Man ed. Foner, E. p65
53 Sturzo, L. (1929) International Community and the Right o f War p23/4
54 United States Declaration o f Independence (1776) Available at:
http: /  / www.ushistorv.org/declaration / docum ent/index.htm. Accessed on 15/01/09.
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that of the equality of every man before God and in the eyes of the Divine Creator. This is a 
point that Paine uses in his argument for the ‘naturalness’ of the rights he champions. 
Liberty, equality and “the unity o f man”55 are seen as steadfast rights that have been 
oppressed temporarily by the tyranny of class, arbitrary power and hereditary rule.
In the eighteenth century, Thomas Paine proudly proclaimed that the “American 
constitutions were to liberty, what a grammar is to language.”56 A grand sense of human 
renewal pervades Paine’s work, and also the writings o f contemporaneous American 
statesman that remains a strong discursive referent in the ideas behind the world 
organisations o f 1919 and 1945. Never afraid of the very boldest turn of phrase, Paine states 
that in a new independent America, “(w)e have it in our power to begin the world over 
again57” and to create “an asylum for mankind.”58
Alexander Hamilton addressed the people of New York in similar terms in the first o f the 
Federalist Papers: “(I)t has been frequendy remarked that it seems to have been reserved for 
the people of this country, by their conduct and example, to decide the important question, 
whether societies of men are really capable or not of establishing good government from 
reflection and choice.”59 This is the discourse of the political, moral and social experiment of 
the New World that is in evidence in the 1930s with Butler. Hamilton’s is a curt dismissal of 
the political efforts of humans throughout history and this is demonstrative of what 
Tocqueville calls “the idea of the indefinite perfectability of man.”60 A high level of equality 
in society, he claims, produces the notion that every person can improve themselves to a 
great degree, conditional only upon their ingenuity. Holding common humanity as the most 
prevalent knowledge complex, and rejecting subject positions defined by class, is arguably 
productive of the notion that the new country of the “western sons of liberty”61 could and 
should improve upon the societies that have gone before.
55 Paine, T. (1984) The Rights o f Man ed. Foner, E. p66
56 Ibid. p95
57 Paine, T. (1967) Common Sense ed. Kramnik, I. p i 18
58 Ibid. plOl
59 Hamilton, A. (1787) Federalist Papers No. I, ‘General Introduction’. Available at: 
h ttp ://avalon . law, yale.edu/I8 th  century/fedOl.asp. Accessed on 05/11/2009.
60 de Tocqueville, A. (2003 ed.) Democracy in America and Two Essays on America p521
61 Jay,J. (1787) Federalist Papers No. II, ‘Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence’. Available at: 
h ttp : // avalon.law.vale.edu/18th century/fed02.asp. Accessed on 05/11/2009.
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In this sense the discourse of equality opens up conceptual space which was constricted by 
the limited possibilities of more hierarchical social structures. We might call the discourse of 
‘America as example’ a derivative discourse of the discourse of human equality. Certainly 
though, this derivative discourse would seem a powerful motivator of potential American 
foreign policy, including the shaping o f international institutions through the lens of the 
founding principles of the American state.
We have begun to tie the conceptions o f humanity in the eighteenth and twentieth centuries 
together loosely around common discourses. It is not my ultimate aim to prove their 
similarity. A good many differences can be found between the projects undertaken by the 
protagonists in the late-eighteenth century and the 1940s and the documentary outcomes of 
their respective works. A surface reading o f the UN Charter for instance reveals a gendered 
aspect (‘equal rights o f men and women’62) that has a separate history. The influence of the 
two world wars is also patently clear, as is Roosevelt’s ‘Good Neighbor’ policy. The Charter is 
not a reproduction o f the eighteenth century documents, but what should be highlighted is 
the continuing presence, during the planning procedure for the UN, of evidence that the 
discourses o f the age of revolution still retained influence.
A universal vision then lies at the heart o f the discourses of the founding texts of the United 
Nations. Obviously, the promotion o f this vision does not sum up the work of an 
enormously diverse organisation. However, arising from the universal values that the UN is 
founded upon, are a number of paradoxes concerning the right to delineate the lives of 
others. Any universal vision must, by virtue of its claim to universality, hold within it the 
desire to transform those who do not conform. The ways we distinguish those within our 
sphere o f values (universal or not) and those without, is the topic of the next section.
62 From the preamble to the UN Charter (1945). See Appendix A.
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1.3 Metaphors of Distinction in World Politics: the Other and Processes of 
World-Making
‘We the peoples of the United Nations determined... to reaffirm faith in the fundamental human rights, in 
the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and 
small... and for these ends... to practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good 
neighbours... have resolved to combine our efforts to accomplish these aims’*3
Just six weeks separated the solemn agreement to these glorious aims in late June 1945 in San 
Francisco, and the first and only belligerent uses of nuclear weapons across the Pacific in 
August. N ot only, as we saw in the previous section, were these ‘universal’ visions far from 
the result o f universal debate and consensus, but they seemed to be aims to which even their 
primary authors did not wish to adhere. The deaths of nearly 200,000 Japanese civilians in the 
wake of the dawning of this ‘new world order’ attest to the fact that the claim to the equal 
worth of the human person had, in June 1945, some important caveats. A fascinating aspect 
of hastily made claims to universal values is how we relate to the ‘Others’ who we deem to be 
exterior to our vision. The ‘Other’ is crucial to all claims to universal values investigated thus 
far, indeed, the paradox of these statements of universalism, is their lack of universal 
applicability. This section looks at ways o f relating to the ‘Other’ who fails to fit into the 
universal ideal, and the limits of popularly invoked modes o f ‘Othering’.
The proclamations of universal values touched upon so far (such as Paine’s writings and the 
US Declaration o f Independence) have emerged in times of crisis and were produced by 
groups faced by tyrannical oppression. Their proclamations of their equality to their social 
superiors in the order o f the status quo were a revolutionary call for transformation and 
liberation. On the contrary, the declarations o f equality after World War Two were made 
primary by those in a victorious position o f great power. The discourses of the UN envisage a 
core of nations presumed to share the values enshrined in the key documentary statements 
and also, implicidy, assumed a remaining set of nations and people who have as yet, failed to 
agree to the common values and aspirations. It is these ‘Others’, against whom the United
63 From the preamble to the UN Charter (1945). See Appendix A.
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Nations “have resolved to combine our efforts”64 in accomplishing the aims of equality, 
peace and security.
As Charlotte Girard argues, this assertion of commonality is “a necessary yet always fictional 
condition to achieve world-making.”65 Girard further asserts that claims to community, let 
alone kinship (as in the human family) are unnecessarily specific for delineating a social and 
political space in projects of world re-making. Girard’s argument, as will be shown in Chapter 
Four, is borne out in the experiences of UN staff. Languages such as that of the human 
family are not only described as being of little practical use in motivating support for UN 
projects, but actually may be counter-productive to consensus building. In fact, the world- 
making propensities of the United Nations, by infusing their discourse of unity with notions 
both o f community and family, layered over a vaguer base of commonality, actually 
strengthen the boundaries and the exclusivity of their putative social space.
Couched in moralistic and semi-religious terms (“the advent of a world in which human 
beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief’66), the foundational texts of the United 
Nations attempt to position, through their use of notions of community and family, any 
opponents as ‘Others’ who are in the minority, and in a morally negative position. What it is 
important to note however, is the mutability of the supposed boundary lines between the 
functioning core of nations, and the exterior Others who are deemed unbelievers in those 
universal principles required for the promotion of “social progress and better standards of 
life in larger freedom.”67 The prominent logics o f making political distinctions, which are used 
in contemporary social theory often seem too rigid to make sense of the way the community 
of nations draws its boundaries of inclusion and exclusion. In particular, over the course of 
the following chapters, the mechanisms of kinship metaphors as principles of distinction will 
be contrasted with notions o f Schmittian friend/enemy distinctions which have taken such a 
firm grip on IR scholarship. By way of introduction however, world-kinship metaphors are 
here situated with relation to Schmitt on the one hand and Said’s Orientalism on the other.
64 From the preamble to the UN Charter (1945). See Appendix A.
65 Girard, C. (2007) ‘Contracting and Founding in Times o f Conflict’ in Karagiannis, N. and Wagner, P. (eds.) 
Varieties o f World-Making: Beyond Globalization p218
66 Preamble to the United Nations Declaration on Human Rights (1948). See Appendix B.
67 Preamble to the United Nations Charter (1945). See Appendix A.
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This begins to locate the work of kinship discourse within the scope of common alternative 
principles of making distinctions in the world.
The practice o f using a purportedly universal statement o f commonality to define a standard 
for humanity would seem to be a Schmittian political decision par excellence. Schmitt’s 
“insistence on the centrality on antagonistic relations”68 seems plausible in this statist 
proclamation which holds a distinct power to produce conforming subjects, and to deny the 
validity of other truths about the human condition. However, the United Nations, blessed 
with a position of great power and authority in 1945, made sure not to make an explicit 
friend/enemy distinction in its foundational rhetoric. Instead it went to great pains to 
proclaim a universalism that was, and remains, no reflection of world politics.
The reincorporation for instance, of Japan and Germany into the notional core of the 
international community over the past fifty years would seem to be an important example 
standing in contradiction to Schmitt’s notion that defining a commonality (to use Girard’s 
terminology) must be a question of the definition o f the right to exist and the right to destroy 
the ‘Other’. Indeed, as Mary Hampton has argued, a central component o f the liberal 
internationalist (Wilsonian) impulse in American foreign relations since Versailles is the belief 
in the need to rehabilitate rather than destroy former enemies.69 The formulation of who lies 
within and without the conceptual boundary defined by the ‘shared values’ of the UN, is 
more complex than state-made notions of friend and enemy as Schmitt formulated them. It 
has already been noted that for the United States, the principal purveyor of those ‘shared 
values’, it was permissible to contravene them spectacularly in the cause of bringing a swift, if 
morally questionable end to World War Two. On the other side o f the fence, the conceptual 
‘Other’ has changed many times since 1945. In the planning process when the UN was being 
designed, the greatest stimulus, especially with respect to the insistence on common human 
worth and rights, was outrage at the Holocaust. Ending the war by decimating Japanese cities 
was justified by Truman in that “a beast had to be dealt with as a beast.”70 Kennan’s ‘Long
68 Strong, T. (1996) ‘Foreword’ in Schmitt, C. The Concept o f the Political- p.xix
69 Hampton, M. (1995) ‘N ATO at the Creation: US Foreign Policy, West Germany and the Wilsonian Impulse’ 
in Security Studies 4(3) p616. As Hampton further notes, this rehabilitation impulse visible at Versailles and 
then later at San Francisco replicates in turn the rehabilitation o f France after 1815 by the Concert o f Europe.
70 Harle, V. (2000) The Enemy With A Thousand Faces: The Tradition o f the Other in W estern Political 
Thought and History p87
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Telegram’ of 1946 soon placed a supposedly expansionist, Godless power that was bent on 
world revolution as the arch-enemy of the liberty of the US/UN canon of values.71 Latterly, 
significant ‘Others’ have been embodied in discourses of radical Islamist terror groups, the 
‘China Threat’72 discourse, and the supposed ‘barbarism’ o f oppressive regimes and civil war 
making in sub-Saharan Africa.
Certainly the authority of being able to “make the Orient speak”73 is central to the elucidation 
of global world-making practices. “What he says and writes,” Said argues, “is meant to 
indicate that the Orientalist is outside the Orient, both as an existential and as a moral fact.”74 
A great number of the discourses of Said’s ‘orientalism’ have been prevalent in Western 
discussion of the various threats to the vision outlined in the United Nations’ version o f the 
future. The defining features of the orientalised ‘Other’ in Said’s discussion of early twentieth 
works o f Louis Massignon and Hamilton Gibb75, are a-temporal stasis and an absence of 
progress76, and a reductive view of Arab society as in petrified thrall to its religiosity, with 
Islam having “an ultimate precedence over all life in the Islamic Orient.”77
In the diverse collection of international ‘Others’, we can define neither a common reason 
nor logic for their status as ‘Others’, nor a common policy towards them. As Said 
demonstrates, focusing only on the Western appreciation o f the Islamic world, the corpus of 
knowledge built up to situate the ‘Other’ may claim that the latter is “antihuman, incapable of 
development, self-knowledge or objectivity, as well as uncreative, unscientific, and 
authoritarian.”78 Since 1945, multiple discourses have been mobilised to set various ‘Others’ 
as outcasts from the community and to situate their actions in opposition to a principle of 
‘world’ orthodoxy, usually as embodied by discourses close to those of the UN.
71 Harle, V. (2000) The Enemy With A Thousand Faces: The Tradition o f the O ther in Western Political 
Thought and History p89. The object o f Kennan’s telegram was, o f course, the USSR.
72 See for instance Bernstein, R. and Munro, R. (1997) — The Coming Conflict With China. Gertz, B. (2002) The 
China Threat: How The People’s Republic Targets America or Terrill, R. (2003) The New Chinese Empire and 
W hat it Means for the United States
73 Said, E.W. (1985) Orientalism: Western Conceptions o f the Orient p20
74 Ibid. p21
75 Said, E.W. (1985) Orientalism: Western Conceptions of the Orient Chapter 3, Section 3, p255-284
76 An exemplar o f the arguments put forward in Fabian, J. (1983) Time and the Other: How Anthropology 
Makes Its Object
77 Said, E.W. (1985) Orientalism: Western Conceptions of the Orient p278
78 Ibid. p296
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Explanation for the malleability of the boundary o f the acceptable members of the 
international community is hard to find either in Schmitt or Said. Friends have become 
enemies since 1945 and enemies have become friends. The socialist world could only 
tenuously be racialised, and it was represented as having little of the allure that led nineteenth 
century colonialists to feminise Africa or India. Far from a universal agreement on values, the 
United Nations has had to rationalise and confront an extraordinarily diverse set of 
challenges (Communism, war, civil war, genocide, terrorism, state collapse, people trafficking) 
which have seemed to contradict the idea o f a shared value system in a bewildering variety of 
ways. And yet, a clear discourse of where the boundaries lie is maintained through political 
discourse and action and media rhetoric to the present day, of how Britain and America 
remain within the community despite warlike aggression, o f how Zimbabwe is bordering on 
international pariah status and how much of the Muslim world is viewed with suspicion for 
wholly different reasons.
The metaphorisation of the core, value-sharing international community in terms of kinship 
has been neglected as a mode of the explanation o f our principles of distinguishing the 
boundaries o f that community. This is despite the prevalence o f the use o f this metaphor; as 
one author rightly sums up: “(D)epiction o f the human family as an ideal to be pursued is far 
from original. Indeed, it is so common as to be nearly a cliche.”79 Rather than being a cliche 
however, both the prevalence of this metaphor and its commonplace dismissal are significant. 
A focus on the mutability o f Western notions o f kinship provides a useful additional model in 
seeking to explain the logics of seemingly capricious practices of boundary-making. Fictive 
kinship is a crucial but neglected mode of distinguishing ‘us’ and ‘them’ in world politics.
79 Weatherford, R. (1993) World Peace and the Human Family p72
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1.4 The Use of Metaphor: Making Sense of the Public and the Private
Many anthropological and sociological studies which have reflected upon the individualistic 
cultures and philosophies of the Western world, have noted the tendency for the domestic, 
private sphere of life to be placed in a conceptually inferior position to the sphere of political, 
public action. Indeed, an enormously diverse literature extends through philosophy, political 
science, history, gender studies and anthropology aiming at unpicking the assumptions and 
putative categorical division o f the world that underpin, not only the suppression of the 
concern with kinship in favour o f individualism, but also by association, the restrictive 
expectations upon the lives of women80. As Terrell Carver writes: “(B)ehind public man there 
is a private world to which woman is consigned through omission, tradition, nature, and 
explicit theorization.”81 As we argued, following McBride above, kinship in Western logic is 
conceived as the anti-political sphere. It is feminised and dismissed as irrelevant to politics. 
There are several modes of downplaying kinship, all connected to this symbolic association of 
kinship as a domain of anti-political life.
The implicit alliance of power, politics, public life, competition, cultural achievement and 
masculinity in opposition to an aggregation o f weakness, kinship, domestic life, nurturing, 
natural instinct and femininity has remained a potent organising mode of Western social life 
that continues to provide feminist scholarship with a formidable scholarly task and political 
agenda. All o f these categorisations and their unquestioned acceptance have been thoroughly 
critiqued in the past thirty years, and the study of kinship itself has come into question82. The 
study of ‘relatedness’83 has seemed to contain fewer assumptions about a notional domain of 
life, and a more reliable focus on discourse and practice of constructing relatedness rather 
than on the structures of kinship. It remains the case though that, as Jacqui Stevens notes: 
‘‘(K)inship and political society are attended to simultaneously in discussions o f ‘primitive’ or 
‘tribal’ societies of Africa (and those pre-modem societies in Asia and the Americas that
80 See, for instance Rosaldo, M. and Lamphere, L (1974) (eds.) Woman. Culture and Society. Elshtain, J.B. (1993) 
Public Man. Private Woman: Woman in Social and Political Thought. Bums, N. et al (eds.) (2001) The Private 
Roots o f Public Action: Gender. Equality and Political Participation
81 Carver, T. (1996) Gender is N ot a Synonym For Women p i 7
82 See in particular, the reconfigurations o f kinship studies made in response to Schneider, D. (1984) -  A Critique 
of the Study o f Kinship
83 Espoused by, for instance, Carsten, J. (2000) (ed.) Cultures o f Relatedness: New Approaches to the Study of 
Kinship
33
resemble them), while a private/public heuristic is frequently relied on by political scientists 
to render invisible aspects of the (European) state.”84 Where a new literature on Western 
kinship practices has emerged, it has been on subjects driven to the margins by mainstream 
society — creation of kinship in same-sex relationships85, practices of adoption86, abortion and 
the New Reproductive Technologies.87
The implications o f this ‘rendering invisible’ have been discussed at great length particularly 
in feminist scholarship on the triumph o f the public and political sphere in becoming the 
legitimated and legitimating sphere in which rights and citizenship were first debated. Carole 
Pateman’s work88 on the grand Western tradition o f political theory derived from a social 
contract between men is extremely persuasive in its explanations of two o f the central 
implicitly masculinist premises of such theory in setting up the division between the public 
and the devalued private spheres. Firstly, she argues, the social contract in political life can 
only come about based on the favourable (for men) terms of the sexual contract of kin 
relations. Secondly, in Yuval-Davis’ words, the social contract represents changing the 
“hegemonic power relations in the society from a patriarchy, in which the father (or the king 
as a father figure) ruled over both other men and women, to a fraternity in which the men get 
the right to rule over their women in the private domestic sphere, but agree on a contract o f a 
social order o f equality among themselves within the public political sphere.”89
Nevertheless, kinship has remained a prominent discursive symbol. However, the trajectories 
in which it is used still place it as the humblest, smallest level from which other modes of 
human interaction emanate. It is symbolically the ‘root’ o f other modes o f social interaction — 
without it, growth is impossible, yet it is the lowest part of the overall organism. Many works 
that deal with the metaphor of family, as applied to the universal human community, trace a 
simple analogy of the principle of social organisation from the family as the most basic kernel 
of affiliation upwards to the nation state and into the international domain. “Men achieve
84 Stevens, J. (1999) Reproducing The State p51
85 See for instance, Lewin, E. (1993) Lesbian Mothers: Accounts o f Gender in American Culture. Weston, K. 
(1995) ‘Forever Is A Long Time: Romancing the Real in Gay Kinship Ideologies’ in Yanagisako, S. and Delaney 
C. (eds.) Naturalizing Power: Essays in Feminist Cultural Analysis
86 Strathern, M. (1992) Reproducing the Future: Anthropology. Kinship and the New Reproductive Technologies
87 Ragone, H. (1994) Surrogate Motherhood: Conception in the Heart
88 See especially Pateman, C. (1988) The Sexual Contract
89 Yuval-Davis, N. (1997) Gender and Nation p79
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freedom and peace as their loyalties and their sympathies become progressively identified first 
with the family, then with the tribe, the state, the nation, the hemisphere, and finally expand 
to include the whole world.”90 It is a mode of optimistic and simplistic extrapolation, and yet 
fails to explain upon which grounds such identifications may be possible, and on which 
grounds they may fail. Rational connections — division of labour, survival, nurturing — and 
connections of affection and identity are presumed to play a role in the transferral of 
association from the level of kinship to the level of the family of nations.
As a denigrated domain assumed to be irrelevant to political life, kinship has been long 
neglected in IR studies of discourses o f affiliation and distinction. As Stevens says: 
“(A)nthropology is a discipline that studies kinship — the principles and meanings associated
with rendering some insiders and others outsiders In the realm of international relations,
where we might expect to find some serious interest in the practices that render some 
populations ‘us’ and others ‘them’, the most influential practitioners display hostility to such 
concerns.”91 Stevens’ own argument shows how reckoning kinship is central to the definition 
of membership of the nation state - “(E)very political society bases rules of inclusion and 
exclusion on invocations of birth.”92 Such an argument suggests the close relationship that 
political authority does indeed have to the definition o f kinship, but with reference to the 
metaphorical practices of the putative family o f nations, the only significance of birth is that it 
is claimed to equally confer and signify humanity.
Stevens’ argument alerts us to the Active community of the nation, a group which is built (like 
kinship) in the interpretation and reconstitution of facts of reproduction and inter- 
generational continuity which may claim an historical ethnic core, a commonality of blood. In 
any case, the relationship of affect and identity that is claimed to be a feature of the modem 
nation is suggestively redolent of the sphere of affect and identity which supposedly 
characterises kinship as Western society characterises it in opposition to politics. Building 
imagined communities of nationhood, or, for the purposes of the case of UN, inter­
nationhood, are often projects founded, in words of Thomas Eriksen, on the belief that the
90 Curtis, L. (1938) Civitas Dei: The Commonwealth of God p51/2
91 Stevens, J. (1999) Reproducing The State p52
92 Ibid. p269
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members “have something profound in common — which could be described as metaphoric 
kinship.”93
The importance of kinship for the nation state is almost beyond question. Not only in the 
politics of representation in terms of national history and unity, but issues o f citizenship, 
population control and even morality, are sites where states attempt to influence kinship. This 
section has pointed to reasons why the importance o f notions of kinship in the international 
sphere has been downplayed. It is also clear that in terms o f international practices of 
metaphor, our ways o f making sense of the world, kinship is important in conveying a sense 
o f the world unity that is desired, and the limits of the community that has been fostered at 
present. Kinship is, as Stevens notes, a way of rendering ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’, but it is 
much more than that. It should be clear that this is so in our prevalent use of kinship 
metaphors to speak in a double-edged way about a human family that has limits, but which 
we wish to make limitless. In an individualist culture where kinship is devalued, how might 
our use of kinship as a metaphorical goal for world politics be explained?
1.5 Kinship. Politics and International Relations: Rethinking 
Relationships
‘The last few years have provided numerous examples of groups whose chart of kinship terms does not 
accurately reflect family attitudes, and vice versa. It would be incorrect to assume that the kinship system 
constitutes the principal means of regulating interpersonal relationships in all societies.m
The imprecision o f the metaphorisation of world politics in terms of kinship in Western 
writing on the United Nations, and in the discourses and documents o f the UN and its 
planners, stands in stark contrast to the technical rule systems described by many early social 
anthropologists in their investigations o f the kinship systems of stateless societies. In 
anticipation of a fuller discussion in Chapter Seven, this final section outlines four bases upon 
which it becomes possible for an extrapolation to be made between a notion of kinship and a 
notion of an inclusive human community.
93 Eriksen, T.H. (1997) T h e  Nation as a Human Being -  A Metaphor in a Mid-Life Crisis?” in Hastrup, K. and 
Olwig, K. (eds.) Siting Culture: The Shifting Anthropological Object p i 06 (Original emphasis)
94 Levi-Strauss, C. (1963) ‘Structural Analysis in Linguistics and in Anthropology’ in Structural Anthropology 
Volume I p38
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The notion o f the ‘family of nations’ as expounded in the UN texts is a Western formulation. 
It does not encompass a great mass o f kinship terms or structural rules, nor is it related to any 
specific notion of common descent other than on the level of the human species. This is 
where other authors95 may have been eager to draw simple and direct comparisons between 
Judaeo-Christian notions of the ‘children of God’ and current Western employment of 
notions of the family of nations. No descent structure, no putative root, delimits the latter 
notion, or sets apart a specific genealogical kinship group from others. In fact, the notion of 
the human family, metaphorical and imprecise as it is, is arguably reducible to three major 
principles. Western notions of a ‘kinship’ extensible to the whole world are prefigured upon a 
biological notion o f defining kinship which is universalised by concepts derived from 
Western science of a genetic species commonality of all human. Secondly and in contrast to 
this first principle, membership of the kin-group entails responsibilities — such as listed in the 
UN Declaration on Human Rights and the UN Charter — and confers benefits and respected 
status. As Feller wrote of the new post-colonial signatories o f the UN Charter during the 
Korean War: “eight of its members have achieved full independence, and for them, 
admission to the UN has meant in the fullest sense of the word, admission to the family of 
nations.”96 Thirdly, shared values outweigh considerations about shared substance. In other 
words, the group is often presented as a family made up of affection rather than rules and 
terminology.
As the quote from Levi-Strauss at the start of this section makes plain, all kinship is a matter 
of both terminology and feeling, and yet, as the recent kinship studies work on the 
processual97 creation of bonds of kinship makes clear, modem Western notions of kinship 
revolve more around feeling than around pre-agreed rules. When David Schneider claimed 
that kinship had become a “non-concept”98, he intended to bring anthropologists’ attention 
to the use of Western categories for the interpretation o f indigenous kinship systems. In
95 For instance, Weatherford, R. (1993) World Peace and the Human Family ch4
96 Feller, A. (1953) United Nations and World Community pl23
97 The work o f Kath Weston and others on the creation o f kinship in same-sex couple adopting families has 
demonstrated that the processual creation o f kinship noted by common practices such as sharing financial 
burdens, common residence or food-sharing, operate equally in the West. See for instance, Carsten, J. (1995) 
After Kinship.
98 Schneider, D. (1972) ‘What is Kinship All About?’ in Reining, P. (ed.) Kinship Studies in the Morgan 
Centennial Year p51
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short, ethnographers were, he argued, inventing a domain of kinship to map onto local 
practices. This critique, though valid, turns ethnographic facts upside down. As McKinley 
comments: “it ignored the diminishing importance of kinship in Western culture, where it has 
virtually vanished”99 and also “that most other cultures still highly value kin ties.”100 In a 
Western culture where we can talk about kinship based on a process of creating it through 
affection or shared values, we are free to apply the term ‘kin’ to any people we choose. In a 
culture where, as in Levi-Strauss’s examples, ‘the kinship system constitutes the principal 
means of regulating interpersonal relationships’ it is not a case of free processual creation of 
kinship and relationships. Rather, it is a rule-governed process. In cultures where kin remain 
governed by rules situating a person with relation to the subject and prescribing patterns of 
behaviour consonant with relations of social distance, a free metaphorisation of global kin 
would both be impossible and non-sensical. Even in societies with more processual, practical 
modes o f kin-creation (co-habitation101, food-sharing etc.) where nevertheless well-observed 
rules govern the success of such a process, a metaphorical extension of a kinship claim to the 
entire globe would make little sense.
The rules of kinship in the individualist West have been partially broken down to leave a 
kinship sphere marked keenly by individual choice. We can claim as kin who we wish and it is 
this malleability o f our notions of kinship that permits us to use kinship as a metaphor in 
world politics. Once the domain of kinship has been impoverished by individualism, it is used 
to express not the specifics of rules and identity, but the imprecision of feelings of affection, 
shared values and similarity. These flexibilities noted above constitute the first base for the 
patterns of applicability of kinship metaphor.
While the surface representations of Western forms of kinship may support such a notion, 
this ‘flexibility’ of use of kinship as a meaningful trope in Western societies does not render 
such formulations infinitely variable. Employing the given menu of meanings inherent in 
Western cultural understandings may encompass various modalities permitting subjects to
99 McKinley, R. (2001) ‘The Philosophy o f Kinship: A Reply to Schneider’s Critique of the Study of Kinship ’ in 
Feinberg, R. and Ottenheimer, M. (eds.) The Cultural Analysis o f Kinship: The Legacy o f David M. Schneider 
p l42
100 Ibid.
101 See Bodenhom, B. (2000) ‘He Used To Be My Relative: Exploring the Bases o f Relatedness Among Inupiaq 
o f N orth Alaska’ in Carsten, J. — Cultures o f Relatedness: New Approaches to the Study o f Kinship
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occupy differing subject positions. Whilst multiple uses of the notion of the family of nations 
derive meaning from Active feelings of closeness, shared cultural and spiritual ties — ties 
explicitly created through affection rather than harbouring even the pretence of natural given­
ness — may also be derived from the implicit association with ‘natural’ subject positions 
within the family at the same time. In the above quotation concerning the admission into the 
family of nations of newly independent former colonies after the Korean War, a similar sense 
of patriarchal tutelage may be inferred as was explicitly used in the colonial era. As Freud102 
reminds us, the very notion of family denotes patriarchy — male dominance of a female and 
offspring makes up the family unit. Freud notes that much early anthropological work on 
matriarchy observed that family nuclei rarely existed and were absent from kinship 
terminology. Women lived with children in separate houses, men with their brothers. The use 
of kinship metaphors to perpetuate colonial patriarchal relations will be further noted in the 
following chapters. Brysk, Parsons and Sandholtz103 review the widespread vestigial usage of 
such tutelary discourse and policies relating to post-colonial relations in the French Africa, 
Spanish Latin America and the British Commonwealth. They argue such parent-child 
constructions produce indulgence of aid and investment in former colonies, but also, more 
negatively, have lead to incursions upon the sovereignty o f the former colony by the former 
coloniser. This production of a relationship of superiority by kinship metaphors and their 
lingering association with colonial discourse will be further examined in Part Three. This 
limited number o f subject positions and symbols within western kinship thus constitutes the 
second base of their applicability.
The third and fourth bases of the UN use of the kinship metaphor explain less the possibility 
of its use, and more specifically, its desirability. The third base is entwined in the valuing of 
the kinship sphere in Western social thought. It has been noted how the domestic sphere has 
been politically debased, and categorised instead as a domain of natural care and support. The 
kinship sphere, in terms of public action, is deemed worthless, and yet in opposition to the 
public sphere, when it is portrayed in a positive light, it is in terms o f the dependable 
affection, the support and understanding, the peace that is supposedly characteristic o f the 
safe-haven of the family. In this way, the idealism of kinship, constructed in opposition to the
102 See Freud, S. (2001) T h e  Return o f Totemism in Childhood’ in his Totem  and Taboo
103 See Brysk, A., Parsons, C. And Sandholtz, W  (2002) ‘After Empire: National Identity and Post-Colonial 
Families o f Nations’ in European Journal o f International Relations 8(2)
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cutthroat world of politics and commerce, displays a host of favourable and attractive tropes 
for the creation of a new world at the end of a catastrophic conflict. When the UN 
Declaration of Human Rights speaks of the human family, a multiplicity of notions is 
embedded in the idea of kinship behind that metaphor which are necessary for the metaphor 
to convey the required idealist aspiration. Finally, as will be explored in detail in Chapters 
Two and Seven, the fourth base for the success of this metaphorisation helps to explain its 
cross-cultural appeal. It is not only the West that would wish for a human family, though for 
the reasons outlined above, there are specific ways that our notions and use of kinship 
prompt us to metaphorise politics in this way. Kinship relations are both cognitively 
extremely useful concepts to use in practices o f metaphor and are psychologically important 
forming grounds for ways in which human beings learn to distinguish between the trusted 
and the untrustworthy. In terms of the metaphorisation of politics in terms of kinship, the 
very vagueness of what is meant by a human family helps to preserve this notion across 
cultures. Such a notion is ‘semi-propositional’104, conveying an indistinct sense of a complete 
proposition of truth. It is therefore widely interpretable; a diverse selection of meanings can 
be derived from the simple ideas o f ‘human’ and ‘family’ and this re-interpretation and 
continual debate and re-claiming of meaning ensures the continuation o f the discourse. 
Kinship relations, in terms of the developmental stages of the socialisation of children, 
generally provide the first principles o f distinguishing between ‘us’ and ‘them’ and as such 
form not only (in most cases) a comparable cultural representation o f the ‘safe’ kin 
environment, but also the first template for practices of distinction between peoples.
Through the chapters that follow, I hope to show that the practice of metaphor in national 
and international politics needs further consideration. The metaphors we choose speak 
volumes about the concepts we assume to be true, the representations of the world that we 
believe in and the desires for the world that we hold. What is more, when we use metaphor, it 
is often, as in the case of the kinship o f the international community, to speak in terms of 
notions whose value and meaning to us has diminished or is obscure. Metaphors, in their 
vagueness, may represent concepts which have become indistinct. Through metaphorical 
discourse, the effects o f power can be transmitted in ways that are opaque. If  an ideal of 
human kinship is held out by the West as a universal goal, it remains a kinship that has been
104 Sperber, D. (1985) O n Anthropological Knowledge: Three Essays p51
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subjected to the vagaries of individual choice, and is blighted by underlying assumptions of 
patriarchal domination. It remains a sphere o f life degraded by comparison to the public 
world of politics, the static ‘natural’ space o f an undervalued version o f femininity and a 
sphere whose image of security may be dubious indeed.
The next chapter lays out the theoretical foundations for the empirical work to follow. To 
analyse the various discourses that are in play in the later parts of the thesis, a series of 
frameworks need to be established to enable comparisons of discourse of numerous speakers 
in differing contexts. In order to be able to provide answers to the questions of why world- 
kinship discourses exist and what effects they have, a methodology for approaching discourse 
and discoursing subjects is fundamental.
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CHAPTER TWO - The ‘Family of Nations5 Deconstructed and
Reconstructed
2.1 Constructing The ‘World*
“human actions and relations are formed through a double hermeneutic: we identify what we do through an 
account of what we do; words and deeds are equiprimordial’*05
Seyla Benhabib’s formulation of the simultaneity of acting and speaking highlights that 
whichever strand o f social theory, mainstream or critical, we may rely upon to apprehend the 
world, we are always confronted with actions and discourses together. The channels of 
causation may differ depending upon theoretical outlook, but the ways in which we talk 
about the world shape our actions in it, regardless of any ‘objective’ realities confronted by 
those actions. The central formulation of this commonplace notion under consideration here 
is, as was discussed in the previous chapter, the widespread political and cultural discussion of 
a putative ‘family of nations’. This particular discursive formulation as used in and after the 
formation of the United Nations, is formed in reference to long historical trajectories in the 
Western world. A fuller mapping of the continuities and innovations inherent in these 
trajectories will be necessary in order to situate the particularities of the discourse under 
scrutiny.
For now however, the primary task is to set out the theoretical tools with which to make a 
useful and reliable investigation of a discourse which, internationally is o f great importance. 
Over the last fifteen years, it has been drawn to the fore in such global flashpoints as 
humanitarian interventions, pre-emptive wars for the purposes of regime change, and debates 
over the rights of political prisoners. What happens though, when we claim to trust in the 
transmission between, on the one hand, our discursive presentations of the world and of 
ourselves, and on the other hand, our political actions in the world? What sort o f perspective 
allows us to investigate this transmission responsibly?
105 Benhabib, S. (2002) The Claims o f Culture: Equality and Diversity in the Global Era p6
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Discursive presentations of ‘reality’ — hallowed master-discourses with global reach, and 
everyday micro-discourses of self-situation — these are the prime foci of this thesis, and as 
such I am speaking in terms of Foucauldian analyses and ‘post-structuralism’ more so than 
conventional constructivism in an IR sense. However, in situating acts and actors in the 
context o f a powerful discourse of human universalism that inspires and is manifest in a 
concept of a family o f nations, my approach may conceived as largely constructivist. Many of 
the basic tenets of constructivism form part of my package of theoretical and methodological 
assumptions. In looking at discursive practices of individuals in creating the UN founding 
documents, or in the patterns of discourse produced in UN and political debates today, an 
understanding of the transmission between discursive resources and individual choices is 
required. In this respect, it is necessary to delineate my methodology in these enquiries from 
existing debates on the agency/structure problematic. Normative discourses such as that of 
the family of nations are deployed to make statements about the moral value of the speaker 
and the in-group and to construct a particular image o f the world. Thus considering these 
discourses overlaps into the territory of constructivist concepts of norms and identity. The 
following sections situate this enquiry with relation to these constructivist concepts.
2.1.1 Discourses and Discoursers
Considering the discourse of common humanity as embodied in the UN-era entails 
investigating the problem of the creation and subsequent usage of this instantiation of 
discourse. Individuals created this ‘universal’ set of values and individuals and organisations 
choose to deploy these values in their discourse. However, the UN-era did not witness the 
invention o f these notions of the human family, but only their re-invigoration by being set at 
the heart o f the new international architecture. Is such a discourse (or implied norm, as 
constructivists might say) of human commonality fully a product of normative, moral, 
discursive structures and the historical developments thereof? Or alternatively, is its particular 
nature and formulation a consequence of the authorial agency of the human creators?
Contra to the methodological individualism of neo-realist and neo-liberal thinking in the IR 
mainstream, constructivists from the 1990s onwards “emphasize a process of interaction
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between agents and structures; the ontology is one of mutual constitution, where neither unit 
o f analysis — agents or structures — is reduced to the other and made ‘ontologjcally 
primitive’.”106 As regards a basic principle in looking at the UN discourses, more subtle 
analysis might result from accepting this line of reasoning rather than vouching 
unquestioningly for the primacy of structures or agents. However, the recourse to claiming 
that a vague process of ‘mutual constitution’ is at work in all instances, is far from helpful 
given the plethora of speakers, subject positions and audiences which will be considered over 
the course o f the following chapters.
As pointed out by Pettman107, work by neo-realist scholars in the recent past has made an 
effort to re-incorporate a notion of relational co-constitution into a frame of analysis which 
still preserves the reified concepts o f agency and structure to be used as the bedrock of 
naturalistic scienticising enquiry. In these terms, the concepts of agency and structure are 
quite distant from the universe of discourses and discoursers which are under consideration.
For Katzenstein, Keohane and Krasner, constructivism and rationalism are merely “different 
styles of analysis — ‘thin’ information for rationalists versus ‘thick’ norms and identities for 
constructivists.”108 While both they as rationalists, and the constructivists they discuss, 
apparently share a belief that human “beings operate in a socially constructed 
environment”109, on issues of epistemology and the methodological implications for 
investigating structuring and structured ‘agents’, they claim that “no great differences divide 
conventional constructivists from rationalists.”110
106 Checkel, J. (1998) "The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory" World Politics Vol.50, No.2
107 Pettman, R. (2000)Commonsense Constructivism. Or. The Making o f World Affairs p i 3 /14
108 Katzenstein, P., Keohane, R., and Krasner, S. (1999) ‘International Organization and the Study o f World 
Politics’ in their edited volume Exploration and Contestation in the Study o f World Politics p42. Just as in the 
case o f Alexander Wendt, these scholars remain instinctually ambivalent about giving up on empirical, objective 
inquiry, in other words, taking the science out o f social science. Their work has often fought shy of taking an 
‘ideas all the way down’ approach, and while leaving them  open to accusation of adhering to too many rationalist 
assumptions, their commitment to the practical process o f proving hypotheses in social science remains 
admirable. As will be later discussed, social anthropology suffered a self-flagellating episode in the 1980s and 
1990s when, concerning issues o f the potential philosophical impossibility o f writing the experiences o f others, 
ethnography itself as a practice fragmented. See Clifford J. and Marcus G. (1986) Writing Culture.
109 Ibid.
110 Katzenstein, P., Keohane, R., and Krasner, S. (1999) ‘International Organization and the Study o f World 
Politics’ in their edited volume Exploration and Contestation in the Study o f World Politics p35
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Social construction, in such a formulation, is invoked in name, but the implications of the 
idea for the status of agents and structures are neglected. The work of Giddens on 
‘structuration’111, and Bourdieu112 on structured ‘praxis’ to name but two prominent examples, 
though produced in the 1970s, constitute a more sophisticated treatment of this question, and 
also would seem to fit in a more commonsensical way into the remit of constructivist project.
The enquiries into patterns of discourse presented in the following chapter involve subjects 
ranging from UN planners in 1940s to UN staff today, from political leaders to writers for 
global NGOs to Sudanese rebels. All o f these speakers are aware of and use articles of 
common discourses such as that o f the human family or the international community. The 
difficulty with labelling such discourses as ‘structures’ and assuming we can impute 
structuring processes to such discourses is that exactly the same discursive articles may be 
used, but given the varying social and temporal subject positions of the discoursing subject, 
the character of the discourse-as-structure may vary.
Furthermore, discourses such that of world kinship are both vague in terms of meaning and 
multivalent in terms o f effects. It is not a simple process to discern why an agent deploys 
them. Also, as will be seen in the comments of UN staff in Chapter Four, it is often hard for 
actors to describe much more than some imprecise ideas about what these discourses mean. 
Rather, it is easier to trace the effects of discourses. Sometimes such discourses are deployed 
as rhetorical tools, sometimes as ways to politically position one’s identity in relation to an 
‘Other’. There are multiple sources of inspiration for such discourses of the world-as-family 
and for the use of such concepts. These include religious associations, liberal ideologies, 
historical colonial templates, the cognitive fitness and flexibility of the notion of kinship. 
Thus in each instance of the use of discourse, the same article of discourse may produce 
multiple structuring effects and the individual discourser may be agentive in multiple ways. 
Also, given the vagueness of the discourses in question, the meanings behind instances of the 
use o f discourse may not even be clear — in other words, processes of agentive action or 
structuring may not always be apparent.
111 Giddens, A. (1984) The Constitution o f Society: Outline o f  A Theory o f Structuration — taken on by, for 
instance Onuf, N. World o f O ur Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations (1989) and 
The Republican Legacy in International Thought (1998)
112 Bourdieu, P. (1977) Outline o f a Theory o f Practice
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Thus, given the character of the enquiry as the analysis o f multiple instances of practices and 
patterns of discourse, these reifications of agent and structure are not of great assistance. The 
individual has no easy relationship with discourse as such. The notion of a family of nations is 
instead arguably an excellent example of Sartre’s notion of a transcendent goal113. It is, in 
many ways, beyond the grasp of the individual to apprehend its meanings and import clearly, 
let alone to conceive (in each instance of the practice o f discoursing) o f the sediments of 
meaning which comprise the articles of discourse of which s/he is aware114. I investigate the 
instances of discourse in the following chapters therefore as processual interactions between 
Sartrean striving consciousnesses and the transcendent goal of a particular knowledge or state 
of being defined in ideas and discourse of world kinship. World kinship is present as an idea, 
a metaphor in discourse, and in its broadness and vagueness seems to represent almost an 
ineffable state of affairs. Present in the paradox of every statement of the family of nations is 
the transcendent goal of world-kinship and the fact o f the political discord of the world. 
Every instance of world-kinship discourse is a practice o f experimenting with a transcendent 
and impossible idea. This experimentation, as we said before, may have multiple motives and 
effects depending on the discourser’s perception of the present and the future which is 
envisaged. We can, in this way, describe a very specific model of interaction, in which there is 
not ‘mutual constitution’ which presupposes separate entities, but a transcendence-factidty 
complex in which consciousness on the one hand, rooted in the facticity o f existence, and 
transcendent ideas or discourse on the other hand, directly imply the existence of each other. 
In other words, the ‘horizon’ described by Gadamer can only exist as the horizon of a 
being115.
The merit o f this perspective is that it allays questions of primacy in our modelling of the 
relations between agents and structures. They are captured and analysed simultaneously in 
any given moment. There is no structure without agents to perceive it and to bring its 
existence about in a given moment; in the same way there is no possible agent whose 
consciousness is not brought into being by its act of perception of social structures and other
113 See, Sartre, J-P. (1943) Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology Part 2.3
114 In dealing with such vague discourses, the need to keep in play a conscious subject is vital. Sartre’s subject 
permits use to conceive o f an individual experimenting with ideas and ideals beyond his/her understanding.
115 Gadamer, H. (1989) Truth and Method
46
agents. It is the accumulation of these simultaneities which make up historical trajectories of 
discourse. Such a perspective is also attractive because the analysis of metaphorical practices 
laid out in later chapters reveals a wide variety of modalities of kinship usage, a diverse 
multiplicity of ways of manipulating the agreed meanings and symbols of various objects in 
the cultural constellation of kinship ideas. While the actual statements (written, spoken) may 
be items in a limited list of formulations, their diversity o f usage bears out the importance of 
recognising the primacy of the individual consciousness interacting with the complexities of 
meaning that transform a set of statements into the dense web of discourse.
2.1.2 The ‘Family of Nations’ as a Statement of Identity and a Normative Vision
The universalist ideas embedded within the foundational texts and later actions of the United 
Nations make bold moves towards claims o f common identity. This is at the very least, an 
intriguing claim and perhaps, in the broad sweep of human culture and conflict, a counter­
intuitive one. However, it is not altogether a surprising emergence, given the dramatic context 
of the end o f a global war. From the League o f Nations to the UN to NATO, peace-building 
initiatives are natural habitats for rhetorical emphasis on shared interests and shared 
substance of some kind. This is not to say that this historical context causally explains the 
specific content o f discourses produced. The introduction of a concern for ‘identity’ and 
‘culture’ when explaining political phenomena is welcome in IR to tie theory to inter- 
subjective levels o f analysis and bring us away from assumed ‘interests’ based only on 
materialist judgements. However, this introduction has not been uniformly practiced as 
Daniel Green summarises: “(A) key fault line is between those who incorporate cultural 
elements as ‘variables’ within neopositivism and those who adopt culturalism holistically, 
viewing the world as ‘ideas all the way down’ in its full implications for ontology and 
epistemology.”116 In Green’s formulation of a two-way addition of culturalist notions into IR, 
the former school of thought, the tentative, halting one, is the easiest to critique. In effect it is 
a stunted effort at ‘putting culture back in the picture’ with very little critical interest in the 
implications that a consideration of cultural variability might have for global politics. Scholars
116 Green, D  (2002) ‘Constructivist Comparative Politics: Foundations and Framework’, in his edited volume 
Constructivism and Comparative Politics p23
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such as Katzenstein117 for instance, operate with the broad notion of domestically constituted 
identity, formed with reference to domestic culture, being a determinant of state interests in 
the negotiating realm of the international. Critiques o f this position emphasise the 
problematic nature of the essentialist reifications of the state, culture and identity. As Zehfuss 
claims, in a statement much closer to my own approach to the individual instantiations of 
discourse which make up a discursive terrain: “identities are continuously articulated, re­
articulated and contested, which makes them hard to pin down as explanatory categories.”118
This point is critical in investigating discourses o f such imprecision as the notion of creating a 
family of nations. Multiple potential identities are created by the deployment o f this discourse 
due to the various points of connection that such notions as the family o f nations have with 
other discourses and discursive referents. As discussed at the end of the last chapter in the 
work of Brysk et al.119, one prominent way o f deploying the notion of the family of nations is 
in a colonial representation of the tutelage of colonial children by metropolitan parents. While 
this was (and remains) deployed in order to advance a caring, generous identity, it also 
advances an image of identity based on superiority and hierarchy in world relations. Because 
‘kinship’ as defined in the Western formulations under investigation has so many overlapping 
meanings, the process of constructing identity out of this symbol must be examined based on 
case by case situation of practices of speaking within larger discursive parameters. Similarly, 
the discourse o f family of nations cannot be simply said to be a ‘norm’ in international 
society, though its deployment is often normative.
The idea o f the existence of ‘norms’ derives partly from reference to legalistic theories 
concerning human cooperation, and also partly from reference to rule-based approaches to 
interaction as a Wittgensteinian game in which linguistic formulations influence human 
behaviour by shaping an ‘inter-subjective context’. In the words of Kratochwil: 
“(N)orms...establish inter-subjective meanings that allow the actors to direct their actions 
towards each other, communicate with each other, appraise the quality o f their actions,
117 Katzenstein, P. (1996) Culture o f National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics
118 Zehfuss, M. (2002) Constructivism in International Relations: The Politics o f Reality p92
119 Brysk, A., Parsons, C. And Sandholtz, W  (2002) ‘After Empire: National Identity and Post-Colonial Families 
o f Nations’ in European Journal o f International Relations 8(2)
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criticize claims and justify choices.”120 Even within the work of a prominent theorist like 
Kratochwil, there remains a tendency for ‘norms’, ‘rules’ and ‘values’ to be used “more or less 
interchangeably.”121 A perspective dominated by norms and actors, while paying lip-service to 
a belief in the inter-subjective creativity of possibility, still requires a strongly entity-focused 
outlook. Holding, as theorists like Kratochwil, and also O nuf do, that inter-subjective 
meaning is dependent upon rules122, makes a mockery of any idea that agents and structures 
have been reconciled in these approaches. As Zehfuss astutely highlights, claiming that a 
particular action is the proven instantiation of a general rule, “obscures the responsibility of 
the subject.”123 This is tantamount to showing that the subject who acts is a mere derivation 
from the rule-based structure. The metaphorical practices I highlight in the later case study 
chapters could not be said to bear out such a strict level of conditioning.
As a result, I am reluctant to use ‘norms’ as a concept of analysis in the derivation of 
discursive practices, though I would not deny the effects that may be felt by subjects 
attributable to social pressure which might be called ‘norms’. Speaking of norms pre­
supposes numerous potentially untenable assumptions about the structure of society. Firsdy, 
it pre-supposes consensus — an act implying a level of volition surely impossible if agents are 
indeed constituted by the pre-existing rules. Secondly, it pre-supposes power relations 
wherein the ‘normal’ interpretation of any given idea has come to attain its privileged status 
by processes that are never charted in conventional accounts of norms. In the case of the 
discourse of common humanity that is our prime object of analysis, it might be said that 
certain aspects of the United Nations formulation of this discourse are approaching the status 
of global norms, but these remain hody contested. As such, by approaching these ideas, 
speech acts, and written formulations plainly in their discursive manifestations, I seek to 
avoid the value judgements of dealing with the concept o f ‘norms’. I also wish to avoid the 
notion that these discourses will necessarily be confining - as they would certainly seem 
were I to construe them as norms, or in a normative light. As in the discussions on agency 
and structure, precisely the same articles o f discourse may be analysed as normative in one
120 Kratochwil, F. (1993) T h e  Embarrassment o f Changes’ in Review o f  International Studies 19, p76
121 Kratochwil, F. (1989) Rules. Norms. Decisions: On the Conditions o f Practical and Legal Reasoning in 
International Relations and Domestic Affairs plO
122 Ibid. p l l  “human-action in general is ‘rule-governed’”. See also, Onuf, N.G. (1989) World o f Our Making: 
Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations p21-2
123 Zehfuss, M. (2002) Constructivism in International Relations p l47
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context, but not in another. This is once again due to the imprecision and flexibility o f the 
metaphors at hand. The effects o f this discourse, and reactions to it, will be crucial subjects of 
study, but I wish to leave the conceptual field open, as I noted previously, to genuine spaces 
of inter-dependency between consciousness and discourse.
In short, and to return to Benhabib’s neat image at the start of the chapter, I take the issue of 
social construction of reality seriously because discourses, discursive effects, and actions are 
inseparable. The relation then, o f individuals to discourse and their production and re­
production o f discourses concerning their action is the matrix in which I seek out processes 
of identity formation.
2.2 On Discursive Origins
It is hardly enough, when considering the historical trails of discourses of human 
universalism, to make a comprehensive list o f the popular touchstones within the scope o f IR 
thinking. Paul Kennedy124, for instance, makes much of joining the dots between authors and 
groups whose ideas immediately might spring to mind in relation to hopes for a sense (and a 
practice) of common humanity. He lists the various Greek federations o f states in the fifth 
century BC, the Stoics, the disciples o f Confucius, Dante, assorted Catholic theologians of 
the mediaeval period, William Penn, l’Abbe de St. Pierre, the American Founding Fathers, 
Kant, and even Lenin. This serves to highlight, more than any genuine commonalities 
between these thinkers and writers, the point that we must be critical about our own ways of 
representing a discourse. It is clear that certain judgments and pre-figured choices condition 
the list that Kennedy makes. It is crucial to try to account for our own productions o f 
particular groupings of ideas. In this section I aim to show how I understand discursive 
production and the relations that people (‘dis coursers’) have to discourse. I shall also try to 
explain a method for studying discursive production, situate myself in relation to mainstream 
discourse analysis, and troubleshoot some of the critiques of this approach that emanate from 
more empirical standpoints in IR. A preliminary remark on the value-neutrality of ‘discourse’ 
as a concept is first necessary. I take a complex o f statements of world kinship over the
124 Kennedy, P. (2006) — The Parliament o f Man: The United Nations and the Quest for World Government p3
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course of this thesis, and I take them as ‘discourse’ simply in the fact that they are formulated, 
they are things said and things sayable. I wish to make no other blanket assumptions about 
this totality o f statements. Parallels between certain of those statements will be drawn where 
appropriate, though the investigation as a whole reveals diversity of meaning within set 
formulations, rather than making attempts to coagulate these formulations into a monolithic 
‘discourse’ and claim that all the statements have the same ideational roots or meanings.
2.2.1 Tracing Discourses
The formation of discourse and the political application o f what we hold to be truths, are my 
central concerns. I seek to analyse a particular instantiation of a discourse of common 
humanity and trace the political and individual reactions caused by it. Having done that, it 
falls to explain the activating (objectivising and subjectivising) power that is transmitted 
through such a discourse. Foucault outlines three modes of delimiting a discourse125 which I 
intend to follow throughout. Firsdy there are criteria of formation, namely, the set o f rules 
which can explain and predict all objects, concepts, theories and operations of a discourse. 
Secondly come criteria of threshold, being details of the conditions required for the 
inception o f the discourse, what modifications the discourse has undergone126, and where 
new discourses have sprouted off from it. Lastly there are criteria of correlation, in other 
words, details o f the sets of relations that set the discourse apart from and situate it amongst 
other discourses.
These are terms taken from a later, and less formal exposition of a method for investigating 
discourse than the Archaeology of Knowledge127, and are products of a period when Foucault 
had begun to consider the mechanisms and articulations of power (manifest in discourse,
125 Foucault, M. (1991) Tolitics and the Study o f Discourse’ in Burchell, G. et al. (eds.) The Foucault Effect: 
Studies in Governmentality: With Two Lectures by and an Interview with Michel Foucault p54.
126 See for instance on the discourse o f bourgeois sexuality, Foucault, M. (1979) The History o f Sexuality Vol. I . 
Alternatively, for the criteria o f threshold for the ‘arts o f government’ see Foucault, M. (1991) ‘On 
Governmentality’ in Burchell, G. et al. (eds.) The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality: With Two 
Lectures by and an Interview with Michel Foucault
127 Foucault, M. (1972) The Archaeology o f Knowledge
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naturally) to be the most criticial object for his work.128 In looking at the discourses of 
common humanity instantiated in the post-war institutional world order, the three 
aforementioned delimiters of discourse will be put to use in the following ways. Considering 
the criteria of formation, the main question to address will be what the critical object of this 
discourse might be. In other words, what is the ‘human’ at the heart of UN discourses of 
common humanity? How is this concept and object (and others besides) formed? We may 
describe such criteria of formation as notions of the meaning of kinship as a sphere of 
nurturance opposed to politics, or the meanings of the family as a sphere of protective 
patriarchy. These meanings and symbols help form statements within discourse. The criteria 
of threshold for these discursive productions will be outlined in the following chapter on the 
creation o f the UN discourse during the Second World War in (predominantly) the State 
Department in Washington. What explains the particularities of this discursive emergence, 
authored at this particular time and under such particular circumstances? Such discourse has 
thresholds at the point where Judeao-Christian notions o f the world-as-family or flock feed 
into modem discourse, or alternatively in the roots o f colonial discourse o f patriarchal 
tutelage of family of advanced and infantile states. Uncovering the criteria of correlation 
(how this discourse is situated among other discursive referents) will feed into the processual 
investigation of its inception - its threshold. Criteria o f correlation may be discerned for 
instance in the relations between patterns of occurrence between world-as-family discourse 
and more bureaucratically hegemonic notions o f the world as a community. How do such 
alternatives correlate? Where and for what purposes is kinship employed?
Foucault’s accounts of the creation of subjects are an important starting point for much of 
my work, because I am interested in looking at the production of discourses that emerge in 
history which amount to claims about the fundamental character of human values. Foucault 
admits openly to the study of technologies of power and technologies of the self which 
would seem to hold out a philosophical technique which need not be crucified on the 
problematic o f ‘agency and structure’. Foucault focuses both on “technologies of power, 
which determine the conduct of individuals and submit them to certain ends and domination,
128 It seems more pertinent to rely on later Foucauldian work because the discourses under consideration in my 
work are prime examples o f hegemonic master-discourses, like those o f sexuality or government, which speak to 
the essence o f  what it is to be a subject o f a power that aims towards universal reach or universal definition of 
subjective traits.
52
an objectivizing of the subject” and also “technologies o f the self, which permit individuals to 
effect by their own means or with the help of others a certain number of operations on their 
own bodies and souls.”129
In fact, possibly my prime referent in terms of the oeuvre of Foucault is The History of 
Sexuality. In a sense, considering a discourse o f human universality that is idealist in the 
extreme, every process of self-situation with reference to that discourse is a truth-telling 
confessional. The confessional and later the medicalised incitements to speak of sex in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries created a discourse of sexuality, but more pertinently, a 
reflective self-fashioning. The confessional, and the confessional sciences (like 
psychoanalysis) were “the formidable injunction to tell what one is and what one does, what 
one recollects and what one has forgotten, what one is thinking and what one thinks he is not 
thinking.”130 In much the same way as the ‘menace’ of sex was controlled by power through 
specification in discourse and confessional truth-telling, the ‘menace’ of discourses of human 
difference that had produced such virulent ideologies131 in the 1940s, were controlled by 
discourses of human commonality and new modes of truth-telling. Foucault’s articulation of 
discourse then, as the relay for the simultaneous subjectivising and objectivising processes 
that form discursive subjects and in turn, new discourses, is the foundation of the 
investigations I make into the sense of UN ‘mission’.
Thus, I will be looking for the effect o f discourse production, UN statements o f mission, and 
protocol on people who work for the UN. To what extent, as Dreyfus and Rabinow put it, 
does this environment become a “mise en discourse (which) has placed the individual in a 
network of power relations with those who claim to be able to extract the truth?”132 To what 
extent does the gap between the great UN ‘mission’ and the myriad obstacles on the ground 
force an internal questioning that shapes the subject in relation to that master discourse?
129 Foucault, M. (1988) ‘Technologies o f the Self in Martin, L (ed.) Technologies o f the Self pl6.
130 Foucault, M. (1979) The History o f Sexuality Vol. I p60
131 One need only think o f the actions predicated on notions o f insurmountable human difference and gradation
which formed the immediate historical backdrop to the formulation o f the UN founding documents — the Rape
of Nanking, the Great Purges and, in particular in American minds, the Final Solution.
132 Dreyfus, H. and Rabinow, P. (1982) Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics p l74
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The elasticity of Foucault’s theory is critical for the success of the work undertaken in this 
study. Critics of discourse analysis and so-called post-modern approaches tend to see subjects 
as defined by the structures o f already existing discourses. However, as the evidence of 
ethnographic work among individuals enmeshed in the political enactment o f policies 
inspired by the discourse o f human universalism shows, one cannot expect the 
uncomplicated formation of uniform subjects. Even less can one expect such subjects to 
relate in uniform ways to such subjectification. In effect the subject is a bricoleur whose 
relation to ideas of self is influenced by discourses which intersect. It is the task of the 
discourse analyst both to unpick the discourses, map the points of articulation between them, 
and to map the similarities and differences between the discursive bricolage o f individual 
subjects, and thence to give a sense of their subjectivity.
2.2.2 Discourse and the Self
As was noted in critiquing the ontological indecision of some types of constructivist position, 
the relation between subjects and discourses is to be understood both in a Foucauldian 
fashion, but also through an existentialist perspective. The work of Sartre133 on 
transcendence-facticity complexes in human consciousness suggests itself strongly to work 
involving global normative discourses. A transcendent ideal is held before us in the 
discourses upon which the United Nations was founded, and yet, on the ground in peace­
keeping operations, diplomatic missions, human rights negotiations and other UN work that 
aims at establishing in political and human relations the practical application of these ideals, 
the UN has to admit to an important gap between current actuality and ideal transcendental 
templates.
Though Sartre’s existential philosophy as a whole is not central to the investigations which 
follow, one particular insight he offers helps us to close a gap which would seem to appear in 
these investigations o f discourse. Naturally, in considering the creation by a group o f Western 
individuals o f a ‘universal’ discourse in the form o f the UN founding documents, or the 
individual usages these global discourses in political circles today, one has to find a way to
133 Sartre, J-P. (1943) Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology
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conceptualise the relationships between individual subjects and discursive resources. Sartre’s 
portrayal of the individual as a consciousness which aims towards the transcendent while 
remaining rooted in the factual or the particular, closes the gap between the notional 
concepts of agency and structure, or Foucault’s notion of the subject and discourse. Sartre 
gives us a model of the subject which is, in its very existence, a construction and a 
constructor of wider transcendent ideals and ideas. Sartre also forces us to focus on the 
individual practice o f living and discoursing, of conceptually manipulating what exists in the 
present and what we desire for the future.
Using his classic example of the over-bearing cafe waiter, Sartre illustrates the idea of the 
being-for-itself acting out a role based on a transcendent template — a waiter playing at being 
a ‘waiter’ as is understood. The reality of the waiter’s actions pivot between the transcendent 
template to which he models his actions and the facticity of his abilities in a state of worldly 
immanence. The transcendent potentiality o f the consciousness can only act in a state of 
facticity. The socially agreed upon, outward signs o f sadness are brought up as another 
example. Gloomy facial expressions, sighs, tears, or quietude are not sadness itself in an 
absolute sense, neither are they one’s own particular sadness. They are attempts to act and 
bring into being sadness as felt in the ways the self comes to understand what sadness is. As 
Sartre puts it; “I am never any one of my attitudes, (or) any one of my actions.”134 The actor 
holds before him/herself a transcendental model of ‘self and plays at this role, matching his 
own actions to this objectified template. Thus, as mentioned before, the process of 
subj ectification is continual and imperfect.
The authorial consciousness therefore is always in flight toward something. It is constantly 
placed in question by the fact o f always referring to things outside itself (that o f which it is 
conscious), and always in a state o f not-being those things of which it is conscious.135 We are 
pointed towards the hollowness o f consciousness and the tension between the ideal and the 
existing. Durkheim comments that “society can neither create nor recreate itself without 
creating some kind o f ideal by the same stroke”136, and that in the form of ‘collective
134 Sartre, J-P. (1943) Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology p83
135 Ibid. p l97
136 Durkheim, E. (1995) The Elementary Forms of Religious Life p445
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representations’ “ideal society is not outside the real one but is part of it.”137 Indeed, if we 
conceive of the international project of producing a cohesive community of affect in a loosely 
Durkheimian fashion, then in the same way as the individual consciousness strives towards 
transcendent models, and disintegrates by that striving, so does international society in the 
pursuit of universalism. In the example of trying to produce a universal community, the effort 
disintegrates in the violence o f transforming the Other — betraying the principles of its 
universalist discourse.
An approach to discourse analysis and processes o f subjectification then must be tempered 
by a concern with individualistic experience. The individual fashioning of self and the 
individual apprehension of discourse as fixed into a transcendent ideal means that we must be 
cautious when speaking o f general processes o f subjectification. Indeed, substantiation of 
such a claim is a difficult enterprise. The individuality o f orientation towards the world 
personalises the experience o f perception. The presences and truths which appear to me are 
contingent upon my own, and only my own, perspective and experience. The organisation of 
the world around and to us on a subjective level is not presented as fragmentary sensations 
which consciousness cements together. Rather, aspects of a person or a nation or for 
example, though presented to us sequentially are comprehended as a “whole, already 
pregnant with an irreducible meaning.”138
Our conscious bricolage o f aspects o f discourse, of Others and of the world, is the starting 
point for conceiving o f the relationship between discourses and individuals through the 
notion o f existential consciousness rather than as separate agents and structures. There is 
never any structure until it is perceived and this is always done by a self-producing 
consciousness dependent upon, conditioned by and in reference to, externalities. As Sartre 
puts it, by looking at individuals in terms of their consciousnesses we are focusing upon “a 
being such that in its being, its being is in question in so far as this being implies a being other 
than itself.”139 This crisis of consciousness then requires a simultaneously constitutive frame 
of reference for our existence in the world. It also sows the seeds for representations of the 
world in terms of inside and outside, the ‘me’ and the ‘not-me’, representations which do
137 Durkheim, E. (1995) The Elementary Forms o f Religious Life p425
138 Merleau-Ponty, M. (1962) Phenomenology o f Perception p25
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injustice to our never-ending creation within the world rather than division from it. The 
roots of these presentations are not in politics, as Schmitt would suggest, though they do 
form, as I shall show, the paradoxical disintegration o f political discourses that aim at 
universal sameness.
2.3 Inside/Outside and the Kinship Metaphor
2.3.1 Kinship and the Universal ‘Human’
In almost all cultures, there is a conceived ‘outside’ — to the ancient Greeks, for instance, it 
was the realm o f the ‘barbarians’ — a region whose inhabitants are thought of as something 
less than human. Concomitantly it is almost universally the case that throughout history and 
cross-culturally “each system of kinship is seen in its own context as the ‘natural’ or ‘god- 
given’ one.”140 Societies have a tendency to refer to only themselves as ‘people’ or ‘the 
people’, and name their land, and their gods, to reflect their belief that they were the only 
existing, true, valid humanity. Whether in the relations between warring groups in a 
segmentary societal system, in the relations between the global North and South or in a 
simply theoretical perspective, we can see possible ways to argue that the source of the 
discourse o f human unity must, in adopting a universalist standpoint, force (successfully or 
unsuccessfully) this universal vision on the ‘Other’. Agreeing upon one version of humanity is 
a denial of the discourses of other societies. The principle of distinction between the 
universal truth and all else, can lead to the hostile denigration of other regimes of truth — in 
particular when concerning claims over such primal values as what it is to be ‘human’. This is 
the danger inherent in the ‘problem of difference’ and an example of this peril is only too 
clear in the sardonic appropriation of the Wilsonian humanist striving to unification we find 
in Mein Kampf:
“anyone who sincerely wishes that the pacifist idea should prevail in this world ought to do all he is capable of 
doing to help the Germans conquer the world... you would have to make up your mind to forget wars if  you
140 Maynes, M. et. al. (1996) ‘Introduction: Toward a Comparative History o f Gender, Kinship and Power’ in 
their edited volume Gender. Kinship. Power p3
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would achieve the pacifist ideal. Nothing less than this was the plan of the American world redeemer, 
Woodrow Wilson...The pacifist-humanitarian idea may indeed become an excellent one when the most 
superior type of manhood will have succeeded in subjugating the world to such an extent that this type is then 
the sole master of the earth...So, first of all, the fight and then pacifism. ’*41
If kinship systems provide a basic articulation of universal humanity in opposition to all else, 
then this very universality means that kinship distinction are metaphorised and extrapolated 
to form discourses at a political level. Similar paradoxes of contradiction and denial of 
competing discourses naturally inhere. As Delaney points out, in the Western tradition, the 
first Biblical notion of a patriarch is Abraham, a name meaning “the father of many 
nations.”142 Principles of patriarchal kinship, generativity and nationhood stem from the story 
o f Abraham. Crucial to the story are G od’s demand in the ‘trials’ of Abraham for one lineage 
to be created, ‘the people’ so to speak, distinct from all others and favoured by God. The 
boundary o f kin and non-kin is established in Genesis 17:10-11 through God’s demand for 
the mark of circumcision to “be a token o f the covenant betwixt me and you.”143 This 
classification is the primal mark of separation of a people from the rest of the world, and also 
the guarantee o f their success as people — “a symbol o f genealogical continuity and 
rupture.”144 As David Schneider145 has suggested, the act of creating kin groups, nations and 
religions (certainly in Western traditions) involves the same sense of denying the worth o f the 
Other, the exterior. Ties that bind people within these groups are essentialised, often into 
discourses that claim universal truth or worth and are created in all three domains either by 
birth or by ‘naturali2ation’.
The story o f Abraham establishes not only the principle of drawing kin/non-kin boundaries 
in the world, but also the paradoxical monarchy o f patriarchal kinship inside a domain that is 
supposedly that o f the chosen people. The chosen ‘people’ in Abraham’s story does not seem 
to include his wife Sarah, passed off to the Pharoah and to the king of Gerar, nor his 
abandoned son Ishmael and his sacrificed son Isaac. Where we would perhaps expect only
141 Hitler, A. (2008 ed.) Mein Kam pf p260 /l
142 Delaney, C. (2001) ‘Cutting the Ties that Bind: The Sacrifice o f Abraham and Patriarchal Kinship’ in Franklin, 
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care for the people/population within the kinship domain (a governmental relationship146) 
and antagonism towards the outside, what is evident in patriarchal kinship of this sort is 
sovereign power within a sphere that is supposedly the chosen few. There is a certain 
violence in this kinship towards women and towards sons, towards the apolitical members of 
society who do not share in the power relationship with God, the defining source of the 
‘human’.
The same paradoxes flow through kinship, and up into the politics that we metaphorise using 
kinship as a mode of representation. The first and most direct political move to stem from 
the isolation of a kinship group from the rest of the world is that of claiming to be the chosen 
people. As Nietzsche comments in his discussion of the origins of morality, the Greek nobles 
described by Theognis called themselves the esthlos, “according to its root (it means) one who 
is, who possesses reality, who is real, who is true.”147 The powerful patriarchal groups in these 
examples claim authority from sources, whether religious or political, beyond the grasp of 
those who must simply contend with the existing system which maps throughout the 
domains of kinship, politics and religion. “(T)he head of the family is the father; the head of 
the nation is, normatively and often literally, a man; as father of the state; and the head o f the 
religion is a male-imaged God, often referred to as father.”148 It might seem natural then for 
these metaphorical transmissions between domains to be used to express common features 
of authority and distinction. The following section demonstrates further cognitive principles 
for the use of the kinship metaphor in politics.
2.3.2 The Facility of Representational Beliefs in Semi-Propositional Content
As highlighted in Chapter One, political appeals to sentiments of kinship swirl around the era 
of the founding of the United Nations and NATO. This metaphorisation of political relations
146 See Foucault, M. (1991) ‘O n Governmentality’ in Burchell, G. et al. (eds.) The Foucault Effect: Studies in 
Governmentality: With Two Lectures by and an Interview with Michel Foucault. The population is the critical 
unit o f governmental management with the object o f the maximisation o f the potentiality o f life.
147 Nietzsche, F. (1998) O n The Genealogy o f Morality p l3
148 Delaney, C. (2001) ‘Cutting the Ties that Bind: The Sacrifice o f Abraham and Patriarchal Kinship’ in Franklin, 
S. and McKinnon, S. (eds.) Relative Values: Reconfiguring Kinship Studies p450
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is widespread culturally and historically and is a pervasive example of the 
“metarepresentational ability”149 of human beings, the facility of creating representations of 
states of being which are only available to our consciousness in the form of already existing 
representations. In other words, we can only make a representation of world politics rather 
than be in factual touch with it, and must then re-represent that in terms of kinship 
metaphors.
Such a conceptual move is a reflection upon one representation (politics), derived from a very 
much separate cognitive domain (kinship). Such crossovers are common. Sperber notes that 
one “may believe with total faith in the Holy Trinity, and yet be aware of the intuitive force of 
the idea that a father and son cannot be one and the same.”150 Or equally, “understand why 
black holes cannot be seen, and yet feel the intuitive force o f the idea that a big solid, indeed 
dense object cannot but be visible.”151 Sperber evaluates this example by suggesting that a 
working knowledge of modem astrophysics fails to penetrate into the cognitive domain of 
naive physics. In the example o f the Trinity, the cultural representation of Christian religious 
dogma fails to penetrate into the domain of naive kinship.
Thus, humans have the capacity for entertaining knowledge and making claims which appear 
to confound the domain-like structure of cognition on the one hand, but also the worldly 
checks and balances we might use to verify claims about the world. Many of the beliefs we 
articulate about the world, and our discourses of human unity would be one such example, 
fall into Sperber’s category o f cognitive relations to semi-propositionat52 representations. A 
‘proposition’ as defined linguistically, is clear-cut and can refer to only one sharply delimited 
thing. To believe in a proposition is an uncomplicated action. As Sperber says, “if it were true 
that the objects of belief necessarily were propositions, then we could only believe ideas 
which we fully understand.”153 We might express a belief in a discourse of human 
commonality but not be able to accurately articulate what sort of proposition was intended in 
that statement. We could express our own version of the idea, and therefore demonstrate a
149 Sperber, D. (1994) ‘The modularity o f thought and the epidemiology of representations’ in Hirschfeld, L. and 
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working understanding, explaining several aspects o f the idea clearly and other aspects less 
clearly. The representation thus believed in, is taken into consideration as a semi-proposition.
Relating to semi-propositional statements cannot rationally take the form of a factual, testable 
belief, but must always be a representational belief. This cognitive nexus of semi- 
propositional statements about the world and our holding them in belief of a representational 
order is not simply vagueness. By offering weak criteria for the acceptance of a 
representation, it facilitates the processing of large amounts o f information by opening up the 
potential for multiple interpretations of given statements. By permitting multiple 
interpretations, it acts “as a source of suggestion in creative thinking”154 and facilitates the 
domain cross-overs of metaphorisation that, as Sperber shows, “is a common experience of 
childhood, when lexical meanings are not fixed in our minds.”155 Kinship, as one of the 
earliest formed cognitive domains of understanding, forms a fertile ground for the creation of 
metaphorised semi-propositional representations of the world. Not only Sperber, but also 
Pascal Boyer provide a theoretical framework for discussing the transmission of cognitive 
connections between domains of representation into cultural connections of representation 
that become metaphorical discourses.
2.3.3 An Epidemiology of Representations?
My analysis in the coming chapters of the formation of the idea of the ‘family of nations’ 
through supranational discourse and action, is a genealogy in two important senses. In 
Foucauldian style I aim to chart the discursive history o f the formulations of common 
humanity that inspire UN policy, and also the policy of the global hyperpower. The second 
task I wish to tackle is to provide an account for the discursive trajectory that provides a 
commentary, if  not an explanation, for why this discourse linking kinship and international 
politics is so prevalent. In Foucault’s words “(T)he question proper to such an analysis might 
b e .. .what is this specific existence that emerges from what is said .. .?”156
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Two methods of explaining the transmission of representations suggest themselves: either we 
seek to explain their dispersal across time through discourse analysis, or through reference to 
the quality and character of the concepts themselves. The first method consists of seeking out 
what Foucault calls the “episteme of a period...an open and doubdess indefinitely describable 
field o f relationships”157 to explain, not through cause and effect, but through the opening of 
conditions for the emergence of particular statements in place of others. In other words, the 
explanation is extraneous to the representation, and is concerned with the purely social 
aspects of transmission of ideas. The second method seeks explanation internal to the ideas 
themselves. “To explain culture” as Sperber boldly puts it, “is to explain why and how some 
ideas happen to be contagious.”158 Both approaches can yield rich results but neither is 
sufficient alone. To produce a worthwhile characterisation of a powerful discourse, one 
cannot neglect its genealogy and the other discourses and cultural resources that it is tied to. 
Neither does a full picture with explanative value for the power and durability o f a discourse 
emerge from merely a consideration of the situation of one discourse within its temporal and 
discursive parameters without an analysis of the content of the discourse and the content of 
the response to it by individual consciousnesses.
As Boyer makes clear, to argue for cognitive structuration of the transmission of 
representations should not lead us necessarily down a classic structuralist path in the 
footsteps o f Levi-Strauss. Indeed, the structuralist obsession with systematising into binary 
oppositions runs up against scientific contradiction — “(psychological research...has never 
found anything of the sort in the mental representation of concepts and categories.”159 
Rather, all that cognitive anthropologists like Boyer seek to do is to grant recognition and an 
explanatory gesture towards common repertoires of cultural representations that are 
observable cross-culturally, but are usually lost in relativist ethnography.
157 Foucault, M. (1991) ‘Politics and the Study of Discourse’ in Burchell, G. et al. (eds.) The Foucault Effect: 
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For Boyer, the successful transmission of representations lies in the fact that they are 
“culturally fit”160 in the sense o f a natural selection of ideas, by virtue of a combination of 
ontological sensibility and the memorable ‘unnaturalness’ of the juxtapositions of 
representations from different cognitive domains. In other words, the cross-over 
metaphorisation discussed earlier is a potential source of memorable unnaturalness. The 
paradoxes inherent in talking of world politics as if it were kinship, of talking of the world as 
a family when it is in no way a family, adds to the potential for such representations to be 
transmitted through time.
Furthermore, Sperber and Boyer posit the psychological ease of application of 
representations as another factor in their potential for successful transmission. The necessary 
criteria for transferral between cognitive domains are narrative memorability161, semi- 
propositional vagueness (leaving room for re-telling and re-interpretation — what Boyer 
terms, ‘under-determination*62 of concepts) and a “psychologically fixed and universal basis”163 
for the cognitive domain, meaning that is in regular use within our minds. This last point 
requires some explanation. To claim that there is a universal basis for the domain of kinship 
within human cognition is not to claim that patterns o f kinship are universal. Rather, the point 
is that every human being thinks of kinship in some way, despite the cultural variability of 
those thoughts and narratives.
The attraction of extrapolating kinship metaphors to world politics is precisely on the one 
hand the multiplicity of meanings that can be attached, meaning that is a fertile ground for 
interpreting the world. On the other hand, it is an extrapolation of a cognitive domain that, 
though differently configured cross-culturally, is ever present. In summary, this metaphorical 
move is a semi-propositional meta-representation that is comprehensible to everyone. The 
very fact of the diversity of possible interpretations means that this metaphorisation is never 
incomprehensible, ideal in a sense for application to global institutional discourse. It reaches 
to a cognitive domain constantly in use, and a cognitive domain formed in the developmental
160 Boyer, P (2000) ‘Functional Origins o f Religious Concepts: Conceptual and Strategic Selection in Evolved 
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stages of each life. It reaches to a cognitive domain that, as we have already seen, is used to 
delineate ‘the people’ from the non-people in the early history of most culture. In this sense 
too it is psychologically powerful. The following section now returns more fully to political 
claims about universal rights, values and the character of ‘man’. Our analysis of the 
transformation from kinship metaphors to political divisions shows the latter to be based on 
the paradoxical boundary between the (false) universal ‘inside’ and the ‘outside’ that is denied. 
As we will fully demonstrate over the course o f the following discussion, the flexibility of 
kinship as a symbol opens up space to rethink Schmittian friend/enemy descriptions of the 
boundary o f the application of universalist discourse.
2.4 What Do Discourses of Universalism Do?
2.4.1 The Emergence o f ‘Man* as Universal Object
The preceding discussion of kinship noted how the division between kin and non-kin is 
frequently transformed into a distinction equating kinship groups with the human. The 
master-discourse of human universality of the world institutions though has spread through a 
kinship metaphorisation to present the ideal of the ‘family of nations’. The cognitive facility 
of this process has contributed to the success of this discourse, as has the power of the 
institutional framework promoting this discourse. However, the unification of a discourse on 
the life and rights o f man has also been facilitated by the rationalisation of the ‘sciences of 
man’ in the Western world since the Enlightenment. A unified discourse on man, mutated 
into a ‘monument’164 was enabled by the scienticising of a human object, which could be 
studied simply and solely as a human object and acted upon by rationalising government.
As Foucault describes, prior to the seventeenth century, knowledge about man or the world 
was garnered from processes of divination and interpretation of signs: “God, in order to 
exercise our wisdom, merely sowed nature with forms for us to decipher.”165 The entire world
164 Foucault, M. (1972) The Archaeology of Knowedge p l55
165 Foucault, M. (1970) The Order o f Things p37
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was conceived as a sacred text with signifiers present in the natural world that suggested 
correlations with a divine plan. The status o f a man within the world was significant of God’s 
value of that particular man. In this sense, the logic of a divinely approved hierarchy was self- 
fulfilling. In the early seventeenth century, the notion of resemblance came under attack 
philosophically and scientifically from Bacon, Newton and Descartes among others. 
Resemblance was replaced by surer notions of identity and difference, measurement and 
order.
Foucault explains the change through a shift in the notion of signs. Processes of signification 
became capable of expressing probability and they became conventional as well as natural166. 
Liberating Western thought from divine resemblance opened up processes of ordering and 
the classification o f man as a scientific unity. As Foucault writes: “(W)e are inclined to believe 
that man has emancipated himself from himself since his discovery that he is not at the centre 
o f creation.”167 From the particular determinants of any given person and his possibilities and 
limits, imposed by the divine plan and the strictures of sovereign authority, we move to a 
world where ‘man’ is a subject which can be defined in his unity and distinct from all else. 
The weaker part o f Foucault’s analysis, his reification of tracts of time into the products 
singular mindsets, is perhaps to be viewed with scepticism. However, as will later be 
discussed in relation to a fuller analysis o f the bases of Western notions of kinship, an 
important aspect o f the cultural application of kinship to politics in modem Western 
discourses is the scientifically based notion o f natural equality derived from seeing ‘man’ as a 
species.
This scientific object ‘man’ then becomes a universal given that is at the root o f the trans­
national institutional framework that espouses a ‘family of nations’ where the ties of kinship 
are close between a functioning core of nations and non-existent in the case of relations to 
states placed beyond the pale in terms of their relations to this human gold standard. 
However, the fact that universalism does not brook contradiction works not only across the 
putative boundary between worldly kin and those rogue Others, but it also purports to
166 Foucault, M. (1970) The Order o f Things p64/5
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establish an unchallengeable ideational monopoly within the bounds of its own sphere of 
nations.
In short, the paradox of universal political discourse is that while preaching commonality, it 
becomes repressive unilateral dogma, and establishes, not only hierarchy, but ideational 
monopoly or mon-archy. This logic of disintegration at the heart of claims to universalism 
addresses itself to the work on inclusion and exclusion by scholars from Schmittian 
backgrounds. In deciding upon a specific form for universal values, one defines the character 
of those decisions based upon a constituent negative. Engaging with Schmitt is critical here, 
especially given the wide-ranging effect that Schmittian perspectives have had on IR in recent 
years. Particularly with reference to the subject matter of Chapter Six, the War on Terror, 
Schmittian notions of the sovereign decision were widely invoked. Investigating metaphors of 
a sphere of world kinship presents an ideal opportunity to revisit and rethink the notion of 
the character of sovereign and their finality and effects.
In the concluding two sections, I wish to explore the differing but related practices of 
inclusion and exclusion that stem from claims based on a singular idea of what should 
constitute ‘man’. How has the idea of ‘man’ outlined above been put to use? How have other 
forms of universal characterisation of humanity worked in similarly paradoxical ways? I shall 
suggest that the practices of distinction rising out of these characterisations are less a 
derivative o f political logic, but rather a transformation through metaphor, one of kinship 
experience.
2.4.2 Friends/Enemies, Bios/Zoe
Discourses of human universalism would seem to deny the need for principles of distinction 
between human beings, or between states. Yet, the making o f claims about universalism has, 
until the present day, been conducted in a world divided by states, cultures, sentiments of 
alliance and fear. What is more, I wish to recognise and give credit to the dominating power 
of the discourses produced in certain powerful parts of the world — discourses capable of
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overriding comparable or contrasting ones produced elsewhere. As we have seen there is a 
significant violence inherent in a discourse produced in an institutional setting with the power 
for significant dispersion of its ‘truth’, which proclaims a universal definition of the condition 
and aspirations of humankind. Distinction thus is at the heart o f the formation of discourse 
in that the sajable emerges from a much wider field of possible discursive options which 
become marginalised. As Sartre says: “to posit as an ideal the being of things, is this not to 
assert by the same stroke that this being does not belong to human reality...?”168 Both 
politically and existentially then, the act of making universal claims is an act of bad faith and 
of discriminatory violence.
Further, in the aspiring tenor of the mission of the United Nations lies a blueprint for global 
transformation. To a certain extent, the universalism of the claims made seem inevitably to 
tend towards global homogenisation in pursuit of these ideals. These are the frameworks of 
our political age, but the notion of a radical distinction between those agreed on a standard of 
‘humanity’ and those judged as yet exterior to this standard, prompted Schmitt to conclude 
that the only possible fate of those beyond the pale was destruction.
“I f  he discriminates within humanity and thereby denies the quality of being human to a disturber or destroyer, 
then the negatively valued person becomes an unperson, and his life becomes no longer of the highest value: it 
becomes worthless and must be destroyed. Concepts such as ‘human being’ thus contain the possibility of the 
deepest inequality and become thereby ‘assymetrica!. ’*69
What must be stressed in considering the metaphorical practice o f constructing the world-as- 
family, is that it can establish a variety of exclusionary boundaries not limited to the creation 
o f Schmitt’s ‘unperson’. Kinship discourse may be used, as previously discussed, by colonial 
powers to establish a ‘private sphere’ in international relations, a family of nations comprising 
a metropolitan ‘parent’ and colonial dependent ‘infants’. The upshot of this may be increased 
tutelage in the context of superiority/inferiority relations solidified by kinship metaphors, or 
the ‘private sphere’ notion may be employed to justify incursions on the sovereignty o f the 
colonised nation on the part of the metropolitan parent unmolested and unmonitored by 
outside powers. On the other hand, kinship discourses may be used much more harshly, to
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define ‘unpersons’ in the case of wars, crimes against humanity and terrorism. As we will see 
in Chapter Six however, the dual bases of kinship determination, unchanging ‘natural’ 
commonality and contingent behavioural actions, render the Schmittian moment of decision 
incomplete. Even when we use kinship to exclude, an olive branch is offered based on 
changing behaviour. Thus though it would be unwise to reject this Schmittian position out of 
hand in light o f the practical application of ‘state of exception’ politics in the contemporary 
political landscape, there is scope for rethinking. This rethinking is timely, for, as Agamben 
shows, a moralising homogenisation is not the only effort at work, but a tendency to 
normalise an appeal to a state of exception has also been developing. He discusses as an 
example, the extra-juridical status of Guantanamo Bay ‘detainees’ who are produced by the 
US Patriot Act as “un-namable and unclassifiable being(s).”170 Part Three thus contains an 
investigation of the relationship between the production o f unclassified beings, and the ideas 
that constitute the identity of those on the ‘inside’ of the ‘universal’ boundary.
The United Nations formulations on the rights of man are particularly pointed examples of 
the construction of universal standards. In a sense, such decisions relate direcdy to a 
fundamental decision upon what ‘life’ is and means. Setting boundaries of human rights 
impinges on the moral standing and bio-political integrity all human beings. For Agamben, 
“the production of a bio-political body is the original activity of sovereign power.”171 This 
statement relates to the fact that, following Schmitt, Agamben defines the sovereign as he 
who decides upon the exception to the law, he who puts a person’s body outside the political 
domain. To use Chantal Mouffe’s terminology, the body placed beyond the pale of 
universalist sovereign claims falls outside the ‘rights group’ of the ‘demos’.172
This terminology is not without significance. Dating from political re-structuring in the 
Cleisthenic reforms173, the idea of ‘demos’ is a formulation o f the ‘populace’, or more broadly, 
the ‘people’, in political and juridical terms. It was made, of course, with reference to 
individuals who remained excluded from political life — primarily women and slaves. This
170 Agamben, G. (2005) State o f Exception p3
171 Agamben, G. (1998) Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life p6
172 Mouffe, C. (1998) ‘Carl Schmitt and the Paradox o f Liberal Democracy’ in Dyzenhaus, D. (ed.) Law As 
Politics: Carl Schmitt’s Critique o f Liberalism p l6 0 / l
173 For a neat summary, see for instance Fornara, C. and Samons, L. (1991) -  Athens from Cleisthenes to Pericles
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principle of exclusion from political life is double-edged though. Not only must we consider 
the practical exclusion from ‘deme’ elections — participatory exclusion — but also the 
exclusion of being deemed ‘apolitical life’. In Agamben’s Greek terms, sovereign power 
makes the distinction as to where human and political life (bios) ends and where a pure state 
of bare, or natural life (zoe)174 is all that remains. In the Cleisthenic case, the individuals 
outside o f the ‘demos’ could only be considered under the logic of property and possession. 
The Roman jural criterion of homo sacer — the criminal found guilty who forfeits his right to 
life — could be killed non damnatur75 having been legally committed to the underworld in lieu 
of his impending death. In a similar sense, the treatment of the zoe of women and slaves was 
an issue that bore no political consequences or accountability.
It is important to remember here that the apolitical status o f women in our examples of 
ancient Jewish or Greek kinship cannot be elided in any sense with the apolitical fate of 
Holocaust victims or Guantanamo prisoners. Agamben and Schmitt are guilty of producing 
single-minded binary distinctions which fail to capture differing levels of exclusion based on 
relationship distance. Exclusionary decisions do not stem from politics alone. Kinship and 
politics mesh in the patrilineality of the Jewish and Greek examples, women are social kin, 
but the political dimension of kinship and the continuity of the kin group is not something in 
which they can be involved. Likewise, the assumption that Schmitt makes that being excluded 
necessarily leads to destruction, is unsubstantiated. As Butler states, “universality is 
necessarily undone by the exclusion of particularity on which it rests.”176 It must define itself 
against something and in doing so betrays the falseness of its claim to universality. But also, 
“ (T)here is no way to bring the excluded particularity into the universal without first negating 
that particularity.”177 This negation need not be destruction, but, as in the case of the 
optimistic universality of the UN discourse of common humanity, it may take the form of 
practices o f transformation.
17-4 Agamben, G. (1998) Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life p7
175 Ibid. p85
176 Butler, J. (2000) ‘Restaging the Universal: Hegemony and the Limits o f  Formalism’ in Buder, J., Laclau, E. and 
Zizek, S. (eds.) Contingency, Hegemony, Universality p24
177 Ibid.
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A discourse purporting to a universal claim to or defence o f a model of human life such as 
the foundational texts of the United Nations, is set up as a manifesto for the transformation 
o f an imperfect world. In effect then, the tendency of claims of an ideal human condition to 
reinstate divisions between bios and zoe, can lead to differing standards of the treatment of 
human beings that betrays the universalist tone of the discourse. As in Agamben’s 
Guantanamo example, the treatment of prisoners rendered ‘bare life’ is justified by their 
supposed threat to the lives and rights of the majority. In effect, this resembles the 
justification for the Nazi Holocaust. Furthermore, the perceived apolitical nature of peoples 
beyond the core nations of the UN, provides leeway for the lack of accountability for 
‘collateral damage’ caused during invasive military actions aimed at regime change.
Discourses justifying regime change or the reformation of political and social systems to fit 
the tenets of the humanising missions of Western institutions, reveal further paradoxes 
concerning the logical work of universal values. In apologies for collateral damage in conflicts 
conducted in the name of Westernised ‘human’ values like democracy or human rights, there 
is an attempt (as we will see in Part Three) made at identifying the common people o f the 
invaded country with the mission o f the invading or peace-keeping Western forces. The real 
‘enemy’ within this discourse is the objectionable political system - communism or 
dictatorship, for instance. As we noted above, the boundary of inclusion and exclusion may 
appear differently depending on the character of the discourse of universality invoked. The 
logic o f inclusion and exclusion then, when applied to political situations is particular rather 
than general.
2.4.3 Using Notions of the ‘Human* in Universalist Discourse
While we have noted the propensity for universalist discourse to place certain groups into an 
apolitical state of being, we must be aware of the particular character of each instance of 
universalist discourse. The paths open for the placing o f life into the zoe category are 
structured in and through discursive formulation and action and through the gradations of 
relationship/kinship distance inspiring these discourses. In the political formulations of the 
United Nations’ defence of universal human values, the essences of human nature are
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conceived in positive light — the world is potentially redeemable. The instances of failure to 
respect such rights can be glossed in terms of contingent aberrant regimes, open to re­
structuration. To bring this into the starkest possible relief, it is worth contrasting the rhetoric 
during the second Iraq war with two historical examples predicated on somewhat different 
discourses o f a universal goal for humanity. Firstly, I shall look at the transformative logics of 
the civilising missions of nineteenth century colonialism. Secondly, I will contrast these 
examples with the origin of the crusading ethic of Western intrusion in the Middle East, that 
of Urban IPs address at the Council of Clermont in 1095.
In the joint addresses by Tony Blair and George W. Bush from 10th April 2003 there are clear 
attempts to make a claim to commonality with the hopes and desires of the ‘Iraqi people’ 
while rooting the cause for Iraq’s lack of a “respected place in the world”178 in the Ba’athist 
regime. Blair makes the plainest distinction: “(o)ur enemy is Saddam and his regime; not the 
Iraqi people.”179 The hope of re-incorporating Iraq into the family of nations was always an 
express aim of the war, to bring the country back from isolation and fear and into the UN 
framework. Bush praises the ‘Iraqi people’ by referring to an imputed common human legacy 
derived from Mesopotamian history: “(T)he nightmare that Saddam Hussein has brought to 
your nation will soon be over. You are a good and gifted people - the heirs of a great 
civilisation that contributes to all humanity.”180
At the height of European colonialism, a different sort o f commonality was felt with the 
people o f the colonized lands. The socio-biological notion o f a Great Chain of Being “served 
as a powerful metaphor, for it conjured up a hierarchy of distinct varieties within (a single) 
humankind.”181 However, the unshakeable truth of the European version of humanity was 
that the undisputable acme, or the ‘telos’ if one thinks in terms of temporal evolution, was 
the European version of humanity. A singular discourse on humanity meant a singular 
pinnacle. This self-assurance allowed administrators such as Frederick Lugard, the British
178 Bush, G.W. (2003) T M ’s Message Broadcast to Iraqi People.’ 10 Apr 2003. Retrieved on 9 Sep 2008 from 
http: /  /  www.pm.gov.uk/output/Page3469.asp.
179 Blair, T. (2003) T M ’s Message Broadcast to Iraqi People.’ 10 Apr 2003. Retrieved on 9 Sep 2008 from 
h ttp ://  www.numberlO.gov.uk/Page3469
180 Bush, G.W. (2003) T M ’s Message Broadcast to Iraqi People.’ 10 Apr 2003. Retrieved on 9 Sep 2008 from
http :/ /  wuav.pm.gov.uk/oufput/Page3469.asp.
181 Comaroff, J. and Comaroff, J. (1991) O f Revelation and Revolution Vol I p98
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governor of Nigeria in the early twentieth century to claim that Europeans were “custodians 
of the tropics” and “trustees of civilisation for the commerce of the world.”182 Such was the 
power of the message of one singular path for the improvement of humanity, that protests 
for the vemacularisation of education in British India in the 1890s, organised by Indians 
themselves, called for a greater application of “the universal spread of European 
enlightenment among the large mass of people and throughout all of India.”183
O n the other hand, the claim to universal See by Urban II is of a quite different order, 
diverging from the models of humanity in both the contemporary and colonial periods, 
which shared the scientific notion of ‘man as object’, even if  differing in their applications of 
this bedrock o f claims to commonality. In the account of the Council of Clermont given in 
the chronicle of Fulcher of Chartres, Urban introduced himself to the assembled nobles thus: 
“(m)ost beloved brethren: urged by necessity, I, Urban, by the permission of God chief 
bishop and prelate over the whole world, have come into these parts as an ambassador with a 
divine admonition to you, the servants of God.”184 Far from this bishopric of the whole 
world being a shepherding of common humanity though, it is a shepherding only of Christian 
‘brethren’ whether in Western Christendom or in the besieged Eastern realm. Urban exhorts 
the Franks to relieve the suffering of Eastern Christians under Turkish and Arab oppression, 
calling these peoples without distinction “a despised and base race, which worships 
demons.”185 Such racial essentialism led the crusade to acts of brutality and destruction, not 
only in the Holy Land, but also en route in vicious attacks on Jewish populations in the cities 
of Germany and Eastern Europe. These acts, zealous overspills of crusading fervour has led 
this period in the early months of the crusade to be termed “the first holocaust.”186 In this 
sense, the formulation of ‘the infidel’ as the exception, the rejection of the “the Redeemer of 
the human race”187, would seem a more radical and pessimistic principle of distinction -  one 
that could only lead to the crusaders seeking the destruction (as Schmitt predicts) of their 
enemies.
182 Spurr, D . (1993) The Rhetoric o f Empire: Colonial Discourse in Journalism, Travel Writing and Imperial 
Administration p28
183 Goswami, M. (2004) Producing India: From Colonial Economy to National Space p i49
184 Fulcher o f Chartres, Gesta Francorum Jerusalem FLxpugnatitium, (1969) (trans. Ryan, F.R., and Fink, H.S.)
185 Ibid.
186 Riley-Smith, J. (1986) The First Crusade and the Idea of Crusading p50
187 Robert the Monk (1895) ‘Historia Hierosolymitana.’ In Munro, D.C. Translations and Reprints from the 
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However, the First Crusade was not intended as a genocide, but as a strategic recapturing of 
the Holy Sepulchre and the restoring o f freedom to the Eastern Church. In the testimony of 
the Council of Clermont given by Guibert de Nogent, who was actually present, he records 
Urban asking the nobles: “ (A)nd you ought, furthermore, to consider with the utmost 
deliberation, if by your labors, God working through you, it should occur that the Mother of 
churches should flourish anew to the worship of Christianity, whether, perchance, He may 
not wish other regions of the East to be restored to the faith against the approaching time of 
the Antichrist.”188 The possibility of redemption is held out just as in the political 
interventions o f modem times, though in this case, it is redemption on an individual and 
spiritual level, rather than at a political and systemic level.
In these three cases, separated by a thousand years, leaders strive for a world that is yet to 
come. The character o f their ideal model o f the ‘human’ is markedly different in these 
discourses of a desired universal state o f being. And yet, the universalist claims to truth about 
the human condition, which are culturally-specific in their respective origins, lead the projects 
of these leaders to career towards conflict from their very beginning. The critical mediaeval 
claim is that one Redeemer came to unite all the human race, but was rejected by some. The 
critical modem claim is that one standard of human rights and life, created by Westerners to 
unite all the human race, has been rejected by some in the contemporary case of rogue states, 
or has not been attained by some in the case o f the colonized populations. Such discourses 
throw their users into paradoxes of hypocrisy and crises of identity. Those who fall within the 
bounds of these universalist discourses are often claimed as kin, those outside the bounds 
rejected as radically Othered non-kin or shows of incorporation are made that reveal the 
insubstantial nature of the original claims to commonality. The paradoxes o f politics and the 
paradoxes o f kinship are smaller and larger models of similar relationships of processually- 
made sentiment. Our capacity for metaphorisation permits transmissions between the two 
and also the creation of boundaries of differing permeability where the political nature of 
kinship distinctions is revealed.
188 Guibert de Nogent (1921) ‘Historia quae dicitur Gesta Dei per Francos.’ In Krey, A.C. The First Crusade: 
The Accounts o f Eyewitnesses and Participants.
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2.5 The Sphere of Kinship: Friend/Enemv Distinctions Rethought
The case made so far for the transmission of kinship to political relations of universalist 
discourses remains incomplete. To conclude, I intend to return to the phenomenology of 
experience and the cognitive formation of the kinship domain. Schmitt’s friend/enemy 
distinction principle is less useful than the idea of a transmission between kin distinction and 
political distinction for two reasons. Firsdy, there are many instances in human relations 
(which are broader than the political relations upon which Schmitt is focused) where an 
expression of distance, o f Otherness, cannot be categorised by friend/enemy logic. 
Difference does not equal conflict; what is at stake is a lack of grounds for relationship, or a 
lack of feeling of relationship. It is perhaps indicative o f the scientificity of the language of 
modem social science that relationships between states, say, are conceived as if  we were 
discussing the relation of forces to objects, or the relations o f different chemical substances. 
Our use of the language of relationship tends to deny the etymological kinship notion at 
work. A perceived distance from the Other or a lack of relationship to the Other is precisely 
that — a lack of perceived grounds for extending our kinship metaphors to the Other.
Secondly, Schmitt’s logic of friend and enemy is assumed to be a cross-cultural given. Rather, 
to return to the existential and phenomenological perspectives with which I intended to place 
caveats upon the use of discourse analysis, I see an important distinction between people as 
made and practiced, and not as given over to a status by a specific logic. At the root o f the 
transmission between kinship and politics are three key principles. Firstly, the kinship 
distinction as we have seen is the primary political action. Secondly, the existential crisis of 
consciousness discussed earlier, grounds the inevitable logics of failed universal 
transcendence in the face of external particuliarity. Thirdly, the metaphorical richness of 
gradations o f kinship enables us to work past binary distinctions between inside and outside 
into actions of transformation, redemption, apoliticisation, negation, and assimilation as well 
as destruction o f the Other. I wish to finally think about the socialisation process within the 
sphere of kinship in the developmental stages of life to draw together the strands of 
cognitivism and phenomenology that would seem to compete.
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Christina Toren’s work addresses the mind not as a universal and pre-formed information 
processing tool, but through a phenomenological perspective. With reference to Piaget, she 
admits that certain ‘modules’ and ‘schema’189 (the ‘domains’ for instance, of kinship, that we 
have already discussed) are present biologically in every mind-brain, but the elaboration of 
these domains means that each mind is a culturally bound construction. An embodied and 
social view of mind, as espoused by Toren, involves perceiving the mind as a production of 
the interaction between sociality and “autopoeisis”190 — the processual, embodied making of 
self, a creative bricolage of experience unique to the self. In a sense this is another way of 
conceiving of the matrix of consciousness and discourse discussed earlier. The very fact of 
being given a world to grow and develop into by the actions of parents and other adults 
prefigures the fact that the making of meaning within the social world is a process of both 
recreation and inheritance of meaning on the one hand, and transformation o f meaning at the 
level o f consciousness on the other.
What Toren shows in her ethnography of children in Fiji, is that the kinship domain, and the 
distinctions within it, are fertile learning grounds for the meta-representational domain 
crossing that occurs later in life when kinship metaphors are extrapolated. As Sperber argues, 
the ability to make semi-propositional statements about representations is an acquired skill. 
Toren highlights how kinship distinction expressed in terms of place and position during 
ritual ceremonies, are learnt first by children as rules articulated around simple axes of 
kin/non-kin and spatial position within the ceremony. The templates of differentiation are 
put in place cognitively using kinship examples before the child can explain the significance 
of why their uncle, say, sits above a non-relative in a kava ceremony.191 Around the practical 
axes of kinship and position form, in later years, an understanding o f symbolic differentiation, 
and this ability was acquired through experience of ritual and not explicit teaching.
The sphere of kinship then furnishes principles of distinguishing between people and is a rich 
metaphor for the use of expressing ideas of inclusion and exclusion in politics. What we must
189 Toren, C. (1999) Mind. Materiality and History: Explorations in Fijian Ethnography p l2
190 Toren, C. (2002) ‘Anthropology as the whole science o f what it is to be human’ in Fox, R. and King, B. (eds.) 
Anthropology Beyond Culture pl07
191 Toren, C. (1999) Mind. Materiality and History: Explorations in Fijian Ethnography p91
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be aware o f though is the very success of this transmission is based upon, not only pre­
existing discursive guides to usage of the metaphor, but the combination of universality on 
the one hand and also phenomenological differentiation between use and understanding of 
kinship on the other. These factors, it should be remembered, are inherent in its structure as a 
cognitive domain. It is this combination, and its primal influence as a practical sphere of the 
socialisation o f principles of distinction that makes it a successful metaphorical selection for 
extrapolation to political life. Its universality and flexibility as a cognitive domain unite and 
provide the most apt way to fashion our desire to speak of ourselves in universal terms192, the 
inevitability of boundary drawing that that action entails, and the masking of the paradoxes of 
power both within and at the edges o f our principles of distinction. Western aptness for 
extrapolating from atomistic individuals, proven to have a scientific shared genetic substance, 
eases the cognitive work of the world-as-family metaphor and, in denying otherness, extends 
its potential positive assurance to its infinite boundary. Armed with these methodological 
insights, the next chapter begins the empirical mapping of terrains of world-kinship 
discourse.
192 Discourse establishing a worldwide ‘family o f nations’ centres the speaker implicidy within the sphere of 
common substance. Taking up a position exterior to the ‘international community’ for instance, is much easier. 
Kinship metaphors thus have an egoist element which adds to their appeal. The positive valuation o f kinship as a 
sphere o f nurturance and affection in Western complexes o f meaning makes such discourse reassuring, and as 
will be later seen, it is often employed specifically to emotionally reassure as to the motives o f actors.
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PART TWO - Creating the U N ’s World-Kinship 
Discourse and Its Place in the U N  Bureaucracy
CHAPTER THREE - Uniting Nations: A Local Project for
Global People
3.1 Acts of Creation and the Post-Conflict Moment: Writing History in 
the Rationalist Canon
3.1.1.1945, The Second Chance
As the surety o f victory steadily increased throughout 1945, the San Francisco Conference set 
for April o f that year came to be seen as a seminal moment in the re-defining of the way that 
the international order was to be governed. In his final State of the Union Address in January 
1945, President Roosevelt concluded his speech with his hopes for the UN conference in 
terms which spelled out the transformation which he wished it to bring about. His final 
exhortation ran as follows: “(M)ost important of all — 1945 can and must see the substantial 
beginning o f the organization of world peace. This organization must be the fulfilment of the 
promise for which men have fought and died in this war...We Americans of today, together 
with our Allies, are making history — and I hope it will be better history than ever has been 
made before.”193
Perhaps it is true in the way that the history of the twentieth century has been told and lived 
out, that this moment was given added importance by the notion that it was, in many ways, a 
second chance194. The grand hope of a ‘war to end all wars’ had proven false and it was 
widely believed that important lessons’ had either not been learned or had not been correctly
193 Roosevelt, F. D. (1945) ‘Annual Message About the State o f the Union to the Congress, January 6th 1945’. 
Reprinted in H olbom , L. (ed.) (1948) War and Peace Aims of the United Nations Vol II: From Casablanca to 
Tokio Bay January 1.1943 — September 1.1945 p313
194 See Divine, R. (1967) Second Chance: The Triumph o f Inter-Nationalism in America During World War Two 
for a full exposition o f this appreciation of and failure to learn from the ‘lessons’ o f the First World War.
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put into practice. On both sides of the Atlantic, debate in political circles, in the press and 
public media, and in influential study groups, contemplated in the most general terms why 
war had yet to be eliminated from the moral and political compass in the international sphere. 
Most particularly, as we saw in Chapter One, these discourses were highly prevalent in the 
United States where commentators in the inter-war period could lull themselves into a sense 
o f detachment from the cockpit of Europe, and where the failure of the US Senate to ratify 
the League Covenant had left politicians with the sense that a new organization must be 
planned with greater care to ensure bipartisan American support.195
As charted in Chapter One, much was made in interwar discourse of the incendiary economic 
policies of protectionism that had been applied to try to lift nations from the grips of 
depression at the expense of collective freedom of trade between countries. Many portrayed 
these structural discriminations within the international system as the prime cause and excuse 
for the militarist expansionism of totalitarian states in Europe and Asia. Much was also made 
o f the weakness o f the League of Nations, and a great number of formerly idealistic 
internationalists such as FDR came to be “disgusted by the ways in which France and Britain 
consistently blocked the League’s efforts to respond effectively to aggression”196 throughout 
the 1930s. The failure to use force during the early months of the invasion of Manchuria in 
1931 and the unwillingness to embargo shipments of oil during Mussolini’s campaign against 
Abyssinia have often been highlighted as key examples o f a “myopic and irresolute”197 
attitude by the Western powers. However, dismay among Americans at the policy of 
appeasement was tempered to a degree by the memory o f the political refusal to countenance 
Wilson’s wording o f Article X198 of the League Covenant in 1920. The major reason that 
Americans had shied away from making the global financial and military commitments 
required by the League system of collective security was precisely the same reason why
195 Especially concerned to get bipartisan support for the UN organisation and thus make up for America’s 
rejection o f the League was Cordell Hull. Hull was an unsophisticated thinker in terms o f international affairs but 
a giant on Capitol Hill and a past-master at engineering cross-party support. See Hinton, H. B. (1942) Cordell 
Hull: A Biography
196 Hoopes, T. and Brinkley, D. (1997) FDR and the Creation o f the United Nations p9
197 Ibid. p l2
198 See Appendix C, Covenant o f the League o f Nations. Article X established the principle o f collective security 
and the commitment to preserve the territorial integrity o f other members. The Senate objected to the burden 
this might be expected to place on the US as the most financially and militarily capable nation after the First 
World War.
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Britain and France, as the main League powers, had often dragged their heels when swift 
action was necessary.
Perhaps the most problematic aspect of the League of Nations system was simply its name 
and reputation — those developments in international politics attributed to the League’s 
‘failures’ haunted the political generations of the 1940s. However, its underlying philosophy 
was seen as being both fundamentally commendable and, in practical terms, redeemable in 
the architecture of a new peace settlement. Indeed, Vice-President Truman made the firm 
proclamation in February 1945 that: “the only rational alternative to existing international 
anarchy lies in some reasonable form of international organization.”199 In other words, 
Truman and his generation kept faith with the same institutional formula of organised supra­
national architecture that the League had embodied.
Such a statement, and much of the political and philosophical thought of humanistic 
Enlightenment and post-Enlightenment traditions and also religious traditions, has perceived 
war as the prime evil of society. Contra Clausewitz200, war is not an extension of policy, but 
an admission of the failure of reason and reasonableness — its violence is a social sin, its 
rupture through the social fabric a lamentable tragedy. From this perspective, the moment 
following a major conflict presents an opportunity to safeguard nations against a ‘relapse’ into 
a violent conflagration. This might fairly be characterised as a Wilsonian attitude — the leading 
power taking responsibility and employing an example of moral authority to re-organise the 
nations of the world. An ideal encapsulation of this attitude can be found in one of the first 
summary reference documents produced for debate on Sumner Welles’ Subcommittee on 
Political Problems in July 1942: “(I)t may seem utterly Utopian at this time consider the 
possibility of the prevention of war. Nevertheless that is what the American soldiers fought 
for in the last war and a fighting for in this.”201
199 Schlesinger, S. (2004) Act o f Creation: The Founding of the United Nations p7
200 See Clausewitz, C. von (2003) O n War
201T -I-O , Docum ent # 2 ’, ‘Preliminary Memorandum on International Organization’: 31st July 1942, p6. Sumner 
Welles Papers, Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park NY. Box 189 — Postwar Foreign Policy Files 1940-43, Folder 5 — 
Documents 2-17.
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In 1945 then, the post-conflict moment was imbued with massive significance. Not only had 
the conflict been the most all-encompassing in history, but powerful discourses portrayed it 
as being the catastrophic and doubly bitter result o f failing to leam from the first global 
conflagration. Furthermore, the struggle had been dramatised by Manichean rhetoric of 
universal human freedoms and their potential destruction by totalitarian enslavement. 
American portrayals o f the motives of the belligerent powers tended towards such 
formulations in spite of the diverse philosophical and political stances of the component 
nations of the Axis and Allied coalitions. As Hilderbrand rightly notes, this simplification and 
exaggeration was often orchestrated for political purposes: “(E)arly planning for a postwar 
security organization.. .had practical utility: it made American involvement in the war seem 
more palatable to those who doubted its immediate value.. .FDR’s response, like Wilson’s, 
was in part a public relations campaign to expand the importance of the war for Americans 
by transforming its ultimate purpose into something larger than the issues of the conflict 
itself — the establishment of permanent peace through postwar international organisation.”202
The character of this post-conflict moment was presented as the most universally significant 
in history and the notion that this was an all-or-nothing war for a set o f fundamental values 
was concretely enshrined in the international institutional framework designed to maintain 
the peace. Two questions must be addressed in order to proceed into the detail of the 
planning process with a clear notion of what is being examined. Firstly, how can we go about 
explaining the particular character of the response to this post-conflict moment? Secondly, 
how might the particular character of the moment of genesis manifest itself in the 
philosophies of the resultant institution? On the basis of tackling these questions it will be 
possible to present the planning process as a highly constrained and exclusive milieu 
producing purportedly universal discourses, principles and morals for the world after the war. 
Crucial to the planners, as we shall see, were the moral visions and values that were to be 
enshrined in the documents of the UN. This was not to be simply a political settlement but, 
as Eleanor Roosevelt said in reference to the Charter, “a guiding beacon”203 for the world.
202 Hilderbrand, R.C. (1990) Dumbarton Oaks: The Origins of the UN and the Search for Postwar Security p5. 
For further details on Churchill’s attempts to persuade Roosevelt to join the war, and Roosevelt’s concern with 
selling the war to the American people, see Kimball, W. (1984) Churchill and Roosevelt: The Complete 
Correspondence Vol I: Alliance Emerging Oct 1933 — N ov 1942 p227/8
203 Roosevelt, E. (1948) ‘The Struggle for Human Rights’ - Speech at the Sorbonne, Paris 28th September, 1948. 
Document 379 in Black, A. (ed.) (2007) The Eleanor Roosevelt Papers Vol. I p905
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This desire to morally re-make the world — set in stone in these great documents — echoes in 
contemporary discourse as we will see in Part Three. However, the expectations that value 
statements could bring the world together have perhaps not been as essential as the planners 
imagined. As will be shown throughout the coming chapters, usage of such Utopian and 
sentimental discourses as that of the human family has declined, while scholars and 
practitioners within the UN itself admit that employing notions like the family of nations may 
put them “at risk of sounding like members of the lunatic fringe.”204 The following sections 
thus investigate the process of how such discourses could be planted at the heart of the UN 
project.
3.1.2 Institutionalisation: A Rational Response?
In elucidating how I aim to explain the character of the response to the post-conflict moment 
in 1945, John Ikenberry’s sophisticated study After Victory is a useful foil. Ikenberry presents 
a detailed answer as to why, at this particular juncture in 1945, a highly institutional and 
supposedly multilateral response to managing the world after war emerges. Ikenberry himself 
contrasts his approach to strictly liberal institutionalist and constructivist positions. The 
former205 school of thought sees the trade-offs in negotiations over multilateral power-sharing 
as being motivated much in the way that rational economic exchanges are supposedly made. 
Actors perform cost-benefit analyses on their negotiating positions and seek to reduce 
uncertainty and transaction costs through the regularisation that comes with institutional 
organisation. A useful way to think of this perspective is, as Haggard and Simmons term it, a 
‘functional’206 notion of international agreement, where actors seek optimal functional utility 
through bargaining. The constructivist school, on the other hand, sees the institutional 
settlement after a war as a reflection (according to Ikenberry) of “the prevailing thinking 
among those party to the settlements about what the proper principles and purposes of
204 Author’s Interview 7, 24th November 2009. Original listings of interviews included in Examiners’ copies but 
removed in the present edition for the sake of confidentiality.
205 See for instance, Keohane, R. and Martin L. (1995) — “The Promise o f Institutionalist Theory” in 
International Security 20(1).
206 Haggard, S. and Simmons, B. (1987) “Theories of International Regimes” in International Organization 
41(3) p499
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international order should be.”207 Much liberal institutional theory argues that institutions 
matter most when hegemony is on the decline208, but instead Ikenberry209 considers the policy 
o f the creation of an institutional settlement as a rationalist policy move on the part of an 
active hegemon.
At the close of a war, Ikenberry argues, the winning state “acquire(s)...a sort of ‘windfall’ of 
power assets.”210 Three options present themselves to the new hegemon: domination of the 
weaker states, abandonment of them, or the use of new-found power to create a long-lasting 
institutional order which favours the strongest state. Blessed with a huge power disparity in 
1945, “(t)he US sought to take advantage of the postwar juncture to lock in a set of 
institutions that would serve its interests well into the future and, in return, it offered — in 
most instances quite reluctantly — to restrain and commit itself by operating within an array of 
postwar, economic, political, and security institutions.”211 Strong states, he plausibly argues, 
desire to maintain their post-war position, weak states want to be assured that the strong will 
neither dominate, nor abandon them. The higher the power disparity, the more the strong 
will have an incentive to design an institutional system into which they can lock their weaker 
allies and former opponents. The higher the power disparity, the more the weak will have an 
incentive to wish to see the power of the strong harnessed and possibly regulated by a high 
level o f global institutionalisation.212
Ikenberry’s work attempts to provide an explanation for the differences between the world 
orders created after the settlements of 1815, 1919 and 1945. Over the course of those 
historical junctures, the power disparity between the major hegemon (Great Britain in 1815, 
and the United States after the World Wars) and the rest o f the world grew, as did the level of 
institutionalisation of the peace settlements. Ikenberry’s argument that the greater the power
207 Ikenberry, G.J. (2001) After Victory: Institutions. Strategic Restraint and the Rebuilding o f Order after Major 
Wars p i 6
208 See for instance, Keohane, R  (1984) After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political 
Economy
209 Ikenberry’s approach retains a primary concern to highlight strategic rationalism in such decision-making, but 
also introduces perspectives from historical institutionalism and its notions of the path-dependency of 
institutional settlements. For a neat overview o f the latter see, Thelen, K. (1999) ‘Historical Institutionalism in 
Comparative Politics’ in Annual Review of Political Science, Vol. 2, p369-404.
210 Ikenberry, G.J. (2001) After Victory: Institutions. Strategic Restraint and the Rebuilding o f Order after Major 
Wars p4
211 Ibid. p l64
212 Ibid. p5
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disparity the more a strong state has an incentive to pursue long term stability by way of 
institutional restraint seems sensible and credible. On the other hand, when power disparities 
are low, it would also seem reasonable to suggest a counter-argument that the leading state, in 
mortal fear of losing its slender advantage, would have litde choice but to make institutional 
deals with its near-rivals. While Ikenberry looks to the contextual concerns of historical 
institutionalism, his three historical studies (1815, 1919 and 1945) are arguably not a 
conclusive set of test cases. Multiple variables are at work, and not simply power disparity.
Ikenberry rightly highlights the strategic utility for the US o f an institutional settlement, and 
this is borne out by some of the statements of the UN planning committees. As Leo 
Pasvolsky noted, “the American people will probably be more inclined to support the 
necessary action by this Government in the interests of peace and security through the 
international organisation, than to support action...outside the organisation but in concert 
with only selected powers.”213 Ikenberry also correctly notes the weakness of the European 
states as being a significant factor in encouraging American internationalism particularly with 
reference to the potential threat of the Soviet Union to Western Europe.214 As Gaddis argues, 
in 1945 “the fear was not of American expansionism but of American isolationism.”215 This 
conception dovetails with the fact that the UN was a largely American project. It was not the 
outcome of the states of Europe banding together to institutionally secure themselves against 
the USSR — such a model fits NATO better perhaps. Nor was the UN planning simply the 
outcome of a grand constructivist debate on postwar principles. In fact, as the following 
sections show, the FDR administration took many steps to close down debate on principles, 
rather than open debate up. This enabled the US to craft an UN organization acceptable to 
its interests and philosophies without complication from outside interference.
213 Briefing Paper - ‘US Foreign Policy and The International Organization: Framework for the Consideration of 
Long-Range Foreign Policy’ 19th December 1944’, p5. Leo Pasvolsky Papers, Library o f Congress, Washington 
DC. Box 5; Folder - US Foreign Policy and the International Organization- 19DE1944.
214 One has only to recall Churchill’s ‘Iron Curtain’ address at Fulton in 1946 to find weight to add to this notion, 
recalling his concluding appeal for the “fraternal association” o f Western democracies against the USSR. This 
speech is available at: h ttp :/ /wuw.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/winstonchurchillsinewso fpeace.htm.
Accessed on: 13/09/2009.
215 Gaddis, J. L. (1983) ‘The Emerging Post-Revisionist Synthesis on the Origins of the Cold War’ in Diplom atic 
History 7(3), pl77
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Thus, the point at which I believe it is useful to diverge from, or add to Ikenberry’s insights is 
in the overriding weight attached in his analysis to rationalist explanations for determining the 
character that decisions have when they become manifest as political realities. Ikenberry 
neglects, for instance, the influence that each of the peace setdements (1815, 1919 and 1945) 
had on each other. In the case of the relationship between the Concert of Europe and the 
Treaty of Versailles, the influence was likely to have been comparatively weak — the 
agreements were made over a century apart, the first entirely a European affair, the second 
hugely influenced by the United States as the new global power. The first was a balance of 
power treaty, the second an attempt at real intergovernmental organization in the 
establishment of the League of Nations. Contrary to this, in the case of the relationship 
between 1919 and 1945, the idea that Versailles was an example to the present generation in 
1945 was extremely strong. In a sense ‘path-dependent’ thinking was critical in the 
philosophies of the 1945 settlement — Sumner Welles for instance insisted that his staff begin 
post-war planning by making exhaustive studies o f the operation of the League of Nations in 
order to start modelling the new UN organization.216
While growing dependence upon institutionalisation is certainly a plausible strategic tactic for 
lessening losses and seeking to tie-in favourable relations, it is crucially also wedded to the 
ways in which nations have come, perhaps only in the past century, to seek international 
legitimacy. Given the contextual backdrop of the way the colonial, unilateral nineteenth 
century has been portrayed, multilateralism today is seen almost uncritically as being the only 
path to legitimate politics in the international sphere. Ikenberry neglects the fact that the 
American national history was founded upon a rejection of the self-serving type of power 
exercised by colonial Europe. American politicians have, almost always, wanted power with 
moral justification and with some self-assuring sense of legitimacy217. In that sense, my 
focus on the postwar planning for the end of WWII is on how the US wished to lock in 
favourable power relations and legitimate them through the universal philosophies of the 
UN. By enshrining in a global institution truths and goals purporting to aid and speak for all
216 See, O ’Sullivan, C. (2008) Sumner Welles. Postwar Planning and the Quest for a New World Order 1937-1943
p68.
217 Legitimacy may be thought to derive from the fairness and rationality supposedly inherent in organised, 
multilateral, consensual politics. Pasvolsky’s analysis above may be borne out by considering the outrage over US 
unilateralism in the Iraq War o f 2003. Liberal Americans as well as America’s European (and other) partners 
clamoured for any intervention to be carried out through UN channels.
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mankind, the institutional settlement was an exercise in the legitimation of power. In this 
sense, the formulation of ideas and discourses is critical even to a strategic project that aimed 
to preserve US hegemony. To produce a full explanation of the particularity of the WWII 
settlement, both the rationalist aims of the planners, and the discourses in which those aims 
were couched require consideration. The following sections explore those aims and the 
foundations of the discourses o f the UN, both with reference to the narrow group of actors 
involved in the planning, and the broader social resources o f discourse which they drew upon 
to communicate their project.
3.2 Key Actors — The Planners of the New World Order and Their 
Ideational Backgrounds
3.2.1 Franklin D. Roosevelt
Critical to Franklin Roosevelt’s contribution to the underlying philosophy of the UN was the 
idealist strain of his personality that had inspired, in particular, the great wartime statements 
of intent such as the Four Freedoms and the Atlantic Charter. While part of the need for the 
Atlantic Charter was to give hope and direction to the countries fighting Hitler in Europe 
(and Roosevelt was certainly aware of the political weight of his words), this is not to say that 
he did not believe in the principles outlined. As his closest wartime confidante, Harry 
Hopkins claimed: “(Y)ou can see the real Roosevelt when he comes out with something like 
the Four Freedoms...don’t get the idea that those are...catch-phrases.”218 FDR himself 
declared in a speech before the Canadian Parliament in 1943 that: “I am everlastingly angry 
only at those who assert vociferously that the Four Freedoms and the Atlantic Charter are 
nonsense because they are unattainable. If  they had lived a century and a half ago they would 
have sneered and said that the Declaration of Independence was utter piffle...I would rather 
be a builder than a wrecker, hoping always that the structure of life is growing, not dying.”219
218 See, Sherwood, R. E. (1948) Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History p266
219 Roosevelt, F. D. (1943) ‘Address Before the Canadian Parliament, Ottawa, August 25*1943’. Reprinted in 
Holbom , L. (ed.) (1948) War and Peace Aims o f the United Nations Vol II: From Casablanca to Tokio Bay 
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Roosevelt balanced idealism and pragmatism throughout his political career, and a number of 
classic biographies220 have weaved principally similar theses to explain the two apparent sides 
to FDR’s personality and political outlook.
Perhaps the most illuminating way to view the UN planning process is to contextualise it in 
relation to Roosevelt’s overall Presidential career. From 1933-45 Roosevelt was almost 
constantly assailed by crises — firstly the Great Depression and then a global war. Founding 
the UN was arguably the final of a series of great projects to remedy these domestic and 
international problems. Roosevelt plunged into office with the New Deal, followed this up 
with the Second New Deal, instituted Lend-Lease to help in the World War, took America 
into conflict with the Axis, and finally helped to found the UN. These great projects all bear 
similar characteristics bome, as scholars such as Abbott221 have argued, of Roosevelt’s 
Progressive-era background and influences.
All these efforts were centralised, ‘Big Government’ solutions imbued with an idealistic, 
moralistic rhetoric focused on transformation and radical improvement o f social conditions. 
In other words, they were broadly the heirs of the Progressive-era policies of two of the men 
who had most influenced FDR in his early career. O f course, Teddy Roosevelt’s trust-busting 
attacks on monopoly capital and corruption were concerned “to set up a moral standard”222 
for fair commercial practices. Woodrow Wilson’s establishment of the League of Nations was 
a highly idealistic plan and, in pushing for the nineteenth amendment in 1918 for women’s 
suffrage, he urged Senators to “do this just thing and show our women that you trust them 
as much as you in fact and of necessity depend upon them.”223 However, as George Mowry224
220 See for instance, Dallek, R. (1979) Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy 1932-45. Ryan, H. 
(1988) Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Rhetorical Presidency. Kimball, W. (1991) The Juggler: Franklin Roosevelt as 
Wartime Statesman, Leuchtenburg, W. (2001) In the Shadow of FDR: Flarry Truman to George W. Bush or 
Woolner, D., Kimball, W. and Reynolds, D. (eds.) (2008) FDR’s World: War. Peace and Legacies
221 See for instance, Abbott, P. (1990) The Exemplary Presidency: Franklin D. Roosevelt and the American 
Political Tradition. O f course, given the Republican dominance o f the 1920s and the failure o f Progressivism to 
deal with crime and corruption in the ways that it had promised, Roosevelt could never term his 1930s projects 
Progressive. Instead he recommended them as ‘liberal’ solutions.
222 See Pringle, H. (2005) Theodore Roosevelt: A Biography p419. Roosevelt’s comment here pertains to the 
need to establish fair and regular railroad tariffs.
223 Wilson, W. (1918) Address to the Senate on the 19th Amendment, September 30th, 1918. Available at:
http://www.public.iastate.edu/~aslagell/SpCm416/W oodrow Wilson suff.html. Accessed on 10/10/2009. 
Author’s emphasis added.
224 See Mowry, G. (1954) The Era o f Theodore Roosevelt and the Birth o f Modem America. 1900-1912
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argues, the Progressivism of Teddy Roosevelt or Wilson was not simply idealism for its own 
sake, but was profoundly a problem-solving ethos, wherein new, rational, sometimes 
explicitly scientific methods o f analysis were employed to investigate and solve discrete social 
problems for the moral and ethical betterment of society. This duality of practical but 
rhetorically moral action manifest in Big Government projects, was carried through into 
FDR’s approach to tackling domestic and international crises.
One way to separate these two facets of idealism and pragmatism is to look at some of FDR’s 
own pronouncements, in particular on a theme that demonstrated an important characteristic 
to his thinking. As Range records, whether on the issue of the ratification of the Treaty of 
Versailles, the implementation of the New Deal, or the issue of postwar planning, FDR most 
often sought to concentrate “on the development of general principles and the achievement 
o f major objectives and.. .look(ed) upon many important matters as mere worrisome details 
that could be settled later by subordinates.”225 In response to press conference questions in 
1943 concerning government thinking on the postwar international architecture, FDR said: 
“(W)hen people ask the details about an objective, I say, ‘I am not interested’ or ‘I am not 
ready to talk’ or *We haven’t studied the methods and details.”226 At the level of general 
objectives, Roosevelt could air his idealist, progressive desires to re-make the world. Many 
times he recognised realistic constraints upon his ideals, particularly in the opposition he 
expected to find to plans to enter the war, or to re-design the postwar international 
institutional architecture. Simply because contingent realities constrain us however, FDR did 
not (as his impassioned self-defence at Ottawa shows above), believe that humanity should 
give up on ideals. If  the ‘Four Policemen’227, for instance, were required to set up a stable 
world in which a more general organisation might not founder as the League had done, then 
that admission to power politics would have to be made. As Richard Nixon said of FDR, “he 
talked always in idealistic terms, but he was an operator.”228 This assiduous blending of 
idealistic statements with a keen awareness of the need for pragmatism is perfectly visible in 
his FDR’s ‘Four Freedoms’ address of 1941. Being one of his most idealistic
225 Range, W. (1959) Franklin D. Roosevelt’s World Order p29
226 Roosevelt, F.D. (1943) Excerpt from ‘Press Conference for the American Society of Newspaper Editors, Feb 
12th 1943’. Available at: http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=l 6361. Accessed on 10/09/2009.
227 See Woods, R.B. (1990) A Changing o f  The Guard: Anglo-American Relations 1941-1946
228 Nixon’s interviews with Douglas Brinkley, see Leuchtenburg, W. (2001) In the Shadow of F D R  Harry 
Truman to George W. Bush p!73
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pronouncements wherein he rallied opposition to dictatorship under the banner of a “moral 
order”, he nevertheless cautioned that the statement was “no vision of a distant 
millennium. It is a definite basis for a kind of world attainable in our own time and 
generation.”229 The same discursive juxtaposition of ideal and pragmatic imperatives is 
observable in the final article of the Atlantic Charter where nations are exhorted to abandon 
the use of force “for realistic as well as spiritual reasons.”230
He did not believe that either the League or the nascent UN could be perfect, but that in 
principle they were, and should be, born of what he called “magnificent idealism.”231 
Assessing the failure of the idealism o f the League, he commented in his State of the Union 
Address in 1943 that “we have learned that we cannot maintain peace at this stage of human 
development by good intentions alone.”232 By the time of his 1945 Message to the Congress 
this message had been solidified and reflected the way FDR contributed to leading the 
development from uncompromising Wilsonian idealism to the more self-aware idealism that 
characterised the UN:
“Nations like individuals do not always see alike or think alike, and international cooperation and progress 
are not helped by any Nation assuming that it has a monopoly of wisdom or of virtue.
In the future world the misuse of power, as implied in the term "power politics," must not be a controlling 
factor in international relations. That is the heart of the principles to which we have subscribed. We cannot 
deny that power is a factor in world politics any more than we can deny its existence as a factor in national 
politics... Perfectionism, no less than isolationism or imperialism or power politics, may obstruct the paths to 
international peace... the retreat to isolationism a quarter of a century ago was started not by a direct attack 
against international cooperation but against the alleged imperfections of the peace.
In our disillusionment after the last war we preferred international anarchy to international cooperation with 
Nations which did not see and think exactly as we did. We gave up the hope of gradually achieving a better 
peace because we had not the courage to fulfil our responsibilities in an admittedly imperfect world. ’S3}
229 Roosevelt. F.D. (1941), Annual Message to the Congress, 6th January 1941. Available at:
h ttp ://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/fdrthefourfreedoms.htm. Accessed on 10/10/2008.
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FDR’s role was to hold out the general ideals that would later be embodied in the UN. 
Thusly Hull wrote to Roosevelt when seeking approval for revamping the postwar studies 
section of the State Department, that the task of the whole planning staff and the new 
Presidential Advisory Committee on Postwar Foreign Policy would be “to translate into a 
program of specific policies and measures the broad principles enunciated in the Adanric 
Declaration and in your other pronouncements of post-war policy.”234 In other words, the 
Rooseveltian mantra of grand, macro-level idealism supported by detail-oriented micro-level 
realist planning permeated the whole process. Delegating the detail to the State Department 
and maintaining a high-level of secrecy until the planning process was well advanced, had 
confronted all the potential obstacles and found answers to all possible objections, was the 
Administration’s prime method for ensuring that the infant wings o f Roosevelt’s postwar 
ideals were not clipped.
3.2.2 Secretary of State, Cordell Hull and Under-Secretary, Sumner Welles
While Cordell Hull was involved in the early years of postwar planning until his declining 
health forced him into retirement in 1944, it has often been noted235 that (perversely for such 
a long serving Secretary of State) foreign policy was far from Hull’s speciality, and in many 
ways he was an unlikely supervisor for the germination of the UN. In fact, during the 
planning process, what turned out to be irreparable tensions grew up between Hull and his 
Under-Secretary, Sumner Welles, over the direction and leadership o f the project. Welles, a 
good friend of FDR, and like his President a former Groton student, was a keen thinker on 
international issues and had been sent on missions to South America, Cuba and Japan by 
Wilson, and later to Europe in 1940 on behalf of FDR. Welles had proved himself to have 
nuanced appreciations for the US’s international role in the developing world crisis as early as 
1937, when he outlined what came to be known as the Welles Plan in his first year as Under­
secretary. In a speech at the University of Virginia in July, Welles proposed a highly 
Wilsonian conception of ways to improve international stability including ‘international 
standards’ of behaviour, regular international conferences and reduction o f arms and tariff
234 Letter, Hull to FDR, 17th May 1942. President’s Official File, Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, NY. Folder - 
OF4720, Advisory Committee on Postwar Foreign Policy 1942-4. Author’s emphasis added, not present in 
original.
235 See for instance, Gellman, I. (1995) Secret Affairs: Franklin Roosevelt. Cordell Hull and Sumner Welles
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barriers. Conversations with FDR subsequent to this address gave the President the ideas for 
his famous ‘Quarantine Speech’, and Welles later proposed in the autumn of 1937 a 
conference o f all nations at the White House where neutral nations would guarantee to 
quarantine international aggressors.236 Welles had found a practical way to promote global 
stability without endangering American neutrality and Roosevelt much appreciated the 
creative thinking of his new Under-Secretary.
Indeed by 1943, as Schlesinger notes, Welles had assumed “a dominance over UN planning” 
that was “starting to embitter Hull.”237 Partly, FDR trusted the internationalist, swift-thinking 
Welles far more on UN issues than he did the cautious Hull. Welles and Roosevelt had 
known each other since childhood and Welles had been a page at FDR’s wedding. Woodrow 
Wilson and his idealist internationalism influenced both men equally and both owed their 
political careers to his influence. Wilson had given FDR his first central government position 
as Assistant Secretary to the Navy. Welles declared himself to be “thrilled to the depths 
of...(his)...emotional and intellectual being by the vision that Woodrow Wilson held out to us 
of a world order founded on justice and democracy.”238 Welles’ rhetoric throughout the war 
was characterised, in the words of Christopher O ’Sullivan, by “idealistic pronouncements 
about freedom, self-determination and radical change” with “an aura of spiritual and moral 
zeal.”239 This idealism though, just as with FDR, remained practical and progressive in nature. 
Welles remained convinced in his own writings that his and Roosevelt’s decision to 
commence practical postwar planning at the earliest stage, (even downgrading their plans for 
the sake of simplification from universal organization to regional bodies based on the Inter- 
American Conferences of the 1930s) was critical to the task o f ensuring US and international 
support for the new world order when the war ended.240 Welles “calculated that the war effort 
would be better sustained by moral arguments than by appeals to self-interest...his vision of 
the postwar order would allow American commerce to flourish alongside universal values and
236 See, O ’Sullivan, C. (2008) Sumner Welles. Postwar Planning and the Quest for a New World Order 1937-1943 
p22-4.
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ideals.”241 He intended to use grand rhetoric to promote support for a new world order which 
would gready benefit the United States’ pragmatic interests.
Hull, conversely, lacked the drive and the expertise to tackle the mountain of issues which 
required consideration in the postwar planning process, especially when the planning staff 
was increased and the process shifted into top gear in May 1942. His political career prior to 
being named Secretary of State conspicuously included almost no foreign experience. He was 
principally credited with turning his legal nous to reforming the domestic taxation system 
under the Wilson administration.242 As Hoopes and Brinkley remark, Welles rather than Hull 
“was the first highly placed US official to make public reference to postwar aims; declaring 
that only an ‘Association of Nations’ could rebuild a shattered world”243 in a speech at the 
Norwegian Legation in Washington in July 1941. Further, Hull’s frequent absences from 
Washington due to ill-health allowed control of the processes of planning to slip from his 
grasp. As we have seen, Welles had already stolen a march on the Secretary, pushing FDR to 
consider grand schemes for reordering the world even as early as 1937.
The initial list of advisors that Hull drew up when his Department was given the go-ahead to 
begin to develop plans for a post-war world organization in 1939 is telling, and perhaps 
unexpected. He lists five main sources: the Council of Foreign Relations in New York and 
the British Foreign Office are his two prime political sources. The rest o f his list though is 
religious: the Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America, the Jewish Theological 
Seminary of America, and Pope Pius XII.244 Hull conceptualised his early work under the 
mantra of “endeavours for a righteous peace”245. However, it is clear that a grand world 
purpose along such shining moral lines was far from his initial thinking and is perhaps the 
product of triumphal hindsight when writing up his memoirs and a reversion to his default 
Episcopalian religiosity. The war in Europe throughout 1939 and 1940 prompted Hull and 
the State Department teams under his control to worry mainly about American trade interests 
and the distant possibility o f Hitler, having conquered all of Europe, seeking control of the
241 O ’Sullivan, C. (2008) Sumner Welles. Postwar Planning and the Quest for a New World Order 1937-1943 p. 
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Western Hemisphere colonies o f the European nations. His overriding concern in these early 
war years was that the US might have to extend heavy export subsidies to Latin American 
countries at taxpayers’ expense in order to bolster their economies for their resistance to 
Hitler.246 In fact, the way in which Hull envisaged the interconnection of the world in the 
postwar period differed little from his 1930s obsession with the opening o f a global free trade 
regime — even though this thinking (part of the Smoot-Hawley era protectionist problems) 
had been surpassed by the scope of other State Department ambitions in early 1940s. Hull 
was a man, according to Hoopes and Brinkley, “whose speeches...seemed like a train of 
twenty cars from which emerged only a single passenger. Hull’s single passenger was always 
the same — trade agreements.”247
Uniting the world economically was safe ground248, perfect for the “obsessive caution249” of 
Hull. Desiring bolder thinking and leadership of greater energy, FDR increasingly turned to 
Welles, especially when Hull’s health began to decline more rapidly in 1941. While Hull was 
given the chair o f the Advisory Committee on Postwar Foreign Policy at the request of FDR, 
Leo Pasvolsky notes that that body was “not on record as having sent any formal 
recommendations to the President.”250 The main Advisory Committee met only four times 
(thrice chaired by Welles), whereas Welles’ Subcommittee on Political Problems met sixty 
times and produced reams o f study reports and literature and was the main organ for the 
debate and drafting of the UN Charter. Though Welles assumed the mantle of figurehead for 
political planning in 1942 and 1943 to the chagrin of Hull, he found his ideas on world 
organisation often blocked or transformed upon reaching the President or Hull.
Welles had been a Latin American specialist since the 1920s and was, in many ways, a 
regionalist when it came to world organisation. Having far more detailed geographical and 
historical knowledge of various areas o f the world than his superior he tended to look at 
political problems in smaller, more detail-oriented focus. Problems over the fate of postwar
246 Hull, C. (1948) The Memoirs o f  Cordell Hull: Vol 2 pl629
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Poland say, were, in his eyes, stricdy a matter for a European council and could not, Welles 
believed, be solved by reforming in generalist terms the moral principles or the trade patterns 
of the postwar world. While Welles had greater Departmental control during the formative 
years of 1942-3, the unitary philosophy of the UN came to embody less the ideas of Welles 
(or another arch-regionalist, Winston Churchill) and more the principled idealism o f Hull and 
FDR, especially following Welles forced resignation in August 1943.251 At this point Hull re­
asserted control over the planning process, but was less than central in the day-to-day 
meetings.
While struggles over the conduct of planning were fought in the State Department, a 
disjunction opened between the outcomes of these battles and the views of the president 
himself. This was principally caused by FDR’s desire to delegate precise planning of the 
postwar architecture in order to devote himself to the task of winning the war. As Welles 
writes, “the President used frequently to say that he did not want to be drawn into the 
intensive studies of post-war settlements...he would say, ‘What I expect you to do is to have 
prepared for me the necessary number of baskets and the necessary number of alternative 
solutions...from which I can make my own choice.”252 Thus disconnection appeared between 
the coalface of postwar planning and the highest echelons where the general principles were 
instantiated and modified. One constant factor throughout both the war years and Hull and 
Welles’ disagreements, enabled the executive and the State Department to regain unity of 
purpose between the principles coming from the top of the Administration, and the 
bureaucratic organisation o f them lower down. This constant factor was Dr. Leo Pasvolsky.
3.2.3 Leo Pasvolsky
More than any other official involved in the UN planning procedure, Pasvolsky became 
indispensable once the planning had reached a stage when, after considerable research, solid
251 Welles was outed as being homosexual after the leaking o f information that he had solicited sexual favours 
from African-American busboys in 1940. The leak was instigated by Cordell Hull as revenge for Welles 
usurpation o f his primacy within the State Department and carried out by William Bullitt Jr.. The rumours 
sufficed to destroy Welles’ career. See Welles, B. (1997) Sumner Welles: FDR’s Global Strategist p273-4
252 Welles, S. (1951) Seven Major Decisions p!76-7.
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drafts of the structure of a potential organization could be finally produced253. Pasvolsky 
coordinated meetings for the State Department’s planning bodies with almost every possible 
influential and interested party. When it came to presenting ideas to allied governments later 
on in the war, Pasvolsky was often de facto if not de nomine the chair, the chief negotiator, and 
the chief expert combined. Given the floating roles o f ‘Special Assistant to the Secretary’ and 
‘Director of Special Research’, he became the only official cognisant of all aspects of postwar 
planning. While many contributors to the planning process worked on one or two 
committees, and often attended infrequently or only during part of the six year process, 
Pasvolsky was present on whole plethora of committees, and attended almost all meetings 
from 1939 through to 1945.254
Pasvolsky’s background was in economic history, and, while living in the US during the 
Russian Revolution, he edited the journal ‘Russian Review’. During the 1920s and 1930s, he 
was employed as a researcher at the Brookings Institute and published several books and 
articles on European war debts, reparations, communist economics, and Russian international 
relations, often in collaboration with Harold G. Moulton.255 As a journalist he attended the 
Versailles conferences to write about the economic aspects of the treaties for the New York 
press. Pasvolsky’s background in international economics made him the perfect foil for 
Cordell Hull, whose policy concerns throughout the economically unstable 1930s meshed 
well with Pasvolsky’s economic expertise. Indeed, such did Hull’s dependence upon
253 See Schlesinger, S. (2004) Act o f Creation: The Founding of the United Nations ch 2
254 A full account o f Pasvolsky’s overarching involvement is recorded in his papers. Especially useful is a full 
chronology o f meetings o f various subcommittees within the State Department, preserved in an Untitled Internal 
Memo dated 4th October 1944, Leo Pasvolsky Papers, Library o f Congress, Washington DC. Box 5; Folder — 
‘State Department Work in International Organisations prior to October 1943’. Pasvolsky was a major 
contributor to Welles and Hull’s Subcommittee on Political Problems, Isaiah Bowman’s Territories 
Subcommittee, the Special Subcommittee on International Organization, and the Special Subcommittee on 
Problems o f European Organization. Furthermore, he chaired the International Organisation Security 
Subcommittee. The only meetings he did not regularly attend were those o f the Security Technical Committee 
which cross-reported with his Security Committee in any case, and the Special Subcommittee on Legal Problems 
wherein he could not claim expertise. Also, it is recorded here that the Drafting Group for the UN Charter was 
“constituted at the direction of Mr. Pasvolsky in July 1943”. It produced the Tentative Draft Text o f the Charter 
o f the UN just a month later in August 1943.
255 ‘Memorandum on Mr. Leo Pasvolsky’ April 5th 1943’, Oscar Cox Papers, Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park NY. 
Series I, Box 26. For further information on ‘second-tier’ figures such as Cox and their activities within FDR’s 
Administration, see Woods, R.B. (1990) A Changing o f the Guard: Anglo-American Relations. 1941-1946. Cox, a 
lawyer by training was a legal aide to Harry Hopkins, a prime draftsman o f the Lend-Lease Bill, General Counsel 
to the Foreign Economic Administration and finally Deputy Director o f the Foreign Economic Administration 
(FEA). See also Pasvolsky, L. and Moulton, H.G. (1932) War Debts and World Prosperity. It is likely that this 
memo on Pasvolsky was prepared for Cox’s benefit as his postwar organization work would impact upon Cox’s 
FEA.
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Pasvolsky grow that, as John Parke Young, chief of the Division of International Finance 
recalled, Pasvolsky “had an office next door (to Hull), was in and out all day long. It was said 
that he was so close to Cordell Hull that Hull wouldn't lift a finger without first speaking to 
Leo.”256
It was due to Hull’s trust o f Pasvolsky, and his own lack of knowledge of the actions of 
Welles’ committees prior to the latter’s resignation in summer 1943, that Hull pushed 
Pasvolsky forward to assume overarching control of the planning process in his stead. The 
economic focus of Hull and Pasvolsky lent itself to transition into appreciating political 
organisation in a unitary rather than a regionalist way. One o f the most universally successful 
aspects of the international management of the League o f Nations was the ILO257, and labour 
rights movements were one o f the major discursive groundswells that inspired general 
movements towards the human rights that became enshrined in the UN institutional 
framework. Quite apart from this, Pasvolsky himself, in charge of the coordination of several 
committees, became the prime administrator of the planning process. His involvement within 
multiple bureaucratic arms, considering the problem of world order in terms of economics, 
politics, legal mechanisms, security measures, and moral principles led him when investigating 
the proposals of other governments, or even of subordinate staff, always to seek a unitary 
solution. Pasvolsky lost patience with British plans for regional councils or separate 
international court procedures or institutions. He recommended to Hull in 1943 that such 
disparate pieces of machinery be eschewed in favour of an institution which would derive 
authority and would make bureaucratic sense by virtue of being able to manage multiple 
aspects of world order “on a coordinated basis”258 and wrote to FDR in the same summer of 
1943 that “the basis o f international organisation should be worldwide rather than 
regional...there are grave dangers involved in having the world organisation rest upon...fully-
256 Harry S. Truman Library Oral History Project. Interview with John. P. Young by James R. Fuchs, 21st 
February, 1974. Available at: h ttp :/  / www.frumanlibrary.org/oralhist/voungjp.hfm. Accessed on 15/10/2007.
257 See Ghebali, V-Y. (1989) The International Labour Organisation: A Case Study on the Evolution o f UN 
Specialised Agencies
258 Memo: ‘International Activities in which United States must participate to Re-establish and Maintain Peace 
and to Promote General Welfare’ August 9th 1943, p9. Leo Pasvolsky Papers, Library of Congress, Washington 
DC. Box 7; Folder - Postwar Planning 1942-3.
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fledge regional organisations.”259 He believed that only a coordinated and singular institution 
backed by a singular and inspiring philosophy, “would be sufficiently flexible to carry out the 
special functions o f.. .a transition from war to peace.”260
In this sense, though hardly the moral inspiration for the UN’s loftier purposes, Pasvolsky 
ensured that a unitary organisation could be in place that was worthy of the aims of Hull and 
FDR. In spite of this, Schlesinger261 argues, Pasvolsky had also become a committed 
Wilsonian internationalist during his work at the Versailles conference. He continued to 
push, for instance, for a universal Bill o f Rights to be included at the San Francisco 
conference — one which defended the individual so robustly as to propose in Pasvolsky’s 
draft to “constitute a part of the supreme law o f each state.”262 This retention of the moralism 
of his superiors in his drafting work came under criticism in later writings of Dean 
Acheson263. It is due to the replacement of Welles by Pasvolsky as the foremost motor behind 
organising postwar planning that the influence o f Welles’ regionalism was cut off in late 1943. 
The drafts for the general structure of a UN to which Roosevelt finally decided to give his 
full support were Pasvolsky’s August 1943264 versions, not Welles earlier work. These drafts 
formed the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals and thereafter the preparatory documentation for 
the many nations at the San Francisco Conference.
259 Memo for the President, ‘Subcommittee on Security o f Advisory Committee on Postwar Foreign Policy 
August 11th 1943’. Leo Pasvolsky Papers, Library o f Congress, Washington DC. Box 3; Folder — International 
Organization — Memoranda for the President 1943 and 1945.
260 Memo for the President, ‘Subcommittee on Security o f Advisory Committee on Postwar Foreign Policy 
August 11th 1943’. Leo Pasvolsky Papers, Library o f Congress, Washington DC. Box 3; Folder — International 
Organization — Memoranda for the President 1943 and 1945.
261 Schlesinger, S. (2004) Act o f Creation: The Founding of the United Nations p33-5.
262 Leo Pasvolsky Papers, Library o f Congress, Washington DC. Box 3; Folder -  International Organizations: 
General International Organization Documentation Book II: VII, Annex II.
263 See Beisner, R. (2006) Dean Acheson: A Life in the Cold War. Beisner reproduces a 1967 letter from Acheson 
to State’s Charles Burton Marshall in which he laments the trajectory of over-ambitious moralism from Wilson 
through to Pasvolsky.
264 These drafts are available in the Leo Pasvolsky Papers, Library o f Congress, Washington DC. Box 3; Folders — 
General International Organization Documentation
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3.3 Outside Influence? Limiting The Space For Debate
3.3.1 US Domestic Pressures for Secrecy
A postwar organisation, indeed a new world order which purported to reflect the views of the 
vast majority of humankind — that majority who had not been turned by the militarism of 
totalitarian rule — might be expected to have been the product of a grand debate upon the 
common values that could be agreed upon by the diverse nations of humanity. With 
reference to the first major discussion between the Great Powers upon the subject, Hoopes 
and Brinkley state that “(I)deally, the discussions at Dumbarton Oaks would be conducted as 
a Socratic dialogue on the future of humankind.”265 Such an ideal dialogue was the initial goal 
of Welles’ reconstituted Subcommittee on International Organisation when it convened for 
its first discussion on ‘Preliminary Views on the Nature of Postwar International 
Organisation’ on 31st July 1942. The minutes record the general (and Wellesian) conclusion 
that “no international organisation can be sustained unless it has a wide popular appeal and is 
buttressed by a deep faith in its ideals.”266 However, the pragmatics of attempting to produce 
a sound and thorough document in the frenzied months of war, meant that the Dumbarton 
Oaks meetings amounted to the Four Powers (though mainly the United States) producing a 
plan on behalf of the world. In fact, a Socratic dialogue, the asking and answering of open 
questions upon the future of the postwar world, especially in terms of a concrete 
organisation, was, as FDR insisted from the very earliest attempts at postwar planning, a 
realistic impossibility.
Taking a cue both from their President and from the dangerous and unstable times, FDR’s 
Administration trod a difficult path between a strong desire to right the failings of Versailles 
and re-order the world once and for all, and the realisation that isolationism at home would 
block their plans and fear of a repeat of the failures of the 1930s would dog their every 
pronouncement. Indeed, within the Administration and the planning hub that was the State
265 Hoopes, T. and Brinkley, D. (1997) FDR and the Creation o f the United Nations p i 37.
266 Minutes T-I-O -2’, 31st July 1942, p3. Sumner Welles Papers, Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park NY. Box 189 — 
Postwar Foreign Policy Files 1940-43, Folder 4 -  Subcommittee on International Organisation Minutes #1-43.
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Department, “(T)he leitmotif of all the working parties and discussion groups... was over the 
right mix of ‘realism’ and ‘idealism’ that should be used in approaching postwar planning.”267 
The ‘idealism’ o f discourse of a ‘new world order’ free from war and protecting a set of 
common, consensual human values had to be tempered in the planning by two ‘realist’ 
factors. Firstly, anti-intemationalism in US domestic public and political opinion had to be 
nullified and a way had to be found to encourage a shift in the prevailing suspicion of 
overseas entanglements. In other words, a method was required to move the weight of 
opinion away from Monroe Doctrine isolationism and rejection of the travails of the outside 
world. Another historical narrative of the American national experience needed to be 
mobilised in order to motivate a real engagement with postwar problems: moral 
internationalism based on a notion of exceptionalism. Just as with the transformation o f the 
war into a Manichean struggle for fundamental values, in the process of making a new world 
order, the FDR Administration could not rely on the American people simply wishing to take 
part, instead they mobilised the exceptionalist268 discourse and took the lead. Secondly, while 
the State Department in private consultation with Great Power allies professed that “the 
approach to the problem of permanent international organisation should be universal”269 in 
including representatives from all nations, no-one was under the illusion that this was even 
vaguely feasible or that many countries, in the middle o f wartime, could spare the time and 
effort required for international debates on proposed world organisation.
On the domestic front, the FDR Administration could not risk their postwar planning project 
falling foul of isolationists in the Senate, Congress or public who could have been expected to 
treat the early start o f the postwar planning program in 1939 as distinctly duplicitous on the 
part o f an Administration which had spent the years 1939-41 actively distancing itself from 
charges o f becoming entangled in the war. On the international front, full and open debate 
seemed impossible due to the circumstances of the war and also due to the differing visions 
that other nations would inevitably have for the postwar order. The nature o f the
267 Williams, A. (1998) Failed Imagination? New World Orders o f the Twentieth Century plO l
268 Roosevelt had begun the traumatic year o f 1939 by invoking Lincoln’s characterisation o f American as ‘the 
last, best hope o f earth’ in his State o f the Union Address. See Roosevelt F.D. (1939) ‘State o f the Union 
Address, 4th January 1939’. Available at: h ttp :/ Avww.presidencv.ucsb.edu/ws/index.phpPpid^l5684. Accessed 
on 10/12/2009.
269 D raft Report - ‘Official Statements and Views Relative to the Maintenance o f Peace and Security’, 31st July 
1944, p i  1. Leo Pasvolsky Papers, Library of Congress, Washington DC. Box 4, Folder: International 
Organisations: Official Statements and Views JL-AG 1944.
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international values and ambitions of the Soviet Union was largely unknown. The question of 
the continuance of imperial relations was clearly an area where the postwar vision for new 
human values espoused in the United States, clashed dramatically with the views of countries 
like Great Britain and France.
Thus, instead of a universal debate, the FDR Administration laid out the plans for the new 
world order within a tightly controlled research and policy group. In effect, control of the 
direction of the future international organisation which would overwhelmingly shape the 
moral tone for values and policy throughout the entire world, lay in the hands o f about 
twenty officials in the FDR Administration, and specifically within the Department o f State. 
The initial “decision of December 27th 1939 to institute consultation by committee” of 
postwar problems and policy recommended a “chosen body (that was) wholly 
departmental.”270 This decision resulted from a “discussion in Secretary Hull’s office of a 
proposal, prepared by Mr. Leo Pasvolsky”271 on that very same day. While at a preliminary 
stage in 1940, the small scale of the staff and their generally low ranking made them a fairly 
anonymous group. However, when some definite results were beginning to be produced by 
the planning staff, White House Order 917-A, of 3rd February 1941272 demanded official 
secrecy for all postwar planning long before the US had looked certain to enter the war.
The planning staff was greatly expanded and re-organised in the wake of the United States’ 
being thrust into war by the Pearl Harbor attacks of December 1941, and the research remit 
within the State Department splintered into increasingly in-depth specialisations. A letter 
from Hull to FDR from May 17th 1942 rubber-stamped the dramatic shift of the planning 
process into high gear. Hull also made clear in this letter than the State Department was to 
maintain close control of general thinking on post war policy at a time when debate on the 
nature of the postwar world was becoming widespread within Washington and in the nation 
at large:
270Undated Memo - TMotes: restricted and secret’. Harley N otter Papers, NARA, College Park, MD. Box 1, 
Drafts o f Foreign Policy Preparation 1939-45. Folder: The Preparations: Secret.
271 Report: ‘II: Period o f WWIF, p3. Harley N otter Papers, NARA, College Park, MD. Box 8, Miscellaneous 
Subject Files 1939-50. Folder — Chronology 1939-41.
272 Undated personal records - ‘Notes on Publicity re: Research Staff. Harley N otter Papers, NARA, College 
Park, MD. Box 11; Misc. Subject Files. Folder; Notter, Harley (Recollections).
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“Since it is yourfurther desire that all recommendations regarding postwar problems of international relations 
from all Departments and agencies of the Government be submitted to you through the Secretary of State, and 
that all conversations or negotiations with foreign governments bearing on post-war problems be conducted 
under your authority by the Department of State, I  should appreciate it i f  you would cause the heads of the 
various Departments and agencies concerned to be apprised of your wishes.,£73
Whilst this might seem merely like the Secretary trying to guard his patch, FDR himself acted 
to shut down the involvement of, for instance, the Secretary o f Commerce Jesse Jones, when 
he set up his own internal Departmental inquiries into post-war issues in May 1942. In a letter 
to the President, Jones stated that “May 21st we had the first meeting for the consideration of 
preliminary steps to study postwar economic problem s...It is our belief that industry itself 
must give some thought and study to its postwar problems.”274 Four days after the receipt of 
this letter, FDR made a reply, not to Jones at first, but to Hull. His memo records: “I think 
there is a real danger in having Jesse Jones expand his thought as contained in this letter.”275 
In his letter replying to Jones, FDR made it clear that his opinion was that work on postwar 
problems by the Department o f Commerce was unnecessary, he wrote that “there is a great 
danger o f confusion if several committees.. .are set up” and if  any work was to be considered 
by anyone on the subject of the commercial implications of postwar planning, “these 
studies.. .should be coordinated through Mr. Frederic Delano”276 — FDR’s uncle. This 
exchange reflects not only the desire of FDR and the State Department to maintain full 
control over postwar planning, but also betrays the fact that the Department of Commerce 
was most likely unaware o f the long-standing State Department investigations into postwar 
economic problems and the President’s desire to keep postwar work confined to the State 
Department.
Through 1942, the planning procedure was diversified and the Division o f Special Research 
staff was expanded. The concern for secrecy remained paramount. Even as confidence in the 
Allied war effort was increasing following the US Navy’s success at Midway in June, the
273 Letter, Hull to FDR, 17th May 1942. President’s Official File, Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, NY. Folder - 
OF4720, Advisory Committee on Postwar Foreign Policy 1942-4.
274 Letter, Jesse Jones to FDR, 12th June 1942. President’s Official File, Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, NY. 
Folder - OF4725, United Nations 1941-2.
275 Memo, FDR to Hull, 16th June 1942. President’s Official File, Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, NY. Folder - 
OF4725, United Nations 1941-2.
276 Letter, FDR to Jesse Jones, 15th July 1942. President’s Official File, Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, NY. Folder 
-OF4725, United Nations 1941-2.
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British defeat o f Rommel’s Afrika Korps in November and the continuing defence by the 
Red Army of Stalingrad, the State Department sought to keep the postwar planning projects 
tightly under wraps. A memo from Leo Pasvolsky to his entire staff dated 22nd December 
1942 issues harsh warnings about the need for secrecy. Battlefield successes, he said, had 
prompted “comments in published form, remarks of radio commentators” and “statements 
by various individuals” on the shape that the US might wish to impose on a world where the 
Axis had been defeated. In this climate of renewed debate he exhorted all personnel to 
“maintain the strictest confidence regarding our work”. Furthermore, he cautioned in strict 
terms that “the existence and organisation of the committees, and the thinking o f the 
committees...are not under any circumstances to be the subjects of comment to anyone 
outside the members of the Division itself...In the event that the direct question is asked 
whether you are engaged in postwar studies, it is suggested that you say that you are 
examining problems arising out of the war”. And in addition to pretending that the 
committees did not exist and not speaking to outsiders, he urged that “(G)reat care and 
caution...be taken by members discussing our work among themselves within earshot of 
others to assure that no one will overhear.”277
The project of maintaining the secrecy of the planning nerve centre was helpfully abetted by 
the fact that the State Department was run by a Secretary, Cordell Hull, who would never 
have been a likely shaper o f the international political order. As Hoopes and Brinkley remark: 
“(R)oosevelt had chosen him not for his qualifications in foreign affairs — he had none — but 
for his high standing and rapport with Senate leaders.”278 Though Hull was the early de nomine 
chair of many postwar planning committee meetings, his overall contribution in the day-to- 
day work of the committees in producing reports and research papers was surpassed by that 
of Sumner Welles and by the man who came to be at the nexus of the research in numerous 
committees, Leo Pasvolsky. Additionally, Hull’s health was failing throughout the 1940s and 
he regularly spent the winter in Florida, totally out o f the policy loop of Washington. 
Pasvolsky wrote o f a talk with Hull in April 1943 shortly before Welles was forced out: “he 
told me that he felt very much in the dark on the whole matter (of) general international
277 All above quotes from ‘Staff Memo no. 26. 22nd December 1942 - To The Members of the Staff and 
Consultants, from Leo Pasvolsky’. Harley N otter Papers. NARA, College Park, MD. Box 11; Misc Subject Files. 
Folder - Notter, Harley (Recollections).
278 Hoopes, T. and Brinkley, D. (1997) FDR and the Creation o f the United Nations p32/3
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organisation.”279 The planning process was thus fragmented. Hull was nominally in charge 
until his resignation in November 1944; for much of the time in the early years of the war 
however, Welles was the de facto driving force, and also assumed the position of Acting 
Secretary of State while Hull was away from Washington. Neither Welles nor Hull would see 
out the planning process, and this fragmentation of leadership meant that it was impossible 
for any one person to have full knowledge of the results of all the research and almost no one 
could be regarded as a great risk in terms of leaking information.
Only after the Allies had definitively turned the tide of war in 1944 did the Administration 
felt confident enough to involve Senatorial groups in debating questions of postwar policy. 
Roosevelt was reluctant to repeat Wilson’s mistake of isolating the legislative branch. 
However, the Senate and Congress were largely unaware until 1944 of the ongoing planning 
organised by the State Department. An indication of the faith FDR invested in the planning 
staff can be derived from the following selection of expenditures approved in 1942 and 1943.
Expenses
($)
D ate
Approved
Stated Purpose 2009 ($) 
Equivalent280
397,000 28th May 
1942
“expenses in connection with the 
Advisory Committee on Postwar 
Foreign Policy281”
15,682,168.33
267,000 18th August 
1942
“geographical assistance to the 
President’s Advisory 
Committee”
10,546,949.48
250,000 26thAugust
1942
“certain types of world maps.. .for 
postwar studies282”
9,875,420.86
900,000 13th July 1943 “activities of the Advisory 
Committee”
29,385,621.96
250,000 15th July 1943 ■‘for maps283” 8,162,672.77
279 ‘Notes on a Talk with the Secretary, 19th April 1943’. Leo Pasvolsky Papers, Library of Congress, Washington 
DC. Box 7; Folder - Postwar Planning 1942-3.
280 Calculated using a Nominal GDP per capita conversion. Calculator available at:
h t t p : /  / w w w . m e a s u r i n g w o r t h . c o m / u s c o m p a r e . Accessed on 10/12/2009.
281 Letter, FDR to Secretary of the Treasury, Hans Morgenthau Jr., 28th May 1942. President’s Official File, 
Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, NY. Folder - OF4720, Advisory Committee on Postwar Foreign Policy 1942-4.
282 Letter, FDR to Secretary of the Treasury, Hans Morgenthau Jr., 26th August 1942. President’s Official File, 
Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, NY. Folder - OF4720, Advisory Committee on Postwar Foreign Policy 1942-4. 
This letter also mentions the above expenditure of $267,000 submitted to the President on August 18th.
283 Record of these final two sums is found in memos from Wayne Coy in the State Department stamped on the 
above dates with FDR’s approval for transmission to the Treasury. See, President’s Official File, Roosevelt 
Library, Hyde Park, NY. Folder - OF4720, Advisory Committee on Postwar Foreign Policy 1942-4.
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However, much that the Congress might be expected to have at least some knowledge of 
these activities, a letter to Hull from Senator Raymond E. Willis of Indiana on 18th April 1944 
suggests that the Senate had very little information at all regarding postwar planning. The 
Senator asked not only whether the State Department had done any work on postwar issues, 
but if so whether the Department staff engaged in such work might be disclosed to the 
Senate along with their ages and salaries. Hull’s reply came two months later on 15th June. He 
admitted that planning had been going on for a full four and a half years without the Senate’s 
knowledge and, while giving a list of some of the postwar planning personnel, confessed that 
“practically our entire staff participates to some degree”284 in postwar research.
3.3.2 America And Its Allies
Limiting the space for the debate o f postwar issues was far from confined to the policy of 
insulating the State Department from other domestic parties. Before calling the Dumbarton 
Oaks Conference in summer 1944, the American planning procedure (as was noted in 
Chapter One) had largely been shielded even from America’s wartime Allies. Compared to 
the State Department’s ‘Tentative Proposals’285, the debate of which became the Dumbarton 
Oaks Conference agenda, the proposals put forward by the British, Russians and Chinese 
were embarrassingly sketchy. This section investigates how America’s allies were presented 
with a thoroughly planned UN organisation as a fa it accompli at Dumbarton Oaks in 1944, and 
how a lack of consultation prior to the meetings ensured that the Allied delegations arrived 
unable to substantially contribute to the discussions.
At the root o f the planning process in the US was the stark strategic belief that “an 
International Organisation is .. .the most effective and economical way to maintain American 
security.”286 As a result of long-standing American suspicion of alliance politics, if the US was
284 Letter, Sec. Hull to Sen. Raymond E. Willis, 15th June 1944. Leo Pasvolsky Papers, Library o f Congress, 
Washington DC. Box 7, Folder — Postwar Planning 1944.
285 For details see Hilderbrand, R.C. (1990) Dumbarton Oaks: The Origins o f the UN and the Search for Postwar 
Security
286Undated memo, TJS Foreign Policy and the International Organisation: A Proposal For the Development of 
Long-Range Foreign Policy’, p4. Leo Pasvolsky Papers, Library o f Congress, Washington DC. Box 5. Folder -  
International Organisations: US Foreign Policy and the International Organisation, 1944.
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to secure its future by an internationalist policy, legitimacy in terms o f public support could 
only come if “(T)he international center of gravity...be increasingly shifted to the 
organisation.”287 In the early stages of planning in 1941, consensus was reached that whatever 
international organisation was designed, it should bolster US vital interests and as such the 
US “should be placed on the senior partnership basis, or (the organization should be) under 
the protectorate o f the United States.”288 As such, the true extent of the planning process was 
partially shielded from the US’s allies, and their attempts to find out about or revise American 
thinking on postwar organisation were regularly deflected.
An early instance o f this reluctance to engage with allies came in February 1940 when Lord 
Lothian informed the State Department of the setting up of a government committee under 
Sir George Schuster to study problems surrounding the terms of peace, and asked about 
American thinking on the subject. Prior to the secrecy order mentioned above, Lothian was 
told of the existence o f the Advisory Committee on Postwar Problems. However, a memo 
from the American embassy in London to Sumner Welles records that “the President replied, 
according to Lothian, that he thought it inadvisable for the two committees to collaborate.”289 
Even contacts on an unofficial level were inadvisable, Ambassador John Winant wrote, due 
to “the real danger that informal contacts and exchange of ideas might easily be construed as 
involvement in British war aims.”290 Throughout the early part of the war, and before 
American military participation, the British Political and Economic Planning body asked for 
cooperation with American planners but was only given access to the non-governmental 
National Planning Association where peripheral topics of discussion were entertained such as 
the domestic issues for belligerent nations of defence budgeting and the wartime problems of 
consumer goods backlogs291. When the British set up the Inter-Allied Committee on Post-war
287 Undated memo, ‘US Foreign Policy and the International Organisation: A Proposal For the Development o f 
Long-Range Foreign Policy’, p4. Leo Pasvolsky Papers, Library o f Congress, Washington DC. Box 5. Folder — 
International Organisations: US Foreign Policy and the International Organisation, 1944. p5
288 Study Report September 1941: International Post-War Problems, p l4 . Leo Pasvolsky Papers, Library of 
Congress, Washington DC. Box 7. Folder -  Postwar Planning 1941. Author’s addition in parentheses to make 
sense o f the grammatical errors in the report.
289 Memo: Winant, J. (US Ambassador to Britain) to Berle, A. (for forwarding to Sumner Welles) 29th February 
1940. Adolf Berle Jr. Papers, Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, NY. Box 65; Folder — Postwar Plans 1939-44.
290 Ibid.
291 Undated personal research notes. Adolf Berle Jr. Papers, Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, NY. Box 65; Folder — 
Postwar Plans 1939-44. It may be supposed from the archival context, especially the subsequent comment on 
Leith Ross’ committee, that these notes date from 1941. We can thus conclude that British attempts at 
transatlantic dialogue were pushed around minor policy circles in Washington for two years while the US was
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Requirements under Frederick Leith Ross in 1941, the State Department planners looking on 
from Washington declared (unbeknownst to the British) that “it is envisaged that the new 
UN Committee would supersede the present Inter-Allied Committee.”292
Throughout 1941, the State Department remained content to let the British organise research 
and postwar think-tanks of their own, though of course they paid little heed to them. Without 
substantial contact between researchers on the two sides of the Adanric, their approaches by 
this time had substantially diverged. While the US had made extensive plans for the 
revitalisation of a League-type organisation called the UN, the British PEP by 1941 was 
producing plans on European Federalisation293. The Foreign Office was at this time 
recommending that the postwar international system ought to be based around a 
strengthened Permanent Court o f International Justice. Reaction to this within the State 
Department was withering: “a study of the Court question alone would not be particularly 
useful.”294 No effort however, was made to bring the British back in line with US thinking at 
this time — such effort was most likely to have been deemed superfluous. In fact, the British 
proposal of October 13th 1941295 asking whether the US would like to participate in or be 
kept informed of debates on the PCIJ was left unanswered for nine months. After elaborating 
on their ideas in two further communications, London cabled on July 28th 1942: “(FJoreign 
Office asks when they may expect indication of Department’s views. Embassy suggests it 
would be helpful if  Dept could indicate whether consideration is being given.”296 Within the 
State Department, their consideration was summed up by Harley Notter shortly before this
making its mind up about joining the war. A t this point, as we have seen, totally separate State Department 
initiatives were instituted whose committees did not debate, and seemingly did not care to consider earlier 
European ideas seriously at all. In many ways it would be difficult politically for the neutral Americans to have 
open dialogues on new world order with the British before joining the war, but their sidelining o f European allies 
thereafter is more intriguing.
292 Memo: U N  Approach to the Problem o f Relief, 24th September 1941. Adolf Berle Jr. Papers, Roosevelt 
Library, Hyde Park, NY. Box 65; Folder — Postwar Plans 1939-44.
293 ‘General IO  Documentation Book II:VIP, p52. Leo Pasvolsky Papers, Library of Congress, Washington DC. 
Box 3; Folder - International Organisations: General IO  Documentation Book II:VII.
294 Letter, Pasvolsky to Welles, 21st October 1941. Leo Pasvolsky Papers, Library of Congress, Washington DC. 
Box 7: Folder - Postwar Planning 1941.
295 Memo of Papers, ‘Permanent Court o f International Justice: British Proposals, no. 500C.114/1926 from 
London, 13th October 1941. Harley N otter Papers, NARA, College Park, MD. Box 19; Folder — Permanent 
Court - British Proposal (SCJ).
296 Memo o f Papers, Term anent Court o f International Justice: British Proposals, no. 500C.114/1935 from 
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last enquiry: “there seems to me to be no question but that we are not prepared to engage in 
even informal discussion with the British.”297
A similarly unresponsive attitude prevailed in 1943. Notter records that the Foreign Office 
submitted an inquiry on 8th April 1943 “concerning (the) nature of armistice terms we 
favoured.”298 While the British debated armistices and international courts, none of this 
international machinery would appear in the postwar architecture of 1945. Referring back to 
the requests on the subject of the PCIJ, the Foreign Office’s inquiry of April 1943 also 
prompted Notter to recall that “nothing has been done about the exchange of facts proposed 
by the British months ago.”299 A decision had been made in September 1942 to agree to a 
factual exchange, but not a policy exchange, however even this was neglected for almost 
another year. Finally in July 1943, Pasvolsky and Welles sent British representatives a 
selection of study reports produced in the course of the work of the State Department 
planners. Far from being a succinct indication as to the results of the planning committees’ 
ideas for a UN organisation, Pasvolsky and Welles dispatched vague, preliminary, and 
sometimes even irrelevant study reports on such subjects as: ‘(T)he Upper Silesia Area: 
Industrial Factors’, ‘Commentary on the Italian Constitution’300, ‘France’s Economic 
Relations with Her Empire’ and ‘The Proposal for A Polish-Czech Confederation’.301 British 
thinking on regional world organisation, deriving from Churchill’s ‘three-legged stool302’ 
notion was given short-shrift within the State Department especially with the departure of 
Welles and the rise of Pasvolsky to pre-eminence, while further requests for talks on world 
organisation were rebuffed or neglected.303 Pasvolsky saw an excessive concern with 
European surrender terms and reparations as merely “ad hoc machinery for each particular
297 Letter, N otter to Durward V. Sandifer, 16th July 1942. Harley N otter Papers, NARA, College Park, MD. Box 
19; Folder — Permanent Court - British Proposal (SCJ).
298 ‘Notes, Jan 1942-Dec 1943’. Harley Notter Papers, NARA, College Park, MD. Box 11; Postwar Planning, 
General. Folder - Notes, Jan 1942-Dec 1943.
299 Ibid.
300 The reports on Italy and Upper Silesia are included in a letter from Pasvolsky to Redvers Opie for forwarding 
to London, 12th July 1943. See Harley Notter Papers, NARA, College Park, MD. Box 79: Records o f the 
Advisory Committee on Foreign Policy. Folder — Exchanges with the British (Gen. Folder).
301 The reports on France and Polish-Czech Federation are included in a letter from Welles to Lord Halifax, 
August 13th 1943. See Harley Notter Papers, NARA, College Park, MD. Box 79: Records of the Advisory 
Committee on Foreign Policy. Folder; Exchanges with the British (Gen. Folder)
302 See Hoopes, T. and Brinkley, D. (1997) FDR and the Creation o f the United Nations
303 ‘Notes, Jan 1942-Dec 1943’. Harley Notter Papers, NARA, College Park, MD. Box 11; Postwar Planning, 
General. Folder - Notes, Jan 1942-Dec 1943. In these notes, N otter records on August 11th 1943: “Clash over 
regional representation - Welles still insisting, Pasvolsky opposing.”
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short-run function.”304 “Such arrangements” he said, “should be subsidiary to the world 
organisation.”305 This more comprehensive and far-sighted vision, Pasvolsky believed, was 
beyond the range of a British government selfishly “seeking to limit British commitments to 
regions of special British interest, as opposed to universal general commitments.”306 As far as 
the Soviets were concerned, their thoughts hardly registered. A comprehensive report from 
August 1943 remarks that the “Soviet Union has given no direct expression of its views on 
the problems of international organisation, with the exception of the prevention of further 
aggression.”307
N ot all allies were taken to be so apathetic. By mid 1943, Pasvolsky was aware of the growing 
disquiet at the control the US might exert over postwar planning. He admitted that there 
existed “a feeling o f uneasiness on the part of both large and small nations.. .especially on the 
score of our single-handed initiative and dominant position.”308 Other nations, he wrote, “feel 
that they should participate effectively in decisions leading up to the launching of any 
particular set of negotiations or conferences.” Participation and debate was scarcely 
conscionable though: “(E)ven if we were to agree to such procedural consultations”, 
Pasvolsky noted, “the process is likely to become increasingly difficult and cumbersome.”309
304 Memo: ‘International Activities in which United States must participate to Re-establish and Maintain Peace 
and to Promote General Welfare’ August 9th 1943, p4. Leo Pasvolsky Papers, Library o f Congress, Washington 
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As the time approached when delegates of the four major powers were invited by the US to 
debate their plans for future world organisation, it became clear the State Department’s close 
guarding o f their work had left the other delegations distinctly under-prepared. Indeed when 
the US proposed the Dumbarton Oaks Conferences, the British embassy in Washington 
registered alarm concerning the composition of the delegations. With the initial suggestion 
that the Secretary of State would lead the US delegation, the British Embassy wrote that “Mr. 
Eden is disturbed...because he anticipates.. .there would be questions in Parliament as to 
why he, Eden, is not taking part...there might be an impression that you (USA) are taking 
this whole matter much more seriously that we (GB) do.”310 Revealing how far they lagged 
behind the US planners, Pasvolsky commented that “it has always been their (GB’s) thought 
that the discussions at this stage would be sufficiendy preliminary to carried out at what they 
call the ‘official’ level.”311 O f course, the ‘stage’ at which Britain was ready to discuss had long 
ago been superceded by the United States.
Two weeks before the conference, “a telegram from Mr. Harriman pointed out that the 
Soviet Foreign Office had not been able to have available for study a translation of (the US) 
basic document.. .(and) that the Russians had not contemplated an advance exchange of 
documents.”312 In their detailed arrangements, the State Department requested that 
“arrangements.. .be made with the British and Soviet groups so that they (would) make no 
statements unless the three heads of delegation approve”313 — a policy which would guarantee 
a US veto on the public statements of their allies. This was critical given the fact that the even 
the agenda and topics for debate set by the US was not to the liking of the other delegations. 
In particular, the British, Russians and Chinese all urgently wished to debate issues of 
international trusteeship, but this issue was taken off the agenda by the State Department “in
ignored. In this light it is well to remember that the Senate must have supposed that the State Department 
would be making postwar plans, but clearly had no details at all.
310 Minutes o f conversation between Pasvolsky and Michael Wright, Counselor o f the British Embassy in 
Washington, 21st July 1944. Leo Pasvolsky Papers, Library o f Congress, Washington DC. Box 4; Folder -  
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deference to the wishes of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’314 who required further assessment of 
the strategic value of various territories which might be occupied by American forces at the 
end of the war.
Suspicion of the unilateral nature of planning for the postwar order became prevalent in 
public and academic arenas, especially based on the feeling that, as the path to world 
organisation began with the Atlantic Charter, the new world order was to be one dominated 
by Western principles and not universal principles. In the wake of the Atlantic Charter 
signing a group of eminent Americans thinkers, among them Quincy Wright, Margaret Mead 
and Walter White of the NAACP, sent a telegram to FDR on 16th January 1942 noting that 
“(A)lready enemies are using the Churchill visit as evidence of Anglo-Saxon will to 
dominance”. They went on to say that as “a spectacular demonstration that this is 
Armageddon of free peoples regardless of race or color, we urge that you arrange dramatic 
conference with Chiang Kai Shek and other leaders of yellow, brown and black millions 
throughout the world.”315 The writers of this telegram had their finger on the pulse of the 
State Department’s management of world order planning. As we have seen, the Soviets and 
Chinese were largely assumed to have no great contribution to make until they were 
permitted to join the conference at Dumbarton Oaks. On the other hand, the State 
Department assumed the British would have plenty of ideas, but that these ought to be 
rebuffed. In fact, six months prior to Roosevelt’s receipt of the warning telegram about 
Anglo-Saxon domination of the postwar order, Hull had sent a memo to the President on the 
Chinese approval of the Atlantic Charter but noting that “the ambassador complained that 
his Government has been largely neglected in recent acts and utterances of this 
Government.”316
The eventual consultations gave the Allies opportunity to debate amendments to the 
American proposals, but due to the lack of communication earlier in the war, they remained
314 Letter, (unsent) Leo Pasvolsky to Admiral William D. Leahy, Chief o f Staff, 1st December 1944. Leo Pasvolsky 
Papers, Library of Congress, Washington DC. Box 3; Folder — International Organizations, International 
Trusteeships ID E  -1944.
315 ‘Telegram to FDR, Jan 16th 1942, 4:51pm’. President’s Official File, Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, NY. 
Folder - OF4725, United Nations 1941-2.
316 Memo, Hull to FDR, 19th August 1941. President’s Official File, Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, NY. Folder - 
OF4351, Postwar Problems, 1940-1.
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on a distinctly unequal footing, with the Chinese in particular treated as a very junior partner 
and accorded less attention and time to voice their ideas. Notes on the positions taken by 
Allied governments in late 1944 and even up to the weeks of the San Francisco Conference in 
Spring 1945 reveal underdeveloped thinking, a lack of specific understanding of the American 
documents, and often representatives sitting in discussions who had come unprepared and 
were still internally finalising their positions317. While having spent much of the war trying to 
keep their powerful allies uninformed about their thinking on world organisation, the State 
Department followed a somewhat different policy with their less significant co-belligerents. 
They were actively co-opted to lend legitimacy to the nascent UN, while being held at arm’s 
length in the same way as the Allies when it came to substantive input into the details of the 
structure and ethos of the organisation.
317 Pasvolsky’s Papers record this lack of international consideration o f problems of international organisation 
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3.3.3 Making Up The Numbers
When thinking on world organisation was in its embryonic stage in spring 1940, and before 
any decisions had been taken upon the shape or structure of any international body, 
Pasvolsky sent a memo to Hull to bring him up to date on his attempts to cultivate the favour 
of neutral states towards US-led planning of a new international order. “We have informed 
40 neutral countries” he wrote, of US plans for “the creation of a sound foundation for a 
lasting world peace.”318 This in itself was a significant outreach in a world of around seventy 
nation states. Predictably perhaps, given the hope of much of the world that the US would 
join the war, Pasvolsky noted that “most of the replies.. .contain a request that we set forth 
our own ideas as a basis o f discussion.”319 US plans to seek support from states in Western 
Europe and Scandinavia however, had to be put on hold as the Nazi Blitzkrieg overwhelmed 
them shortly after this early exchange.
As the Allies regrouped and the force of Hitler’s aggression turned from the Blitz in England 
to Operation Barbarossa in the USSR, they pledged an initially vague, but rapidly solidifying 
pact of war aims in the Adantic Charter of August 1941 and the United Nations Declaration 
of January 1942. As Roosevelt commented in a press conference in 1945: “(T)he Adantic 
Charter is a beautiful idea. When it was drawn up, the situation was that England was about 
to lose the war. They needed hope, and it gave it to them.”320 These declarations spurred 
hopes in countries large and small around the globe and the State Department, as Adolf Berle 
wrote to FDR on 5th January 1942, “received a huge stack of so-called ‘adherences’, ranging 
from .. .the Danish Minister whom we know and trust, to King Carol of Rumania whom we 
won’t even let into the country.”321 O f the more reliable signatories, Berle told FDR “if you
318 Memo, Leo Pasvolsky to Cordell Hull, ‘Suggestions for the Secretary’s Conversation with the Secretaries of 
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care to O K  this I will, on their application, permit their signatures.”322 A certain looseness of 
criteria for being admitted by the US as a United Nations signatory was apparent even in 
those immediately accepted. The Thai Minister in Washington for instance, Seni Pramoj323, 
was, according to Berle “running a ‘Free Thailand’ movement all by himself’. The State 
Department however, had no objection to his becoming a supporter o f the UN Declaration 
on behalf of his country even though Berle admitted “he does not represent very much.”324 
Though initially sceptical of the credentials of some of the ‘representatives’ of minor nations, 
even those who merely led private interest groups or ex-pat forums, the State Department 
left open the possibility of returning to their applications and permitting them to represent 
their nations in the stead of anyone more officially qualified. As Berle remarked in the midst 
o f the initial flood o f letters: “like Barnacle Bill the Sailor, we loves ‘em all and marries none 
for the time being.. .”325
Throughout the early part o f America’s participation in the war in 1942 and 1943, postwar 
planning had moved into high gear and the task of the State Department was to formulate 
comprehensive plans, taking advantage of the relative preoccupation o f other, less fortunate 
governments. They would then be put to the Allies in complete and impressive detail. 
American attempts to use the moral beacon of the Atlantic Charter and the hope of US war 
aid as a bargaining tool for allegiance on future principles of world order continued apace. In 
a policy that would have shocked British and French colonial administrators of the region at 
the time, a telegram from the State Department to Cairo in 1943 records that “the American 
Government would view sympathetically plans for Arab Union if these were developed by 
the Arab peoples of their own free will and were in accord with the principles set for in the 
Atlantic Charter.”326 While this policy eventually came to nothing, it was in this same period 
that the US realised that their best hope of securing substantial numbers of independent 
nations’ support for their UN projects lay not in Europe or the Far East. Those nations,
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threatened and oppressed as they were, might have been considered therefore perhaps the 
most receptive targets for the new principles that would found the UN. However, they had 
neither the time nor energy to engage with ideas of the postwar world until the menaces that 
violated their lands and peoples had been fully expunged. The easiest way to build a coalition 
of interested and easily influenced nations was for the US to look to the periphery o f the 
conflict. The US looked to its own backyard, (which FDR and Welles had assiduously 
cultivated with the Good Neighbor policy in the 1930s) in South America.
Debates in the latter half of the war surrounding the establishment of the UN show a massive 
numerical weighting toward the nations of South America. A list from June 1943327 of the 
nations the State Department considered for non-permanent security council membership 
comprises thirty-nine nations, o f these nineteen (49%) were South and Central American 
states. Europe counted for nine states, Asia had one representative (Philippines), the British 
Dominions numbered five, and Africa and the Near East were conglomerated, counting for a 
further five states. Earlier the Department had suggested “excluding the Far Eastern group 
and the group o f Near and Middle Eastern states because of the small number of states 
involved328”, but this was fortunately rejected.
The South American states had, being on the very edge of both the Asian and Pacific conflict 
zones, much more time than states in Europe or Asia to engage with US ideas about future 
world organisation. The Pan-American Union organisation, a common heritage of republican 
government and an increasing trade relationship had throughout the early twentieth century 
brought about, as previously remarked in Chapter One, a notion of the Western Hemisphere 
and its republican peace, fortunately superior to the extremism of Asia and Europe. The US 
held out promises o f special consultation on world organisation projects in return for 
supporting the war. As FDR said in a meeting with Pasvolsky and new Secretary of State, 
Stettinius in Autumn 1944; “we should take all the necessary steps to induce the...so-called 
‘associated’ nations in South America to regularize their position by declaring war and thus
327 See Appendix D. A list o f this kind is originally found in Annex I o f ‘UN Protocol’, a report o f June 3rd 1943. 
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making themselves eligible for invitation”329 to conferences with the US planners. However, 
the character and content of these conferences soon seriously disappointed Latin American 
representatives. As Ambassador Carlos Martins of Brazil told Nelson Rockefeller and 
Stettinius, by autumn 1944 “Latin American relations were at a low ebb and that (he) was 
inclined to attribute this to their not having been taken into confidence on the world 
organisation.”330 The meetings he felt, were cosmetic and superfluous in character, and 
permitted no substantive contribution by the US’s allies.
The conference of Latin American ambassadors hosted by the State Department in 
December 1944 was organised as a chance for the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals to be 
discussed by Latin American allies. Having not been invited to Dumbarton Oaks itself, the 
American Republics wished to debate all aspects of the UNO, even down to the revision of 
the name itself.331 However, as Pasvolsky and Rockefeller advised Stettinius, “the basic 
objectives of the conference.. .should be to satisfy the representatives of the American 
republics that many of the things they seek are in point of fact included in the Dumbarton 
Oaks Proposals, and that the others were, after full consideration, rejected for good and 
sufficient reason.”332 In other words, no changes to the Proposals were to be admitted. On 
the first day of the Conference, Stettinius responded to the suggestions of the Latin American 
Committee on Coordination by admitting that the US could not “participate
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with Latin American Ambassadors JL -D E 1944.
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in .. .recommendations at variance with the (Dumbarton Oaks) Proposals.”333 In effect, the 
Ambassadors had assembled in Washington for no reason.
Following this meeting of Ambassadors, the Inter-American Conference on Problems o f War 
and Peace was assembled in Mexico City as a further move to link the Latin American 
republics into the UN project. In a preliminary meeting at the American Embassy, US 
Ambassador George S. Messersmith was angrily asked by Mexican delegates Campos Ortiz 
and Manuel Tello “whether the US actually wished to have...any criticisms o f the 
Dumbarton Oaks Proposals which would presume to reflect the consensus o f the 
Conference...whether in fact, the Conference could pass any critical report.”334 The reply to 
the Mexican representatives was unequivocal, as Notter records: “it was remarked that the 
United States had in effect a gentleman’s agreement among the major powers not to negotiate 
on the D O P’s.”335 The conference, had only been called in order “to secure...a general 
endorsement of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals.”336 In the conference itself the US 
delegation wished to air an initial resolution for the acceptance of the DOPs but instead of 
proposing a motion themselves they wished to have the Mexicans do so. Accordingly, they 
issued a text of their resolution and a Spanish translation to the Mexican delegation for them 
to present as their own motion. This co-opting of the Mexicans to give a supportive example 
for other nations to follow backfired however, as Pasvolsky records: “to our utter 
consternation.. .the Committee on Initiatives received and reported out the Spanish text of 
our draft as a resolution prepared by the US delegation and marked with the word 
‘translation’.”337
In these exchanges with the South Americans, a dual policy then was revealed. The US 
desired numerical support for its plans, even if  some the countries involved were relatively 
insignificant. The American Republics were drawn closer, but also kept at arms length in very
333 Minutes o f ‘Meeting o f the Latin American Ambassadors Friday December 29th 3:45pm’ —‘ Response by the 
Secretary to Report from the Latin American Committee on Coordination presented by Ambassador Carlos 
Martins o f Brazil’. Leo Pasvolsky Papers, Library o f Congress, Washington DC. Box 2; Folder — International 
Organization: Conversations with Latin American Ambassadors JL-DE 1944.
334 Note, ‘Only for Background Info- Secret’ 14th March 1945. Harley N otter Papers, NARA, College Park, MD. 
Box 11, Miscellaneous Subject Files. Folder: Notter, Harley (Recollections).
335 Ibid.
336 Ibid.
337 Report, ‘Conference at Mexico City’ March 13th 1945. Leo Pasvolsky Papers, Library o f Congress, Washington 
DC. Box 4; Folder — International Organizations, Memoranda o f Conversations.
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direct ways when it came to real influence. What the US achieved, through these negotiations, 
and the shielding of its comprehensive planning from its more powerful allies, was the 
building of a detailed and unified vision and discourse which was to be presented as being 
consensual and universal. In fact, through the political practices of the FDR Administration, 
the germination of this vision of discourse was largely the product of a small group and their 
particular take on discourses of peace, morality and the human individual and human 
community. Up until the 1945 Conference, very little was permitted to dilute the American, 
Progressive, liberal, idealist character of the proposals and plans made and discourses 
favoured by the small circle of Administration planners.
The next section thus discusses two of the prime characters of discourse at the heart o f the 
UN project which often become intertwined. Firstly, there is a notion that an ideal world is 
possible — the dream of the Four Freedoms made reality. Secondly, there is a mobilisation of 
positive metaphors of kinship, community and unity in a time o f global strife when such 
virtues were never less apparent. In a sense, the project of the UN, by holding onto the latter 
in the darkest hours of war, had the strength to reach out for the former.
3.4 Discourses For The Post-War Moment
3.4.1 An Unsurpassable Vision
In an address to the Pan-American Union in 1933, FDR remarked, in praise of the peaceful 
Western Hemisphere and in response to the re-emerging extremism in Germany, that; “(T)he 
300,000,000 citizens in the American Republics are not different from other human 
beings.. .There are not wanting here all the usual rivalries.”338 Roosevelt referred, of course, to 
the diversity o f the Western Hemisphere, and made a general assertion as to the peaceable 
nature of the peoples of those nations and their concomitant (and, one might be led to
338 Donovan, F. (1966) Mr. Roosevelt’s Four Freedoms: The Story Behind the UN Charter p l2
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assume, causal) republicanism. The difference from Old Europe, where Hitler had just taken 
power was, he said; “a new and powerful idea — that of the community of nations.”339
The important cornerstones of the idealism of the UN began to be exercised in discourse 
through the interwar period. Certainly in the Americas both the aggression of Hitler and 
Mussolini, and the perceived weakness and irresponsibility of the Western Powers made it 
easy to take the moral high-ground, especially given the notion that Wilson’s vision and 
example at Versailles had been thwarted by Europeans. As Adolf Berle wrote in 1941, recent 
inter-war American “objectives and policies pursued.. .have been scrupulously free from 
politics”340 - a form o f shorthand for selfish self-interest. He went on to eulogise America’s 
pursuit in particular of the Good Neighbor policy in relations with Latin America; their 
efforts to promote disarmament, or less ambitiously, policies of the possession only of 
defensive arms; their promotion of economic freedom of trade, as opposed to the narrow­
minded protectionism o f many European powers; and finally a general policy o f “cooperation 
with all peace-seeking nations.”341 On the contemporaneous world conflagration, Berle wrote: 
“extreme nationalism, accompanied by deterioration in moral standards, led to armament 
races, armed conflict, and finally warfare extending to many parts of the world.”342
After the US’s engagement as a belligerent, the moral high-ground of pacifism was exchanged 
for the discourse of fighting for a certain set o f truths and freedoms and, as was noted earlier 
in this chapter, it was much easier, in an isolationist climate, to gamer public support for the 
war if the reason for fighting was presented as a universal and moral cause, rather than simply 
to help England or France or China.343 Many of the influential political figures involved in the 
planning process or the public debate about the postwar order couched these freedoms in 
religious terms. One o f FDR’s Four Freedoms, a key building block of the UN program, was 
freedom of worship. Hull’s consultation of religious leaders has already been noted. A diary 
entry from Harry Hopkins’ trip to Moscow in 1941 records him praying “for the victory of
339 Donovan, F. (1966) Mr. Roosevelt’s Four Freedoms: The Story Behind the UN Charter p l2
340 Report, ‘Planks on Foreign Relations, July 1940. Adolf Berle Jr. Papers, Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, NY. 
Box 65; Folder — State Department Subject File 1938-45, Outlines Proposed Peace Plans, Latvia September 1941.
341 Ibid.
342 Ibid.
343 This point was also apparent in the analysis by O ’Sullivan (2008) o f Sumner Welles’ wartime idealist rhetoric 
referred to earlier in this chapter.
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right and truth”344 in the course of the war. In Sumner Welles Subcommittee on Postwar 
International Organisation, early minutes from July 1942 document that among the 
Committee members in the State Department, and at large in the American population: 
“many.. .are sure that all will be well if Christian principles are proclaimed and accepted.”345 
These same minutes claim that Roosevelt’s Adantic Charter and Four Freedoms “embody a 
widely accepted set of human values. They should be...stated ever more vigorously.”346 
Further public sources bolstered this fusion o f war aims and religious morality including John 
Foster Dulles’ ‘Commission to Study the Bases o f a Just and Durable Peace’. Its Six Pillars of 
Peace347, published in 1941, include “religious and intellectual liberty” and an “international 
standard of morality.”348
Quite apart from this strand of idealism, the UN has been famous for its encouragement of a 
universal standard of human rights — a concern strong enough to merit a separate Declaration 
in 1948. The discursive paths to this declaration came through the Atlantic Charter and the 
UN Charter as immediate precursors, but the earliest antecedent in the postwar planning 
procedure was in fact the Covenant of the League of Nations. Welles’ Committee’s second 
week of meetings resolved that “whether we like it or n o t.. .the search for ‘fair and humane 
standards of labor for men, women and children’ (Art. XXIII Covenant)...must again 
become a cardinal principle of international action.”349 The more modest aim of securing 
labour rights, as we have said, was a catalyst for a more sweeping set of guarantees. However, 
shortly after this commitment to overhaul the League of Nations provisions on human rights, 
a full international Bill of Rights had been drafted taking its prime inspiration from the US
344 Diary Entry, aboard HMS Prince o f Wales, 10th August 1941. Harry Hopkins Papers, Roosevelt Library, Hyde 
Park, NY. Sherwood Collection, Book 4 ‘Hopkins in Moscow’, Box 306.
345 Untitled Report, T -I-O , Document # 3 ’, 31st July 1942, p i.  Sumner Welles Papers, Roosevelt Library, Hyde 
Park NY. Box 189 — Postwar Foreign Policy Files 1940-43, Folder 5 — Documents 2-17.
346 Ibid.
347 See also, Arend, A. (1988) Pursuing a Just and Durable Peace: John Foster Dulles and International 
Organization
348 Report, ‘Permanent International Organization: Functions, Powers, Machinery and Procedure’. Subsection, 
‘Discussions and Proposals Since 1939’, 21st August 1943, p29. Leo Pasvolsky Papers, Library o f Congress, 
Washington DC. Box 3; Folder -  International Organizations: General International Organization 
Documentation Book II: VII.
349 Untitled Report, ‘P-I-O, Document #3 ’, 31st July 1942, p5. Sumner Welles Papers, Roosevelt Library, Hyde 
Park NY. Box 189 — Postwar Foreign Policy Files 1940-43, Folder 5 — Documents 2-17.
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Bill of Rights.350 This provision was sharpened later in the war as the issue of human rights 
came into the starkest global focus due to the gradual revealing of atrocities committed in the 
Holocaust in Europe and in the Japanese occupation of China.
Framing these ideals in terms of rights to be protected and the moral defence of liberty was 
critical for the UN planners. For this reason and to boost the moral authority of the UN 
organisation, Welles’ Political Subcommittee recorded that “it was believed that the preamble 
o f any new international charter ought to be couched in the strongest possible language.”351 
When it came to the preparation for the UN Conference in 1945, the delegation enlisted 
Archibald MacLeish, a long-time associate o f the Administration, but also the Librarian of 
Congress and a Pulitzer Prize-winning poet, to work specifically on the preamble, where the 
virtues of the UN vision would be outlined. MacLeish remarked, on seeing the current draft 
in June 1945 that the preamble was in a “bad way”, “a...complete literary and intellectual 
abortion”352, having a “dry, academic and legalistic flavour.”353 Writing to Stettinius, Hiss and 
Pasvolsky, he said, “I agree that the Preamble should be more than a piece of drafting. It 
should move men’s m inds...It is impossible.. .to overestimate the importance of the 
preamble. The sentences o f the Declaration of Independence which have influenced history, 
are the sentences of the first few paragraphs.”354
FDR, in one o f the last acts o f his life, also appointed Virginia Gildersleeve, Professor of 
Literature and Dean of Barnard College as a full delegate to the San Francisco Conference, 
where she was assigned to sit on the Committee dealing with the Preamble. Up to that point, 
in another aspect of the exclusive nature o f the State Department’s UN planning, no
350 This full 26 Article document appears in Pasvolsky’s Papers on 3rd December 1942. Leo Pasvolsky Papers, 
Library o f Congress, Washington DC. Box 3; Folder -  International Organizations: General International 
Organization Documentation Book II: VLI, Annex II.
351 cP -I-0  5: Application o f International Trusteeship Through Regional Boards’, August 21st 1942. Sumner 
Welles Papers, Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park NY. Box 189 — Postwar Foreign Policy Files 1940-43, Folder 4 — 
Subcommittee on International Organisation Minutes #1-43. Original emphasis.
352 Letter, Archibald MacLeish to Stettinius, Alger Hiss and Pasvolsky, 8th June 1945. Leo Pasvolsky Papers, 
Library o f Congress, Washington DC. Box 1; Folder -  International Organizations (UN) Charter: Drafts, 
Proposals etc.
353 Letter, Archibald MacLeish to Stettinius, 9th June 1945. Leo Pasvolsky Papers, Library o f Congress, 
Washington DC. Box 1; Folder — International Organizations (UN) Charter: Drafts, Proposals etc.
354 Letter, Archibald MacLeish to Stettinius, Alger Hiss and Pasvolsky, 8th June 1945. Leo Pasvolsky Papers, 
Library o f Congress, Washington DC. Box 1; Folder — International Organizations (UN) Charter: Drafts, 
Proposals etc.
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American woman had participated in any of the formal discussions. As Christy Snider writes: 
“(T)he exclusion of women from Dumbarton Oaks led to angry responses by women’s 
organizations, like the AAUW and Congresswomen Clare Boothe Luce, Edith Rogers and 
Margaret Chase Smith.”355 Gildersleeve records in her memoirs that fellow delegate Harold 
Stassen considered that “the Preamble should be short and moving and beautiful, something 
simple that every school child in the world could commit to memory.”356 Acting on similar 
convictions, especially that the Preamble should have similar literary and moral power as the 
“perfect Preamble of the Constitution of the United States”357, Gildersleeve set about making 
amendments to the “straggling, awkward sentences of the Smuts version”358 brought to the 
Conference by the Union of South Africa which had initially been placed before Committee 
1/1 which dealt with the Preamble. Admittedly, Marshal Smuts, in conference with the 
British, had pushed hard for what Peter Marshall has called “a statement of our human 
faith.”359 However, the New York college professor was able to re-exert American influence. 
She wrote of the Smuts preamble and its formulation of an agreement between ‘High 
Contracting Parties’ not as an inspiration or a help, but as “(o)ur greatest difficulty”360 in 
finalising a draft with the “beauty of wording”361 befitting the ideals of the new organisation.
In the following years, the statements of the Preamble to the Charter were added to, and in 
some ways surpassed, by those of the Declaration of Human Rights. Chief among the 
architects of that document was Eleanor Roosevelt. She wrote copiously of the need for the 
Declaration to be not a political or legal statement, but a moral and ideal statement of 
intention. Speaking o f the Declaration she claimed that “we shall have done the equivalent of 
providing the compass for the ship...an instrument for determining the direction in which we
355 Snider, C. J. (2007) ‘Planning for Peace: Virginia Gildersleeve at the United Nations Conference on 
International Organization’ in Peace and Change 32(2) pl78. The AAUW is the American Association of 
University Women.
356 Gildersleeve, V.C. (1954) Many A Good Crusade p344.
357 Ibid.
358 Ibid. p346.
359 Marshall, P (2001) ‘Smuts and the Preamble to the UN Charter’ in The Round Table 358, p57.
360 Gildersleeve, V.C. (1954) Many A Good Crusade p344. Gildersleeve’s memoir makes a direct textual 
comparison of Smuts’ draft, her draft and the final Preamble. The tone o f Smuts’ draft, much like a treaty of 
armistice, is greatly different from Gildersleeve’s draft which takes inspiration from the Declaration of 
Independence and the US Bill o f Rights. A great deal o f this influence comes through in the final UN 
documents.
361 Ibid. p345.
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are going.”362 Political and military supremacy was not enough for the United States as a 
nation or as a prime sponsor o f the UN. The world, Roosevelt insisted “requires moral and 
spiritual leadership”363 from the United Nations. In her newspaper column in 1946 she 
expressed her belief that, “if we are to have peace, there must be rise in spiritual 
leadership...there can be no permanent settlement of the problems that face us nationally and 
internationally without a real spiritual awakening in the world as a whole...One hears so much 
of power politics...We won’t get away from that until the people of the big nations say to 
their leaders, W e want you to do the thing that is right, not for us alone but for humanity as a 
whole.’ That will not be said until the people are conscious that spiritual force must rule the 
world.”364
The vision of UN claimed to be unsurpassable and to be universal, to represent both an ideal 
morality for the future and also the deep, true morality of the human race, even in times 
when that morality was obscured. MacLeish’s belief that positive visions and ideals were 
essential to the creation of harmony in world politics for instance, was not simply a notion he 
derived from a rejection o f the dry drafts o f the subcommittees. In 1938, reflecting on both 
economic and political failings in the international system, he wrote: “(W)ith no means, or 
with very few, men who could imagine a common good have created great civilizations. With 
every means, with every wealth, men who are incapable of imagining a common good create 
now ruin.”365 Coursing through men and women like MacLeish, Gildersleeve and Eleanor 
Roosevelt, all chosen (in different ways) by FDR to contribute to the UN project, is a similar 
conviction that the postwar moment called not only for political settlement but a literary, 
moral and spiritual statement o f ideals for the world.
362 Roosevelt, E. (1948) Tress Statement by ER, US Mission to the United Nations’ 18th June 1948. Document
360, in Black, A. (ed.) (2007) The Eleanor Roosevelt Papers Vol. I. p841.
363 Roosevelt, E. (1948) ‘Liberals in This Year o f Decision’, in The Christian Register 1948’. Document 355, in
Black, A. (ed.) (2007) The Eleanor Roosevelt Papers Vol. I. p831.
364 Roosevelt. E. (1946) ‘My Day, 3rd August 1946’. Document 139, in Black, A. (ed.) (2007) The Eleanor 
Roosevelt Papers Vol. I. P363.
365 MacLeish, A. (1940) ‘In Challenge, N ot Defense’ in A Time To Speak: The Selected Prose o f Archibald 
MacLeish p4.
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3.4.2 Fear and The Desire for Unity and ‘Kinship’
That familiar paradox of claiming to speak for all humanity in times of war is epitomised by 
the metaphorisation of the UN’s visionary world as a world of common kinship. O f course, 
in the 1940s, millions in their thought and actions violendy contravened the principles which 
the UN planners ascribed to everyone. The notion o f shared substance bolstered, and 
logically could compensate for, the vision of shared rights and principles that was so patendy 
being violated during the years when the world was at war.366 In basic terms, bonds of kinship 
in a Western understanding can endure and provide solace due to their unequivocal positive 
valuation, even when the behaviour of members of the kin-group does not match social 
expectations o f kin relations. The kinship metaphor spoke to the hope that an underlying 
common morality, deriving from shared substance, did still exist, even if the propaganda of 
totalitarianism had blinded many to its precepts.
The metaphor o f kinship performed two particular roles when utilised in the era of UN 
planning. The first, as above, concerns when kinship was reached out to as the last and best 
supposed glue to bind a fractious humanity. For Flag Day 1942, President Roosevelt made 
first a national proclamation of war aims, then made a full speech on the state of the war, and 
then read a specially commissioned ‘Prayer For The United Nations’. In the proclamation, 
the paradox of a unity of human values is utterly apparent: “(I)n this planetary war,” he said, 
“we are part o f a great whole: we are fighting shoulder to shoulder with the valiant peoples of 
the United Nations, the massed angered forces of common humanity. Unless all triumph, all 
will fail.”367 Logically speaking, from such a statement it would be hard not to conclude that 
forces opposing ‘common humanity’ were not extra-terrestrial. In the speech FDR made he 
claimed that; “(T)he belief in the Four Freedoms of common humanity — the belief in man, 
created free, in the image of God — is the crucial difference between ourselves and the 
enemies we face today368”. The notion of the unitary nature of Creation, and the equality of 
life under God readily bolsters notions of human kinship as we will see further in the full 
analysis of Western models o f kinship in Chapter Seven. Space is opened up by the
366 This dual basis o f kinship, which lends it flexibility and applicability, is further explored in Part Four.
367 Memo, ‘Flag Day, 1942: A Proclamation’. President’s Official File, Roosevelt Library, Flyde Park, NY. Folder 
OF4725, United Nations 1941-2. Subfolder — UN Week, Pittsburgh June 1-6 1942 and Allied War Exhibition.
368 Ibid.
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flexibility of Western notions of kinship for it to be used as a ready metaphorical 
substitute for some of the collective virtues attributed to the religious life. Indeed, in 
, the prayer that was written for Roosevelt to read, it is striking how the support and solace of 
religion and of kinship are intertwined in a prayer which, at a desperate time, and transmitted 
to an uncertain and frightened people, pleads not only for divine guidance but for wholeness 
on Earth through a recognition and practice of kinship.
‘Yet most of all grant us brotherhood, not only for this day butfor all our years — a brotherhood not of words 
but of acts and deeds. We are all children of the earth — grant us that simple knowledge. I f  our brothers are 
oppressed, we are oppressed. I f  they hunger, we hunger. I f  their freedom is taken away, our freedom is not 
secure. Grant us a common faith than man shall know bread and peace — that he shall know justice and 
righteousness, freedom and security, and equal opportunity and an equal chance to do his best, not only in our 
own lands but throughout the world. A nd in that faith let us march, toward the clean world our hands can 
make.'*69
The kinship metaphor plays one further role in the planning of the UN, and in particular in 
the debates surrounding membership and the rights of members. In many speeches and 
documents alluding to worldwide shared values which we have encountered, the language 
used is that of common feeling, common faith, common humanity. However, when the issue 
of the particular group o f nations who might merit inclusion within the UN group is raised, 
the notions o f the ‘community of nations’ and the ‘family o f nations’ are more prevalent. A 
memo from Harley Notter to Sumner Welles during the preliminary discussions of the 
Subcommittee on Postwar International Organisation put forward the argument for 
“automatic membership in an organised international system coterminous with the family of 
nations.”370 Naturally, the kinship metaphor is a ready resource when ideas of group 
membership are being discussed, and the idealism of a peace-keeping organisation is well 
matched to the idealistic notions that Western society has assigned as default values to 
kinship in opposition to the public sphere. However, it is arguable that there is more at stake.
Dense concentrations of the use of kinship metaphors when planners and politicians 
discussed the entry into the UN fold of nations or peoples as yet under colonial rule. For
369 Memo, ‘A Prayer for the United Nations’. President’s Official File, Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, NY. Folder 
OF4725, United Nations 1941-2. Subfolder — UN Week, Pittsburgh June 1-6 1942 and Allied War Exhibition.
370 Memo, Harley N otter to Sumner Welles, T)ivision o f Special Research’ August 7th 1942. Sumner Welles 
Papers, Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park NY. Box 189 — Postwar Foreign Policy Files 1940-43, Folder 4 — 
Subcommittee on International Organisation Minutes #1-43.
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example, in a speech in Paris in 1948 in preparation for the unveiling of the UN Declaration 
o f Human Rights, Eleanor Roosevelt commented: “ (W)e have noted with particular 
interest...the work of the UN relating to the millions of people who are not yet fully self- 
governing. We believe that all possible assistance and encouragement should be given to 
them to the end that they also may play their full part in the family of nations.”371 It should be 
remembered that the creators of this UN group, this ever-more inclusive family, were (with 
few exceptions), in every sense o f the term, ‘founding fathers’ and the implicit patriarchy of 
this type of world-kinship discourse even enveloped a female speaker such as Eleanor 
Roosevelt. The application o f the notion of the family by Westerners to the non-self 
governing peoples of Africa or Asia is hardly surprising. The metaphor re-inscribes notions 
o f tutelage, o f the child-like nature of the colonised population, of their having to grow and 
learn how to be a part o f the family, and to abide by its patriarchal rules.
Notions o f kinship and the unitary and unsurpassable vision of the UN then, play parallel 
roles in the legitimating o f the organisation. Given the attention to the discursive force o f the 
values of the UN, it is somewhat hard to look at institutional formation merely in 
cost/benefit terms. It is easy to see though, how discourse is the prop for aims and projects 
in the international sphere which are founded upon stark realpolitik. The following chapters 
seek to illuminate how the values enshrined in the key texts of the UN in the 1940s enable, 
inspire, or constrain those who carry out the UN’s mission in the contemporary world and 
how these discourses are employed in political contexts today. As we will see, the West- 
centric moralism of the 1940s, contrary to opinion at the time, is not taken to be essential to 
the work o f the UN. Rather, Western moralising on the desirable image of world unity can be 
seen as useless, or even counter-productive in dealing with projects relating to non-Western 
groups. Nevertheless, usage o f world kinship metaphors to envisage the world as a unified 
moral community group, is still prominent in contemporary politics. They are still used to
371 ‘Speech in Paris, 3rd Draft, September 20th 1948’. Eleanor Roosevelt’s Papers, Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, 
NY. Box 4565 — UN General Correspondence 1947. Folder -  Speeches, 1947. Further examples of this type of 
kinship metaphor will be seen in the chapters to come. Patil, V. (2008) Negotiating Decolonisation in the United 
Nations discusses the prevalence o f a parental notion of kinship used by colonial powers in the period of 
decolonisation debates in the UN 1946-60. The aforementioned Brysk, A., Parsons, C. And Sandholtz, W  (2002) 
‘After Empire: National Identity and Post-Colonial Families o f Nations’ in European Journal o f International 
Relations 8(2) present a hill investigation o f various modes o f paternal and parental kinship discourses related to 
colonisation and the tutelage o f colonised states.
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attempt to inspire, or in politically problematic echoes o f the colonial tutelage formulations 
discussed above.
In the following case studies, the patterns of kinship metaphor usage in the current period are 
elaborated as contrasted with the current tendency to view international politics as the quest 
to build an ‘international community’. In the twenty-first century, we are perhaps (as the 
following chapter shows) more apt than were the generations of the early twentieth century, 
to question the Western and Christian underpinnings o f some of the visions that exist in 
discourse for the way an ideal world should be organized and conceived. Bearing in mind the 
close circumscription of authorship of the ‘universal’ vision of the UN that has been revealed 
in this chapter, the roles of kinship in politics today can now be investigated and the political 
benefits and pitfalls o f these very Western notions drawn out.
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CHAPTER FOUR - The Practice of Universal Philosophies: 
Translating WWII Ideology into Contemporary Policy
4.1 The Problematic Survival of Kinship Discourse
The wartime milieu of the 1940s, moulded by global conflict and the memory of a previous 
global conflict, was a period dominated by rhetorical extremes both of depravity and 
grandeur in international politics. Exhortations o f the values of nationalism and 
internationalism, brazen conquest and bold defiance o f aggression, plumbed terrifying depths 
and reached towering peaks. Thus in the bleakest hours, as we saw in the UN Prayer, the 
notion o f the world united and healed (in quasi-religious as well as pacifistic terms) as a family 
came to prominence. The family here plays the role o f a highly culturally cohesive Western 
symbol o f idealised unity. Seeing the far-reaching splendour of the founding documents of 
the United Nations in context of such a highly charged discursive milieu highlights why the 
UN was seen as being of necessity a statement not just o f a new international institutional 
order, but as o f a triumph of ideals. Drawing such universal ideals into monumental global 
documents laid down discursive sediment intended to solidify into the bedrock of a new 
global politics for the ages.
As will be discussed in later chapters, the emergence o f kinship discourse in UN (and 
political) circles in the contemporary period can be closely correlated with statements of an 
emotive, general or aspirational register. Often also, the kinship metaphor, that unsurpassable 
vision of unity, is used to retell the mythic history of the UN and its mission. The UN’s own 
Intellectual History Project comments:
“Fewer than one member in ten of today's human family was alive when the United Nations was founded in 
1945. Even fewer were old enough to have followed those pioneering events in any detail Sixty years later, the 
remarkable vision and creativity of the world organisation’s founders should be recalled. ’*72
372 Jolly, R , Emmerij, L., and Weiss, T. (2005)The Power o f UN Ideas: Lessons from the First 60 Years p i. 
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UN Ideas and Global Challenges Published by UNIHP.
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This paper, and other works373 by the UNIHP, single out the UN’s idealism as ripe for praise 
in reforming the world order:
“(W)hat made the U N ’s design and establishment so remarkable was its broader ambition - for human rights 
on a global scale, for sovereign independence and freedom and democracy in all parts of the world, for 
improvements in living standards worldwide. Tqually astonishing, when much of this lofty idealism was 
dismissed as little more than humbug, is that so much of this early vision has been achieved. No period in 
human history has seen so many people benefiting through advances in life expectancy, health, education, and 
living standards, as in the U N ’s lifetime. ’i74
The merits of re-shaping and widening agreement upon diverse principles of international 
political life, rationalising and codifying procedure and holding out at least the threat of 
opprobrium or sanctions for defying such consensus, should be recognised. However, 
blanket statements such as those below, which concern the UN’s intellectual contribution to 
world politics, such as the remarks below, cannot be taken at face value.
‘The intellectual contributions to ideas, analysis, and policymaking in the economic and social arenas have 
been among the U N ’s most inrportant achievements. They have had a significant influence on national and 
international action. This can be judged by the extent to which U N ideas have often set paths that others have 
followed. Perhaps the clearest examples are global conferences setting goals and benchmarks that many 
countries have chosen to follow and that have influenced theirpolicies and outcomes.>i7S
The intellectual parameters of the UN-era are perhaps more complex than an initial reading 
of the work of the UNIHP would suggest. The UNIHP concerns itself largely with the 
concrete achievements o f the UN through its history in advancing the theory and practice of 
world politics. In such a project it is perhaps easiest to locate the UN’s intellectual 
contributions by focusing on such issue-specific conferences, agreements, protocols, ‘goals 
and benchmarks’ instituted by the UN or under its auspices. This is a first level of intellectual 
contributions — a technocratic layer of new standards for law or behaviour in international 
politics, for example on issues of labour standards, human rights or environmental practices. 
The UN provides a forum for thought on such issues to be regularised and signed into 
agreement. The vision o f world unity that is being investigated in this thesis however,
373 See for instance, Jolly, R., Emmerij, L., and Weiss, T. (2009) UN Ideas That Changed the World. Published 
by UNIHP.
374 Jolly, R., Emmerij, L., and Weiss, T. (2005) The Power o f UN Ideas: Lessons from the First 60 Years p3. 
Published by UNIHP.
373 Ibid.
127
represents a broader level of intellectual contributions. A vision is held out by the founding 
documents of the UN of a unified world order of human kinship — a ‘spirit of brotherhood’ 
in the words o f the Declaration of Human Rights. What kind of intellectual addition to world 
politics is made by improbable images such as this? Its presence in discourse and its actual 
meaning sometimes seems (as we shall see later in this chapter) obscure or taken-for-granted 
to even those who would espouse it.
As we have uncovered in the preceding discussions, the prevalence of emotive uses of 
kinship rhetoric, through the breakdown of the international economic and political system in 
the 1930s and in the bleak struggle of the 1940s, was strong. The discursive landscape of the 
interwar and wartime period remained coloured by the novelty and fragility of the modem 
sense of internationalism. Notwithstanding the obvious example of Roosevelt’s sustained and 
difficult batde against entrenched isolationism, Chamberlain’s characterisation of the 
reluctant concern for and ultimate betrayal of the C2echs (“a quarrel in a far away country 
between people of whom we know nothing”376) is a prime instance of the preceding sixty 
years of development of an organised international institutional architecture having precious 
little impact upon the commitments and thinking of major powers when vital interests were 
at stake.
In internationalist discourse of the 1930s and 1940s we have so far noted two features linked 
to kinship metaphors. Firstly, great variance and experimentation with modes of expression 
and secondly, greatly emotional, even Utopian formulations being expressed using fervent, 
sometimes quasi-religious hopes for world kinship. Both these features are consonant with 
the contested and fragile nature o f the spirit of internationalism in this period, especially 
when it was seemingly being betrayed by the failures of both the League and the Great 
Powers. Two points maybe made by way of accounting for this character of the discursive 
landscape. Firstly, much of the writings of this time were produced by individual journalists, 
politicians, scholars, and informal or ad hoc study groups377 each of whom created their own 
independent modes of formulating a notion of a unified world order. Nothing like the
376 BBC Radio Broadcast, 27 September 1938, cited in Neville, P. (2006) Hitler and Appeasement: The British 
A ttem pt to Prevent the Second World War pl07
377 We might think o f Buder’s Carnegie Endowment for International Peace studies, or those of the American 
Academy o f Political and Social Science.
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massed bureaucratic output of the UN and the army of NGO reporters, replete with now- 
standardised formulas, existed. Secondly, as Beer and de Landtscheer argue378, metaphor acts 
as a reassuring device in that it is inherently a simplification. Thus, metaphorisation of politics 
(especially of hopes for the future of politics), may be expected in response to the 
contemporaneous perception of the calamities inherent in the collapse of internationalist 
spirit — beggar-thy-neighbor economic protectionism and rapacious nationalist warfare. 
Moreover, given the unequivocal positive valuation placed upon the notion of kinship in 
Western practices of political metaphors of unity, kinship images are deployed to be 
especially reassuring — holding out promises not only o f common substance but with the 
attached affective behaviors (of love, care and respect etc.) that cement a Western idea of 
‘practiced’ kinship.379
The survival of expressions o f the hope of building a human family is curious given the 
trajectory of world politics since the 1940s. The notion that the UN-era might lead to this 
Utopia was built upon the expectation of the resolution of Great Power conflict, the ability to 
manage and dispel the prosecution of small wars, the peaceful end of colonialism and the 
advancement o f development, human rights and economic, cultural and social freedom and 
unity. Many of these objectives have been, at least in the eyes of a large number o f scholarly 
and political commentators, frustrated380. In bureaucratic branches of the UN, with specific 
and technical mandates, such starry-eyed and vague hopes are often, as we shall see presently, 
almost meaningless. What is more, over the decades o f the UN’s existence, human kinship
378 Beer, F. and de Landtscheer, C. (2004) ‘Introduction: Metaphors, Politics and World Politics’ in their edited 
volume, Metaphorical World Politics p29
379 Once again, hall explanation o f these symbolic associations is reserved for Chapter Seven where Western 
notions and usages o f kinship as a metaphor are examined in detail.
380 As charted in Malone, D. (2004) The UN Security Council: From the Cold War to the 21st Century. Great 
Power conflict during the Cold War sidelined or paralysed the UNSC to a large degree. Further, the current 
G reat Power peace is potentially destabilised by the rise o f China (and India and Brazil) in the context of 
increasing resource scarcity. Exposition o f projections for such scenarios may be found in Hoffman, W.J. and 
Enright, M.J. (2008) China Into the Future: Making Sense o f the World’s Most Dynamic Economy or Hsiao, 
M.H.H. and Lin, C. Y. (2009) (eds.) Rise o f China: Beijing’s Strategies and Implications for the Asia-Pacific. Small 
wars, civil wars, and long term wars between either Great Powers and developing countries (Afghanistan and Iraq 
II) or between smaller powers (Second Congo War) have often been beyond the capacity or willingness o f the 
UN or the international community to manage. Insightful examples include, Boulden, J. (2003) (ed.) Dealing with 
Conflict in Africa: the United Nations and Regional Organizations and Vogel, B., Dolzer, R. and Herdergen, M. 
(2005) (eds.) After the Iraq War: the Future o f the UN and International Law. The end of colonialism has given 
way to neo-colonial structures in grossly inequitable economic globalisation and development has often 
foundered economically and socially, especially after initial successes in post-colonial Africa. For further 
elucidation see Ratsimbaharison, A.M. (2003) The Failure o f the United Nations Development Programs for 
Africa
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discourse as an image o f hoped-for world unity has been displaced by the notion of the 
building of an ‘international community’. This latter, as the following chapters will argue, has 
become a hegemonic representation of global unity. This present chapter then begins a series 
o f investigations of the survival of world kinship discourse in the contemporary period.
The purpose o f this and the following two case study chapters is certainly not to attempt a 
comprehensive history of examples of kinship metaphor usage from the 1930s through to the 
present day. In the sense o f being organised around geopolitical and ideational bipolarity at 
the highest level, the Cold War period after the founding of the UN presents little 
overarching change in the structural support for discourses of human commonality from the 
wartime period. David Campbell makes a similar argument with reference to the American 
continuity o f deployment of identity/difference discourses relying upon such tropes as 
civilisation/barbarism and family metaphors381. This is to say that the functions fulfilled by 
the discourses of the human family as employed in such speeches as the Prayer for UN are 
fulfilled similarly in many world kinship statements made in Cold War rhetoric. In particular, 
two functional similarities of the discourse stand out regardless of whether the ‘non-kin’ are 
the fascist nations of World War Two or the Communist nations of the Cold War.
Firstly, the discourse is used to reaffirm the virtues of the in-group by portraying it in the 
light of the supposed positive values of a family. For instance, Margaret Thatcher emphasised 
the need for familial respect and tolerance among the Western European powers in forging 
closer trade and defence alliances. She commented in the conclusion of a speech in Bruges in 
1988: “(L)et Europe be a family of nations, understanding each other better, appreciating 
each other more.”382 Similarly, President Eisenhower characterized an early Cold War vision 
of the family o f nations as a sphere of harmony and freedom both within its bounds and with 
respect to those implicitly beyond it. Addressing the UN General Assembly in 1953, he said: 
“we hope that this coming conference may initiate a relationship with the Soviet Union which 
will eventually bring about a free intermingling of the peoples of the East and of the
381 See Campbell, D. (1992) Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics o f Identity, chapters 5 
and 8.
382 Thatcher, M. (1988) ‘Speech to the College o f Europe’, Bruges, September 20th 1988. Available at:
http: /  /wuav.margaretthatcher.org/speeches /displaydocument.asp?docid = 107332. Accessed on 17/10/2009.
130
W est...we seek a harmonious family of free European nations, with none a threat to the 
other, and least of all a threat to the peoples of Russia.”383
The second functional similarity relates directly to dangers beyond the bounds of the family 
group and for the need therefore to expand its compass. Richard Nixon, in a paper written 
prior to his presidency but presaging his ‘opening’ of China while in office, argued: “we 
simply cannot afford to leave China forever outside the family of nations, there to nurture its 
fantasies, cherish its hates and threaten its neighbors.”384 This statement paints the space 
outside the family as one o f frustrated exclusion and lawless vindictiveness. It echoes Sumner 
Welles’ Postwar International Organization committee sentiment that the US should build an 
“organised international system coterminous with the family of nations.”385 Organisation and 
communication bring common purpose within the family while dangerous isolation exists 
outside in which nations are perceived to fester in their disenfranchisement. Thus kinship 
performs the double work discussed further in Part Four, o f simultaneously affirming the in­
group while addressing the injustices of the out-group. Desires for the transformation o f the 
exterior based on the extension of the virtue of the in-group flow from this pattern of 
discourse, as the following from Ronald Reagan’s fifth State of the Union Address 
encapsulates:
“family and community remain the moral core of our society, guardians of our values and hopes for the 
future... A nd we can enlarge the family of free nations i f  we will defend the unalienable rights of all God's 
children to follow their dreams. To those imprisoned in regimes held captive, to those beaten for daring to fight 
forfreedom ...we say to you tonight: you are not alone, freedom fighters. America will support you with moral 
and material assistance your right not just to fight and die for freedom, but to fight and win freedom — to 
freedom in Afghanistan; in Angola; in Cambodia; and in Nicaragua.
Reagan’s words recall the UN Prayer and its exhortation that through ‘brotherhood’ — a 
manifestation of a spirit o f kinship - a ‘clean world’ of ‘freedom and security’ might be
383 Eisenhower, D. (1953) ‘Atoms for Peace’ Speech, UN General Assembly 8th December 1953. Available at: 
http: /  / www.amcricanrhetoric.com/speeches /dwightdeisenho wcratomsforpeacc.html. Accessed on 15/09/2009.
384 Nixon, R.M. (1967) ‘Asia After Viet N am ’ in Foreign Affairs 46(1) p i 21
385 Memo, Harley N otter to Sumner Welles, T)ivision of Special Research’ August 7th 1942. Sumner Welles 
Papers, Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park NY. Box 189 — Postwar Foreign Policy Files 1940-43, Folder 4 — 
Subcommittee on International Organisation Minutes #1-43.
386 Reagan, R. (1986) 5th State o f the Union Address to the Congress, Washington DC, February 6th 1986. 
Available at: h ttp : /Avww.atnerican-presidents.com/ronald-reagan/1986-state-of-tbe-union-address. Accessed on 
16/10/2009.
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created. In both instances the ‘moral core’ of kinship is used as a symbol both to bring the 
in-group together and to justify its remaking of the world.
Aside from such commonalities, there is a second crucial reason why the contemporary 
period, rather than the 1950s or 60s, say, enables a new set of questions concerning the value 
and appeal of kinship metaphors to be launched. As will be shown throughout the empirical 
work of the following chapters, particularly with reference to the Darfur crisis and the War 
on Terror in Part Three, the vast proliferation of N G O  commentary on contemporary world 
politics has transformed the discursive landscape in comparison to the mid-twentieth century. 
Most pertinendy, the varied conceptions of the coming world order which have been 
presented thus far from the mid-twentieth century (family of nations, human family, 
international brotherhood, world society, human community) are largely standardised into a 
hegemonic formulation o f the world as an ‘international community’ in the overwhelming 
mass of discourse produced by world NGOs in the current period. This has also become a 
standard term and conception of politicians and news media and its preponderance in the 
contemporary discursive landscape presents the opportunity to appreciate a different aspect 
o f the particularity of the conditions of the continued emergence of kinship metaphors. 
Unlike in the mid-twentieth century, international discourse today does not only consist of 
the output of a few politicians, news commentators and interested scholars and amateur 
organisations, largely from Western nations. An army of genuinely international NGOs and 
advocacy groups use the diverse communications media of the contemporary period to 
produce a flood of discourse, and are largely reliant upon conceiving of the desirable shape of 
world order in terms of the ‘international community’. Nevertheless, kinship metaphors still 
are employed in certain contexts in spite of this hegemony of the notion of the international 
community. A critical thread of continuity between these different discursive landscapes is 
the timeless canon of the founding documents of the UN. Only a detailed comparison of the 
contemporary period with the purpose of the founding of the UN enables purchase on the 
problem o f detailing the channels in which kinship discourse has persisted. The first aspect of 
this investigation then must be to unpick the U N ’s special status as, on the one hand a 
colossal rational and technical bureaucracy that has changed immeasurably since its design in 
the years leading up to 1945, and also as the bearer o f grand ideals expressed in universal, 
emotive and impractical language.
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4.2 ‘Bureaucracy’ as an Ideal Type
As demonstrated in Chapter Three, the United Nations Organization was conceived not just 
as a dry debating chamber for the resolution of conflict and the promulgation of various 
forms of social and economic development. It was meant to be something “to move men’s 
minds”387 and to be the standard bearer of a new morality in global politics. This 
characteristic of the UN sharply contradicts one strand o f popular critique of bureaucracy. As 
Paul du Gay writes:
“(T)he bureau is routinely conceived of as the one-sided expression of an \instrumental rationality’ which can 
sustain its identity only through repressing and marginalising its ‘other’ — the emotional, the personal, the 
sexual, and so forth. From this perspective, ‘bureaucratic culture ’ is assumed to be based upon a series of 
foundational separations and exclusions’ — between reason and emotion, pleasure and duty, public and private 
and so on — whose ‘absent presence’ erupts on to the organisational surface in the form of cumulatively 
disabling dysfunctions. ’iSS
Getting to grips with the TJN as bureaucracy’, especially in light of the emotion and 
moralising bound up in its design and its values, requires a notion of an ideal typical 
bureaucratic standard. O f course, for many years, the starting point for even the broadest of 
comparative studies of bureaucracy has been the “seminal”389 work of Max Weber. Using 
Weber as a guide, Richard Hamilton presents an elegant investigation of the applicability of 
Weberian analysis to the contemporary United States. He summarises Weber’s 
characterisation of bureaucracy in five neat propositions390. Bureaucracies are: “large and 
growing”, “impersonal”, “intrusive”, “tend towards monocratic rule” and are “directed by 
technically trained experts”. These characteristics embody the ‘rational-legal’ mode of 
authority of which the bureaucracy is Weber’s archetypal example. Further, ‘bureaucracy’, and 
its foundation upon ‘rationality’, may be conceived in several separate relations to society. As 
Page summarises, bureaucracy may be firstly a style of rule or authority wherein technically
387 Letter, Archibald MacLeish to Stettinius, Alger Hiss and Pasvolsky, 8th June 1945. Leo Pasvolsky Papers, 
Library o f Congress, Washington DC. Box 1; Folder — International Organizations (UN) Charter: Drafts, 
Proposals etc. See chapter 3.
388 D u Gay, P. (2000) In Praise o f Bureaucracy: Weber, Organization. Ethics p2
389 McMillan, C. et al. (1973) ‘The Structure o f Work Organisations Across Cultures’ in T he Academ y of 
M anagem ent Journal 16(4) p555. This article is itself a perfect example of the breadth o f application for 
W eber’s studies o f bureaucracy.
390 The following citations from Hamilton, R. (2001) Mass Societyr Pluralism and Bureaucracy: Explication. 
Assessment, and Commentary pl30.
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trained officials dominate by virtue of their expertise. It may be secondly be a system of 
conduct based upon the implementation of impersonal rules derived only from rational 
analysis or decision. It may thirdly be conceived as a social group — those who work in the 
bureaucracy.391
The Weberian ideal-typical bureaucracy benefited from “purely technical superiority” 
characterised by “precision, speed, unambiguity, knowledge of the files, continuity, discretion, 
unity, (and) strict subordination.”392 Bureaucracy as a system and modus operandi is held by 
Weber to promote the “optimum possibility for carrying through the principle of specialising 
administrative functions according to purely objective considerations.”393 Weber remarks that 
his ideal type o f technical bureaucracy “develops the more perfecdy, the more it is 
‘dehumanised’, the more completely it succeeds in eliminating from official business love, 
hatred, and all purely personal, irrational and emotional elements which escape calculation.”394 
The separation of the bureaucracy from its social surrounding may be more completely 
manifested when the level o f specialization and expertise of the bureaucracy far outstrips the 
competency of its political masters. This effect is likely to be exacerbated, as Peters writes, in 
the difficulty of “any political executive imposing its will upon the ongoing administrative 
offices”395 due to the fleeting nature o f political administration in comparison to the stability 
and entrenchment of the bureaucracy. The latter, in theory396, is made up of career officials 
who are (much more than politicians) able to retain their official positions for a long period 
of time.
The historical expansion o f the UN organization has, in some ways, bome out the Weberian 
model. During its Cold War years, the UN found itself under pressure from both sides in the 
geopolitical struggle. The United States, in thrall to McCarthyism in the early 1950s, 
suspected the UN Secretariat of harbouring communist spies and sympathies397, and most of 
the Americans working for the Secretariat were investigated by McCarthy or his Chief
391 Page, E. (1992) Political Authority and Bureaucratic Power: A Comparative Analysis 2nd ed. p5-7.
392 Weber, M. (1968 ed.) Economy and Society Vol. 3 p973 Original emphasis.
393 Ibid. p975
394 Ibid.
395 Peters, B.G. (2001) The Politics o f Bureaucracy 5th edition, p21.
396 See Rose, R. (1974) The Problem o f Party Government
397 See Lie, T. (1954) In The Cause o f Peace p396-9.
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Counsel, Roy Cohn. O n the opposing side, the USSR felt outnumbered by Western 
powers398, especially on the Security Council and, during the first ten years of the 
organisation’s life, used its Security Council veto eighty times.399 In this climate, Dag 
Hammersjkold argued that for the organisation to be viable for the future, it needed to 
develop as “a truly international civil service, free from all national pressures and 
influences.”400 In other words, it needed greater bureaucratic neutrality and independence.
Growth of the UN bureaucracy, not only in terms of member state numbers, but in terms of 
the diversification of specialised agencies, has provided support for the Weberian notion that 
the valuation of rationality in modem society leads to greater levels of UN bureaucracy. 
Following the institution of the principal organs of the UN, further agencies such as the 
International Maritime Organisation (IMO), the World Intellectual Property Organisation 
(WIPO), the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the United Nations Industrial 
Development Organisation (UNIDO) were added to the UN machinery.401 The supposedly 
independent, non-partisan UN, rather than self-interested nations states, is the more ‘rational’ 
choice for the administration o f these international issues. As Peters notes, the more public a 
bureaucracy, the greater tend to be the levels of accountability required.402 The UN, whose 
public is international, thus may be seen as a highly rational choice for a role in global 
administration due to its cosmopolitan make-up and supposed political disinterest, and the 
high demands for accountability placed on it.
Further, in diversifying into more ‘managerial’ specialisations (such as intellectual property 
protection or the work of the World Meteorological Organisation) and away from the 
broadest vision o f world re-making in the Charter, the UN follows a Weberian trajectory in 
the character of its authority. Alas, “Weber notes that over time, charisma tends to be
398 See for instance, Browne, L (1946) ‘Will the Soviet Union Co-operate With the United Nations?’ in Annals o f 
the American Academy o f Political and Social Science Vol. 246
399 Global Policy Forum (2008) ‘Changing Patterns in the Use o f the Veto in the Security Council’. Available at:
http://www.globalpolicy.org/securit\r-council/tables-and-charts-on-the-security-council-0-82/use-of-the- 
veto.html. Accessed on 24/10/2009.
400 Hammersjkold, D. (1953) UN Doc. A/2404, 21July 1953. Cited in Simons, G. (1994) The United Nations: A 
Chronology o f Conflict p61
401 See Simons, G. (1994) The United Nations: A Chronology o f Conflict p67
402 Peters, B.G. (2001) The Politics o f Bureaucracy 5th edition, p229.
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institutionalized and to be converted into rational-legal authority.”403 From the charismatic 
creation of a new discourse and vision for world order, brotherhood and the building of a 
human family, the UN has sprouted multiple branches with narrow remits and specialized, 
technical, non-political functions. The fact o f embedding a charismatic vision in a 
bureaucratic machine from the beginning has provided an institutional locus (backed by the 
moral and political rhetoric o f those founding visions) for further administrative expansion.
Nevertheless, Weber’s ideal type methodology cannot be directly used to characterise discrete 
social phenomena, but only as a comparison. His ideal model of bureaucracy - that of 
Germany at the turn of the twentieth century, was not described as a template to be mapped 
onto other examples but as an archetype o f the bureaucratic rationality. As such, we should 
expect to add to Weber’s outline, especially when dealing with a subject as large and complex 
as the UN. Indeed, there is much about the UN system, especially its haphazard founding, 
which speaks to both Weber’s conception of charismatic and bureaucratic impulses at the 
same time. To an extent o f course, aspects o f the virtues of Weberian bureaucracy mesh into 
the UN mission as laid out in the founding documents despite their visionary and impractical 
character, especially with reference to kinship discourses. Traits such as bureaucratic 
disinterest, expertise and neutrality may be seen to pave the way to just and respected 
decisions on the international stage. However, Weber’s work also does not go very far 
towards theorising aspects of intermeshing between the impulses characteristic o f his discrete 
models. In the UN system, part charismatic in vision, but mostly bureaucratic in procedure, 
this is precisely the insight that is required. Moreover, internal differentiation within a 
bureaucracy cannot be dealt with simply by reference to ideal types. The following section 
then keeps in mind Weberian models while making more nuanced account o f the tensions 
within the UN between rationality and objectivity of procedures on the one hand, and 
subjectivity and emotion in aims on the other.
403 Peters, B.G. (2001) The Politics o f Bureaucracy 5th edition, p71
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4.3. The UN as a Bureaucracy
As Chapter Three demonstrated, the practice of institutional design in the case of the UN 
was neither based on inclusive nor objective debate. Further, the theoretical taken-for- 
grantedness of rational design of international institutions or organisations within IR has 
recently come under scrutiny. Alex Wendt, for instance, highlights two types of rationality 
inherent in the design o f institutions such as the UN where significant historical sediment 
weighed upon the planners. Objective rationality, working upon the logic of consequences 
and interests, and subjective rationality based upon considerations of appropriateness.404 As 
Wendt notes, “the (subjective) rationality of institutional choices is always internal to the 
discourses by which collective-action problems are constituted.”405 In other words, the 
constitution of the moral backbone of the UN was hardly likely to be based upon a series of 
foundational separations o f interests and consequences, but instead, on the constitution of a 
problem in international society being the lack of consensual moral guidance for international 
conduct. A certain shaping o f desires, formats and beliefs is in evidence in the replication of, 
or deviance from, the language o f the League Covenant, but also, as Robert Goodin argues, 
cliques of bureaucrats planning a morally charged institution may become enraptured by a 
“central animating idea.”406 Delivering or fighting for democracy, peace or equality through 
the new institution becomes more of a concern than designing an institution actually apt to 
objectively fulfil the interests of participating parties. Such a tendency was recognised early in 
the development of institutional theory by Robert Merton, who wrote: “(t)here may ensue, in 
particular vocations and in particular types of organisation, the process of sanctification”407 
either o f the institution in general or by bureaucrats of their roles within it.
In some ways then, the choice to instantiate a set of grand moral aims in the same 
bureaucracy as was to provide such practical global needs as hosting hard-headed Security 
Council meetings and organising the fight against preventable epidemic diseases is, in itself, 
somewhat counter-intuitive. A peace treaty might have borne the ideational baggage instead,
404 Wendt, A (2001) Driving with the Rearview Mirror’ in International Organization 55(4) pl023
405 Ibid. p i 024
406 Goodin, R. (1996) ‘Institutions and Their Design’ in his edited volume The Theory o f Institutional Design
p26
407 Merton, R. (1957) Social Theory and Social Structure p202
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leaving the bureaucracy as a purely technocratic machinery. Indeed, this separation, which in 
the nineteenth century characterised international technical bureaucracy on the one hand, and 
moral concerts and conferencing on the other, might have continued but for the fact the 
Woodrow Wilson made his career prior to a move into politics as one of America’s (and the 
world’s) most prominent theorists in the first wave of interest in the sociology of institutional 
theory.408
The result of the design choices thus far investigated is an organisation positioned as an 
attempt to act both as an organ of the progressive rationalisation of international affairs, and 
also to act as a moral beacon. Or perhaps, to be more subtle, following Risse-Kappen’s409 
insights, it might be more useful to speak of our investigation of the UN planning process in 
terms of active feedback loops between designers and contemporaneous, already-existing 
fields of design. Together, these shaped the formulation of the UN and the emphases placed 
upon technical (non-political) questions, and political questions o f the values of the 
organisation. Processes by which the designers might themselves be ‘designed’ include: the 
effect o f historical sediment (so crucial in the present case) which shapes their values and 
beliefs; the effect of previous designs, such as the League, influencing direcdy the 
membership of ‘expert’ planning groups (recall Pasvolsky’s Versailles experience); or, finally, 
the process of design might open up new avenues of knowledge which place fresh constraints 
on the pathways o f overall design. As Wendt argues, “(c)alling attention to the effects of 
designs on designers is a way to ensure the power of the latter remains accountable rather 
than being taken for granted.”410
From these feedback loops emerged an organisation aiming primarily at guaranteeing the 
security of world order and positive action on human development through rationalising, 
codifying and obtaining commitments on states’ aims in foreign affairs. O f course, as has 
been alluded to earlier, the unequivocal positive valuation of systematic rationalisation 
perversely leads to that sense o f sanctification Merton discusses. The Western world is 
wedded to rationality not simply because it is rational to be so, but because it believes in
408 See for instance Wilson, W. (1889) The State and Federal Governments o f the United States
409 Risse-Kappen, T. (1996) Collective Identity in a Democratic Community: the Case o f N A TO ’ in Katzenstein, 
P. (ed.) The Culture o f National Security
410 Wendt, A (2001) Driving with the Rearview Mirror’ in International Organization 55(4) p!035
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rationality. There is then, a symbiotic relationship between the ‘removal’ of emotional and 
irrational elements in order to perfect a disintested bureaucratic form o f administration, and 
an emotional surge o f self-affirmation which lauds this purging and re-invigorates an 
emotional justification for the bureaucratic apparatus. Weber noticed that bureaucracy is 
“devoted to impersonal and junctional purposes” but that “(T)hese purposes of course, 
frequendy gain an ideological halo from cultural values...which appear as surrogates for a this- 
worldly or other-worldly personal master and which are embodied by a given group.”411 
Furthermore, not only is an emotional attachment to rationality apparent, but also the veil of 
rationality may be used to disguise subjective processes. As Fineman writes: “sorting priorities 
and making sense of events are often fraught with anxieties, self-doubt and emotional 
preferences.”412 Because of these inbuilt emotional modes of conducting rational actions, 
Fineman concludes that: “what we term rationality in organizations is a remarkable facility to 
present — to ourselves and to others — emotionalized processes in forms that meet 
‘acceptable’, ‘rational’ images of objectives and purpose.”413
The import of this symbiosis does not seem to impact Weber’s work as a whole however, and 
it is at such a juncture that the limitations of his ideal types are apparent. As Bamett and 
Finnemore state, “IO ’s are eager to spread the benefits of their expertise and often act as 
conveyor belts for the transmission of norms and models o f ‘good’ political 
behaviour....Officials in IO ’s often insist that part o f their mission is to spread, inculcate, and 
enforce global values and norms. They are the ‘missionaries’ of our time.”414 In other words, 
organisational planning that combined an explicit moral mission with the culturally assumed 
positive valuation of rationality attributed to bureaucracy, gives rise to an organisation prone 
to presenting itself as missionary. Two problems stem from this conjunction and will be 
confirmed in the evidence presented from UN staff at the end of the chapter. Firsdy, the 
sense o f mission or sense of values may stagnate due to its fusion with a rationalised form of 
organisation which tends towards social solidity, stability and specialisation. The routinization 
of the pursuit of narrow and specialised goals renders the overarching political values
411 Weber, M (1968 ed.) Economy and Society Vol. 3 p959
412 Fineman, S. (2000) ‘Emotional Arenas Revisited’ in his edited volume, Emotion in Organizations plO
413 Ibid. p l2
414 Bamett, M. and Finnemore, M. (1999) ‘The Politics, Power, and Pathologies o f International Organizations’ in 
International Organization 53(4) p712/3
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irrelevant. Secondly, the principles of bureaucratic neutrality and value-laden mission can 
often act against each other in projects on the ground.
To elaborate on the first problem - the fixity of the bureaucratic system has been discussed 
by numerous scholars. Giddens remarks that “institutions by definition are the more 
enduring features o f social life...giving ‘solidity’ across time and space.”415 This argument may 
apply to the instantiation and solidification of a social institution, such as the notion of the 
family of nations, within an organizational setting. Or equally, it may apply conversely to the 
institutionalisation of an organisation, such as the UN, as it becomes embedded in social 
consciousness and practice over its lifetime. Weber noted that, due to its possession of 
rational authority, “ (O)nce fully established, bureaucracy is among those social structures 
which are the hardest to destroy.”416 Indeed, imagining purposive organisational realignment 
or even grand reformation o f the value-structure of such a bureaucratic monolith as the UN, 
one can only conceive o f tremendous upheaval and regression of all the projects for which 
there is no other current competent overseer. As Weber put it: “(T)he ruled...cannot dispense 
with or replace the bureaucratic apparatus once it exists, for it rests upon expert training, a 
functional specialisation o f work, and an attitude set on habitual virtuosity.”417 Furthermore, 
implicit in the rational logic of bureaucratic processes is a resistance to sea-changes in 
institutional assumptions. As Barry Hindess argues, a corpus of rational norms and processes 
of thinking and working within a bureaucracy tend to be self-perpetuating. Exceptions to 
norms are dealt with by processes of rationalisation and comparision back to the norm, 
which is reflexively reinforced by contrast to the discovery of new exceptions. In other words 
“there should not appear to be too many departures from the norm, and (it is important) that 
the departures can be explained away.”418 There are fewer institutional costs involved in 
factoring in new exceptions, keeping every social fact divided into the rational and the 
irrational, than there is in the total recalibration of the rational framework that would be 
required on the occasion o f admitting of the existence of that which was a-rational.
415 Giddens, A. (1984) The Constitution o f Society: Outline o f the Theory o f Structuration p24. See also 
Jepperson, R. (1991) ‘Institutions, Institutional Effects and Institutionalism’ in Powell, W. and DiMaggio, P. 
(eds.) The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis
416 Weber, M. (1968 ed.) Economy and Society Vol. 3 p987
417 Ibid. p988
418 Hindess, B (1987) ‘Rationality and the Characterization of Modern Society’ in Lash, S. and Whimster S. (eds.) 
Max Weber. Rationality and Modernity p i 50
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This fixity of organisational structure, bolstered by faith in the unsurpassability of rational 
methods, is arguably problematic in a value-laden bureaucracy. An emotive valuation of the 
bureaucratic modus operandi means that values, just like technical structures, stagnate. Such 
fixity is perhaps enhanced in the case of the UN by its claim to be a singular, impartial seat of 
unsurpassable values; as Jeffrey Legro remarks: “(W)hen one organisation has a monopoly on 
expertise and no competitors, it faces less pressure to change and no checks on organisational 
biases”419. In other words, not just the practices, but the values of the UN are made more 
resistant to change by virtue of the UN’s founding documents purporting to rationally 
establish an impartial and just organisation speaking ‘self-evidently’ for all peoples. This may 
be over-simplified, but the problem remains of the cohesion between rational structures and 
values which produces excessive inflexibility in those structures. As Wendt asks, “ (T)he 
Rational Design framework defines rationality relative to a given conception of Self. This is 
fine for certain purposes, but what do we do if the Self will change as a result o f our 
choices?”420
This problematic can be examined in more detail by considering more deeply the make-up of 
the UN-as-bureaucracy. Johan Galtung constructs a useful typology of UN branches, dividing 
them according to two dichotomies — intellectually flexible/intellectually rigid; and politically 
progressive/politically non-progressive.421 As examples, he classes the World Bank and IMF 
as being of the intellectually rigid and politically non-progressive type, staffed as they are 
almost solely by economists and “not...working for the restructuring o f the world system”422 
in any way. UNCTAD, he argues, retains an economistic intellectual rigidity but works more 
for the political restructuring of the economic system and the closing of income gaps. 
Intellectually flexible, but non-progressive branches would include the ILO due to the 
diversity o f its programs and staffing but its focus on ameliorating but not transcending the 
status quo o f global patterns of employment. UNESCO and the WHO are Galtung’s 
examples o f an intellectually flexible and politically progressive branches, UNESCO having
419 Legro, J. (1997) ‘Which Norm s Matter? Revisiting The ‘Failure’ O f Internationalism’ in International 
Organization 51(1) p37
420 W endt, A (2001) Driving with the Rearview Mirror’ in International Organization 55(4) pl035
421 Galtung, J. (1986) ‘A Typology o f United Nations Organisations’ in Pitt, D. and Weiss, T. (eds.) The Nature 
o f United Nations Bureaucracies p63
422 Ibid.
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“probably...the greatest variety when it comes to professional training and...disciplinary 
background” and the WHO campaigning for the “political commitment and action”423 
necessary to deliver greater equality of health benefits across the world.
Galtung’s divisions highlight a crucial point concerning bureaucratic fixity in relation to the 
highest level o f purpose or mission of an organisation like the UN. Just as was discussed with 
relation to the ‘intellectual contributions’ of the UN at the start of the chapter, there are two 
levels of contributions that the UN makes — the technical and legal agreements and 
advancements which it enables, and the vision of world order which it espouses. As Galtung 
reminds us, some of the bureaucratic positions within the organisation as it exists today 
permit of a degree of engagement with innovative thinking upon the purposes and practices 
o f their branch and its mandate or remit. A great majority of positions however, do not 
reward or permit even this. None of Galtung’s examples touch upon the second level o f the 
U N’s intellectual contribution to world politics — that of the character of an envisioned world 
order. The trajectories o f this intellectual contribution (launched in the 1940s) and that of 
contemporary bureaucratic work are parallel but distant. They are related, but the opportunity 
o f conjoining is difficult to envisage. Innovation in bureaucracy may well take forms such as 
those argued for by Alexander Styhre424: entrepreneurial experimentation or scientific inquiry 
into new practices and opportunities are certainly encouraged in contemporary bureaucracy, 
contrary to the stolid Weberian model. However, such fluidity operates again on the first, but 
not the second level of intellectual contribution — questioning techniques but not overturning 
fundamental purposes.
O n the second point of the cross-cutting actions of emotive values and bureaucratic 
rationality, Bamett and Finnemore highlight UN peacekeeping missions in Bosnia to show 
how the combination of purposes of an organisation may hinder instrumental action. Pressed 
into action by the ‘“all necessary means’ provision o f Security Council resolutions”425 which, 
given the backlash to the failure to respond in time to the recent Rwandan crisis, carried more
423 Galtung, J. (1986) ‘A Typology o f United Nations Organisations’ in Pitt, D. and Weiss, T. (eds.) The Nature 
o f United Nations Bureaucracies p72
424 Styrhe, A. (2007) The Innovative Bureaucracy: Bureaucracy in an Age o f Fluidity, chapters 4 and 5.
425 Bamett, M. and Finnemore, M. (1999) ‘The Politics, Power, and Pathologies o f International Organizations’ in 
International Organization 53(4) p725
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than usual value-laden emotive zeal for intervention, the UN set itself the mission of 
delivering protection inside the warzone by setting up safe havens and the provision of 
humanitarian aid. Unfortunately, the UN’s cross-cutting bureaucratic desire to maintain 
neutrality, to abstain from ‘taking sides’ in the conflict led to contradictory policies which put 
blocks upon the increase o f resources to deal with the numbers of people requiring UN 
protection and ultimately the failure to protect thousands from disease, hunger and 
persecution.
Two conclusions can be drawn from this case. As Bamett and Finnemore argue, this is a 
story of immobile, inflexible bureaucratic insistence upon the preservation of codified rules — 
the failing of the excessive rigidity of a great machine seized up with sunk costs. According to 
Scott, “(Organisational ecologists...assume that stability or, in their terms, inertia, is a normal 
state for organisations. Inertia is the product of such organisation-level processes as sunk 
costs, vested interests and habitualised behaviour.”426 The lamentable lack o f singular 
leadership in the Bosnian case meshes neatly with one o f Weber’s characterisations o f the 
Achilles heel o f bureaucracy: “(A)n official who receives a directive which he considers wrong 
can and is supposed to object to it. If his superior insists on its execution, it is his duty and 
even his honour to carry it out as if  it corresponded to his innermost conviction, and to 
demonstrate in this fashion that his sense of duty stands above his personal preference. This 
is the ethos of office. A political leader acting in this way would deserve contempt.”427 On the 
other hand, one might argue, as do William Durch428 or Richard Betts429 for instance, that UN 
purposes in this conflict (and others) are led astray by the confused priorities/statements and 
actions of its constituent member states who supply the money and materiel for intervention. 
Wherever the balance of blame might be thought to lie in any given case, bureaucratic failings 
or member states failings do not detract from the main thrust of the characterisation which 
the preceding discussion enables us to make of the UN system. Narrowly specialised in much 
of its work, and fragmented by the diversity of its member states, the emotive unity of the 
broad statements of U N  purpose profoundly misfit the reality of the organisation and
426 Scott, W. (2001) Institutions and Organisations 2nd ed. p i 10
427 Weber, M. (1968 ed.) Economy and Society Vol. 3 pl404
428 See Durch, W. (1996) UN Peacekeeping. American Politics and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s
429 See Betts, R. (1994) T h e  Delusion o f Impartial Intervention’ in Foreign Affairs 73(6)
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the reality of mobilising the organisation. This will be further confirmed by the following 
section from UN staff perspectives.
Conceived for a moment without reference to the idiosyncrasies of its design, the UN is, by 
virtue of its status within the international structures of power, a bureaucracy heaped with 
emotive, value-laden purpose. In a sense, these values, misrepresenting institutional unity as 
they do, still fill a void. Lacking the legitimate independent physical projection capacities of 
states, IOs such as the UN “do not command and control but rather inspire and inform430”. 
Or, unable to command and control, inspiration and information is all they can aspire to 
provide. In Scott’s words, IOs, as well as IN G O ’s “are themselves a product and serve as 
carriers o f broader, worldwide cultural frameworks supporting rationalisation activities of 
many types. They function less as independent agents and more as enactors of social 
scripts.”431
Returning to the emphases set out in Part One, it is upon discourse or ‘social script’ that the 
investigation o f this and the following two chapters rests. In many ways, the planners of the 
UN, conditioned as we have seen432 by the institutional designs of the past and the discourses 
and historical sediments of the League-era, did indeed function less as independent designers 
and more as relays of pre-existing discourses and ideas. In a bureaucracy where attempts at 
rationalised programmes meant for achieving concrete goals in the world are central to the 
legitimacy of the organisation, what role can be accorded or what credit attributed to the 
passive perpetuation of discourses such as the notion of building the ‘family of nations’ 
where no actual method, means o f achieving the goal, or even agreement as to the meaning 
of the discourse is to be found in the conscious workings of the organisation? Such 
discourses instead are ever-present but unexplained and seem to represent in their vagueness 
the very antithesis o f what would be helpful to bureaucratic work as understood in terms of a 
Weberian archetype. Instead they represent and serve to legitimate what Weber called, “(T)he 
charisma of office — the belief in the specific state of grace of a social institution.”433 Here
430 Scott, W. (2001) Institutions and Organizations 2nd Ed. p l32
431 Ibid. pl31
432 For instance in Welles’ careful studies o f the League architecture with his planning committees. See 
O ’Sullivan, C. (2008) Sumner Welles, Postwar Planning and the Quest for a New World O rder 1937-1943 p68.
433 Weber, M. (1968 ed.) Economy and Society Vol. 3 p i 140
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Weber blends together impulses of two modes of his modes of authority, and in this respect 
he offers a more subde way to conceptualise how the grand discourses of building human 
kinship serve to legitimise (one might even go so far as to say anoint) the bureaucratic 
projects of an organisation like the UN. They inspire respect and admiration, but (as will be 
further discussed in Chapter Eight) are catachrestic — they intentionally deceive by portraying 
the technical apparatus as capable of performing the charismatic miracle of turning a 
fragmented world into a family.
Intriguingly for the study of kinship discourses, and the notion of the UN as a means of 
binding together a wider and more inclusive human family and providing neutral arbitration 
in disputes, Weber makes a further comparison between such a bureaucratic overseer and the 
regulatory institution of the blood feud. I quote the following at length:
“Among purely political factors, the increasing demand of a society accustomed to absolute pacification for 
order and protection...in all fields exerts an especially persevering influence in the direction of 
bureaucratization. A  direct road leads from mere modifications of the blood feud, sacerdotally or by means of 
arbitration, to the present position of the policeman as the ‘representative of God on Earth The former means 
still placed the guarantees for the individual’s rights and security squarely upon the members of his sib who 
were obligated to assist him with oath and vengeance. ’*34
The early anthropology of the blood feud435, in common with the prevailing functionalism of 
the period, assumed this phenomenon to be always functionally regulatory. While this has 
been thrown out, still many more modem studies436 attest to the homeostatic potential of 
blood feuding practices.
The isomorphism Weber argues for between the sacred workings of the blood feud and the 
sacred respect for a bureaucratised, just, impartial, national or world policeman — two modes 
of social organisation apparently vastly divergent — suggests once more the potential depth of 
the unconscious transmission of kinship discourse from the small-scale management of 
genuine kinship relations into the highest strata of international contemporary politics.
434 Weber, M. (1968 ed.) Economy and Society Vol. 3 p972
435 See among others, Radcliffe-Brown, A. R. (1931) T h e  Social Organization of Australian Tribes’ in Oceania 1 
(1-4), Evans-Pritchard, E. (1940) The Nuer: A Description o f the Modes o f Livelihood and Political Institutions 
o f a Nilotic People
436 See for instance Boehm, C. (1984) Blood Revenge: The Anthropology o f Fueding in Montenegro and Other 
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Naturally this argument is provocative and is a reminder of the strengths and weaknesses of 
Weber’s unique breadth o f vision. By extension from a national to an international plane, his 
line of thinking posits that in just the same way as the controlled use of force, sanctions, or 
threats on the part of the international community through the UN apparatus (or even 
unilateral state action) is recommended as being on behalf of ‘humanity’, so the blood feud — 
regularised, rule bound, predictable — is often found to be respected as the one way that 
society (the ‘people’) can seek justice for their kin and stability among the humanity that 
makes up their social kin. It would be irresponsible to argue for this transmission as a 
social phenomena. However, the transmission Weber describes is, we should not 
forget, a mirror of the transmission that occurs in metaphorical practices. Language 
that describes action at the level of kin-groups is vastly extrapolated to the international level. 
The cognitive ability to make this transmission is apparent in usage of discourse.
The UN, then, at once rational bureaucracy and sacred beacon, upholds a social script of 
human kinship whose design can only partially be attributed to the intentions of the planners. 
Formulations of the world as family were not invented by them, but instead recycled, given 
new credibility and visibility. While conscious efforts were made to bring into being an 
organisation that would appeal to the emotions and the better natures of statesmen and 
citizens around the world, no recorded debate exists upon the choices of metaphors to be 
employed when envisioning the unity to come. This attests to the supposition that the 
culturally-agreed upon menu of linguistic options was and remains so well integrated in 
thought that no debate upon parameters was deemed necessary. So used to the notion of 
world-as-family were the planners that no explanation of this idea is ever given in their 
debates over the drafting of the Charter or the Declaration of Human Rights — it is only to be 
assumed that ‘naturally’ such formulations are to be employed to add emotive and moral 
weight to the linguistics of the documents.
The re-emergence of this formulation in the Millennium Development Goals, agreed in 2000, 
is striking in the combination of a superficial sense o f grandeur with deeper, puzzling 
meaninglessness.
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‘We solemnly reaffirm, on this historic occasion, that the United Nations is the indispensable common house 
of the entire human family, through which we will seek to realise our universal aspirations for peace, 
cooperation and development. ”,3?
Finding the metaphor carried as far as to picture the UN as the human family’s ‘house’ is an 
extremely rare extension. As the final clause438 of perhaps the most widely referred-to 
document in the UN’s recent history — its contemporary restatement of its mission — it is the 
perfect illustration of the fact that this metaphor has lost little of its allure. The following 
section considers the idea of the unconscious continuity o f this social script within the UN as 
a bureaucracy. As we have seen, these flighty metaphorical goals seem at odds with, or 
contributing little to, the UN’s main, technical work. Further, the discourses (which the 
planners believed so vital) seem to have contributed only tenuously, if at all, to bringing about 
the world unity they describe. In conditions where such discourses - which meant so much as 
hopeful ideals in the wartime period - are still perpetuated by the UN, how do those who 
work in the UN bureaucracy relate to such vague senses o f mission?
4.4 Methodological Details of the Present Interview Data Collection
The following data set comprises a combination of interviews conducted with members of 
UN staff past and present, and work drawn from the UNIFIP’s UN Voices439 study. Perhaps 
the primary concern in attempting to build up a picture o f the meanings of the UN’s grandest 
discourses for UN staff was to focus on interviewees who were able to contribute in terms of 
understanding the UN as an active bureaucracy working in situations of ‘on the ground’ 
politics as well as policy development. Thus, the bulk o f the investigation rests upon data 
from UN branches as the UNHCR and the UNDP which have both theoretical and very 
practical aspects to their work.
437 See article 32, ‘United Nations Millennium Declaration’, UN General Assembly Resolution 55/2. Available at: 
h ttp ://www.un.org/millennium/declaration7ares552e.pdf. Accessed on 16/02/2009.
438 As will be shown in Part Four, kinship discourse is often employed to make an emotive shift in tone and 
register o f speeches and rhetoric and thus positioned in climactic portions o f addresses. Examples highlighted 
thus far include the UN Prayer and the MDGs. Further examples will be discussed in Chapter Eight.
439 Jolly, R., Emmerij, L. & Weiss, T. (2005a) UN Voices: The Struggle for Development and Social Justice. The 
UNIPIP team interviewed seventy-three UN staff and associates. Sources drawn from this work are 
supplemented in the sections which follow by eight authorial interviews.
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This small-scale project of bureaucratic ethnography was undertaken in order to delve into 
current concepts of discourse and policy especially with reference to the historical, ideational 
sediments which frame the UN project. The following sections thus ask questions of grand 
UN philosophy in relation to the practical experience of those who are, or have been, putting 
it into practice. The results of this inquiry form a basis upon which more detailed 
investigations into contemporary political discourse in Part Three, can be understood.
An obvious methodological problem in inserting this kind of work into a larger project 
concerned mainly with textual discourse analysis has to be the effect of the interpretation, 
and thereby distortion, of the words and opinions o f subjects by the author. Such questions 
swamped post-Geertzian cultural anthropology in the 1980s. Early twentieth century 
anthropology had empirically sought answers to questions of the structure and function of 
social phenomena440. It was assumed that rational causation could explain the appearance and 
character o f the social lives of other societies. Structuralism and Geertz’s interpretative 
school later considered social facts as symbols whose meaning could be derived by 
comparative analysis441. By the 1980s scholars such as Clifford and Marcus, in their classic 
collection Writing Culture442 questioned the ability o f the sole fieldworker to represent in any 
authentic way the views of the diverse subjects o f the society under ethnographic 
investigation. They raised the issue that the impartation o f Western models, assumptions and 
biases would greatly compromise the value of any account of non-Westem peoples written 
solely on the basis of the perceptions of a Westerner. This caused great disciplinary ruptures 
and for a time experimentations in multiple authorship were undertaken wherein the voices 
of members of the society were placed alongside the anthropologists comments. In time, a 
more mature set of considerations443 of the issues raised by the Writing Culture’ revolution 
gave rise to more productive ways of proceeding than attempting to fragment authorship into 
confusing and directionless narratives and disjointed sets of vignettes. It would be just as
440 For excellent overviews see Stocking, G. (1995) After Tvlor: British Social Anthropology 1888-1851 or Kuper, 
A. (1996) Anthropology and Anthropologists: The Modem British School 3rd ed.
441 See Levi-Strauss, C. (1968) Structural Anthropology V ol.l. Levi-Strauss, C. (1978) Myth and Meaning or 
Geertz, C. (1973) The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays
442 Clifford J. and Marcus, G. (1986) Writing Culture: The Poetics and Politics o f Ethnography
443 See for instance, James, A., Hockey, J. and Dawson, A. (1997) After Writing Culture: Epistemologv and Praxis 
in Contemporary Anthropology or James Clifford’s own ‘Ethnography Two Decades After Writing Culture: 
From the Experimental to the Baroque’ (2007) in Anthropological Quarterly 80(4)
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dissatisfying in this current investigation to attempt simply to stand back and let each UN 
subject ‘speak for themselves’. Instead, as Gottlieb recognised when considering the various 
influences on authorship external to the fieldwork process itself, the real problem highlighted 
by the ‘writing culture’ debate was “an epistemological conviction that the fieldworker ought 
to make herself as invisible as possible in order to get at the ‘real truth’ of the culture ‘out 
there’.”444 By making researchers conscious of the genuine processes of co-construction of 
ethnographic data, the realisation dawned that “the more people in the anthropological team 
the less this increasingly problematic fiction is able to be maintained in any viable manner.”445
In this sense, in the following discussion and in the chapters which follow concerning 
discourses surrounding the Darfur crisis and incarceration at Guantanamo Bay, the 
correlations between statements are not generally attributed to the ‘truth’ about a given 
society composed of UN staff. At specific and clearly marked points, the effects of the social 
and epistemic community upon the values of individuals may be related, but in the most part 
the analysis treats the relationship between the grand social scripts of our investigation and 
individual staff as being meaningful in two ways. Firstly, there is an important intersection at 
the level of the impact of grand discourse for the practice of overall policy. Secondly, at the 
level o f the experiences of individuals in their working lives one can investigate the import of 
the grand discourses. Thus the following lines of inquiry are pursued to get at these 
intersections. Addressing the first point: how useful or meaningful are such discourses of 
unity in politically fractious operations or parts of the world? How well do they motivate, 
how well do they produce the vision they describe? In what cases are they divisive or 
counterproductive and on balance is their role negative or positive in general UN practice? 
Tailored to the second point: what purpose do grand discourses serve in the day to day work 
of UN officials? Are the cross-cutting negative effects of impossible ideological visions felt by 
individuals? How do they attempt to explain the persistence of such discourses which may 
have little concrete impact in the U N ’s work?
444 Gottlieb, A. (1995) ‘Beyond the Lonely Anthropologist’ in American Anthropologist 97(1) p22
445 Ibid.
4.5 Philosophy. Language and Values in the Contemporary UN  
Bureaucracy
Perhaps the first and easiest question to answer in evaluating the role of grand discourses 
upon the UN as a working bureaucracy is to assess the perception of these historical relics 
and their relevance in everyday work. Given that the UN posits itself as a great moral arbiter 
o f international society and upholds its founding documents as the unalterable principles 
guiding international politics, it would perhaps be initially surprising to find that most UN 
staff from the sample taken were either not inspired at all by the grand visions of the UN, or 
derived their inspiration and zest for their work from smaller and more achievable principles 
and actions. The grand ideals of the human family, or brotherhood were often dismissed by 
staff who claimed that “inspiration doesn’t come from the founding ideals”446 in terms of 
contemporary projects or that “these abstract ideals do not motivate anybody”447 due to their 
vagueness. Indeed even attempting to question staff on whether they were inspired by these 
ideals often drew laughter and reflexive self-questioning as to what sort of answer was 
expected. As one UNDP peacekeeping official asked “should I give you my honest answer? 
The honest answer is ...I’m a bureaucrat” meaning that a sense of that typical bureaucratic 
detachment was her general modus operandi. A general lack of interest in the overall moral 
mission of the UN was confirmed by the comment that even prior to joining the bureaucracy 
she had “not a good picture of the UN and (it was) not a place where I aspired to work.”448
When motivation or inspiration was attached to the grand visions of the 1940s, caveats tended 
to be expressed. One possible caveat was that such inspiration was couched in terms of an 
‘official line’, as a policy evaluator of UNHCR remarked, “speaking for UNHCR again, we 
would say that we believe in a family of nations but we very much operate in a world of 
sovereign states and you are not going to have much credibility with states by emphasising 
the family of nations.”449 This comment also builds in the notion of the impracticability of 
working to build the family of nations. Many assumptions, on the parts o f states especially, of 
what this creation of unity would entail involve greater federalisation and the curtailing of
446 Author’s Interview 1, 8th April 2009. Original listings of interviews included in Examiners’ copies but removed
in the present edition for the sake o f confidentiality.
447 Author’s Interview 6, 1st December 2009.
448 Author’s Interview 8, 2nd April 2009.
449 Author’s Interview 1, 8th April 2009.
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sovereign rights and individuality. A second caveat which might be emphasised is that while a 
belief in the family of nations as a goal is expected, it is unclear exactly what it is one is 
supposed to believe. Questioned on the family of nations idea, one commentator exclaimed 
simply, “I’m  not sure what that means to anyone today.”450 Or, to take another example, one 
UNHCR advisor spoke of the human family being “nice to talk about” while noting that the 
world “was certainly not there (an embodiment of family relations) in terms of nation states 
or even within nations.”451 A third caveat exists wherein defence of the idealism of the UN is 
made with relation to an attack on the politics of non-UN actors in the international system. 
For instance, one commentator claimed that he and his UNHCR colleagues “are trying to 
keep alive, I suppose, the ideals of the 1951 convention4’2” in the face of constant opposition 
from states whom he accused of wanting far fewer demands placed upon them for the 
provision o f aid to refugees than the 1951 Convention4’3 originally required, but without 
proposing any “coherent alternatives” to that which they had already agreed. Another 
UNHCR official praised the openness and inclusivity o f the UN in comparison to nation­
states and N GOs, claiming that by permitting such figures as Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and 
Colonel Gaddafi to speak in the General Assembly, the UN acted as an important “global 
pressure valve”. He claimed that “the danger of not giving people a voice is that they are 
likely then to harbour a great deal of animosity internationally.”4’4
Causes o f detachment from the ideal of the family of nations do not stop at its inherent 
vagueness and impracticability. A sense pervades many UN staff that this formulation is 
outdated or even absurd. One UN writer claimed that many political thinkers and UN staff 
would avoid the idea of the family o f nations due to a “natural tendency to shy away from 
coming out with something that sounds preposterous.”455 Staff expressed the view that, 
contrary to the U N IH P’s assertions above, the mixture of idealism and technical expertise in 
the UN did not confer special status to the UN’s authority or mission. Rather it was noted 
that an amorphous desire to bring the world closer together permeated many of the
450 Author’s Interview 2, 30th November 2009.
451 Author’s Interview 5, 27th August 2009.
452 Author’s Interview 1, 8th April 2009.
453 See the 1951 ‘Convention Relating To The Status o f Refugees’ accessed on March 21st 2009 at: 
http: /  /  www.unhcr.org/protect /  PROTECT! ON /  3b66c2aal O.pdf
454 Author’s Interview 4 , 1st December 2009.
455 Author’s Interview 7, 24th November 2009.
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developments in international architecture from the late nineteenth century onwards. As one 
UNHCR staff member commented - “there is a similar mixture of idealism and pragmatism 
even in  technical organisations like the International Postal Union!”456 Further detachment 
maybe attributed to the sense of the UN failing to attain anything like its high ideals. The 
disjunction between discourse and capabilities, just in the same way as it leads states to 
despair of the UN, also leads staff to distance themselves from its most Utopian ideals of 
which the idea of world kinship is perhaps the most stark. Such resigned comments as “(I) do 
believe in it (the UN’s attempt to build the family of nations) to the extent to which one can 
with a degree of scepticism” and “if you didn’t have the UN, you’d have something just as 
bad”437, attest to this institutionalised dubiousness. As one commentator in the UN Voices 
project remarked, the initial fervour o f the UN founding document amounted to “a spirit that 
didn’t last very long.”458 In other words, though the generations of the 1940s were united in 
thinking that the UN bureaucracy needed strong moral statements in order to gain support 
and legitimacy, current staff find the grand notions o f building a family of nations or working 
towards international brotherhood only vaguely inspiring and only tangentially relevant to 
their work. Further, as the next section shows, these discourses, which the planners expected 
to be so useful, are often argued today to be counter-productive in the UN’s work at 
improving the lives of the world’s citizens.
4.6 Problems with Kinship Discourse -  Ineffectiveness and 
Ethnocentricitv
Just as will be seen in the following chapters on Darfur and Guantanamo, the contemporary 
international organisational episteme is dominated by a massive rational, problem solving 
complex of bureaucracies and advocacy groups, much more so than was the case in the mid­
twentieth century. Bureaucratic standards o f expression of the goals of the IG O /N G O  
community have largely been fixed to remain as practicable and emotionally neutral as 
possible — this is manifest in the contemporary preference for the notion of the international
456 Author’s Interview 1, 8th April 2009.
457 Author’s Interview 8, 2nd April 2009.
458 Jolly, R., Emmerij, L. & Weiss, T. (2005a) UN Voices: The Struggle for Development and Social Justice 
p i 61/2. Interview with Robert Cox, ILO.
152
community over other visions of world order. In this context, speaking in impracticable and 
emotive terms of the family of nations occupies a discursive niche as a potent but risky 
linguistic choice. Two problems emerge in particular. Firstly, kinship metaphors are seen as 
ineffective tools for building consensus or unity of purpose. Secondly, they are seen to carry 
Western overtones, especially with relation to colonial images of parent metropolises and 
infant peripheries, or, as in the last chapter in Eleanor Roosevelt’s statement in Paris in 1948, 
Western powers situating themselves in the centre of the familial in-group and by virtue of 
their parental and tutorial aid to less developed nations, permitting them to become full 
members of the family. These discourses are still echoed by contemporary politicians, as the 
following chapters will show.
To elaborate: kinship metaphors can be used as a rallying call, but their aspirational and 
emotive tones can make the pronouncements of bureaucrats seem unrealistic, distant from 
actual politics, and lacking credibility, as the above reference to maintaining the trust of states 
would indicate. Many officials perceive the allure of discourses of international community 
and the family o f nations but note also that “the more you use it, the less it means” and that 
in terms of working for UNHCR, it was crucial to be “quite careful in not pitching its case 
solely in terms o f ideals.”459 As one UNDP officer noted kinship ideals in her experience have 
“no place...no place whatsoever” in dealings with states or in the development of most 
official documents, instead “we have to be very clear in our wording and objectives.”460 
Working towards consensus and agreement on the basis of shared ideals can often waste 
valuable time according to one UNHCR policy advisor. He claimed that by trying to appeal 
to a sense of common ideals “you can get agreement on an intellectual level sometimes, but 
ultimately, you’ve got to get to the guys who have some influence and couch things in terms 
of political and economic benefits”461 in order to secure backing for UN projects. Lofty 
idealism, according to another former UN humanitarian advisor, can have shocking limits on 
the ground. Discussing violence in refugee camps he talked about the point at which, in the 
field, values become useless. Failing to reason with either side, he concluded that at times 
“you reach a point where this is not about principles, it’s simply about vengeance.”462 In other
459 Author’s Interview 1, 8th April 2009.
460 Author’s Interview 8, 2nd April 2009.
461 Author’s Interview 5, 27th August 2009.
462 Author’s Interview 3, 8* December 2009.
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words, though the generations o f the 1940s were united in thinking that the UN bureaucracy 
needed strong moral statements in order to gain support and legitimacy, current staff relate to 
the grand notions of building a family of nations or working towards international 
brotherhood in highly ambivalent ways.
Taking up the second problem above, the philosophical limits of these discourses are a point 
o f some contention in the commentaries of UN staff particularly with respect to the effect of 
kinship discourses and associated grand discourses of world unity in enhancing the exclusive 
Westem-ness of the organisation. While a respect for the intentions of this Western corpus 
exists, as does an appreciation that the “principles are still valid” of the historical documents 
despite their age, the recognition that these principles “continue to be the type of norms that 
are still upheld internationally” is far from universally lauded. The perpetuation of such 
discourses, it is commonly stated, re-inscribes “a Western liberal approach to humanity from 
a Western dominated organization.”463 Further, by virtue of the claim to unsurpassability of 
the UN’s grand goals, one commentator spoke of the rigidness of such ideals given their 
embedding within a transnational bureaucracy — ““you have a Western set of rules and you 
live or die by them, accept them, or not, try to change them or whatever, at your peril.”464 As 
far as explanation for this rigidity is offered (other than to point to ‘rational’ or sunk cost 
bureaucratic reasons) one commentator argued that it was “perhaps an indication that the 
West hasn’t changed that much.”463
This seems like an alluringly simply evaluation, and yet, I would argue that it points instead to 
a more complex failing of the process of embedding vague ideals of world kinship at the 
heart of a rational bureaucracy. As will be shown in greater detail in the following chapters, 
the West has indeed changed a great deal since the founding of the UN and the terrain of 
discourse in which the West speaks of its ideal image o f the world has changed starkly. An 
illusion o f fixity has been fostered however, by the institutionalisation of the kinship ideal 
within the myth and history of the UN mission. Part Three shows the general tendency in 
international political, N GO and media rhetoric for this formulation to slip out of use. UN 
staff themselves ascribe to it problems of ethnocentricity, its paternal redolence of a colonial
463 Three citations from Author’s Interview 8, 2nd April 2009.
464 Author’s Interview 1, 8th April 2009.
465 Author’s Interview 8, 2nd April 2009.
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gaze, its sentimentality and its inarticulacy, yet it has been preserved to re-inscribe those 
tendencies on what should be a dynamic and inclusive organisation. Further, as the next 
section discusses, these discourses have largely failed to deliver the widening of human unity 
that they describe and are not usually acted upon in serious ways by UN staff. The politicking 
of preparing projects and building coalitions to advance UN work, for instance towards its 
commonly agreed Development Goals, is best done with little reference to grand ideals. Even 
though one may argue that pushing towards the MDGs is a step towards building the family 
of nations, many UN officers find the negative capital attached to such sentiment to be either 
irrelevant or actually counterproductive.
4.7 Building the ‘Family of Nations* on Kinship Discourse Isn’t Working
To what extent then, in the practice of UN bureaucracy, have the discourses of world kinship 
been capable of producing what is described? Admissions abound that the United Nations or 
the international community is not only agreed upon certain technical standards or principles 
but is united around “human ideals centrally concerned with individuals and the rights of 
groups.”466 Apart from such pervasive agreements as the MDGs however, it is unclear how 
closely world unity discourses may fit into the conceptual space occupied by the supposed 
“common strategy and goal”467 which commentators claim for the diverse UN bureaucracies.
Many UN staff expressed the opinion that the discourses of world unity, even kinship, 
fostered by the United Nations over the past three generations have failed to reach out to 
political elites or the deeper social strata of much of the global periphery. A certain cynicism 
accompanied discussions of the limit of the international community or the family of nations. 
Rather, a pervasive sense existed that, being built upon Western values bolstered by claims to 
moral and rational unsurpassability, either it has been difficult for non-Western perspectives 
to carve change into the philosophical or bureaucratic architecture due to political blocks 
placed upon them, or else non-Westemers, by their alienation from the core values o f the 
organisation, are less interested than Westerners in contributing to debates on these value 
sets. In terms of philosophical agreement, it seemed clear that UN staff were prepared to
466 Author’s Interview 4 , 1st December 2009.
467 Author’s Interview 8, 2nd April 2009.
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concede that “Western parties are all on the same page”46* though on most things relating to 
contributions towards the principles behind policy “China doesn’t get involved, nor Russia, 
the Arab states etc” and “the international community doesn’t include them most o f the time, 
though we’d like it to . . .when we talk about the international community, we are talking about 
the Western donors whom you want to pay for things.”469 In essence this self-affirmation, 
making those from whom you need financial support feel needed and valued as community 
or even ‘family’ members is by turns both an extremely politic and helpful use for such grand 
discourse, but also a fairly cynical usage too. There is little sense of wanting to create a wider 
family here, simply to reassure those who place themselves ideologically at the centre o f the 
functioning core as a matter of default due to the ethnocentric setup of the discursive 
parameters. As an interview in the UN Voices project confirms “the parameters (of the UN) 
are not defined by any o f the Third World countries at all”470.
Furthermore, it was common to find UN officials expressing open admissions that the 
constraints, beliefs and co-dependencies of their own bureaucratic community were more 
important than any outside input in formulating policy. Officials described a fairly closed 
community: “we’re all very similar and much more similar than to ‘normal people’ in our own 
countries”471 and within this sphere a tendency was to “gravitate toward your own region or 
nationality.”472 While a certain bureaucratic ‘groupthink’ might be expected given the 
supposed fixity and sunk costs of such an organisational system, more intriguing were 
responses to questions on relations between UN staff and officials from non-Westem 
governments — officials whom, it would be supposed, may challenge UN philosophies. One 
official described having to threaten “public naming and shaming”473 of recalcitrant 
governments. Others commented upon government ‘disinterest’ and tendency towards vain 
obsession with individual measures instead of engaging in debate on the principles o f UN 
action: “as long as they see their pet things in there, then they’re happy just to let you draft
468 Author’s Interview 8, 2nd April 2009.
469 Ibid.
470 Jolly, R., Emmerij, L. & Weiss, T. (2005a) UN Voices: The Struggle for Development and Social Justice p209. 
Interview with Conor Cruise O ’Brien, formerly Ireland’s Permanent Representative to the UN.
471 Author’s Interview 1, 8th April 2009.
472 Ibid.
473 Author’s Interview 6, 1st December 2009.
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the rest.”474 Pacification with token gestures as a way to “bless their system”473 replaces any 
attempt to convince of the merits o f UN principles. In cases of government engagement, the 
tendency towards remaining within what one official described as ‘concentric circles’ of 
bureaucratic society and norms, can still be reinforced — “government people.. .tend to have 
gone to the same universities as you.. .you gravitate towards each other that way.”476
There is a great sense that the politics of working for UN agencies is not about promulgating 
or attempting to get outside parties to buy into the grand discourses of the institution. Rather, 
such attempts would be politically unfeasible and stir up hotly contested differences of 
philosophy which would lead to the breakdown of cooperation and the possibility of 
consensus. The task instead, when working with government partners is “just to get rubber 
stamps as you move along.”477 Commentators also denied having to or wanting to use the 
UN’s supposed position in the international moral high ground, to advocate principles based 
upon the unsurpassable claims of their organisational moral philosophy. Instead, on this 
question o f attempting to exploit differences of opinion in order to advance the UN’s 
philosophical line, vehement denials were made. Concerning ‘project level’ disagreements 
over policy it was seen to be preferable to finesse the situation and circumvent or delay 
confrontation rather than to try to change the contrary views of third parties “it’s our job to 
manage the situation so it doesn’t get to the stage of disagreement478” one UNDP officer 
related. Another related that these “constant attempts to balance relations with different 
stakeholder interests” was perhaps the most enjoyable part of policy development noting, 
“we play a double, triple or even quadruple game on this...we get things done by saying 
completely different things to different people.”479
Not only does the bureaucratic machinery seek actively to avoid bringing world unity ideals 
into its dealings with states, but the opinion of UN officials on the unifying power of such 
discourses was generally found to be low. Staff spoke of the “polarisation between the West
474 Author’s Interview 8, 2nd April 2009.
475 Author’s Interview 6 , 1st December 2009.
476 Author’s Interview 8, 2nd April 2009.
477 Ibid.
478 Ibid.
479 Author’s Interview 1, 8th April 2009.
157
and the Third World”480 and “ridiculous amounts of wrangling” due to the fact that, “on the 
member states side with their fundamentally world-different (sic) views, the principles divide 
a lot.”481 It was also noted that the UN’s highest ideals are often hijacked by the NGO 
community in ways which then, by their polarisation of debate, can hinder cooperation 
between member states. One example given was the promotion of a form of the 
‘Responsibility To Protect’ (R2P) doctrine by the International Crisis Group. UN staff 
commonly saw such organisations (also Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch) as 
“aligning R2P too closely to the idea of humanitarian intervention instead of that being a last 
resort482”. The result of this distortion of debate, which had begun with an attempted 
reassessment o f UN principles on human rights, was marked heightening of member state 
conflict due to many G77 nations developing “an issue with a problem of feeling their 
cultural sovereignty under attack.”483 That strain of the grand ideals which promulgates a 
singular and uncompromising set o f legitimate values and practices, when turned to spotlight 
the domestic responsibilities of developing world countries by a Western NGO adopting the 
Western language o f the UN, provoked outcry and fractiousness.
More optimistically, the increased assertiveness of the G77, piqued by a sudden re-emergence 
of an interfering tendency at the heart of ideals of a singular standard for states relations as 
members of the family nations, may be positive force for overall UN reform in the longer 
term. That the “very divided family of nations484” of the present may perhaps eventually 
reform a more inclusive and practical self-image and canon of ideals in reaction to the 
ethnocentrism and impracticability of the 1940s version, is a change only likely to come to 
pass due to increasing power and discursive assertiveness of non-Westem states.
The translation thus far though, of 1940s ideals and ideology into contemporary bureaucratic 
practice has been hesitant and incomplete and many UN bureaucrats view the excesses of 
wartime ideals with scepticism, as a hindrance or an irrelevance. Many though still express an 
instinctual attachment to such “wonderful and idealistic”483 notions consonant with their
480 Author’s Interview 2, 30th November 2009.
481 Two citations from Author’s Interview 8, 2nd April 2009.
482 Author’s Interview 1, 8th April 2009.
482 Ibid.
484 Author’s Interview 8, 2nd April 2009.
485 Author’s Interview 5, 27th August 2009.
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persistence in discourse. The inarticulacy of the family o f nations concept means that there 
has never been a coherent way to operationalise this vision. In many ways such an attempt 
would be nonsensical as well as impossible. This is perhaps the most pointed criticism to be 
made of the legacy left by the planners for the bureaucracy they created. In their ideals, they 
made sacred both practicable guidelines for international conduct, and also passive 
replications of social scripts, images of a promised land for which no political road-map could 
be drawn. Indeed, in the discursive sediment of these social scripts of the human family, most 
often the only possible road-map to reach this state of unity is a path of religious 
improvement and not political principle. It is perhaps little surprise then that this complex 
and contradictory legacy should be problematic for UN officials. Due to the changes in the 
discursive field of discussing human unity, bureaucrats often find it impolitic to use notions 
of human kinship in their work and find it difficult to explain the emergence of this rhetoric 
in documents relating to contemporary UN practice such as the MDGs. The two following 
chapters explore the discursive terrain not just of UN rhetoric but political and N G O  
rhetoric too, tracing the niches within discourse where kinship metaphors retain an important 
role in the structure of conceiving of the unity of purpose and substance of the world.
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PART THREE - Case Studies of Languages of 
Inclusion and Exclusion: Metaphors of the Margins of 
the ‘Functioning Core* in the Early Twenty-First
Century
CHAPTER FIVE - Case Study One: The Darfur Crisis, 2003-5
5.1 Investigating the Political Usage of Kinship Discourse
In the investigations of Part Two, some defence for the employment o f the notion of a 
functioning core of the international order has been outlined. A core set of principle beliefs 
and the shoots o f a burgeoning structure of international institutions and political regimes 
were delineated by a closely-circumscribed group of politicians and political advisors and 
bound up within sets of languages of international shared substance, values and purpose. 
Nevertheless, as the previous chapter indicated, the normative languages which planners felt 
would be crucial to motivating international society to believe in the UN organisation may, in 
their West-centricity, be counter-productive in the work of contemporary UN bureaucrats. 
While clearly notions of the acceptable members of international society are fluid and 
contested, this is not to deny that the concept of a core group o f nations driving and 
controlling the ethos of the world international institutions remains in play in political and 
popular discourse, and remains o f great political and symbolic value.
This chapter, following on from the previous bureaucratic ethnography, looks at the 
operational workings of foundational discourses of the institutional international community 
at its putative margins. Our argument in Part One has been that logics of difference, 
especially when metaphorised in terms of kin and kin-community, admit of a plurality of 
responses towards those on the edges of the group. By the richness of their metaphorical 
content, kin metaphors construct the relations of the discoursing subject and their object of 
discourse in multiple potential modes of understanding that in turn permit diverse actions of 
power. The kin metaphor can play upon supposed notions of nurturance and safety and the
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valuing of the (metaphorical) person, or, as further explored in the following chapter, equally 
can be employed to re-impose hierarchy and dominance within the group. On the margins of 
the group it can be employed to lend substance both to policies which demonstrate a 
welcoming collective, or an exclusive one.
Two contemporary case studies where the limits of the human family/international 
community are tested are thus presented, firsdy international attempts to address the 
humanitarian crisis in Darfur, and secondly the neglect of human rights in the prosecution of 
the Global War on Terror. The aim of these case studies is to elaborate the potentialities of 
world kinship discourse and investigate patterns of its employment among alternatives such 
as ‘international society’ or ‘international community’. As a statement within the discursive 
field of the description of global opinion and decision-making today, the term ‘international 
community’ is almost the blanket referent o f choice in a dominant ‘enunciative modality’486 
for speaking o f the functioning core of the world and global opinion. As Foucault charts, an 
‘enunciative modality’ is constructed from a particular type of discourse producer, inhabiting 
a specific subject position in relation to his audience and may rely for his/her authority upon 
a subject position within a particular institutional site. We are used, for instance, to political 
figures, NGOs, print and television media mobilising the notion of a putative ‘international 
community’ as the moral and political conscience and judge of world affairs. To take 
instances from the current events of 2009, North Korean nuclear arms testing provoked 
widespread tension and criticism from world leaders framed in most cases as an affront to the 
international community. Gordon Brown commented that "(T)he international community 
will treat North Korea as a partner if it behaves responsibly. If  it does not, then it can expect 
only renewed isolation”. The Japanese Foreign Minister, Hirofumi Nakasone said of the 
testing, "(A)s it is a violation o f UN Security Council resolutions, [Japan] condemns and 
protests it strongly. It is a challenge to the whole o f the international community and 
increases tensions.”487 A month later the disputed Iranian election prompted US President
486 A mode o f the production o f meaning, given shape by the “various statuses, various sites, the various position 
that he (the subject) can occupy when making a discourse”, Foucault, M. (1972) The Archaeology o f Knowledge 
p54.
487 All above citations from ‘World Unites to Condemn North Korea Nuclear Test’ in Daily Telegraph, 25th May 
2009. Available at: http://www.relegraph.co.uk/news/ worldncws/ asia/northkorea/5383019/W orld-unires-to- 
condemn-North-Korea-nuclear-test.html. Accessed on 30/10/2009. This article also cites President Obama’s 
take on the testing. He accused Pyongyang o f "directly and recklessly challenging the international community”
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Obama to declare that “(T)he United States and the international community have been 
appalled and outraged by the threats, the beatings and imprisonments of the last few days”488 
as the Iranian regime cracked down on protestors.
In light of the findings of Part Two, discourse surrounding Darfur and the War on Terror 
can provide us with ways of mapping the survival of world kinship discourse in an era where 
the default mode of thinking of, and speaking about, global opinion and a vision o f global 
unity is in terms of an ‘international community’. In particular these case studies seek to 
address the following questions. What patterns of usage for kinship discourse exist in the 
contemporary period? How are these patterns different from those in the era of the UN 
planners? What is kinship discourse in particular employed to do?
The first case study then concerns the political and ethnic conflict and humanitarian crises in 
the Darfur region o f Western Sudan which came starkly to the notice of the international 
community in the early years of the twenty-first century. In this case, many of the freedoms 
and rights supposedly guaranteed to citizens of the international community have been lost to 
the Darfurians. Further, the marginalisation of Darfur by the Sudanese central government in 
Khartoum has (in some quarters) pushed the Sudanese nation state towards something 
approaching pariah status. For prominent Western governments and for international 
organisations though, the desire is for Sudan and Darfur to be re-incorporated as full and 
equally respected members of the ‘family of nations’. The second case study concerns an 
instance where those on the margins of the functioning core are felt to be a threat which 
needs to be excluded and isolated, rather than to have fallen outside the group as a result of 
misfortune. Here, the international reaction to the isolation of political prisoners of the War 
on Terror at Guantanamo Bay and the abuses of human rights at Abu Ghraib prison will be 
investigated.
and warned that “ (S)uch provocations will only serve to deepen N orth Korea's isolation. It will not find 
international acceptance unless it abandons its pursuit o f weapons o f mass destruction and their means of 
delivery.”
488 ‘Obama Sharpens Criticism of Iran’ in Washington Post, 24th June 2009. Available at 
http://w w w .washingtQnpost.com/wp-dvn/content/articIe/2009/0 6 723/AR200906230'1743.html. Accessed on 
20/07/2009.
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The purpose and line of inquiry of these case studies must be carefully circumscribed. There 
is neither the need nor the space to rehearse comprehensively the politics of the international 
community’s responses to the Darfur crisis or the Guantanamo controversy. Instead, it must 
be remembered that the tracking of metaphorical practice is the crux o f the exercise. At the 
dawn o f the latest project for a truly international world order in the 1940s, kin metaphors 
held an important place in discussing glorious aspirations for world unity. In the following 
contemporary investigations, selections o f discourses related to the events in question are 
analysed to suggest the work of various metaphorical devices and the potential motivations 
for the choices made by political actors in presenting the self and other at the margins of 
functioning core o f international society.
Further, it should be remembered that the political debate in either the Darfur or War on 
Terror case contains examples of world kinship and community discourses used both for 
practices o f inclusion and exclusion. It has been noted that a prevalent Western desire has 
been to re-incorporate Darfurians (inclusion) and to isolate rogue states and terrorists 
(exclusion). However, Western voices have also spoken in exclusionary terms about the 
Government o f Sudan, and Western powers have attempted to democratise and thus re- 
include former terror sponsors such as Afghanistan. Thus it would be wrong to see the 
present Darfur case study as being solely a case of investigating kinship (and other) languages 
as means of pushing for inclusionary politics. The same applies to an uncritical association of 
the War on Terror with exclusionary politics.
The fact that Western desires, opinions and principles are at the root of the supposedly 
‘universal’ languages and actions of the UN as an international moral arbiter, has the effect of 
presenting issues of world politics as being organised around a W estem/UN orthodox 
perspective while on the sidelines sit various dissentions. Clearly this overlap and structure of 
perspectives is hugely prevalent, but not ubiquitous. Neither the UN nor the West can be 
taken uncritically as having singular voices. Nevertheless, the overwhelming potential of a 
W estern/UN perspective (which presents itself in terms o f universal normative values) to 
organise other viewpoints with relation to itself cannot be discounted. Analysing practices of 
inclusionary language separately from exclusionary language would fragment the logical sense 
of the politics of both case studies and so they are presented with relation to the existing
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UN/W estern orthodoxy which has seen Darfur as mainly a matter of re-inclusion, and the 
War on Terror as mainly a matter of security-minded exclusion. In each case it will be 
necessary to be mindful of linguistic practices which run counter to this hegemonic 
organisation.
5.2 Voices of humanity? The Escalating Debate Concerning Darfur: 
2003-5
In making a case study of the international community’s response to the Darfur crisis of 
recent years, what is to be presented is a close analysis of how the conflict and ensuing 
humanitarian catastrophes have been discussed. The conflict itself, in the context of the 
Second Sudanese Civil War has roots in the attempted homogenisation of Sudan by the 
dominant Arab North — a struggle which has continued in various ways for several 
generations.489 Following years o f persecution and marginalisation under the Bashir 
government, Darfurian rebel groups (principally the Justice and Equality Movement, or JEM, 
and the Sudanese Liberation Movement/Army, or SLM/A) began carefully planned and 
audacious attacks on Government forces and installations. The resulting backlash through 
scorched earth attacks on villages by janjaweed militias in the summer and autumn of 2003 led 
to massive displacement of non-Arab Fur villagers and in 2004, the UN described the area as 
the scene of the worst humanitarian crisis in the world at that point.490 2004 was marked by 
burgeoning international debate upon courses of action open to the international community 
and also debate over the classification of the conflict as genocidal. This initial phase o f the 
conflict (quite separate from more recent upsurges) began to wind down as peace talks were
489 An excellent overview of the historical background to the conflict is provided in Johnson, D. (2003) The Root 
Causes o f Sudan’s Civil Wars. This point is discussed in detail in Fake, S. and Funk. K  (2009) The Scramble For 
Africa: Darfur — Intervention and the USA. See especially chapter 2. The authors raise the point that the 
racialisation (though based more on lifestyle than genetics or skin colour) o f the population o f Darfur was 
accelerated successively from the 1968 election onwards and later as part of Colonel Gaddafi’s Pan-Arabist 
Libyan expansionism. Also pertinent is the fact that part o f the Government o f Sudan need to foster ‘Arab’ 
janjaweed groups to conduct suppression o f Darfur and thus intensify the racial element o f the crisis was created 
by the previous plundering o f Darfurian villages to fill ranks o f the Sudanese army. Unlikely to turn on their own 
homelands, the GoS was backed into fostering specifically ‘Arab’ elements in order to try to bend Darfur to its 
will. See Natsios, A. (2006) ‘Moving Beyond the Sense o f Alarm’ in Totten, S. and Markusen, E. Genocide in 
Darfur: Investigating the Atrocities in the Sudan p29-32
490 This initial phase o f the conflict is covered well by Flint, J. and de Waal, A. (2005) Darfur: A Short History o f 
a Long War or Prunier, G. (2007) Darfur: The Ambiguous Genocide
164
arranged in Abuja, Nigeria. It is from this phase that the majority of the discursive statements 
in this case study will be taken, with other foundational texts and later commentaries on the 
period brought in to lend contextual weight.
In particular, four types of statements will be analysed. Firstly I shall look at academic 
discourse on Darfur and the international community response. Much of the literature on 
Darfur has cast the conflict in terms of a putative history of failures to act in defending 
human rights in Africa, and much is made of comparisons with the Rwandan genocide in 
1994. This first section will help to flesh out the discursive referents for contemporary 
discussions of Darfur though, as a proviso, it must be noted that such academic discourse 
does not represent an object of discourse in the thesis as a whole. To elevate it to an object of 
analysis alongside political speeches and rhetoric, the meeting minutes and writings o f UN 
planners, or even the statements of UN officials would require a dilution of the analyses of 
the above categories of discursive output.
There is little purchase to be gained in the self-contained analysis of contemporary academic 
output. As will be seen, more depends upon the school o f IR (or other disciplinary) thought 
of the author in determining the terminology used in contemporary writing - such is the 
weight o f accumulated semantic association locked into the conceptual frames of the world 
favoured by various academic groupings. Further, comparing contemporary scholarship and 
the collections of writing from the 1930s and 1940s analysed in Chapter One would be 
somewhat misguided. Academic contributions to the international organisation/world unity 
debate in the 30s and 40s were mosdy written by a combination of academics and political 
figures and, moreover, sponsored by political organisations and so tied into, and intended for, 
digestion by political classes. In contrast, the academic discourse in the following section 
refers more closely to a fairly insular community o f academic debates than to deliberate 
engagement with political rhetoric.491
491 This argument has been made variously from several perspectives. Karin Knorr-Cetina (1981) pointed out in 
The Manufacture o f Knowledge the motivation for academics to produce work which appeals to a closed 
community o f peers rather than to readers outside o f academia. This helps to manipulate an internal economy of 
advancement based on recommendations and reviews for publications, grants and promotions. Scholars in 
feminism and queer studies, such as the widely cited Messer-Davidow, E. (2002) Disciplining Feminism: From 
Social Activism to Academic Discourse have questioned whether academic modes o f writing are sufficiently 
engaged with political processes and whether such engagement is structurally possible. Further work, such as
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By contrast, the second and third types of statements, namely political rhetoric from Western 
nations on the one hand, and UN and N GO reporting on the other, will be considered as 
objects o f discourse analysed in the broad scope of the thesis. Much of the debate 
surrounding Darfur has dwelt on issues o f responsibility and has invoked notions of 
international collective will in spite of the difficulties that surrounded assessing and then 
acting upon the unfolding crisis. Bureaucratised and formalised reporting, negotiating and 
policy-making in all these fields tends to rely upon standardised formulations and tends to 
shy away from more emotive metaphorisations of the duties and aims which might be in play.
I deal initially with the vast discursive background o f fairly neutral statements and 
formulations of international crisis response. Following this, the chapter looks at the less 
frequently engaged language of kin metaphors and attempts to account for their role in the 
discursive landscape. Finally, sources of Sudanese discourse from both sides of the conflict 
are analysed. Both the aspirations and manifestos o f the rebel movements and the 
international self-defence of the Government of Sudan are taken into account to help to 
frame more accurately the particularities of Western-global discursive patterns.
5.3 Contextualising the Crisis: Academic Treatments of the Initial 
Phases of Conflict
The first wave of academic commentary on the unfolding Darfur crisis began to be published 
in 2004, shortly after the extent of the suffering resulting from the retribution exacted by the 
Government of Sudan (GoS) and its proxy militias, was becoming known to the outside 
world and discussed in international arenas. Much of the literature situated the conflict within 
the scope of debates on the ‘responsibility to protect’ (R2P492) and in a historical trajectory
Jackson, P. And Sullivan, G. (1999) ‘Introduction: Ethnic Minorities and the Lesbian and Gay Community’ in 
their edited volume Multicultural Queer: Australian Narratives has criticised the academy and its discourse for 
being unable to keep up with or capture the complexity o f lived experience, instead demonstrating significant 
cultural and discursive lag. More mainstream critics o f the hermetic and self-referential nature of academic 
writing have focused on its lack o f translatability to wider society in all its diversity. Among many varied 
examples, Bartolome, L. (1998) The Misteaching o f Academic Discourses: The Politics o f Language in the 
Classroom. Canagarajah, A.S. (2002) A Geopolitics o f Academic Writing or for a more populist take, Graff, G. 
(2004) Clueless in Academe: How Schooling Obscures the Life of the Mind.
492 The use of this abbreviation has been taken on following its pervasive adoption in UN and N G O  circles 
following the modern naissance o f the notion o f a ‘Responsibility to Protect’ in the report o f the International
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stretching back through international events concerning attempted humanitarian intervention 
in the 1990s.
Prior to Darfur appearing on the international radar, most engagement with Sudan had been 
in the context of the long-standing conflicts and stop-start peace negotiations between the 
North and South. International concern had been intensified and the potential stakes upon 
the outcome of peace negotiations raised by the beginning of exports from the oilfields of the 
South through a newly developed pipeline to the Port of Sudan coast in 1998.
As captured by Randolph Martin in a 2002 article in Foreign Affairs, global interest in Sudan, 
and in particular, US interest in Sudan, was of a very different order to the ‘responsibility to 
protect’ debates that dominated discourse after the emergence of the Darfur crisis. The initial 
coup which brought Omar al-Bashir to power in 1989 plunged Sudan into both “pariah 
status493” and economic decay. Martin, a director of the International Rescue Committee and 
an experienced voice on domestic and international politics in Sudan, wrote positively of 
Sudan’s gradual transformation in the years following the military coup. An “international 
charm offensive494” included efforts at regional stability through the hosting of peace talks for 
the conflict in the Central African Republic and the conclusion of productive trade 
agreements with its other neighbours, especially Egypt. Slowly, throughout the 1990s, the 
Bashir government addressed the United States’ concerns that Sudan was sponsoring and 
aiding international terrorists, and expelled Osama Bin-Laden from the country in 1996. 
Further international conventions on the suppression o f terrorism were agreed to by Sudan in 
1997 and 1999.
At Martin’s time o f writing he noted that “virtually all other nations o f consequence — with 
the notable exception of the United States — now enjoy full diplomatic relations with
Convention on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) in 2001 — available at h t t p : / / w w w . i c i s s . c a / r e p o r f -  
e n . a s p . Accessed 30/06/2009. The ICISS report will be taken up later in this chapter. The concepts has been 
worked through in the Darfur context by such writers as de Waal, A. (2007) TDarfur and the Failure of the 
Responsibility to Protect’ in International Affairs 83(6) 1039-54. A prominent think-tank, Responsibility to 
Protect — Engaging Civil Society, an arm of the World Federalist Movement, has helped push the term into 
common usage. See: w w w . r c s p o n s i l 3 i l i t y t o p r o t e c t . o r g
493 Martin, R. (2002) ‘Sudan’s Perfect W ar’ in Foreign Affairs 81(2), p2
494 Ibid. p3
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Khartoum.”495 Notably however, the development of an international oil economy, with 
companies from Malaysia, China, France, Sweden and Canada (among others) involved in 
extraction in Southern Sudan, has helped Khartoum finance war against the South and later 
in Darfur. This upheaval and brutality throughout Bashir’s consolidation period may have 
been masked partially by a charm offensive but caused human suffering on a massive scale. 
As Heather Sharkey writes: ‘(T)he US Committee for Refugees estimates that from 1983 to 
1998 two million Sudanese died from war-related causes (accounting for 20 percent of the 
Sudanese population), and more than 80 percent o f the Southern Sudanese population had 
been displaced at different times.”496
While US economic sanctions, especially on American involvement in Sudan’s oil boom, 
remained in place consistently in the period leading up to the beginning of the Darfur 
insurgency, Martin chronicles a pattern of normalisation of US relations with Sudan 
throughout the early years of the Bush Administration. The 1998 American cruise missile497 
attack, he argues, reflected American perceptions o f Sudan formed in “dark days of turmoil” 
following the coup o f the earlier 1990s — “more a visceral reaction to an outdated image than 
a calculated response to current information.”498 In the early 2000s, the Bush Administration 
made good headway in engaging further with Sudan, though it found itself pushed and pulled 
in contrary directions by various domestic pressure groups. The Christian Right and the Black 
Congressional Caucus urged aid to the South and condemnation o f the North, while oil 
interests desired the lifting o f trade sanctions on the North to open up trading 
opportunities.499 The Administration approved humanitarian aid missions, appointed a charge 
d’affaires (working admittedly from Nairobi) and a special peace envoy in John Danforth. 
Martin urged the opening of diplomatic relations as a means of applying continued pressure 
on Khartoum over its human rights record, and to send a message to the South that outright
495 Martin, R. (2002) ‘Sudan’s Perfect War’ in Foreign Affairs 81(2) p3
496 Sharkey, H. (2004) ‘Globalization, Migration and Identity: Sudan 1800-2000’ in Schabler, B. and Stenberg, L. 
(eds.) Globalization and the Muslim World: Culture. Religion and Modernity p l32
497 See also Sharp, W.G. (2000) ‘The Use of Armed Force Against Terrorism: American Hegemony or 
Impotence?’ in Chicago Journal o f International Law 1(1), 37-48.
498 Martin, R. (2002) ‘Sudan’s Perfect War’ in Foreign Affairs 81(2), p7
499 Preferential trading relations with Sudan, especially after the oil strikes o f 2005 which doubled the country’s 
known reserves, would be a useful counterweight for the US and the Western world in general to the economic 
leverage on prices currently held by the OPEC cartel. See Fake, S. and Funk, K. (2009) The Scramble For Africa: 
Darfur -  Intervention and the USA p57. Clearly the US at least is reluctant to take such a step no matter the 
attraction due to the moral compromise of association with the present Sudanese regime.
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secession was not a policy Washington would support. The lifting of sanctions, he added, 
might be used as a substantial incentive to the successful conclusion o f peace talks.
All through this period Darfur, marginalised, deprived and unstable as it was, barely featured 
in international concerns with Sudan. The spectacular SLM/A and JEM attacks on 
government posts and military aircraft at al-Fashir in April 2003500 represented a more 
impressive blow against GoS forces than had been struck in twenty years o f slow-burning 
insurgency in the South and the reprisals later that year were predictably harsh. However, 
despite the UN putting out an appeal for $139 million to help Darfiirians cope with the 
ongoing GoS and janjaweed revenge attacks, throughout 2003 as Hugo Slim writes, “the 
world’s media were never mobilized, being editorially diverted by Iraq and physically 
prevented from entering Darfur by Khartoum’s news blackout.”501
Only throughout 2004 did debate begin in earnest in the UN and in academia. Slim’s early, 
and oft-quoted article praised the fact-finding missions by NGOs, the UNCHR and OCHA 
as well as the United States’ innovative use of satellite images to show the devastation of 
torched villages in the wake of janjaweed raids. As international machinery sought to grasp the 
nature and magnitude of the conflict as well as what was at stake for the rebels and 
government, the urgency and thoroughness of data collection bears witness to what Slim 
refers to as a “consciousness unmistakeably influenced by the experience of Rwanda.”502 This 
is not an idle reference, for two important criticisms of the international response to the crisis 
as developed in academic commentary turn upon this linkage. Firstly, unfortunate practical 
decisions were made which hampered the international response in the heat of an attempt to
5°° Flint, J. and de Waal, A. (2005) Darfur: A Short History of a Long War p99-100
501 Slim, H. (2004) ‘Dithering over Darfur? A preliminary review o f the international response’ in International 
Affairs 80(4) p814
502 Ibid. p813. A conceptual connection with Rwanda was played up as a way to motivate responses to Darfur at 
the highest levels. It was, in this way hugely convenient and symbolic that the world’s notice was captured by 
Darfur in the year of the tenth anniversary o f the Rwandan genocide. As pointed out in Mamdani, M. (2009) 
Saviours and Survivors: Darfur. Politics and the War on Terror, far greater (numerically speaking) humanitarian 
catastrophes had occurred in the intervening period, most particularly in the Second Congo War. Despite this, it 
was the Darfur crisis that was framed by the international community as a second Rwanda and the anniversary 
was exploited to reinforce this connection. See for instance Annan, K. (2004) ‘Action Plan to Prevent Genocide’. 
Available at: 
h ttp ://www.preventgenocide.org/prevent/UNdocs/KofiAnnansActionPlantoPreventGenocide7 Apr2004.htm. 
Accessed on 02/08/2009. A near simultaneous statement was made by the US President. See Bush, G. (2004) 
^President Condemns Atrocities in Sudan’. Statement by the President. Available at: http://georgewhush- 
whitehouse.archives.gov/news / releases /2004/0 4 /20040407-2.html. Accessed 03/10/2009.
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address the situation with greater decisiveness than had been generated in 1994. Secondly, 
important theoretical reflections by international bodies upon the Rwandan genocide and the 
implications for the rights and responsibilities of sovereign states vis-a-vis the international 
community played into, and in some ways hamstrung, the response to Darfur. These two 
post-Rwanda influences are critical to understanding academic commentary on the response 
to the crisis.
As regards the practical reactions to the unfolding conflict, substantial academic work 
throughout 2004 and 2005 reflected upon the conceptual situation of Darfur by international 
commentators within the context of the other conflicts that had wracked Sudan over the 
course of the preceding generation. Darfur, as Alex de Waal wrote in 2004, is possessed of 
“such a long history o f internal migration, mixing and intermarriage that ethnic boundaries 
are mostly a matter of convenience.”503 Whilst the Southern conflict might have been, in a 
vaguely responsible way, described as war between two sides o f different religious and ethnic 
make-up, the Darfur crisis was never simply an adjunct to the attempt by the Northern 
establishment to hold down an Islamic state in the face of non-believing ‘others’ on the 
nation’s peripheries.
Little heed was taken of these complicating factors by many in politics and even in academia. 
Scott Straus, while paying lip-service to the religious and ethnic admixture o f Darfur, opened 
an article reflecting on the recent characterisation of the crisis as ‘genocide’ by the Bush 
Administration as follows: “(T)he primary perpetrators of the killings and expulsions are 
government-backed ‘Arab’ militias. The main civilian victims are black ‘Africans’ from three 
tribes.”504 The government-backing of the janjaweed dovetailed neatly in contemporaneous 
concerns with state-sponsorship of fundamental Islam and terrorism, and references to the 
‘blackness’ and ‘tribal’ nature of the ‘Africans’ is simply predictable pejorative treatment of 
African society.
503 de Waal, A. (2004) ‘Counter-Insurgency on the Cheap’ in Review o f  African Political Econom y 31 p718
504 Straus, S. (2005) ‘Darfur and the Genocide Debate’ in Foreign Affairs Jan/Feb  2005 p i. Regardless o f the 
racial ‘blackness’ mentioned, even Straus’ insistence on using the word ‘tribes’ would, to many post-colonial 
scholars and anthropologists, sound the alarms o f unfortunate essentialism tied into colonial trajectories o f 
understanding.
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In the context of a ‘war on terror’ conducted largely for the neutralisation of extremist 
Islamic groups around the world, the US decision to label the conflict a ‘genocide’ (a decision 
which received scant support from other nations) was almost inevitably inflammatory. As 
Straus notes: “such a designation, it was long thought, would inevitably trigger an 
international response” and further “Darfur.. .provides a good test of whether the 56-year- 
old Genocide Convention, created in the aftermath of the Holocaust, can make good on its 
promise to ‘never again’ allow the targeted destruction of a particular ethnic, racial or 
religious group.”505 However, such a dramatic response from the international community 
was not forthcoming for a number o f reasons, not least the feeling engendered in Khartoum, 
that the US’s singular policy was an attack on its Islamic regime and a reversal of the thaw in 
relations that had occurred throughout the years leading up to the US removing Sudan in 
May 2004 from its list o f states uncooperative in the War On Terror.506 As de Waal 
summarises:
‘The fact that the US media and government have mischaracteri^ ed the Darfur war as ‘Arabs’ killing 
Africans’ has allowed Khartoum to portray it as (another) American conspiray against Arabs. The US 
determination that genocide has been committed, while not substantively different, in its description of atrocities 
and responsibility for them, from statements by European and African leaders, has appeared to put 
Washington out on its own in its opposition to Khartoum. From the perspective of Khartoum (and indeed 
many other capitals in Africa and the Middle East) the genocide determination appears to be the tynical use of 
a new tool to legitimise US intervention and demonise Arabs. This has enabled Khartoum to revive the 
defunct Egyptian and Eibyan initiative for reconciliation in Sudan, which is in effect a spoiler for the 
Naivasha and Abuja processes. ,fi07
Still focused upon the successful conclusion of the Naivasha peace talks between Khartoum 
and the South in 2003, there was initial “international reluctance to include more parties in 
the delicate machinations for fear o f making it unmanageable”508 and this saw the Darfurian 
rebel groups hosted by Chad in the initial attempts at ceasefire talks. Though the conceptual 
linkage of the Darfur crisis to the Southern conflict (especially through language associated 
with the war on terror) was highly unwise as Slim509 points out, a comprehensive effort to
505 Straus, S. (2005) ‘Darfur and the Genocide Debate’ in Foreign Affairs Jan /F eb  2005 p i
506 Daly, M.W. (2007) Darfur’s Sorrow: A History of Destruction and Genocide p293
507 de Waal, A. (2005) ‘Briefing: Darfur, Sudan: Prospects for Peace’ in African Affairs 104/414 p i33
508 Mans, U. (2004) ‘Briefing: Sudan: The New War in Darfur’ in African Affairs 103 p293
509 Slim, H. (2004) TDithering over Darfur? A preliminary review of the international response’ in International 
Affairs 80(4) p822
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address the disenfranchisement o f Sudan’s margins was indeed necessary, and in their 
exclusion from Naivasha510, the Darfurians felt neglected.
However, when talks were convened, it became clear that the theoretical fallout from the 
international failure in Rwanda clouded attempts at comprehensive progress. In the wake of 
Rwanda, the UN Secretary-General’s Special representative on Internally Displaced Persons, 
Francis Deng, produced two influential studies511 on the relationship between the primary 
responsibilities o f sovereign governments to protect the human rights o f their citizens and 
the secondary rights of international forces to intervene when that primary responsibility was 
not deemed to be upheld. Following the formulations of Deng’s work wherein the 
“obligation of the state to provide life-sustaining standards for its citizens must be recognized 
as a necessary condition of sovereignty”512, further work was commissioned on the role of 
external powers when that obligation was not met. In particular, the Canadian government 
set up the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) in 2000. 
The ICISS report framed the question in terms less o f the competing rights of States and 
interveners, but in terms of levels o f responsibility of both to protect citizens: “the 
responsibility to protect looks at the issue from the point of view o f those needing help; it 
acknowledges that the host state has primary responsibility for the welfare of its citizens and 
that intervention can only be contemplated if the state is either unwilling or unable to fulfil its 
responsibilities.”513
Three stumbling blocks to comprehensive international aid came out o f these theoretical 
investigations promoted by the inquest in Rwanda, and to the non-UN intervention in 
Kosovo in the late 1990s. Firstly, as Williams and Bellamy note, the initial UNSC resolutions 
on Darfur, particularly 1556514, “firmly placed responsibility to protect the suffering 
Darfurians in the hands of the Sudanese government. This was in spite of the fact that most
510 The site o f the talks between the GoS and the John Garang’s South Sudanese People’s Liberation Army which 
concluded a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) on the N orth/South conflict in 2005.
511 Deng. F. (1995) ‘Frontiers o f Sovereignty’ in Leiden Journal o f International Law 8(2) and Deng, F. et al. 
(1996) Sovereignty as Responsibility: Conflict Management in Africa
512 Deng, F. et al. (1996) p. xviii
513 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (2001) The Responsibility to Protect p i 7
514 UNSC Resolution 1556, 30/07/2004. ‘Report of the Secretary-General on Sudan’. Available at: 
h ttp ://w w w .un.org/D ocs/sc/unsc resolutions04.html. Accessed on 01/10/2009.
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experts agreed that the Government of Sudan lacked the capability and will to quickly stop or 
disarm the janjaweed by force515”.
Secondly, the ‘responsibility to protect’ debate arguably clouded issues of longer-term strategy 
in talks between the Darfurians, the GoS and the international community. Getting the UN 
forced ‘in’ became a mantra, a panacea, almost seeming to be an end in itself, rather than a 
means to a greater goal. Hence debate was neglected, especially at Abuja, on the operational 
prospects for a UN force. Furthermore, the expectations of salvation led the Darfurians to 
hold unrealistic negotiating positions, and also the apparent international belief that only UN 
forces could alleviate the problems in the region left to the serious de-moralisation of African 
Mission In Sudan (AMIS) forces already present.
Thirdly, as de Waal shows, the parallels made in US N G O  and media sources about ‘saving’ 
Darfur in the same way as Kosovo was ‘saved’, convinced many in Khartoum that the 
‘responsibility to protect’ was a Trojan horse for US/UN ambitions to dismember Sudan.516 
Mahmood Mamdani’s recent criticism of the Save Darfur Coalition’s dishonest coverage of 
the crisis aside517, it is only necessary to remember that one of the most prominent early 
rallying slogans used by Save Darfur was, ‘Out of Iraq, into Darfur’. Whilst such sentiment 
made sense to much of liberal America, coupled with Save Darfur’s advocacy o f unilateral US 
intervention, it is easy to see why such slogans would cause alarm in other comers of the 
globe, particularly in the Arab world. As Bellamy puts it, (following Wheeler’s518 use of the 
notion o f primary ‘norm carriers’), the US and its allies, in the light of a post hoc attempt to 
justify the Iraq war in terms of humanitarian concerns when the search for WMDs failed, 
were “unable to build consensus about collective action (in Darfur) at least in part.. .because 
of their diminished credibility as norm carriers.”519
515 Wiliams, P. and Bellamy, A. (2005) ‘The Responsibility to Protect and the Crisis in Darfur’ in Security 
D ialogue 36(1) p32
516 de Waal, A. (2007) ‘Darfur and the Failure of the Responsibility to Protect’ in International Affairs 83(6) 
p i  046
517 See, Mamdani, M. (2009) Saviours and Survivors: Darfur. Politics and the War on Terror.
5,8 See especially Wheeler, N. and Morris, J. (2006) ‘Justifying Iraq as a Humanitarian Intervention: the Cure is 
Worse than the Disease’ in Sudhu, W. and Thakur, E. (eds.) The Iraq Crisis and World Order: Structural and 
Normative Challenges
519 Bellamy, A. (2005) ‘Responsibility to Protect or Trojan Horse? The Crisis in Darfur and Humanitarian 
Intervention after Iraq’ in Ethics and International Affairs 19(2) p33
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This explanation certainly demands attention, especially given official confirmation of the US 
government’s desire to try to negate the negative political capital of one humanitarian crisis 
caused in Iraq by solving one in Sudan. Stephen Kostas notes this tendency within the Bush 
Administration, drawing on testimony to the House Committee on International Relations by 
Lome Craner, Assistant Secretary for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor.520 He writes: 
“(T)he Bush Administration was eager to point to its leadership on Sudan policy to 
demonstrate that they could speak with authority on grave issues of human rights at a time 
when issues around the treatment o f detainees, particularly at Guantanamo Bay and Abu 
Ghraib, threatened to strip the Administration’s voice of legitimacy on human rights 
issues.”521
These practical obstacles and the botched attempts to conceptually tie Darfur to the memory 
of Rwanda led to frustration among NGOs, academics and Western publics as a gap between 
normative rhetorical exhortations and actual progress to resolve the conflict opened up. The 
following sections argue that the very languages which frame international visions of 
one united ‘world’ solving a problem in its midst do not, in many cases, provide 
necessary leverage to turn ideals into action. Indeed, as we have seen consistendy 
throughout, especially in the closing sections of the last chapter, a discursive gap between on 
the one hand, the ideal of a united world (or even loftier and still more vague, a world-as- 
family), and on the other, the diversity of values and dissension from a united purpose that 
characterise modem international politics, is very much a feature of the way that ‘ideals’ and 
‘reality’ face off against each other in the UN-era. The extent of this gap, as I will further 
argue in the following chapters, is potentially unhealthy for international relations and the 
effect o f the use of kinship discourse to metaphorise unity in world relations often serves to 
widen that gap. One effect o f this gap is noted in the Darfur case by Jerry Fowler as follows: 
“(A)fter calling for international cooperation ‘to liberate mankind from such an odious
520 Craner, L. (2004) Testimony by Assistant Secretary Lome Craner at a Hearing o f the Committeeon 
International Relations, U.S. House of Representatives, July 7, 2004. Available at:
http: / / www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/archives/  108/94707.pdf. p6-13. Accessed on 08/09/2009.
521 Kostas, S. (2006) ‘Making the Determination o f Genocide in Darfur’ in Totten, S. and Markusen, E. Genocide 
in Darfur: Investigating the Atrocities in the Sudan p i  16. Kostas also refers closely to testimony by the State 
Department’s Lome Craner which confirmed that he was pressed to try to assert leadership on Darfur to nullify 
criticism over Iraq and Afghanistan.
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scourge’, the Convention522 proceeds to define the crime of genocide in terms that, from the 
perspective of ‘preventing’ or ‘suppressing’ genocide, are problematic. It then offers only the 
vaguest sense o f what should be done when genocide is imminent or actually underway.”523
By couching their motives in terms of the very loftiest o f values, documents such as the UN 
Charter or the Genocide Convention purport to be unimpeachable and unchangeable 
statements of universal purpose for the ages. This renders it difficult for international society 
to address the weaknesses in such documents, as Fowler notes. Further, the repetition of 
these high values in times of crisis by UN figures or nation state politicians is taken to be a 
legitimate contribution to debates on solving political issues. As we have seen and will see 
further, these languages of idealism can be startlingly ineffective in motivating action and 
debate on genuine action can be stalled by speakers retreating behind the walls o f these ideals, 
reinforcing their own self-image by restating them, while not addressing the particularities of 
individual political issues. The following sections now investigate the patterns of discourse 
observable in the Darfur case.
5.4 International Languages of Unity: International Community - The 
Bureaucratic Standard
“It is widely accepted that the Security Council has a legal right to authorise humanitarian intervention under 
Chapter V II of the U N  Charter. There is also a partial consensus among some liberal states that there is a 
moral right to intervene without council authorisation in extreme cases.>f24
The rights of judgement vested in the UN Security Council are, despite great challenges to 
the authority and standing of that body throughout its history, an important part of the legal 
and even moral structure of international politics. The Council itself, through the Charter, 
purports to be (and by many is treated as if it does embody) the ultimate forum for the 
exercise of collective and consensual power. As a forum which is representative o f a regularly 
rotated collection o f powerful states, this contention holds some weight.
522 Fowler refers to the United Nations Genocide Convention (1948).
523 Fowler, J. (2006) ‘A New Chapter o f Irony: The Legal Definition o f Genocide and the Implications o f 
Powell’s Determination’ in Totten, S. and Markusen, E. Genocide in Darfur: Investigating the Atrocities in the 
Sudan pl27.
524 Bellamy, A. (2005) ‘Responsibility to Protect or Trojan Horse? The Crisis in Darfur and Humanitarian 
Intervention after Iraq’ in Ethics and International Affairs 19(2) p33-34
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More dubious however, and the subject o f this section, are the discursive practices which 
refer less specifically to the notion of a supposed moral arbiter in international politics. It is 
arguably the natural consequence of a body like the Security Council, (situated within an 
organisation like the United Nations) that it comes to represent more than it actually 
embodies. The UN makes institutional goals o f the grandest of objectives, and the most 
sweeping of aspirations in its Charter purport to be the representative desires of the whole 
world. As Kofi Annan put it in a speech commemorating ten years since the Rwandan 
genocide, and in the midst of increasing debate on intervention in Darfur:
“Anyone who embarks on genocide commits a crime against humanity. Humanity must respond by taking 
action in its own defence. Humanity’s instrument for that purpose must be the United Nations, and 
specifically, the Security Council.>i25
The Security Council as the UN’s highest decision making body was originally endowed with 
specific jurisdictions and remits. It is not, however, the moral conscience of the world. As 
Gerald Caplan writes in tones of some despair over inaction in the case o f Darfur: “the global 
powers-that-be are capable of almost infinite callousness and indifference to human suffering 
if geopolitical or political interests are not at stake. Calls for forceful intervention based on 
strictly humanitarian grounds.. .are simply irrelevant to those with the means to intervene.”526 
The Security Council, comprising powers of very different international outlooks and with 
diverse individual interests, has many roles but cannot always be expected to act as a singular 
moral authority. However, precisely this notion of the UN as a moral conscience often seems 
to be invoked in the international crises into which the Security Council is thrust. In this way, 
instead o f addressing complaints or proposals specifically to UN persons or bodies, much 
political and N G O  discourse metamorphoses the UN and the UNSC into an amorphous 
supranational catch-all — the ‘international community’.
Tentative use of the term, and exploration o f the meaning of the notion of ‘international 
community’ was made by scholars both in the early UN-era and in the era of the League of
525 Annan, K. (2004) Address to the UN Commission on Human Rights, Geneva, April 7th 2004. Available at: 
h ttp : //w w w .un.org/N ew s/ossg/sg/stories/ statrncnfs search full.asp?statID=13. Accessed on 01 /04/08.
526 Caplan, G. (2006) ‘From  Rwanda to Darfur — Lessons Learned?’ in Totten, S. and Markusen, E. Genocide in 
Darfur: Investigating the Atrocities in the Sudan p l73
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Nations.527 In more recent times though, the notion has come to dominate the discursive field 
of statements made concerning global collective opinion or action. The shape of the 
discursive field today is much altered from those more experimental, hopeful writings around 
the time of the formation of the UN, when the embodiment of any sort of ‘international 
community’ was still a Utopian pipedream. Certainly today, those who might claim to be 
contributory voices to the community are politicians and bureaucrats. Those in the media 
who comment upon international bureaucracy are apt to speak of this bureaucracy as the 
physical embodiment of the ‘international community’. By the vast multiplicity of NGOs and 
IGOs (especially the many sub-branches o f the UN) that exist today and are permanently 
staffed, a very real sort of bureaucratic community would seem to exist, and be made up of 
representatives of many countries of the world. By contrast the League of Nations, 
particularly in its early years, could hardly represent a permanent community representative of 
world opinion. Its staff met infrequently and they were few in number, received much less 
media comment and attention and were often members of rarefied classes within their home
5^8country. "
Nevertheless, it is difficult even today to say what politicians, the public and the media in the 
Western world mean by the notion of ‘international community’. In spite of this vagueness, 
as discussed in the first section of this chapter, the term ‘international community’ has 
become almost the ubiquitous referent o f choice in a dominant ‘enunciative modality529’ for 
speaking about the putative institutional grouping which acts as the mouthpiece of world 
values and opinion. Contrast this to the plethora of works using such (now largely defunct) 
terms as ‘world society’, ‘world community’, ‘one world’, ‘world union’ that were produced in 
the early twentieth century530. A distinct subset o f this literature comprised highly personal,
527 See for instance, the aforementioned Sturzo, L. (1929) International Community and the Right o f War, along 
with Graham, M.W. (1948) American Diplomacy in the International Community. Plischke, E. (1964) Systems of 
Integrating the International Community. Alternative approaches were made in the legal field; outstanding 
investigations include: Lauterpacht, H. (1933) The Function o f Law in the International Community and Scott, 
J.B. (1939) Law, the State and the International Community
528 An admirable account is presented in Northedge, F.S. (1986) The League of Nations: Its Life and Times 1920- 
46
529Foucault, M. (1972) The Archaeology of Knowledge p54
530 Prominent examples include the afore-mentioned Streit, C. (1939) Union Now, Mander, LA.. (1941) 
Foundations o f a M odem World Society. Doman, N . (1942) The Coming Age o f World Control: The Transition 
to an Organized World Society. Stapleton, L. (1944) Justice and World Society. WUlkie, W.L. (1943) One World, 
Newfang, O. and Gault, P. (1939) World Federation. Tuttle, F.G. (1919) Women and World Federation.
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speculative, Utopian and sometimes quasi-religious or explicitly religious treatises which 
presented not just plans for a new world order, but something closer to genuine visions or 
dreams.531 The selection of ‘international community’ as the dominant language for 
encapsulating visions of world consensus from the muddle of terms deployed in the mid­
twentieth century does not necessarily mean that it is a significantly more precise concept.
As an example, George McGhee wrote, shortly after the end o f the Cold War, that 
international community amounted to “the net effect o f many overlapping efforts by people 
and nations all over the world based on the willingness to cooperate with and assist others in 
endeavours for the common good.”532 The imprecision o f such a statement is, in itself, quite 
impressive. What also is striking is the realisation that surely if an international community 
existed as McGhee defines it, then the Darfur crisis could not have lasted as it did without 
intervention from the overlapping efforts o f people all over the world keen to end the 
suffering. The haziness o f notions such as ‘international community’ helps them to seem like 
an easy cure-all for the problematic conflict between responsibilities to humanity and to one’s 
individual society. As Linklater notes, “the primordial fact about humanity is the existence of 
cultural individualities”533 and not singularity o f purpose or opinion, despite what the world 
unity discourses would persuade us.
Even relatively modem accounts such as this, have a tendency to utilise notions of 
international community as a panacea for world problems tied to unrealistic or religious 
visions of a peaceful future. As McGhee explains, his notion of international community is 
“an attitude o f mind towards the relations between individuals and states, based in essence on 
the principle of the Golden Rule534, which is a part o f every world religion and which stems 
from instincts very deep in men.”535 Such notions run aground of the historicist critique that 
“all universalistic codes inevitably reflect the preference of specific cultures or civilisations,
Culbertson, E. (1944) Summary o f the World Federation Plan: An Outline of a Practical and Detailed Plan for 
World Settlement
531 See for instance, Randall, J. H. (1930) A World Community: The Supreme Task of the Twentieth Century. 
McNeill, J. T. (1937) Christian Hope for World Society or Fleming, D.J. (1945) Bringing O ur World Together: A 
Study in World Community
532 McGhee (1992) International Community: A Goal For a New World Order p37
533 Linklater, A. (2007) Critical Theory and World Politics: Citizenship. Sovereignty and Humanity p22
534 Here presumably, McGhee refers to the idea o f treating others as one would wish to be treated oneself.
535 McGhee (1992) International Community: A Goal For a New World Order p i 07
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which assume that their moral practices are valid for the entire human race.”536 Yet, as 
Linklater further points out, histoncism itself assumes trans-historical validity for its 
objections, and thus is self-contradictory. He concludes that notions o f international 
community remain deeply problematic. One cannot run roughshod over the diversity of 
humanity in pursuit of a singular set o f principles. On the other hand, to support diversity 
may be to give licence to the development o f antagonistic forces which would destroy 
peaceful international cooperation. Speaking about the tension between obligations to 
humanity and to one’s culture, he notes that “none o f the philosophical attempts to realize 
this objective (or to combine these approaches in a higher synthesis) has commanded any 
lasting consensus.”537
These caveats have not halted the overwhelming consensus built in the post Cold War era 
that it is an ‘international community’, not a ‘world union’, a ‘world society’ or any other 
variant o f these ‘megametaphorics’ (to use Timothy Luke’s538 apt term), that we have today, 
or indeed, should aspire to build and further strengthen in the contemporary period. On the 
subject of the unfolding humanitarian crisis in Darfur, a vast proliferation of N G O  papers, 
reports and recommendations was produced and formed some of the first and most 
immediate commentary as N GO workers could often get access denied to political actors. To 
consider a representative sample of this output, three of the major global human rights and 
global crisis NGOs, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and the International 
Crisis Group, produced heavily-cited reports on Darfur between 2003 and 2005 as follows.
Amnesty’s report from February 2004, ‘Darfur: Too Many People Killed for No Reason’539, 
makes six references to the ‘international community’ (IC)540 and no characterisations of 
world comment, action or opinion under any other discursive formulation. Their July 2004
536 Linklater, A. (2007) Critical Theory and World Politics: Citizenship. Sovereignty and Humanity p34
537 Ibid. p23
538 Luke, T. W. (2004) ‘Megametaphorics: Re-reading Globalization and Virtualization as Rhetoric o f World 
Politics’ in Beer, F. and de Landtscheer, C. Metaphorical World Politics
539 Amnesty International (2004) ‘Darfur: Too Many People Killed for No Reason’. Available at: 
http: /  /  www.amnesry.org/en /library/asset /  A FR54 /008 /2004 /  en /dom-A FR540082004cn.pd f. Accessed on 
01/02/2008.
540 Hereafter ‘IC’ is often used as shorthand for ‘international community’.
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report, ‘Sudan: At the Mercy of Killers: ‘Destruction of Villages in Darfur’541 follows the same 
pattern, all three references using the same term. Their November 2004 paper, ‘Sudan: 
Arming the Perpetrators of Grave Abuses in Darfur’542 likewise contains six international 
community references and no deviations from this formulation. Similarly, Human Rights 
Watch publications ‘Darfur in Flames’543 and ‘Empty Promises?’544 retain complete adherence 
to this pattern while their ‘Darfur Destroyed’545 contains a single reference to ‘world 
community’ in a footnote along with five references to IC. Even more strikingly, the ICG 
produced five influential reports546 between July 2003 and March 2005 containing a total of 
ninety-eight uses of the IC characterisation with not a single deviation.
Many o f the prominent political and IGO documents and speeches made upon the crisis 
reflect this same trend. The UN’s own ‘Report of the International Commission of Inquiry 
on Darfur’547 makes twenty-four IC references, three Svorld community’ references and uses 
no other formulations. Colin Powell’s statement to the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee548 on September 9th 2004 declaring that the conflict ought to be considered as 
genocide, exclusively relies on the IC formulation. Further examples, for instance from the
541 Amnesty International (2004) ‘Sudan: A t the Mercy o f Killers: Destruction o f Villages in Darfur’. Available at: 
h ttp ://www.am nestv.org/en/librarv/asset/AFR-54/072/2004/en/dom - AFR540722004en.pdf. Accessed on
04/03/2008.
542 Amnesty International (2004) ‘Sudan: Arming the Perpetrators o f Grave Abuses in Darfur’. Available at: 
http: /  /  www.arnnesty.org/en /library /  asset/AFR54 /139/2004 /  en /  dom-A FR541392Q04en.pd f. Accessed on
05/03/2008.
543 Human Rights Watch (2004) T)arfur in Flames: Atrocities in Western Sudan’. Available at: 
h ttp ://w w w . hrw.org/reports/2004/sudan0404/sudan0404.pdf. Accessed on 05/03/2008.
544 Human Rights Watch (2004) T m pty  Promises? Continuing Abuses in Darfur, Sudan’. Available at: 
http://wvAV.hrw.org/backgrounder/afr.ica/sudan/2004/sudan0804.pdf Accessed on 05/03/2008.
545 Human Rights Watch (2004) TDarfur Destroyed: Ethnic Cleansing By Government and Militia Forces in 
Western Sudan’. Available at: h ttp ://www.hrw.org7reports/2 0 0 4 /sudan0504/sudan0504.pdf. Accessed on 
06/03/2008.
546 International Crisis Group (2003) ‘Sudan Endgame’. Available at:
h ttp ://www.crisisgroup.org/library/docum ents/report archive/A401038 07072003.pdf. Accessed on 
08/03/08; ICG  (2004) T)arfur Rising: Sudan’s New Crisis’. Available at:
http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/docum ents/africa/horn o f africa/076 darfur sudan new crisis.pdf. 
Accessed on 08/03/2008; ICG (2004) ‘Sudan: Now or Never’ Available at:
http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/docum ents/africa/horn o f africa/080 sudan now or never in darfur.pd 
f. Accessed on 09/03/2008: ICG (2004) ‘Darfur Deadline: a New International Action Plan’. Available at: 
http://wAw.crisisgroup.org/library/docum ents/ africa/horn o f africa/083 darfur deadline a new internation 
al action plan.pdf. Accessed on 10/03/2008; ICG (2005) ‘Darfur: The Failure to Protect’ Available at: 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/docum cnts/afriea/horn o f  africa/089 darfur the failure to protect.pdf. 
Accessed on 02/03/2008.
547 United Nations (2005) ‘Report o f the International Commission o f Inquiry on Darfur’. Available at: 
http://wwAV.un.org/news/d h / sudan/com  inq darfur.pdf. Accessed on 02/03/08.
548Powell, C. (2004) ‘The Crisis in Darfur’. Available at:
http: /  / wuAV.state.gov/secretary/former/pow ell/remarks/36042.htm. Accessed 20/02/2008.
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US House of Representatives and Senate debates on declarations of genocide549 might be 
noted along with many of the academic writings previous referred to, but this would only be 
to further labour the point.
The consistency and rigidity o f this linguistic practice is somewhat startling, especially as 
noted above, given the vagueness of the notion of the ‘international community’, and even 
more so, given the variety of institutional locations and subject positions from which 
discoursing actors inflexibly mobilise this unwavering referent. As Nik Rose points out 
concerning the notions of civil society and community, “part of the attraction of these zones 
lies in their apparent naturalness: their non-political or pre-political status.”550 In stemming 
from a supposedly primordial basis of cross-cutting ties and sharing of values, the 
‘community’ does not seem a construct o f political machination, but acts as a politically 
neutral referent. The ‘natural’ construction of community (implicitly a consensual project) 
according to Rose “is not merely an ontological claim but implies affirmation, a positive 
evaluation.”551
This attractiveness aside, those acts of speech and authorship where such rigidity is to be 
noted are fairly specific in the enunciative modality they embody. In this modality it is 
arguably of little surprise to find formulaic adherence to the part of the discourse (on 
practices of global opinion formation and decision making) which is dominant today. 
Looking back to the description of an enunciative modality given by Foucault helps to clarify 
the commonalities in these dominant discursive productions. It also suggests avenues for the 
investigation o f other (rarer) parts of this field of discourse in the next section.
Foucault’s enunciative modality is constructed from the interrelation of the type of person 
speaking or author writing, their ‘institutional site’, and their subject position relative to 
systems of the transmission of knowledge and relative to other institutions and other 
subjects. In other words, in the aforementioned documents, our authors, their institutional
549 See for instance, 108th Congress 2nd Session House Concurrent Resolution 467 T)eclaring Genocide in 
Darfur’. Available at: h ttp ://thom as.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/D ?cl08:1:./tem p/~cl08FX rrV I. Accessed on 
09/03/2008. or 109th Congress 1st Session US Senate S.1462 — Darfur Peace and Accountability Act. Available at: 
http:/A vww .govtrack.us/data/us/bills.text/109/s/sl462.pdf. Accessed on 05/03/2008.
550 Rose, N. (1999) Powers o f Freedom: Reframing Political Thought p i 88
551 Ibid. p!68
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situations and their subject positions as discoursers are in many ways similar. All of the 
preceding documents are bureaucratic productions in some way, many will have been 
collaboratively written in the institutional context of ‘strategically neutral’552 editorial/political 
rules of expression. The conveyance of apparently disinterested facts is crucial even to those 
documents where political advocacy is the primary purpose — a reasonable argument or 
condemnation, not an emotional appeal or vituperative denunciation, is what is sought. This 
is especially true given the nature o f the documents themselves. Most are reports — designed 
to provide the factual information to convince a target audience of other bureaucrats — and 
this will inevitably shape the metaphorical choices made when addressing concerns to the 
arbitration o f putative world authorities. In terms of the authorship and the subject position, 
which would seem to differ across UN, N G O  and Governmental source production, it is 
perhaps instructive to remember that many N G O  and IGO staff, along with foreign policy 
experts in national governments, have held previous employment in another part of the IC. 
In many ways, their interrelated subject positions taken as a collectivity, and also perhaps felt 
as lived-experience, construct a self-referential IC in a more meaningful way than their 
discourse, when digested by outsiders, can ever make specific.
In other words, (referring back to the notions outlined by UN staff in the final section of 
Chapter Four) the “concentric circles” o f the bureaucratic community, where more 
commonality is experienced with other bureaucrats than with outsiders, would seem to be a 
domain of considerable homogeneity in terms of discourse produced and target audience 
expectations. Evidence for the effect o f ‘groupthink’ which was also discussed by staff in 
Chapter Four would seem to be provided in the uniformity of discourse within the IC. The 
critique aired in the previous chapter of the difficulty of reform in entrenched bureaucracies 
rears its head again. The rigidity of discursive production we have encountered would seem 
to support Thomas Weiss’ lament that “analysts of international organizations have strayed 
away from paradigmatic rethinking. We have lost our appetite for big and idealistic plans 
because so many previous ones have failed.”553 Or, to address this argument fully to the
552 This is a tactic whereby the very essence o f the efficient, disinterested bureaucratic body or department is 
cultivated for the purpose o f gaining trust and political leverage. See Huber, G. (2007) The Craft o f Bureaucratic 
Neutrality: Interests and Influence in Governmental Regulation o f Occupational Safety ch i.
553 Weiss, T. (2009) W hat Happened to the Idea of World Government?’ in International Studies Quarterly 
53, p256
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dream of the family of nations, we might argue that zest for new thinking has been lost 
because previous visions have proven too vague to understand or operationalise.
5.5 International Languages of Unity: Deviance from the Norm and 
the Place of Kinship in the Discursive Field
Describing the place within the discursive field of those enunciations of the global processes 
of opinion formation and decision-making which deviate from the IC norm, is now critical to 
the continuing investigation of the metaphorisation of politics and the functioning world core 
in terms o f kinship. This interplay between dominant and less common forms of linguistic 
usage is what Foucault terms the pattern of “enunciative regularities”554 and he usefully notes 
that the regular and the imitative are just as active a part of discourse as the novel and the 
unusual. However, much as the dominant form we have just considered does active political 
work in describing and furthering a particular representation, it may be argued that in a 
discursive field so far weighted towards one dominant linguistic form (in the contemporary 
period) the choice to depart from it may reveal more specific political intentions of the 
discoursing subject than simply the repetitive neutrality of the IC formulation. Indeed the 
contextual situation of instances o f the use of kinship metaphor would seem to suggest 
several types o f statement where this linguistic choice may be made.
The IC formulation holds almost universal sway in fact-based reporting by IGOs, NGOs and 
political figures. Where however, in UN documentation, kinship metaphors are invoked, it is 
never in contexts where they are attached to technical detail, but instead to enunciate very 
general aims and principles. The UN Mission In Sudan (UNMIS) produced a Unified Mission 
Plan555 in 2005 as a comprehensive guide to the parameters of its work for peace and 
humanitarian assistance. The technical aspects of its work, and in particular relating to its 
liaisons with other named international or Sudanese bodies, were expressed with uniform IC 
references. However, at the very end of the document, aspirations for sustainable 
development in Sudan are tentatively outlined. In this context “the UN family has begun
554 Foucault, M. (1972) The Archaeology o f Knowledge pl45
555 UNMIS (2005) ‘Sudan Unified Mission Plan’. Available at:
bttp://w\v\v.unsudanig.org/unsudan/data/Sudan%20Unified%20Mission%20Plan.pdf. Accessed on 
11/03/2008.
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work on several interrelated processes with the parties in support o f sustainable development 
for the people o f Sudan.”556 Two markers of the use of kinship metaphor, which will be 
further explored, are pointed out in this instance. Firsdy, very general principles are outlined in 
the final section of the UNMIS report — action on AIDS, economic governance, 
environmental sustainability, urban development, and so on. Secondly, the projects are 
future-oriented and highly aspirational with no fixed date for completion envisaged.
A third marker is also present, namely where the kinship metaphor is used as an expression 
of an emotional bond o f human unity or as an expression o f an emotional affront to that supposed 
unity. In the former instance, while much of the reporting of the Darfur crisis previously 
considered, deals with the statistics of ethnic cleansing in a fact-dependent style of advocacy 
which aims to be hard-hitting without recourse to necessarily emotional appealing, at points 
where the individual suffering o f Darfurians is being conveyed to individual workers within 
the UN system, a more emotional style o f communication is deployed. The UN Population 
Fund has undertaken some of the most emotionally-charged work in responding to the 
Darfur crisis and their training manual for the humanitarian prevention of sexual exploitation 
and abuse defines their mission as follows:
“Kind, caring, compassionate, civilised or charitable. Humanitarian aid is that assistance provided to 
populations in need due to disruption of their normal lives by natural factors floods, drought, epidemics) or 
man made factors (war, genocide). The aid is meant to restore their dignity as human beings and demonstrate 
a sense of caring for them as part of the universal human family.,f57
The technicalities o f the work with victims o f abuse is detailed in altogether more neutral 
tones but here, in making a definition o f the role o f the humanitarian worker, a combination of 
generality, aspiration and emotive content is brought together in the kinship metaphor. The 
notion o f a process of re-incorporation of the oppressed into the welcoming arms o f a 
human family — a notion that was initially taken up as a theme for the hoped-for moment of 
decolonisation at the founding o f the UN — drives the emotive power of this instance of the
556 UNMIS (2005) ‘Sudan Unified Mission Plan’, p68. Available at:
http: /  /  www.unsudanig.org/unsudan /  data /  Sudan%20Unified%20Mission%20Plan.pdf. Accessed on
11/03/2008.
557 UNFPA (2005) TDarfur Humanitarian Response, Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in Humanitarian Crisis: 
Training o f Trainers Manual, prevention o f Sexual Exploitation and Abuse’, p53. Available at: 
http:/  / \vww.ochaonline.un.org/QchaLinkClick.aspx?link=ocha&docId— 1061910. Accessed on 12/03/08.
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use of kinship metaphor. Incidentally, exacdy the same formulation of re-incorporation 
(redolent of 1940s usage) was deployed by Tony Blair in a letter to EU heads of state in 2006. 
Blair wrote: “(W)e should urge the government of Sudan to rise to the challenge above 
(commitments to peace-making), make the right decisions to protect the people o f Darfur, 
and put Sudan back in its rightful place at the heart of the family of nations.”558 In the format 
of a personal letter, greater scope for the use of non-conventional linguistic usage, especially 
forms associated with great emotive impact, might be expected. In particular this applies to a 
political figure like Blair, infamous for frustrating his staff by his insistence on personally 
overseeing the writing of his speeches and statements559.
By contrast, the metaphor is also emotionally invoked for the purpose of making emotive 
condemnations o f the actions of groups, or especially states - notions o f the trust, naturalness 
and unity o f the international ‘family’ being betrayed by the actions of a few. This language of 
exclusion will be further investigated in the following chapter, but applied in Darfur case, a 
group o f international lawyers, human-rights activists and writers convened by the Nobel 
Laureate Wole Soyinka, staged a mock trial of Omar El-Bashir in New York in 2006. Their 
damning verdict referred to Bashir’s regime as a “deviant member of the family of nations”560 
and repeatedly invoked the notion of kinship to describe the duties of both African and 
international collectives in bringing the Sudanese state into line.
These three markers for the use o f kinship discourse are not to be taken as predictive rules. 
That is to say that when these three markers are observed, it is not the case that a discoursing 
subject must rely on kinship metaphors. Rather when the conditions of the format or 
political purpose o f the statements made are not demanding of such bureaucratic and fact- 
based regularity as to confine the writer to the hegemonic IC formulation, then alternative 
choices within the discourse may be made. Those statements that are of a general, aspirational 
and emotive order are often given greater emphasis by the positive connotations (as discussed 
in Chapter One) o f the Western formulation o f the kinship metaphor. Further, since kinship
558 ‘Blair’s Letter to Darfur in Full’ 17th September 2006. Available at:
h ttp ://new s.bbc.co.uk/I /h i /u k  politics/5353348.stm. Accessed 16/03/08.
559 See for instance the memoir o f Blair’s former chief o f staff - Powell, J. (2008) Great Hatred. Little Room: 
Making Peace In Northern Ireland
560 International Citizens’ Tribunal For Sudan (2006) ‘Judgement’. Available at:
http ://w w w .judgmentongenocide.com/judgment.html. Accessed on 01/04/2008.
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relations (as defined in Western political thought) are often held out as an idealised 
behavioural model, the kinship metaphor in politics can be employed either to praise the 
actions of the international collective (acting like a family) or, as in the verdict of the Soyinka 
Tribunal above, to demand that the international collective face up to its responsibilities and 
do more to act like a family. As an example of the former, in the debates following in the 
wake o f the UNSC mission to Darfur in 2006, the following comments reported in the 
minutes of the 5462nd Meeting of the Security Council, were made by the British 
representative, Sir Emyr Jones Parry. Herein, the kinship metaphor is used to lend praise to 
the food aid efforts of the UN, in the face o f the difficulties caused by the incomplete and 
rushed Darfur Peace Accord which it had belatedly championed to much derision.
“He had heard many interlocutors describe what was wrong with the accord. It was not perfect, but it was the 
only agreement there was, and in the mission's (AMIS) view it should be implemented robustly. He 
encouraged those who had not joined the agreement to do so as soon as possible. In support of the accord, the 
U N  family, particularly the World Food Programme (WFP), now had the largest food support operation in 
the world. ’*61
These characteristic markers of generality, open-ended aspiration (as opposed to detailed future- 
oriented planning) and emotionality, accord with the analysis of speaking of the world as family 
that was presented in Part One to help to explain what ‘work’ kinship metaphors are 
employed to ‘do’. There is a critical gap, as will be fully elaborated over the course of the 
coming chapters, between what international discourses intend to do/mean with kinship 
metaphors, and the political effects that actually get played out. In short, and much in keeping 
with the observations of the UN staff in Chapter Four, kinship metaphors are attractive 
ideas, but not necessarily effective discursive tools.
At this stage, preliminary conclusions can be drawn about the work of kinship as a metaphor 
from the pattern o f discourse noted above. Beer and de Landtscheer present an admirable 
catalogue o f the potential reasons for deploying metaphor in political rhetoric. Particularly 
relevant to the present inquiry, they note that “(P)olitical leaders use metaphors as keys to
561 Parry, E.J. (2006) Comments at 5462nd Security Council Meeting 15th June 2006, SC/8750. Available at: 
h ttp : //\v\vw.un.org/N ew s/Press/ docs/2 0 0 6 /sc8750.doc.htm. Accessed on 11/03/08.
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citizens’ sentiments”562, that is, by tying together a political reality (unity) with a commonly 
accepted positive valuation based on understandings of the positive meaning of kinship, 
politicians show support for their audience’s own value systems. In particular, metaphorising 
world politics as kinship is an especially powerful ploy as regards some of the principle uses 
for metaphor in international relations. Many scholars have noted that the structures o f 
metaphorical deployment within languages suggest that among the deepest rooted metaphors 
are those deriving from the common human experience of embodiment.563 The most 
commonly cited ‘root’ or earliest metaphors are thus those derived from our spatial 
experience o f our bodies within the world. As Lakoff and Johnson note: “the structure of our 
spatial concepts emerges from our constant spatial experience...concepts that emerge in this 
way are concepts that we live by in the most fundamental way.”564 These concepts include 
“up-down, in-out, front-back, light-dark, warm-cold, male-female.”565 Using the family as 
metaphor is widely seen to be a primordial metaphorical trait of the next remove.
Lakoff and Johnson argue that two of the most prototypical conceptualisations o f change and 
causation in human expression “emerge naturally from as fundamental a human experience as 
there is, namely, birth.”566 Again, it is our embodied experience that presents us with a visual 
field which contains us, presenting us with the primordial concepts of ‘containers’ and 
‘objects’.567 The transformation of these two ideas represents the metaphorical extensions of 
causation, and is united, according to Lakoff and Johnson, in birth. “In birth, an object (the 
baby) comes out of a container (the mother). At the same time, the mother’s substance (her 
flesh and blood) is in the baby (the container object). The experience of birth...provides the 
grounding for the general concept of creation, which has as its core the concept o f making a 
physical object but which extends to abstract entities as well.”568 Processes of conceptualising
562 Beer, F. and de Landtscheer, C. (2004) ‘Introduction: Metaphors, Politics and World Politics’ in their edited 
volume, Metaphorical World Politics p27
563 See for instance Osborn, M. (1967) ‘Archetypal Metaphor in Rhetoric: The Light-Dark Family’ in Quarterly 
Journal o f Speech 53, Steamey, L. (1994) ‘Feminism, Ecofeminism, and the Maternal Archetype: Motherhood 
as a Feminine Universal’ in Communication Quarterly 42, or Hahn, D. (2003) Political Communication: 
Rhetoric, Government, and Citizens
564 Lakoff, G. and Johnson, M. (1980) Metaphors We Live By p56/7.
565 Ibid. p57.
566 Ibid. p74
567 Ibid. p 3 0 /l and 73. Lakoff and Johnson show how conceptualisations o f change and making involve the 
transformation o f these two concepts. Either the object comes out o f the container/substance, or the 
substance/container goes into or makes up the object.
568 Ibid. p74.
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such fundamental ontological bedrocks as creation and change may be argued to have roots 
in the embodied biological processes o f living. Kinship, the creation of new persons and 
relations, is the primordial model for change in the processes of life. Similarly, Rigney 
reminds us that “(A)mong the most ancient o f biological metaphors are those that depict 
social phenomena in the language of kinship and reproduction. Indeed, the earliest known 
written records, the ancient cuneiform texts o f the Sumerians of Mesopotamia dating from 
the third millennium B.C.E., contain hymns and mythic tales that picture the social process of 
harvesting and storing grain as a metaphorical ‘marriage’ of the god o f fertility to the goddess 
of the storehouse.”569
Part o f the positive aura of the metaphorising o f global efforts in humanitarian actions in 
terms o f kinship (lent a specific niche in the discursive field by the three markers identified), 
is due to the idealised notion o f kinship as a sphere of nurturing emotional bonds and 
common substance. Such an aura is given added weight by the Western construction of 
kinship as the social opposite to political life, wherein the breakdowns of respect for human 
rights and dignity apparently occur. Despite the fact that kinship metaphors are supposedly 
employed to “foster a feeling o f connection”570 among the implied familial in-group, there are 
clear negative effects to this discursive tactic.
To think once more of the statement made by Jones Parry: in the context of the values o f the 
international community being threatened by a failure to live up to stated ideals befitting a 
‘family’, the reassertion of this image potentially works in two ways. Firstly, the image is 
supposed to re-motivate the community to act in the caring way fitting of the notion of 
family relations. Secondly, following Beer and de Landtscheer’s argument, “(O)ne of the 
major functions o f metaphors can be to reassure the audience. Metaphors may suggest that 
political issues are simple: they simplify complex situations and thereby give the audience a 
sense of confidence.”571 This effect is doubled in the case of kinship wherein, the reassuring 
effect is not only derived from the process o f simplification but from the unequivocal 
positivity o f valuations attached to ideas of caring, nurturing kinship. A double deception
569 Rigney, D. (2001) The Metaphorical Society: An Invitation to Social Theory p l4
570 Beer, F. and de Landtscheer, C. (2004) ‘Introduction: Metaphors, Politics and World Politics’ in their edited 
volume, Metaphorical World Politics p i 7
571 Ibid. p29
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occurs when this language is used; politics is presented as simply a matter o f acting like a 
family to solve political problems. In fact, one might motivate practical action better by 
addressing political problems by acting like politicians and recognising the complexity of 
issues at stake. Rather than motivate here, the rhetoric merely betrays the gap exposed earlier 
between high rhetoric to hide behind and inability to address the situation.
This stagnation o f debate which spins its wheels in reasserting comforting but a-temporal 
ideals, is heightened when politics attempts to solve crisis moments by striving at unrealistic 
universal values like human kinship. As Zarefsky argues, labelling an event a crisis “creates 
pressure for consensus in support of whatever measures leaders advance as an appropriate 
response.. .it shifts the rhetorical landscape...it discourages deliberation itself.”572 Allied to 
this tendency towards rigidity in debate, attempts to address crises by reasserting the notion 
of the world as a united family and relying on tropes associated with the unchallengeable 
discourses o f the grand UN founding documents, transforms the debate from one where 
multiple positions may be legitimately defended to one where disagreement with the 
orthodoxy is seen as negatively deviant573. Two factors then block kinship discourse from 
meshing with the actual particularity of contemporary problems. Due to the universalism of 
such discourse, its lack o f specificity and over-generality is difficult to challenge. Secondly the 
effect of ‘crisis assertion’ is to rally consensus behind leading rhetoric, in this case the 
unchallengeable assertion that greater human kinship is required.
A further set o f observations on the locus o f kinship within discourses of common human 
purpose are worked through in further examples of languages of exclusion in the next 
chapter. Firstly, however, a discussion is presented of the interface between the international 
sphere which claims sovereign rights o f decision-making in such cases o f humanitarian 
intervention, and the aspirations of Sudanese parties, both in terms of the languages of
572 Zarefsky D. (2008) T w o Faces of Democratic Rhetoric’ in McDorman, T. and Timmerman, D. Rhetoric and 
Democracy: Pedagogical and Political Practices p l30
573 Ibid. pl28. Zarefsky refers to the neat analysis o f US Presidential elections by Donald Stokes and John Dilulio 
for guidance here. Stokes and Dilulio coin the terms ‘position issue’ where many legitimate positions may be 
occupied, and Valence issue’ where difference is seen as ‘beyond the pale’ deviance. For instance, law and order 
can be turned into an election Valence issue’ wherein any neglect o f this topic can be portrayed as social 
irresponsibility and weakness in the face o f crime. For further examples see Stokes, D. and Dilulio, J (1993) T h e  
Setting: Valence Politics in Modem Elections’ in Nelson, M, (ed.) The Elections o f 1992 pl-20.
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resistance of Sudanese authorities to intervention, and the hopes of the Sudanese rebels of 
engagement with international aid.
5.6 Sudanese Languages of Self-Situation
These markers (generality, aspiration, emotionality) o f discourse use notwithstanding, the patterns 
of linguistic choices we have noted rely implicidy upon a shared subject position, that o f 
feeling oneself to be a part of the international community or inside the putative boundaries 
of the family of nations. These conceptual boundaries shift depending on the focus of any 
given debate on the duties and responsibilities of the community. The use of discourse in the 
above cases constitute the Sudanese Government as having lost its rights of membership or 
identity due to reprehensible actions — proving itself to be different. They also constitute 
Darfurians as exterior to the community in order that the community can come to their aid.
It is perhaps scarcely surprising to find the Sudanese government commenting on the crisis in 
sharply divergent ways from many other UN members. During the debates after UNSC 
Resolution 1556574 requested immediate janjamed disarmament, the GoS representative 
constituted his government explicitly as exterior, being targeted by the UN (and the US) 
unfairly:
‘ Would the Sudan have been safe from the Council even if  there was no crisis in Darfur? Was the crisis a 
Trojan Horse? The Government was fully aware that some activists in the United States administration had 
worked to foster the rebellion. It had sound recordings of talks between rebel leaders and United States 
officials.
The attachment of discourse on the crisis to notions of neo-imperialism, by virtue of cherry- 
picking elements from discourse surrounding the United States’ War on Terror, has been 
prevalent not only in the GoS defence of its own policies in the face of UN pressure, but also 
in statements made by the rebel movements themselves. As one member of the JEM ’s 
Legislative Council writes: “(T)he United States o f America has been carrying the banner o f
574 UNSC Resolution 1556, 30/07/2004. ‘Report o f the Secretary-General on Sudan’. Available at: 
h ttp :/A vww.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc resolutions04.html. Accessed on 01/10/2009.
575 Elfatih Mohamed Ahmed Erwa (2004) ‘Comments during UN Security Council’s 5015th meeting, 
30/07/2004. Available at: h ttp : //www.un.org/News/P ress/ docs/2004/sc816Q.doc.htm. Accessed on 11/03/08.
190
indicting JEM as an Islamic Movement without full scrutiny of JEM manifesto. Last year, the 
USA concluded economic sanctions against JEM president Dr Khalil Ibrahim Mohamed for 
no reason other than to prove to the international community that it is even-handed with its 
sanctions... The US’ negative image of JEM  emanates from a false Islamic phobia that has 
stricken the US leadership since the target attack of September H .”576 Certainly the JEM in 
particular received bad press in the US. Time magazine described the JEM as “a fiercely 
Islamic organisation said to be led by Hassan al-Turabi” whose overall goal was “the 
presidential palace in Khartoum and a stridendy Islamic Sudan”577. Turabi was commonly 
portrayed in US literary and political circles as being a close adherent to the philosophies of 
Al-Qaeda, sharing their “vision of a worldwide struggle to establish a pure Caliphate.”578 As 
noted in section 5.3, the peril o f essentialising the crisis in the context of a time-period 
dominated by discourse generated by the War on Terror, germinated the theoretical seeds 
present within even the liberal ‘R2P’ discourse, (or notions of re-incorporation into the family 
of nations) causing the latter to potentially appear a neo-imperialistic project.
Statements of policy by the Darfurian rebel JEM  and SLM/A are almost wholly focused on 
intra-Sudanese solutions to the marginalisation o f Darfur and other parts of the Sudanese 
periphery. However, a certain level of opting into hegemonic discourse for the purpose of 
garnering international attention is noticeable in two contexts. Firsdy, statements of policy 
made prior to the realisation that international agreement on aid to Darfur was unlikely to be 
quickly and simply acquired. These early appeals to the international community ran up 
against the same failure to motivate action or bring about consensus that alarmed Western 
commentators. Secondly, statements made at time when representatives of the JEM or 
SLM/A were engaged directly in talks with international parties.
As an example o f the former, the SLM/A’s ‘Political Declaration’ of Spring 2003 pledges to 
“seek friendly relationships with the international community” and in return “appeal(s) to the 
international community to assist the people o f Darfur with humanitarian relief to address
576 El-Tahir Adam El-Faki (2004) ‘The Justice and Equality Movement/Religion and the State’, accessed 
Available at: http://www.sudanjem.com/en/index.phpppage^leserbrief.full&id—394. Accessed on 11/03/2008. 
All grammatical errors are reproduced from the original.
577 Time, 31st October 2004, Tow er Struggle: Darfur’s Janjaweed Militia Aren’t the Only Ones Sowing Chaos and 
Death. Meet the Two Rebel Factions Threatening Yet Another Civil War’.
578 Clarke, R. (2004) Against All Enemies: Inside America’s War on Terror p i36
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and ameliorate the serious and deteriorating humanitarian situation in the region.”579 This 
initial appeal is not tempered by any expectations that it will fall on deaf ears; it is likely that 
early discussions with NGO operatives in the region led the rebel groups to expect that their 
cause would find enough international backing to exceed the tipping point required for 
concerted action. By contrast, and somewhat chastened by the lack of international support 
for their cause throughout 2003 and 2004 as shown above, the JEM’s 2005 manifesto paper 
‘A Proposal for Change: towards a Sudan o f Justice and Equality’ seeks Sudanese solutions to 
Sudanese problems and makes absolutely no mention o f international actors or outside aid, 
other than the guarded (and implicidy defensive) proposal for the “institution of friendly 
relations with the outside world guided by principles of mutual respect.”580 Further to this note of 
suspicion o f outside interference, the statement proposes that “(T)he National Army must be 
renamed to reflect its sole and primary role of protecting the country against outside 
intervention. Hence it should be renamed ‘Sudan Defence Forces’.”581 By contrast when the 
JEM  were participating in the Oslo Donors’ Conference, again in 2005, the IC discourse was 
once more to the fore with the opening of their statements including an “appeal to the 
international community to assume its responsibility and work jointly with us for the 
reconstruction of Darfur.”582
The patterning of linguistic choices is marked by the co-opting of hegemonic forms when the 
rebel groups wish to engage outside assistance. It is perhaps not surprising that it is the 
dominant IC formulation that is transmitted to those seeking to communicate in languages 
and political fora alien to them. As regards kinship metaphors, formulations emotively 
expressing outrage or solidarity are to be found but aspirational formulations o f idealised 
kinship extending into a Utopian future are not to be found. What kinship formulations do 
exist to express in-group solidarity take not the idealised ‘family’ form, but the idea of 
brotherhood as its touchstone. For instance, the SLM/A condemned the divide and rule 
policies o f Khartoum in this way: “(T)he monopolization of power and wealth led to the
579 Minnawi, M. (2003) Tolitical Declaration o f the SLM/A’ p4. Available at: 
www.sudan.net/news/ press / postedr/214.shtml. Accessed on 14/03/2008.
580 JEM  (2005) ‘A Proposal For Change: Towards a Sudan o f Justice and Equality’ p2. Available at:
http: / / www.sudanjern.com/sudan-alt/english/books / pamjemlst-1 1 .htm. Accessed on 14/02/2008. Author’s 
emphasis added.
581 Ibid. p7
582 JEM  (2005) ‘Rehabilitation and Reconstruction o f Darfur: Oslo D onors’ Conference: A Proposal’. Available 
at: http://www.sudanjem.corn/sudan-alt/eng;lish/english.html. Accessed on 16/03/2008.
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institutionalization of the hegemonic policies of riverain Sudan’s dominating establishment. 
These were entrenched through the fuelling of ethnic and tribal wars, with the governments 
in Khartoum providing military assistance to some Arab tribes and organizations to fight 
against their non-Arab brethren, with whom they have peacefully co-existed for centuries.”583 
The Darfurian unity suggested in this passage is reinforced later by the recognition by the 
SLM/A that “Arab tribes and groups are an integral and indivisible part of Darfur’s social 
fabric who have been equally marginalized.”584
The notion o f a Sudanese brotherhood as a community committed to non-violence within its 
bounds requires some explanation. It is both a discourse of equality and exclusion. Firstly, we 
need to look at the pronouncements o f the rebels as they speak as Darfurians, not just as 
Sudanese or Muslims. Ladislav Holy’s classic study of the Berti of Darfur notes that the 
traditional recommendation for the choice o f spouses in Darfur was overwhelmingly in 
favour of the marriage of the children of two brothers. Being a patrilineal society where 
justice and compensation for interlineage wrong-doing involves obligations for kin to support 
blood feuds585 against out-groups, the reason given for marrying the children o f two brothers 
would be that the new spouses would be of the same lineage and therefore any quarrels 
between them could not spiral upwards into inter-lineage feuding586. In other words, 
brotherhood was the nucleus and symbol of a kinship system that was (internally at 
least) a non-violence community. Internal differences would be resolved without violence 
or divisive compensation claims587, but the community also embodied a group obliged to 
defend its own rights from outside interference.
As a symbol, the notion of brotherhood employed here (and more widely, it may be argued) 
carries different connotation than the notion of family. As Vrushali Patil claims, the 
connotations of family with the hierarchy o f parents and children, has lent this formulation
583 Minnawi, M. (2003) Tolitical Declaration o f the SLM /A’ p i.  Available at: 
www.sudan.net/news/press/postedr/214.shtm l. Accessed on 16/03/2008.
584 Ibid. p3
585 This characteristic also applies in similar ways to other Sudanese groups such as the Nuer or Dinka. See for 
instance Evans-Pritchard, E. (1940) The Nuer: A Description o f the Modes o f Livelihood and Political 
Institutions o f a Nilotic People. Deng, F. (1978) Africans o f Two Worlds: The Dinka in Afro-Arab Sudan or 
Hutchinson, S. (1996) Nuer Dilemmas: Coping with Money, War and the State
586 Holy, L. (1974) Neighbours and Kinsmen: A Study o f the Berti People of Darfur p71
587 Ibid. p i 30. The paternal kin or agrabun group would resolve differences between members simply by treating 
the crime as a ‘sin’ and making communal offerings to reset moral equilibrium within the group.
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especially to use in colonialist discourse. Studying debates in the General Assembly from 
1946-60, Patil argues that the “colonialist powers and sympathisers largely resort to the 
kinship politics o f paternal rule...the purpose of which is to teach and guide childlike, 
underdeveloped peoples.”588 Anticolonial speakers in the GA, especially from the developing 
world resented such ‘infantilization’. As Patil notes, “(R)ather than international relations 
being modelled on the image of parents and children...anti-colonialists argue that they should 
instead be modelled on the image of brotherhood.”589 Thus their discourse draws on the 
implicit equality of brothers as an alternative image of international politics. A relationship 
may be discerned between Sudanese cultural models of brotherhood as a non-violence 
community of equals and the choices made by anti-colonial speakers in the UN to demand a 
move towards international brotherhood as a more equal mode of international relations 
between the global North and South.
Secondly, this appeal from the Darfurians is directed in itself to the ears o f President Bashir’s 
own clique, the ‘Muslim Brothers of Sudan’. Male-centred metaphors o f ‘brotherhood’ and 
‘brethren’ abound within both sides o f the Sudanese conflict, offer some glimpse into the 
pervasive andro-centridty of the culture and the dominance of the public sphere by men. As 
Michelle Rosaldo argued, many of the anthropological examples of very gender-egalitarian 
societies are marked by loose separation between domestic and public spheres of life, a 
mixture of male and female responsibilities in each of those spheres and the existence of 
similarly developed networks of association in the public sphere for both men and women.590 
Such equality is not represented in terms o f the leadership of either the rebel movements or 
the high echelons of Sudanese government. Though we have noted the adoption of 
discourses o f brotherhood in anti-colonial rhetoric from speakers from the global South in 
UN debates, the gender insensitivity has led to this discourse being largely dispensed with in 
the global North. Thus far in the case studies, no examples of this idiom from Northern 
sources have been presented other than in the 1948 Declaration of Human Rights. The
588 Patil, V. (2008) Negotiating Decolonization in the United Nations p3/4.
589 Ibid. p4.
590 See Rosaldo, M. (1974) ‘Woman, Culture and Society: A Theoretical Overview’, especially p35-41, in Rosaldo, 
M. and Lamphere, L. (eds.) Woman. Culture and Society
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UNIHP comments that this language “would now be avoided as insensitive to the role of 
women.”591
This is not to make an essentialising indictment of Sudanese or Islamic or Global South 
society but merely to note that where a dominance of languages of brotherhood is indicated 
in any culture, this may reflect internal inquality. Using the example of revitalisation o f the 
fraternal form of organisation in nineteenth century America, Mary Clawson argues that 
societies with powerful fraternal organisational cultures reflect underlying patriarchal 
dominance. She notes the “overwhelming popularity”592 o f organisations such as the Knights 
of Labor, the largest union society of its time. Such societies “articulated a vision of unity and 
brotherhood among men of disparate social statuses.”593 Fraternalism, she argues, set up a 
network o f channels for the distribution o f social resources - power, capital, political favour - 
with which women could not compete. “In its use of kin-based imagery”, Clawson notes, 
“fraternalism invoked the moral community of the family.”594 However, the exclusivity o f the 
fraternal organisations was a reinforcing agent of the male-dominance o f the era. 
Fraternalism allied male-dominance with socially-oriented morals without having to derive 
those morals from the traditionally feminine family sphere. The ‘moral family’ could be male- 
only.
‘Brotherhood’ though for the rebels and the Khartoum Islamists may have multiple referents 
and meanings and vast pan-Islamic generalisations are not helpful. The West is used to 
conceiving of Muslim notions o f ‘brotherhood’ as linked closely to Qutbist radicalism, as a 
warlike community o f men bringing jihad to outsiders. However, Barbara Zollner charts in a 
biography of Hasan al-Hudaybi, second leader o f the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, that an 
important strain o f Islamist thinking has rejected such philosophy. Hudabyi stressed that his 
thought for the purposes of the Brotherhood turned on a particular interpretation of the 
Qu’ran (4:59) which states that “if you differ in anything among yourselves, refer it to 
Allah.”595 While Qutbists used this to justify resistance to any secularism, Hudaybi believed
591 Jolly, R., Emmerij, L. and Weiss, T. (2005) UN Voices: The Struggle for Development and Social Justice p327
592 Clawson, M.A. (1989) Constructing Brotherhood p3
593 Ibid. p6
594 Ibid. p212
595 See Zollner, B. (2009) The Muslim Brotherhood: Hasan al-Hudaybi and Ideology p i 35
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that “submission to the divine is the guiding principle” and that one need not follow the 
worldly leadership of an Islamic state if  that state was sinful. Hudaybi “explicidy directs his 
words against the focus of (radical) Islamist interpretations, which argues that it is essential 
for the believer to actively engage in the establishment o f an Islamic political system in order 
to remain part o f the community of Muslims.”596 He obliged his followers to show patience 
(sabr) and exercise peaceful opposition to outsiders, noting that “a Muslim who violates this 
obligation is a sinner (fasiq).”597
Considering the military milieux in which rebel documents are produced, as well as the 
paternalism o f Islam which is certainly more explicit than the largely implicit paternalism of 
contemporary Western (Christian) discourse, we see again the multiple possibilities of 
meaning inherent in kinship metaphorisation. As against Schmittian claims, we see that such 
language (in the Islamist case) may be turned violently against out-groups by unifying equals, 
but has the potential to resist that apocalyptic outcome. Seeds of ambivalence exist within 
purely Darfurian modes of meaning. As we saw earlier, the brotherhood may be the 
community which is enlisted in feuds, but also, as Holy shows, the kin group for the 
Darfurian Berti at least, is largely permeable. He notes that examples of kin groups accepting 
new members, and thus ‘creating’ new kin, are commonplace. Once a person participates in 
‘kin’ obligations (especially helping with the group’s diya or compensation payments to 
another lineage) in a village he has just moved to, he may be considered kin.598 Holy remarks, 
“(W)ithin maximal lineages the awareness o f genealogical ties is vague.”599 Thus “(A)n 
unrelated individual who lives with a group of people begins after a certain time to be 
considered their kinsman on the basis of his fulfilment of certain duties.”600
In sum, we see patterns whereby firstly, attempts to use kinship discourse in Western 
enunciative modalities are often imitated by those who sought to appeal to the outside world 
for aid in the Darfur crisis. An unbalanced discursive field, dominated by a hegemonic
596 Zollner, B. (2009) The Muslim Brotherhood: Hasan al-Hudaybi and Ideology p l44
597 Ibid. p l40
598 Perhaps confusing to Westerners, this is based upon not giving overwhelming precedence to ‘biological 
realities’ as the W est does. The Berti and many other societies derive notions of kinship from locality, 
performance o f obligations, giving of care and education and many other markers, along with notions o f ‘blood’ 
ties.
599 Holy, L. (1974) Neighbours and Kinsmen: A Study o f  the Berti People o f Darfur p l68
600 Ibid. p i 70
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formulation of a putative international community was taken up by rebel groups and the 
Sudanese representatives to the UN to engage in attempts to influence global opinion. 
However, both Sudanese parties stretched the boundaries of discourse on the crisis, 
incorporating statements from the internationally-agreed discourse on humanitarian 
intervention into other discourses. Elements o f the intervention discourse were melded into 
resistance discourse in the context of the war on terror presented as a crusade against Islam. 
Here, the notions o f idealistic collectivity expressed through kinship were switched from 
family motifs to notions of brotherhood within deeply Islamic organisations also most likely 
informed by Darfurian cultural kinship symbolism. Brotherhood here on the one hand means 
male-exclusivity, but on the other hand is a powerful resistance discourse. N ot only with 
inspirational organisations like the Muslim Brotherhood, but, as Patil shows, even among UN 
delegates from the global South, brotherhood is a language of equality which resists the UN 
and its Western founders’ notions of a patriarchal family of nations which implicitly 
infantilises the Southern ‘children’ o f the world. Freud, speaking of Darwin’s notion o f a 
primal horde, imagines brotherhood similarly as a resistance to tyranny. He pictures a 
“violent and jealous father who keeps all the females for himself and drives way his sons as 
they grow up” eventually facing a destructive uprising from a band of brothers “composed o f 
members with equal rights.”601
On this basis, several preliminary conclusions can be summarised from the inquiry thus far. 
Firstly, purportedly universal, emotive ideals were felt to be essential to the success of the UN 
project of remaking the world. These decisions were taken by small political circles, largely 
within the American political and literary establishment. Secondly, such discourses, especially 
metaphors which liken global politics to kinship, are used much less in contemporary 
discourse than in the early history of the UN-era. Thirdly, UN staff attest to the vagueness 
and irrelevance o f such ideals in practical UN work. However, they acknowledge a tie to the 
spirit o f such discourses, though sometimes feel uneasy about their colonial, Western, 
sentimental and religious overtones. Fourthly, in spite o f this, such discourses persist in the 
UN’s own rhetoric and that of political speakers. Their attraction lies in their flexibility and 
their capacity to reassure, which is rooted in the unequivocally positive valuation placed, in 
Western social thought, upon the notion of kinship as used in this type of discourse. Fifthly,
601 Freud, S. (2001) Totem and Taboo p i 64
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the purposes and positions which these kinship formulations occupy are quite specific. They 
are marked by their generality, aspirational-nature and emotive character in envisioning world 
politics. The flexibility of kinship as a symbol enables Western forms of discourse to be used 
by non-Westemers, but also, non-Westemers may fall back upon the notion of brotherhood 
to fight for equality in world-kin relations, as opposed to quasi-colonial parent/child 
rhetorical formulations.
The interface between the Islamic world and the Western dominated ‘international 
community’, in the context of the isolation of political prisoners of the war on terror is now 
the focus o f the following chapter in order to explore the outward facing uses of kinship as a 
mode o f discussing exclusion, rejection and reforming those outside the collective. The tasks 
to be taken up in the succeeding chapters will be defined by the need to sharpen the markers 
for the positioning of Western kinship discourse elaborated in this chapter. Further, based on 
the finding o f the Darfur and War on Terror case studies taken together, a full categorisation 
of the ‘work’ of kinship discourses can be drawn up. In particular, how does kinship work for 
purposes of exclusion as well as inclusion? How much more effective is it as a discursive trait 
than hegemonic formulations, or how much more dangerous and incendiary might it be? 
And, overlaid onto these questions, how might these analyses of kinship as a principle of 
distinction enable us to rethink Schmittian perspectives on decisionism in world politics?
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CHAPTER SIX - Case Study Two: The War on Terror
6.1 The Double-Edge of Kinship
The Darfur crisis, in common with much of the historical trajectory o f humanitarian 
interventions o f the late twentieth century, turns (in discourse at least) on a central schematic 
representation o f the international political arena in which the functioning core is compelled 
by the putative bonds of human commonality to reach out to a persecuted group. These 
representations, employing images of the family of nations and the building of a stronger and 
wider international community, are the incarnation of a liberal, Rortyan view o f the purposes 
of democratic politics. As Rorty argues, “(T)he goal of this manipulation o f sentiment is to 
expand the reference of the terms ‘our kind o f people’ and ‘people like us’”.602 This liberal, 
‘pastoral’ mode of kinship discourse as we have seen, can be employed to mobilise support 
for such humanitarian projects o f re-integration o f the oppressed into the protective embrace 
of the human family.
The third critical party in such a schema is those deemed by international powers to be 
conducting whatever oppressive policies are seen to have severed a part o f the human 
community from the notional core. In addressing this third party, even in cases like Darfur 
where the central action is one of humanitarian re-incorporation, the kinship metaphor may 
be put to use to condemn those who have ‘failed’ to act as befits ‘true’ members of the family 
of nations. An example from the aforementioned ‘Judgement on Genocide’ tribunal serves to 
illustrate the power and vehemence of kinship metaphors in such contexts and reinforces 
once more the three markers of generality, aspiration for change and emotionality highlighted 
previously:
602 Rorty, R. (1999) ‘Human Rights, Rationality and Sentimentality’ in Savic, O  (ed.) The Politics o f Human 
Rights p74. See also part 3 o f Rorty, R. (1991) Objectivism. Relativism and Truth. Chantal Mouffe captures 
Rorty’s position as the belief that “(Democratic politics consists in letting an increasing number o f people count 
as members o f our moral and conversational ‘we’.” See Mouffe, C. (2005) O n The Political p88
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“When a member of a family misbehaves, it is the duty of other family members to bring the miscreant into 
line. The Arab family has steadfastly refused to call Sudan to order. It has failed to call for Bashir’s 
judgment for mass murder under the sacred laws of Islam. Indeed it has placed obstacles in the way of 
sanctions and his generally refused to allow stories and statements critical of Sudan to appear in its press.
Nor has the African family, represented by the African Union, taken a seriously critical stance.
The United Nations has not been much more forthright orforceful. It has passed many resolutions with high- 
sounding words, but has failed to enforce them. When a deviant member of the family of nations flouts, indeed 
revels in the abandonment of the most basic norms of human decenty, is there really justification in evoking the 
excuse that protocol requires the permission of that same arrogant and defiant entity to accept U.N. 
peacekeepers in its territory? When that family of nations, in its majesty assembled, declares its responsibility 
to protect citizens of any county whose human rights are being violated, can it consider its responsibility a 
serious matter i f  it requires the consent of the violator to stop the crimes?’*03
At the perceived margins of the functioning core of international society, three sets of 
practices and discourses then are apparent. Firstly, there are discourses o f humanitarian 
reincorporation of those who have fallen outside of the normal protection of the community. 
Secondly, there are condemnations and attempts to punish or reform those whose miscreant 
actions have (temporarily) placed them in a position outside the community as objects of 
criticism or ostracism. Their status as temporary non-members of the consensus group places 
their rights in jeopardy until they have reformed in some way. These two sets o f practices and 
discourses have been evident in the preceding treatment of the Darfur crisis. The second 
‘condemnatory’ set o f discourses gives way at certain points to discourses of pure exclusion; 
in essence, treatments of those parties in the international sphere who are deemed to be 
irredeemably beyond the pale in terms of boundaries of the value community of the human 
family. This second set of discourses locks into debates on, and practices of, international 
regime change. The third set of discourses however, has been mobilised when groups are 
judged as having committed actions so antithetical to, or posed such a threat to, the values 
and stability of the liberal international regime, that they must be securely confined, punished 
and may have fundamental rights denied to them. To explore further the terrain that bridges 
between the second and third of our sets o f discourses at the margins of the functioning core, 
this chapter presents a consideration of the debates surrounding the international outrages 
and terrorist actions o f the Global War on Terror and in particular, the exceptional practices
603 International Citizens’ Tribunal For Sudan (2006) ‘Judgement’, Available at: 
http: /  / www.judgmentongenocide.com/judgtncnt.html. Accessed on 12/07/2009.
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of the United States in confining, abusing and torturing ‘unlawful combatants’ in 
Guantanamo and Abu Ghraib.
Similarly to the preceding case study, the object of the following investigation is a mapping of 
the discursive field in debates surrounding the prosecution of the War on Terror and the 
treatment of captives in the Guantanamo and Abu Ghraib affairs. Further, an account o f the 
usage o f kinship metaphors in this arena of exclusionary politics is presented. While politics 
at the margins of the functioning core may be inclusionary and exclusionary vis-a-vis the 
maintenance and adjustment of the boundaries o f that core within discourse, this chapter will 
detail how the usage o f kinship metaphors to include and to exclude form complementary, 
but not symmetrical patterns. Further light then, can be shed here upon the character of the 
notions of kinship as applied to world politics in comparing its positive (inclusionary) and 
negative (exclusionary) usage patterns.
Just as has been suggested throughout, the inherent flexibility of kinship as a cognitive tool 
for thinking about difference and identity leads to greater flexibility in policy options and the 
glossing o f potentially incendiary cases of apparent ‘exclusion’, than decisionist theorists such 
as Agamben and Schmitt might suggest. This insight provides a helpful addition to recent 
critiques o f applications of Schmitt to Guantanamo. Constructions of ‘we/they’ groupings by 
discourses o f inclusion and exclusion are, I argue, much more contingent than Schmittian 
theory would suppose. In the final section o f this chapter, I tie together the patterns of 
discourse noted in the Darfur and War on Terror case studies to outline what these examples 
suggest as to the overall potentialities of world kinship discourse in political debates in the 
contemporary period.
My argument is that Schmitt’s critique of liberalism604 and its tendency to universalise and 
moralise politics is indeed highly valuable. World politics indeed has a great deal to fear from 
such propensities, and world kinship discourse plays an important role as a prime instrument 
of such trajectories of framing politics. However, the practice of analysing discourse 
illuminates a reason for correcting some o f Schmitt’s pessimism. Bringing into play 
discourses o f idealised human unity is a moment both of ‘the political’ in a Schmittian sense 
of enacting a decision, and also a moment within a continuous stream of the practice of
604 See in particular, Schmitt, C. (1985) The Crisis o f Parliamentary Democracy, transl. Kennedy, E.
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politics. This duality is the result o f the fact that although human unity discourses purport to 
make a decision upon the content of the in-group, no effectual mode of realising such 
discourses, in the moment o f speaking, exists. Thus, rather than a one-way process whereby 
the speaker describes, and can effect, a decision upon the content o f the international in­
group, a two-way (or more) process occurs. In fact, the statement of the content of the 
international in-group is used instead politically (though not in a Schmittian sense) as part of 
an international dialogue that is, by its nature, unresolved and undecided. It is employed as a 
moral badge of honour, or a mode o f attempting to induce shame and a change in conduct. 
Though possession traits o f the ‘decision’, as we have seen from the beginning, such 
discourses exist in the register o f the aspiration, the hope, and the dream. In this way, they are 
incomplete proposals at the same time as appearing to be decisions; it is in this sense that 
they are open for response in international political dialogue. Fuller implications of this 
insight will be developed as the terrain of discourse in the case of the War on Terror is laid 
out. First however, the purported linkages between Schmitt and the exclusionary politics 
practiced in the War on Terror require examination.
6.2 Legal Exception. Rights, and the Person: the Case of Guantanamo
Liberal and institutionalist critiques, of the detainment of ‘unlawful combatants’ at 
Guantanamo not to mention the of War on Terror in general, commonly frame their attacks 
by representing the Bush Administration’s aggressive pursuits of global or national ‘security’ 
as the breaking waves of a new and dangerous tide of national sovereign unilateralism. 
Guantanamo has been, as Magnus Fiskesjo puts it, “a rift through which we can already see 
the sharp shadow of imperial sovereignty.”605 Implicit in such critiques is a fear of the 
potential arbitrariness o f sovereign power and the absence of the checks, balances and 
reasoned agreement o f institutional modes of governance. In this case, the manifestation of 
these concerns came in the expansion o f the powers of an American executive branch often 
judged to have Manichean, preconfigured notions of international threats and security.
605 Fiskesjo, M. (2003) The Thanksgiving Turkey Pardon, the Death o f Teddy’s Bear and the Sovereign 
Exception o f Guantanamo p60
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Indeed, given the design of the US Constitution specifically to enact the most carefully 
balanced separation of powers conceived in Western government up to the point of its 
signing, the tension between a democratic nomos606 and the state of exception is perhaps the 
most obvious in the American case. The following passage from Agamben’s State of 
Exception sums up the foundational concerns of the Constitution to institute both effective 
representative democracy and overriding executive power for times of crisis, but also to make 
these two branches ever dependent upon each other and ever in a productive state of tension.
“The place — both logical and pragmatic — ofa theory of the state of exception in the American constitution 
is in the dialectic between the powers of the President and those of Congress. .. The textual basis of the conflict 
lies first of all in Article 1 of the constitution which establishes that ft]he Privilege of the Writ of Habeas 
Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of rebellion of Invasion the public Safety may require it ’ 
but does not specify which authority has the jurisdiction to decide on the suspension... The second point of 
conflict lies in the relation between another passage of Article 1 (which declares that the power to declare war 
and to raise and support the army and naty rests with Congress) and Article 2, which states that ft]he 
President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and N a y  of the United States.>£07
As Agamben and others have argued, the state of exception is a paradigm or technique of 
government, invoked in times when the normative legal structure is under dire threat and 
only sovereign control is deemed sufficiendy potent to address such a challenge. Following 
the notion that the War on Terror might be a misconceived project608 which can never be 
brought to successful conclusion (especially by the application o f military force), some of the 
greatest concerns about detention at Guantanamo and civil liberty restrictions placed on 
citizens as part o f a drive for greater anti-terror security, have been centred around the 
potential permanence of the state of exception in such a conflict. As Rens van Munster 
points out, US discourses of emergency in the War on Terror have modified expected 
notions of how dire a threat must be for a state of exception to be invoked. The changes in 
discourse might be summed up as “a move from defence to prevention, or from (addressing)
606 The term is used in the sense o f a set o f social expectations and orientations orbiting around principles of 
democratic predictability, rationality and accountability both as a domestic and international oudook. See Ulmen, 
G. (2003) Translator’s Introduction’ in Schmitt, C. The Nomos o f the Earth in the International Law of the Tus 
Publicum Europaeum — “the community o f political entities united by common rules...considered to be mutually 
binding in the conduct o f international affairs” plO.
607 Agamben, G. (2005) State o f Exception p i9 /20
608 O r else, in the eyes o f certain neo-conservative hawks, a World War against the Islamic heirs to the fascist 
and communist threats o f World War II and the Cold War (World War III). See Podhoretz, N. (2007) World 
War IV: The Long Struggle Against Islamofascism
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danger to risk.”609 In other words the threshold for determining national emergency is being 
lowered to a point where the historical distinction between peace and war is replaced by a 
permanent state of exception due to the view that threats are multivalent and amorphous. In 
illustration of this move, the National Security Strategy of 2002 promulgates adapting “the 
concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of today’s adversaries” and 
declares that “(T)o forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States 
will, if necessary, act pre-emptively.”610
Critiques of Guantanamo note the seemingly deliberate attempt to place prisoners (potentially 
linked to Al-Qaeda or the Taliban, though the Bush Administration has deemed it 
unnecessary to prove this openly) beyond the rule of national or international law; in Lord 
Steyn’s words, they have been placed in a “legal black hole.”611 Initially confined without even 
the right to invoke the writ o f habeas corpus, Agamben argues that Guantanamo produces a 
“legally unnamable and unclassifiable being”. He continues: “(N)ot only do the Taliban 
captured in Afghanistan not enjoy status as POWs as defined by the Geneva Convention, 
they do not even have the status o f persons charged with a crime according to American 
laws. Neither prisoners nor persons accused, but simply ‘detainees’, they are the object o f a 
pure de facto rule, of a detention that is indefinite, not only in the temporal sense but in its 
very nature as well, since it is entirely removed from the law and from judicial oversight.”612 
As a comparative measure of the exceptional nature o f this detention, Steyn notes that an 
equivalent practice of deliberately placing persons outside the jurisdiction both of national 
and international courts and thereby denying a right to habeas corpus, has been illegal in 
English Law since 1679613.
609 van Munster, R. (2004) ‘ The War on Terrorism: When the Exception Becomes the Rule’ in International 
Journal for the Semiotics o f Law 17, pl41
610 National Security Strategy o f the United States (2002) p i  5. Available at: 
h t t p :  /  / w w w . g l o b a l s e c u r i t y . o r g / m i l i t a r y / l i b r a r y  / p o l i c y / n a t i o n a l  / n s s - 0 2 0 9 2 0 . p d f . Accessed on 02/09/2008.
611 Steyn, J. (2003) ‘Guantanamo Bay: The Legal Black Hole’ — 27th F.A. Mann Lecture, 25th November 2003. 
Aavailable at: www.nimi.com/docum ents7Guantanamo.pdf. Accessed on 23/06/2008.
612 Agamben, G. (2005) State o f Exception p 3 /4
613 Steyn, J. (2003) ‘Guantanamo Bay: The Legal Black Hole’ — 27th FA.. Mann Lecture 25th November 2003, 
p l l .  Available at: www.n i m j . c o m / d o c u m e n t s  / G u a n t a n a m o . p d f . Accessed on 23/06/2008.
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Notwithstanding independent reports by the International Committee o f the Red Cross614 of 
systematic abuse of detainees at Guantanamo, members of the Bush Administration were at 
pains to defend the camp in principle as well as the more specific details of its practices of 
detainment and interrogation. Much turns on the notion of revising the notion of ‘war’ to 
bypass the restrictions o f the Geneva Conventions and to increase the purview o f executive 
power, prosecuting efforts against terrorism as ‘war’ rather than as the punishment o f the 
crime o f terrorist attacks. John Yoo, a Justice Department official, caught up in accusations 
over the ‘Torture Papers615’, unconvincingly rationalises such a determination as follows: 
“ (W)ere the attacks (World Trade Centre and Pentagon) organized and systematic enough to 
be considered ‘armed conflict’? The gravity and scale of September 11 surely crosses that 
threshold.. .Although it may seem circular, one way to know if  the line between crime and 
war has been crossed is simply to note whether nations must turn to a military response.”616
The justification above certainly would seem to have more than a hint o f tautology about it. 
While advocating the need for “adapting the rules o f war to provide a new framework to 
address the new enemies o f the twenty-first century617”, the process o f adaption seems lop­
sided. US prosecution of ‘war’ entitles greater executive power and the restriction of 
information from domestic and international review. However, given the unorthodox tactics 
and formation of the terrorist organisations supposedly conducting systematic campaigning 
against the US, they are denied the rights to POW status. The overall formulation sets up the 
US as conducting a ‘war’ against a diffuse enemy which does not bear the hallmarks of a war- 
making power. Further, to quote President Bush: “(O)n September the 11th, enemies of 
freedom committed an act o f war against our country”618, but those enemies are deemed to 
be “violating every law o f war”619 and therefore not actually prosecuting ‘war’ in a way that 
would guarantee them prisoners’ rights.
614 A damning summary and reaction to the initially confidential report is given in the New York Times article by 
Neil A. Lewis, ‘Red Cross Finds Detainee Abuse in Guantanamo’, 30/11/2004. Available at: 
http://www.nytim es.eom /2004/11 /30/politics/30giu Gitmo.html. Accessed on 24/06/2008.
615 See Greenberg, K. and Dratel, J. (2005) The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu Ghraib
616 Yoo, J. (2006) War By O ther Means: An Insider’s Account o f the War on Terror p9/10
617 Ibid. p l7
618 Bush, G.W. (2001), ‘Address to a Joint Session o f Congress and the American People’, 20th September 2001. 
Available at: h ttp : //www.dhs.gov/xnews/speeches/speech 0016-shtm. Accessed on 24/08/2009.
619 Yoo, J. (2006) War By O ther Means: An Insider’s Account o f the War on Terror p l7.
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While the apparent opportunism of such formulations and the legal blackout extending over 
detainees o f disputed legal status has riled critics, the diverse mass of opprobrium cannot be 
taken as a fully sound basis for considering the legal, let alone the rhetorical discourse 
surrounding Guantanamo. Conservative authors such as Yoo make much of the intensive 
legal work done to make certain, for instance, that no domestic or international body could 
legally demand Geneva Convention protection, or rights to legal counsel, for detainees in the 
War on Terror at Guantanamo. This somewhat misses the point made by many liberal critics, 
and also fails to address the concerns of Colin Powell620 at the time of the institution of 
Guantanamo detention, namely that the US perhaps had moral and political interests in 
seeking to apply high and open standards in its treatment of detainees. While many legal 
criticisms o f Guantanamo have been blunted or nullified by the work of Administration legal 
teams, moral criticisms cannot be addressed simply by legal self-protection.
Indeed, this line of defence from conservative authors points towards ways in which it is 
necessary to be cautious in categorising Guantanamo as an arena wherein the force of the 
nomos retreats to make way for pure sovereign power. Law, in the Schmittian schema, appears 
to yield utterly to politics and such a “blending o f executive, legislative and judicial powers in 
one person or even in one branch of the government is ordinarily regarded as the very acme 
of absolutism.621” As Kaytal and Tribe frame it, Bush’s military order of November 2001, 
which in part legitimated the redefinition of participants in the War on Terror, and thus 
opened up the possibility of such unusual detention “installs the executive branch as lawgiver 
as well as law-enforcer, law-interpreter and law-applier.”622 However, to criticise the 
movement of law being replaced by sovereign politics by invoking Schmittian exceptionalism, 
is somewhat irresponsible. Casting persons outside of the rights group of the human 
community is a more complex process than many legal critics have assumed. In an incisive 
article commenting on the notion that the practice of invoking the exception is becoming 
increasingly the rule in contemporary international politics, Fleur Johns notes that while being 
outside of the full reach of international and domestic jurisdiction on many matters,
620 US Department o f State (2002), Memorandum to the Counsel to the President, Assistant to the President for 
National Security Affairs, by Colin L. Powell, Draft Decision Memorandum for the President on the Applicability of the 
Geneva Convention to the Conflict in Afghanistan, 26th January 2002. Widely available online, or in Greenberg, K. and 
Dratel, J. (eds.), The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu Ghraib. p i22.
621Kaytal, N. and Tribe, L. (2002) W aging War, Deciding Guilt: Trying the Military Tribunals’ in Yale Law 
Journal 111, pl266, quoting Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1,11 (1957)
622 Ibid. pl265.
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Guantanamo is a space where carefully administering law is crucial to a camp which exploits 
legal loopholes. She writes: “ [F]ar from a space of ‘utter lawlessness’ then, one finds in 
Guantanamo Bay a space filled to the brim with expertise, procedure, scrutiny and 
analysis.”623 Even in Kaytal and Tribe’s categorisation of excess executive power above, that 
power is instantiated in an abundance of law-making.
Thus, there is a patent difference between an archetypal re-emergence of Schmittian 
sovereign power and the tactics of the Bush Administration in finding ways to argue for 
unusual practices of detainment and interrogation in the War on Terror. This difference is 
that which is perceptively pointed up by Kalyvas624 in his comparison o f Schmitt and Weber’s 
notions o f a leader’s legitimacy. While Schmitt argues for legitimacy deriving purely from 
sovereignty and thus the potential (and legitimate) abrogation of the constitution by the 
sovereign, Kalyvas contrasts Weber’s standpoint whereby democratic legitimacy remains 
much more closely tied to the leadership actively defending the law and the constitution. 
These may be suspended if  it is to the benefit of constitutional survival, but such a practice 
requires some negotiation or persuasion. In this sense, Guantanamo cannot be taken as a 
simply sovereign refusal of law and a move into the domain o f pure political decisionism. The 
attempts to justify Guantanamo politically by reference to the need for defence o f the nation 
and the threat posed by the inmates (as we will see below) have been numerous and do not 
speak of an Administration operating with the confidence o f unchallengeable sovereign 
authority. The attempts to work within existing legal frameworks to justify the camp’s 
necessity, the mobilisation of massive legal teams to make sure the camp could be insulated 
against charges of illegality — all these actions speak more o f a set of measures requiring 
political justification which aim not at abrogating legal structures at all. At the very most, 
partial suspension of legal norms has occurred, but mostly, processes of disguised 
circumvention of norms or attempts to re-negotiate legal norms have been the prominent 
tactics employed.
In part, over-enthusiastic attributions of Schmitt and Agamben to War on Terror policies 
have been caused by some o f the more sweeping statements, particularly of the latter. While
623 Johns, F. (2005) ‘Guantanamo Bay and the Annihilation of the Exception’ in European Journal o f 
International Law 16(4) p618
624 See Kalyvas, A. (2008) Democracy and the Politics o f the Extraordinary: Max Weber. Carl Schmitt and 
Hannah Arendt p l5 8 /9
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criticising the Bush Administration for lde facto rule’ (as quoted above), Agamben’s work also 
makes clear that the state o f exception is “neither external nor internal to the juridical 
order.”625 Schmitt describes, in his Political Theology, that precisely in order to have a space 
of legal normality, the state of exception must be prefigured in law to shape the bounds of 
that normality.626 As a Department of Defense briefing o f February 2004 outlined, inmates of 
Guantanamo were rigorously assessed by “analysts, behavioural scientists and regional 
experts”627 and a weighty set o f guidelines628 for annual reviews of individual threat risk 
guided the camp release program. As some law has been unable to reach Guantanamo, so it 
can been seen as a political tactic to reinsert other law and regulation, both to concentrate 
authority in the executive branch but also, while doing so, reassure the wider world o f the 
rationality of the detention procedures. As Peter Gratton629 neatly points out, Agamben, 
contra Arendt, has consistently characterised the camp630 not as apolitical (as some legal and 
liberal critics perceive) but as hyper-political. It is a space where the sharpest and most 
fundamental decisions on the limits o f the body politic are made; a space created by and at 
the limit of the legal regime.
However, efforts (limited though they may be) at reinscribing Guantanamo with aspects of a 
legal regime for the sake o f proving the accountability and rationality o f the process of 
detention, limit the decisionism that is supposed to be at the heart of executive control o f the 
camp. The rationale for Guantanamo is rarely, as suggested above, publicly expressed as one 
of sovereign decision, though that Constitutional power o f the President as Commander-in- 
Chief is often invoked as the first line o f explanation. As Johns notes, the “acts of the would- 
be sovereign.. .are characterized by repeated references to some higher source of competence
625 Agamben, G. (2005) State o f Exception p23
626 Schmitt, C. (1985) Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept o f Sovereignty p l3
627 Butler, P. (2004) ‘Briefing on Detainee Operations at Guantanamo Bay, 13th February 2004’. Available at: 
http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2004/tr20040213-0443.html. Accessed on 15/06/2008.
628 ‘Administrative Review Procedures for Enemy Combatants in the Custody o f the Department o f Defense at 
Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba, Department o f Defense Order, 11th May 2004. Available at: 
http://h.rw .org/english/docs/2004/08/16/usdom 9235 txt.htm. Accessed on 25/06/2008.
629 Gratton, P. (2006) ‘A ‘Retro-version’ o f Power: Agamben via Foucault on Sovereignty’ in Critical Review of 
International Social and Political Philosophy, 9(3), p451
630 Here the authors refer o f course, not only to Guantanamo, but to ‘the camp’ as a historically grounded 
sociological space. One might think o f the Soviet Gulag and the Nazi concentration camps as prime referents in 
the thought o f Arendt and Agamben, but also recall deeper historical precedents such as those camps established 
under Kitchener’s command in the Second Boer War.
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and direction631” — actions justified and merited in the name of democracy, liberty, the 
American ‘way of life’ and even God. Johns further illustrates how, in briefing the press on 
the potential release of prisoners, Secretary o f the Navy Robert England at first confirmed 
that he was the one to “make the ultimate decision” but then presented such judgements as 
impersonal and standardised, being “based on facts, data available...the best decisions a 
reasonable person can make.”632 Johns sums up this move as follows: “the experience o f 
decision-making reported by such figures as Secretary England seems, to a significant degree, 
to be one of deferral and disavowal — as though his job were more a matter of 
implementation than decision.”633
From Johns’ argument then, it is important to recognise that ‘pure’ sovereign decisions or 
policies resulting from them may require politicking, disguising or nuancing when entering 
into discourse in an international sphere where proceduralism is almost universally held to be 
a guarantor o f rationality and fairness. The original political relation may well be the ban634, 
but when the international institutional architecture rests upon the principle of universal 
human inclusion within a rights and value-sharing collectivity, the action of excluding a 
portion of humanity from that collectivity cannot be discussed, let alone carried out, simply 
on the basis of sovereign decision. It is with this in mind that the workings of discourses of 
world unity and notions of a bounded family of nations must be understood. Simply 
employing such ideas does not automatically bring about the political groupings described, 
but may go some way towards erecting boundaries in the social interactions of international 
parties. In all instances, the effects of discourse are dependent upon such factors as the 
institutional sites of the speakers and audiences and the historical referents that may be 
triggered in such discourses. In the present case, a set of complementary discursive actions 
frames the creation (or attempted creation) of an exceptional group labelled ‘terrorists’. The 
values of those fighting terror are reaffirmed to make ‘just’ any force applied to defeat the 
enemy. These values are then inverted to describe the enemy and to provide rationale for 
their incarceration, interrogation, torture and destruction. Central then to this production o f a
631 Johns, F. (2005) ‘Guantanamo Bay and the Annihilation o f the Exception’ in European Journal of 
International Law 16(4) p630
632 Ibid., quoting ‘Special Defense Briefing with the Secretary o f the Navy, Gordon England’, 23rd June 2004. 
Available at: http: /  / www.defenselink.mil/transcripts. Accessed 01/02/2009.
633 Ibid. p631
634 As claimed by Agamben, G. (1998) Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life
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space o f exclusion, in a world where such naked sovereign power is feared, are a number of 
discourses aimed at solidifying the identities of the belligerents. Firsdy, there are discourses 
of the exceptional nature o f the war on terror and o f the ‘universal’ values o f the alliance 
prosecuting it. Secondly, there are discourses o f the failure of terrorist groups to respect, 
comply with, or even recognise such ‘universal’ values. Thirdly, justifications are made for the 
repercussions meted out to those who, by their deviance from international standards and 
expectations, either cast themselves out of the rights group o f a common human community, 
or, must be forcibly cast out. Parallel to these political discursive representations o f such a 
value conflict are those discourses which would take issue with this institution of a ban on a 
certain pariah group, be they international institutional voices, or voices representing those 
subject to this exclusion. It is to the political representations of the exclusion of terrorists 
from the common rights group that we turn first, before considering those discourses which 
would resist attempts made to exclude. On the basis o f surveying this terrain o f discourse, 
Schmitt’s critique of liberalism can be brought to bear to illuminate the potentialities and 
limits o f world unity discourse in effecting political change, while these discourses themselves 
prove a tool for refining a productive engagement with Schmitt and the lacunae o f his 
thought.
6.3 Negating Humanity: Discourses of Exclusion in the War on Terror. 
Guantanamo and Abu Ghraib
<cPeople go to war because of how they see, perceive, picture, imagine, and speak of others; that is, how thy  
construct the difference of others as well as the sameness of themselves through representation.>£i5
This well-rehearsed postmodern framing o f the politics o f conflict meshes easily into 
discussions of the War on Terror, since by greater necessity than in times of conventional 
warfare, modes of picturing ‘threat’ must be developed through the work of discourse. 
Threat, or a public belief in threat, cannot be taken for granted on behalf of any state 
government but may need to be cultivated. The enemy’s forces are not, metaphorically, 
visible at the gates to menace the population within. They are, by contrast, hidden and
635 Der Derian, J. (2002) T h e  War o f Networks’ in Theory and Event 5(4). Available at:
h ttp :/7muse.jhu.edu/journals/theory and event/v005/5.4derderian.html. Accessed on 03/07/08.
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diffuse, their offensive materiel is minimal or non-existent. Instead o f conventional 
weaponry, the contemporary terrorist ‘enemy’ made use of civilian aircraft in their most 
devastating attack on September 11* 2001, and conspicuously neither Al-Qaeda, nor its 
supposed sponsors, were found in possession of WMDs.
In part then, and setting aside for the moment possible notions of the political manipulation 
o f the perception of the level threat by the Bush Administration, it is perhaps not surprising 
to find that in a war with an enemy more amorphous than many encountered in modem 
history, an unusually diverse and sharply ‘othering’ mass of discourse has been generated to 
represent terror and terrorists. In particular, much of the political rhetoric explored in this 
section explicitly seeks to dehumanise the terrorist and to claim that the ideology, and even 
the existence o f terrorism represents something existentially inimical to humanity and human 
society itself. Such ‘othering’ discourses naturally form part of the justification for ruthless 
prosecution of the War on Terror and o f treatment of captives taken during the course o f the 
conflict. Consonant with the findings o f the previous chapter, at times when rhetoric seeks 
the most emotionally charged modes of expressing the existence of powerful common 
purpose, or the dire consequences of radical difference from that common purpose, kinship 
metaphors are invoked.
On the evening o f September 11* 2001, in his address to the nation, President Bush stated 
“today our nation saw evil, the very worst o f human nature.”636 Repeatedly in that address 
and in speeches thereafter, the notion of evil was attached to the terrorist organisations 
supposedly responsible for the World Trade Centre and Pentagon attacks. Bush used Psalm 
23 to metaphorise his interpretation of the feelings of the nation: “(E)ven though I walk 
through the valley of the shadow of death, I fear no evil, for You are with me.”637 This 
became elaborated into a concept of bin Laden as “the evil one”638 and Al-Qaeda as “the evil
636 Bush, G.W. (2001) ‘Statement by the President in his Address to the Nation’ September 11th 2001. Available
at: http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news /releases/2001 /09/2001091 l-16.html. Accessed on
04/07/2009.
Ibid.
638 Bush, G.W. (2001) Press Conference, The East Room, Washington D.C., October 11, 2001. Available at 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/septll /president Q49.asp. Accessed on 02/08/2009.
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ones.”639 As Richard Jackson notes, “this language conforms to an explicitly individual theory 
of evil, where evil exists as a force of principle residing within specific human beings, rather 
than in a complex set o f structural conditions.”640 Further, allied to the regular use of notions 
of ‘evil’ and ‘evildoers’, the more explicitly religious use o f the idea of ‘evil ones’ (a popular 
evangelical reference to the Devil641) demonises terrorists as being satanic rather than human 
entities. Rooting this notion o f evil in the very nature of those committing attacks (as in 
Bush’s 9/11 address) “implies that the evil is eschatological and cannot be dealt with except 
through destruction or a type o f sacred cleansing.”642 Jackson quotes a wry and telling remark 
from Donald Rumsfeld in reference to the notion that his job was not to teach, improve, 
redeem or reform the terrorists, instead his task as Secretary of Defense was instead to 
destroy that instantiation o f evil in the world. Rumsfeld said in an interview with USA Today: 
“(N)o one around the Pentagon’s going to change the nature of human beings.”643
This movement to individualise the ‘evil’ threatening the international community also 
transported discourse away from the historical precedents which had, from the first, inspired 
the Bush Administration’s response to 9/11. Those attacks were immediately compared in 
US media and scholarly commentary644 to the Japanese assault at Pearl Harbor in 1941 and 
the link was made explicit by the Administration. In a speech to military commanders, 
Assistant Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz claimed, in a replication of Roosevelt’s 1941 
wording that “September 11th has taken its place alongside December 7th as a date that will 
live in infamy.”645 Roosevelt had moralised American victimhood and called for its “righteous 
might” to rise against Japanese aggression. His portrayal of the enemy had, however, focused
639 Bush, G.W. (2001) Presidential Remarks to US Attorneys Conference, Dwight David Eisenhower Office 
Building, November 29, 2001. Available at h ttp :// avalon.law.vale.edu/septll/president l l l .a s p . Accessed on 
01/09/2009.
640 Jackson, R. (2005) Writing the War on Terrorism: Language, Politics and Counter-Terrorism p66. This 
individualization o f evil has also been a point o f theological contention. While the King James Version’s Lord’s 
Prayer asked only to ‘deliver us from evil’, the Revised Version o f 1881 and the American Standard Version 
based upon it asking God to “deliver us from the Evil O ne’.
641 See also New American Standard Bible, 1 John 5:19: “We know that we are o f God, and the whole world lieth 
in the evil one.” Available at: http://www.keyway.ca/bibles/asv62.htm#C5Vl. Accessed on 13/07/2009.
642 Jackson, R. (2005) Writing the War on Terrorism: Language. Politics and Counter-Terrorism p67
643 Ibid. Jackson cites Rumsfeld, D. (2001) Interview with the Editorial Board o f USA Today, News Transcript 
from the US Department o f Defense, October 24, 2001.
644 See Griffin, D. R. (2004) The New Pearl Harbor: Disturbing Questions A bout the Bush Administration and 
9-11
645 Wolfowitz, P. (2002) Standup o f U.S. Northern Command — Remarks as Prepared for Delivery by Deputy 
Secretary o f Defense Paul Wolfowitz, Petersen AFB, Colorado Springs, CO, Tuesday, October 01, 2002. 
Available at: http://www.defenselink.mil/Speeches/Speech.aspxPSpeechID—292. Accessed on 15/06/2009.
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on their “dastardly” behaviour and the “treachery” of their actions rather than attempting to 
describe them as innately evil646. Equally with President Reagan’s ‘Evil Empire’647 discourse, 
he made clear repeatedly in that much-quoted speech that what he conceived of was a 
“phenomenology of evil” abroad in the world. It was to be properly linked to the political 
system (the Empire) rather than to individuals themselves. He urged his listeners instead to 
“pray for the salvation o f all o f those who live in that totalitarian darkness”. This 
individualisation of evil does not though, as Jackson argues, lead un-problematically to 
politics of the destruction o f excluded individuals. As will be discussed further in the final 
section, the values upon which world unity discourses rest do not easily permit of such policy 
and, as a result in the prosecution o f the War on Terror, a focus on hunting down individuals 
is tempered by concerns for regime change that are more in keeping with historical US 
policy.
Among other dehumanising tropes employed in political rhetoric, prominent especially in 
discussions of Guantanamo has been the wedding of notions of otherness and evil to the 
long-standing politico-legal category of ‘enemy alien’ to produce such representations as 
‘alien terrorist’ — a term beloved o f John Ashcroft, the Attorney General at the time of 9/11. 
‘Enemy aliens’ have represented the ‘enemy within’ in times of war in the United States and 
high-profile confinement or deportation o f these groups (for instance Japanese-Americans in 
World War Two648 or suspected communists in the Cold War) has been widely supported to 
secure the supposed integrity o f the nation. Bolstering the unspoken value-loading of the 
‘citizen/good’ - ‘alien/dangerous’ dichotomy, Ashcroft noted that 9/11 was an illustration 
that “aliens also come to our country with the intent to do great evil.”649 He instituted the 
Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force with the pledge to “detain, prosecute, (and) deport
646 Citations from Roosevelt, F.D. (1941) Speech to the Congress o f the United States, December 8th 1941. The 
complete address is available at: http: /  / www.ibibko.org/hyperwar/PTO /EastW ind /Infamy.html. Accessed on 
15/06/2009.
647 The following citations drawn from Reagan, R. (1983) Speech Before the National Association of 
Evangelicals, Orlando, FL, March 8th 1983. Available at:
http://www.presidentreagan.info/speeches/empire.cfm. Accessed on 16/06/2009.
648 See, for instance, Theismeyer, L. (1995) ‘The Discourse o f Official Violence: Anti-Japanese N orth American 
Discourse and the American Internment Camps’ in D iscourse & Society, 6(3), p319-352
649 Ashcroft, J. (2001) News Conference with Immigration and Naturalization Service Commissioner James 
Ziglar, and Director o f Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force, Steve McGraw, Department o f Justice 
Conference Centre, October 31st 2001. Available at: http://avalon.law .yale.edu/septll /doi brief022.asp. 
Accessed on 01/09/2009.
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terrorist aliens650” and this implicit dehumanising of foreign nationals filtered into the 
treatment meted out in Guantanamo.
A final group of major referents have been especially employed with respect to the framing 
both of terrorism in general and also more specifically to prisoners of the War on Terror to 
deny their humanity - namely metaphors likening terror and terrorists to lower forms of life 
or to harmful infections. Dennis Blair, Commander-in-Chief of the US Pacific Command 
spoke of the “cancer” o f Al-Qaeda infiltrating the Middle East and Central Asia with its 
“spawn”651. Similarly Bush likened terrorists to “parasites”652 whilst Colin Powell preferred to 
think of “the scourge o f terrorism”653. In setting up the War on Terror as “civilisation’s 
fight”654 against the barbarism of Al-Qaeda, the rhetorical door was opened not only for the 
labeling of terrorists as low forms of savage humanity, but also to deny their humanity and 
refer to them as animals, and in this respect language of a ‘hunt’ for terrorists could be used 
to characterise the prosecution of the War on Terror. The US Ambassador to Japan at the 
time of 9/11, Howard Baker, claimed that Al-Qaeda rejected “those values that separate us 
from animals.”655
A political and media barrage of such discourse built up in 2001 and 2002, and, when 
revelations of prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib began to break in 2004, it was perhaps hardly 
surprising to find patterns of abuse consistent with dehumanising discourses chief among the 
outrages. Lacking legal personality, the prisoners of Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo found 
themselves in the same relation to their captors as animals to humans, dependent largely
650 Ashcroft, J. (2001) News Conference with Immigration and Naturalization Service Commissioner James 
Ziglar, and Director o f Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force, Steve McGraw, Department of Justice 
Conference Centre, October 31st 2001. Available at: h t t p :  /  / a v a l o n . l a w . y a l e . e d u  / s e p t l  1  / d o j  b r i e f 0 2 2 . a s p . 
Accessed on 0 1 /0 9 /2 0 0 9 .
651 Blair, D. (2001) Taking Back O ur World from Osama-Bin-Laden’. Available at: h t t p : / / u s i n f o . o r g / w f -  
a r c h i v e / 2 0 0 1 / 0 1 1 1 0 1 / e p f 4 0 S . h t m . Accessed on 0 7 /0 9 /2 0 0 9 .
652 Bush, G.W. (2002) State o f t h e  Union Address available at: h t t p :  /  / w w w . w a s h i n g t o n p o s t . c o m / w p -  
s r v / o n p o l i t i c s / t r a n s c r i p t s / s o u O l 2 9 0 2 . h t m . Accessed on 0 8 /0 8 /2 0 0 9 .
653 Powell, C. (2001) Remarks by the Secretary o f State to the National Foreign Policy Conference for Leaders of 
NGOs, US Department o f State, October 26th, 2001. Available at:
h t t p : / / a v a l o n . l a w . v a l e . e d u / s e p t l l / p o w e l l  b r i e f 3 1 . a s p . Accessed on 1 2 /0 7 /2 0 0 8 .
654 Bush, G.W. (2001) Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People, September 20th 2001. 
Available at: h t t p : /  / g e o r g e w b u s h - w h i t f c h o u s e . a r c h i v e s . g o v / n e w s  / r e l e a s e s  / 2 0 0 1  / 0 9 / 2 0 0 1 0 9 2 0 - 8 . h t m l . Accessed 
on 1 4 /0 5 /2 0 0 9 .
655 Baker, H .H . (2001) Comments at Japanese Observance Ceremony for Victims o f Terrorism in the US, 
September 23rd, 2001. Available at: http:/ / u s i n f o . o r g / w f - a r c h i v e / 2 0 0 1  / 0 1 0 9 2 4 / e p f l  1 1  .htm. Accessed on 
0 1 /0 9 /2 0 0 9 .
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upon goodwill for their humane treatment and survival. The following from Charles 
Brower’s discussion o f the dehumanising of prisoners draws out the explicit linkages:
“Guards used open blades to cut away prisoners’ jumpsuits, from their necks to their thighs. This action 
represents a symbolic slaughter that created a sense of mortal terror among detainees. Having obscured their 
faces and removed their clothing — two highly distinctive human characteristics — guards ‘branded’ the 
prisoners like cattle, drawing words and symbols on their legs or buttocks. According to several accounts, 
guards forced prisoners to crawl like dogs on their hands and knees, to bark on command, and to follow their 
captors on leashes or strings. A t  other times, crawling prisoners served as ‘donkeys’ or riding animals’, forced 
to bear fellow prisoners or guards on their backs. To complete the picture, Staff Sergeant Ivan Frederick 
reportedly forced on male detainee to masturbate near the open mouth of another male detainee, then 
remarked: Took at what these animals do if  you leave them alone for two seconds. ”656
As Thomas Pogge comments, it is “remarkable that our governments show so little interest 
in justifying, in moral terms, the great harms they are clearly inflicting upon innocent 
persons.”657 In the case o f Abu Ghraib above, the Bush Administration simply tried to pass 
off abuse with an apology and frame it as a misrepresentation of American values in the War 
on Terror. Rumsfeld made the following statement to the Senate Armed Services Committee: 
“I feel terrible about what happened to these Iraqi detainees.. .Our country had an obligation 
to treat them right.. .To those Iraqis who were mistreated by members of U.S. armed forces, 
I offer my deepest apology. It was un-American. And it was inconsistent with the values of 
our nation.”658 As for Guantanamo, indefinite confinement and aggressive interrogation were 
justified by further characterisation o f the evilness of the inmates. Rumsfeld again: 
“(A)nybody who has looked at the training manuals for the al Qaeda and what these people 
were trained to do, and how they were trained to kill civilians — and anybody who saw what 
happened to the Afghani soldiers who were guarding the al Qaeda in Pakistan when a 
number were killed by al Qaeda using their bare hands — has to recognize that these are 
among the most dangerous, best trained vicious killers on the face of the earth.”659 As Yuval 
Ginbar documents, the justificatory model for ‘enhanced interrogation techniques’ (including
656 Brower, C. (2004) T h e  Lives o f Animals, The Lives of Prisoners and the Revelations o f Abu Ghraib’ in 
Vanderbilt Journal o f Transnational Law 37, p4
657 P°gge> T. (2008) ‘Making War on Terrorists -  Reflections on Harming the Innocent’ in The Journal o f 
Political Philosophy 16(1) p22
658 Rumsfeld, D. (2004) Testimony o f Secretary o f Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld Before the Senate and House 
Armed Services Committees, 7 th May 2004’. Available at: http://arm ed- 
services.senate.gov/statemnt/2004/May/Rumsfeld.pdf. Accessed on 30/06/2009.
659 Rumsfeld, D. (2002) Tress Briefing Concerning Media Availability En Route to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, 
January 27th 2002’. Available at: h ttp ://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid::=2320. 
Accessed on 07/07/2008.
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waterboarding, sexual humiliation, prolonged isolation, beating and stress positions), has 
been the High Value Detainees model.660 This speculative model, o f detaining and 
interrogating anyone who might have high value information, was motivated by the so-called 
‘One Percent Doctrine’, wherein the Bush Administration was convinced to take as a 
credible threat any scenario of terrorist conspiracy which might have even a one in a hundred 
chance of actually existing661. As fears of a second 9/11 attack escalated amid claims that Al- 
Qaeda might additionally have access to WMDs, the value of captives was grossly 
overinflated. During the search for WMDs and the attempt to build support for an invasion 
of Iraq, Dick Cheney reminded the American Association of News Editors of the 
Administrations view of the potential further threat from Al-Qaeda: “(W)e are dealing with 
terrorists.. .who are willing to sacrifice their own lives to kill millions of others.”662
Whilst legal scholars like Ginbar assess (and condemn) the moral implications of a model 
wherein the supposed information obtainable from a few captives may lead to the saving of 
many more innocent lives, it should be noted that the High Value Detainee model advanced 
by the Bush Administration provides no legitimate explanation either for the presence of 
some of the juvenile detainees at Guantanamo, or that large majority released to their home 
countries for ‘continued detention’ who have been since set free663 without charge, or the 
abuses and torture at Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo documented variously by human rights 
scholars664. As one former US interrogator made clear, most of those rounded up by the 
military had little or no connection to active insurgency — “90 percent of the people that I 
saw were in my opinion innocent.”665
Indeed, though much legal work has been done to try to prove the case for redefinitions of 
‘torture’, or to exempt detainees from the protection of the Geneva Conventions, the moral,
660 Ginbar, Y. (2008) Why N ot Torture Terrorists? Moral. Practical, and Legal aspects o f the ‘Ticking Bomb’ 
Justification for Torture. See especially chapter 15.
661 See also Suskind, R. (2006) The One Percent Doctrine: Deep Inside America’s Pursuit o f Its Enemies Since 
9/11
662 Cheney, D. (2003), Vice-President’s Remarks to the American Society o f News Editors, April 9th 2003’. 
Available at: http://www.acronym .org.uk/docs/ Q304/doc03.htm. Accessed on 21/07/2009.
663 Vicious Killers’ from Guantanamo Bay Routinely Freed by O ther Countries’, Selsky, A. (2006) in USA Today, 
15th December 2006. Available at: http: /  / www.usatodav.com/news / world/2006-12-15-gitmo-freed x.htm. 
Accessed on 15/07/2009.
664 See for instance, Worthington, A. (2007) The Guantanamo Files: The Stories o f the 774 Detainees in 
America’s Illegal Prison or Rose, D. (2004) Guantanamo: America’s War on Human Rights
665 See Tactics o f Interrogation’. Chris Matthews’ ‘Hardball’ interview with US Army Specialist Tony Lagouranis, 
MSNBC, January 2006. Available at: http: /  / www.msnbc.msn.com/id /10895199. Accessed 05/06/2009.
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rather than legal justifications for abuse and torture have scarcely been taken on in political 
rhetoric other than, as seen above, in the context of sheepish or evasive apologies. Legal 
personhood has been denied and in discourse, as we have seen, human personhood has been 
denied in ways which have certainly contributed to the instances and particular character of 
some o f the dehumanising abuses committed. The discourses discussed implicitly cast 
terrorists beyond the human rights group. Nevertheless, in mainstream US political rhetoric 
in the case o f Guantanamo and the broader War on Terror, it is hard to find the sort of 
explicit rejections of terrorists’ membership o f the human community/family such as 
deployed in the Soyinka Tribunal with which this chapter began. Such a move, in a 
pressurised climate, would surely have been only further fuel to the fires of criticism of 
overbearing aggression and imperial-style presidency. This is not to say that such a 
formulation would be impossible, but there are several reasons explored below to anticipate 
and account for its absence in many sites within discourse. While eschewed by Bush 
Administration politicians in their high-profile policy statements, nevertheless this 
formulation has been employed elsewhere, though again by speakers not enmeshed in 
administrative politics or those enmeshed in UN rather than US Administration subject 
positions. Even here though, the emphasis is placed upon a voluntary self-exclusion rather 
than a sovereign exclusion. In a speech in Oxford in 2005, the then Saudi Ambassador to the 
US, Prince Turki Al-Faisal said:
“This terrorism is not based on Islam, but is a perverted cult ideology. Its followers have excluded themselves 
from normal society, from the human family, and placed themselves outside of reality to live out fantasies that 
have nothing to do with the real world.>666
Consider also the investigation in 2003 of Liberian President Charles Taylor by former 
Pentagon Inspector General David Crane, then working as a UN Special Prosecutor. 
Accusing Taylor of harbouring international terrorists and facilitating Al-Qaeda expansion in 
West Africa as a whole, Crane concluded his indictment by stating, “(W)e call on Taylor to 
rejoin the family of nations and turn over...any other indicted war criminals he is 
sheltering.”667 Herein, the possibility of rejoining the in-group is .held out if only Taylor (who
666 Al-Faisal, T. (2005) Address to the Oxford University Philosophy, Politics and Economics Society. Topic: 
"Terrorism Threats and Challenges." October 11, 2005. Available at: h ttp : //www.saudi-us-relfltions.org/fact- 
book/ speeches /2005 /051011 -turki-saudi.html. Accessed on 03/09/2009.
667 Crane, D. (2003) Special Court for Sierra Leone, Indictment o f Charles Taylor, 14th May 2003. Available at: 
h ttp ://www.unwire.org / unwire/20030515Z33747 story.asp. Accessed on 15/05/2009.
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was initially indicted on 654 charges) would behave cooperatively in handing over his 
supposed allies. Just as in Al-Faisal’s statement, where perverted ideology is blamed for the 
beliefs which have cast some Muslim groups outside the human family, the possibility of 
redemption based upon different behaviour is held out.
Recalling the discursive terrain uncovered in humanitarian conflicts in Chapter Five, we 
noted a hegemonic notion of the ‘international community’ and a principal variant in notions 
o f a kin community or human family responding to the crisis. It is interesting in the rhetoric 
o f the Bush Administration in the War on Terror that not only are references to Al- 
Qaeda /terrorism’s relationship to the ‘human family’ absent but so are references to A Q ’s 
relations to the ‘international community’. Notions o f their aggression against ‘civilisation’ or 
‘our way of life’ are present, but in all instances, attempts to invoke greater international 
consensual response by using rhetoric that would imply collective opprobrium are quite 
guarded. In part, and especially by the time of Guantanamo, the notion that the international 
community was under threat from terrorism had somewhat evaporated. While ‘Le Monde’ 
was happy to claim that W e Are All Americans’ on 9/11, by 2004 a more unilateralist war 
was being undertaken. Calling on the international community or the family o f nations to 
exclude terrorists or Al-Qaeda or the state sponsors o f terrorism was a dead-end policy and 
rhetoric option for the Bush Administration by 2003/2004. However, as detailed below, in 
the earlier days o f the War on Terror exactly this trajectory was followed in terms of 
generating support.
Given their later split from the greater part of the UN community over the invasion of Iraq, 
it is unsurprising that the Administration would be less inclined to speak on behalf of the 
international community in attempting to make sovereign decision statements as to the limits 
o f that in-group with reference to the terrorist threat. By contrast, it is predictable that in a 
setting where he acts as the mouthpiece of the UN as the embodiment of the family of 
nations, David Crane would use this discourse. Also, as noted, the potential for kinship to be 
mobilised as a flexible sphere which can be rejoined after exclusion was unlikely to correlate 
with the fate the Bush Administration envisaged for their enemies.
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6.4. Kinship, the Creation of Unity or Aspiration in the War on Terror
So as to further bolster the notion that the debate over the international community’s 
involvement with the War on Terror, and related abuses at Guantanamo and Abu Ghraib, 
are not part o f the same humanitarian discursive register as those on crises involving 
supposed international ‘innocents’ such as in Darfur, a short consideration o f NGO 
discourse, parallel to that conducted in the previous chapter, is instructive. As for the most 
important reports by Amnesty International, far fewer IC references, or any variations for 
describing the same putative collective, are present than in the Darfur reporting. The 202- 
page report ‘Human Dignity Denied668’ a summary of 3 years at Guantanamo, the recent Abu 
Ghraib revelations and suspected abuses during the Afghan war, makes only 5 references to 
the IC, and one further to the ‘international community of nations’. Many of Amnesty’s more 
focused reports make no mention of the IC whatsoever669. An identical pattern may be seen 
from the reporting and advocacy of Human Rights Watch for instance670. Meanwhile, the 
U N’s ‘Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms While Countering Terrorism’ has produced critical reports671 with 
almost no reference to the opinion, or obligation of the international community, but rather
668 Amnesty International ( 2 0 0 4 )  ‘Human Dignity Denied: Torture and Accountability in the W ar on Terror”. 
Available at: h t r p : / / w w w . a m n e s t y . o r g / e n / U b r a r y / i n f o / A M R . 5 1 7 1 4 5 / 2 0 0 4 . Accessed on 1 2 / 0 8 / 2 0 0 9 .
669 Among many examples, one might refer to: Amnesty International ( 2 0 0 4 )  ‘An Open Letter to President 
George W. Bush on the Question o f Torture and Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment’. Available at: 
h t t p : /  /  w w w . a m n e s t y . o r g / e n / l i b r a r y /  a s s e t / A M R 5 1  / 0 7 8 / 2 0 0 4 / e n / d o m - A M R 5 1 0 7 8 2 0 0 4 e n . p d f . Equally, the 
widely cited report by Amnesty International ( 2 0 0 4 )  ‘Restoring the Rule o f Law: The right o f Guantanamo 
Detainees to Judicial Review o f the Lawfulness o f their Detention’. Available at: 
h t t p :  /  /  w w w . a m n e s t y . o r g / e n / l i b r a r v / a s s e t / A M R 5 1  / 0 9 3 / 2 0 0 4 / e n / d o m -  A M R 5 1 0 9 3 2 0 0 4 e n . p d f . A further 
excellent example would be the highly damning report Amnesty International ( 2 0 0 3 )  T h e  Threat o f a Bad 
Example: Undermining International Standards as W ar on Terror’ Detentions Continue’, available at: 
h t t p :  /  /  w w w . a m n e s t y . o r g / e n  / l i b r a r y /  a s s e t / A M R 5 1 7 1 1 4 / 2 0 0 3  / e n  /  d o m - A M R 5 1 1 1 4 2 0 0 3 e n . p d f . All o f the above 
accessed on 1 0 / 0 8 / 2 0 0 9 .  Collectively, they make no mention of the IC or any similar variant.
670 For example see Human Rights Watch ( 2 0 0 4 )  ‘United States: Guantanamo Two Years On: US Detentions 
Undermine the Rule o f Law’ January 9 th 2 0 0 4 .  Available at: 
h t t p :  /  / w w w . h r w . o r g / l e g a c y / e n g l i s h  / d o c s  / 2 0 0 4 / 0 1  / 0 9  / u s d o m 6 9 1 7  t x t . h t m . Accessed on 1 0 / 1 2 / 2 0 0 9 .
671 See Zerrougui, L ( 2 0 0 3 )  ‘CIVIL A N D  POLITICAL RIGHTS, INCLUDING T H E  QUESTIONS OF 
TORTURE AND D E TE N T IO N  — Report o f the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention’. Available at: 
h t t p : / / d a c c e s s d d s . u n . o r g / d o c / U N D O C / G E N / G 0 3 / 1 7 0 / 7 2 / P D F / G 0 3 1 7 0 7 2 . p d f ? Q p e n E l e m e n t  or Scheinin, 
M. ( 2 0 0 7 )  TR O M O TIO N  AND PROTECTION O F ALL HUMAN RIGHTS, CIVIL, POLITICAL, 
ECONOM IC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS, INCLUDING TH E  RIGHT T O  DEVELOPM ENT - 
Report o f the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms 
while countering terrorism, Addendum MISSION TO T H E U N ITED  STATES OF AMERICA’ Available at: 
h t t p : / / d a c c e s s d d s . u n . o r g / d o c / U N D O C / G E N / G 0 7 / 1 4 9 / 5 5 / P D F / G Q 7 1 4 9 5 5 . p d f ? O p e n E l e m e n t . Both of the 
above accessed on 1 2 / 0 6 / 2 0 0 9 .
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an emphasis upon the US’s obligations with relation to customary (and actual) international 
law. This re-affirms the above argument that the unilateralist pursuit o f the War on Terror 
and the failure to cultivate support for it, or even a consensus on the worldwide nature of the 
threat, conditioned discursive reluctance to reference the international community.
This said, at the start of the War on Terror, the UN made attempts to galvanise a sense of its 
institution, as a collective and a value-sharing group, being under threat from terrorism and 
chose the kinship metaphor to express this in the immediate moment o f crisis.
“Academic speculation and suspected scenarios turned into grim reality imposing on all of us the responsibility 
not only to ensure that there is never again, anywhere in this world, a repetition of such an abomination but 
that we also strengthen our global institutions to co-operate as a human family against such common threats as 
terrorism. ’*72
Attempts to cultivate strong identity with the prosecution of a war for a set of values, such as 
has been observed in earlier chapters dealing with the period o f the foundation of the UN, 
are apt to arise in times o f crisis. At these times, emotions o f fear and uncertainty pervade 
political discourse and leaders and organizations are apt to express more direcdy emotional 
appeals to Active identity. At a General Assembly Special Session on Terrorism on October 
1st 2001, Rudi Giuliani gave this appeal for support:
“But now it's up to the member states to enforce this and other aspects of the resolution, and for the United 
Nations to enforce these new mechanisms to take the financial base away from the terrorists. Take away their 
money, take away their access to money, and you reduce their ability to carry out complex missions.
Each of you is sitting in this room because of your county's commitment to being part of the family of nations. 
We need to unite as a family as never before - across all our differences, in recognition of the fact that the 
United Nations stands for the proposition that human beings we have more in common than divides us.,£73
As was hinted at in the preceding chapter, it is somewhat easier for politicians to engage with 
kinship metaphors under a number of conditions. It is, as we have said, often employed as a 
highly emotional, aspirational discourse, used as a way o f elaborating the broadest principles. 
As such, lacking rigour or detail and engaged with vague and emotional metaphorisation, it
672 Dhanapala, J. (2001) United Nations Symposium on Terrorism and Disarmament, 25th October 2001. 
Opening Remarks by the Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs. Available at: 
http: /  /disarm am ent.un.org/speech/25oct2001 .htm. Accessed on 13/07/2009.
673 Giuliani, R. (2001) ‘Opening remarks to the United Nations General Assembly Special Session on Terrorism’ 
October 1st 2001. Available at h ttp ://  www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/rudvgiuliani911unitednations.htm. 
Accessed on 15/08/2009.
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can seem an irresponsible choice for politicians. When it is employed it is often in times of 
crisis, when extra emotionality is acceptable or required. It is more likely to be employed in 
ad hoc remarks or in remarks made by lesser figures, such as Al-Faisal and Crane above, 
whose comments are less likely to be subject to multiple bureaucratic revisions. It carries a 
ring of religiosity as will be explored in the following chapters, and as such is associated with 
the more openly religious climate of the early twentieth century and with contemporary 
politicians who profess religious leanings. In exactly the same format as his open letter to 
Darfur that has been commented upon, Tony Blair (famed for his disregard for submitting 
his ideas to scriptwriters’ editing) produced an open letter to Iraq which called, in a 
somewhat patronising pastoral register, for the re-incorporation of the Iraqi people into the 
family of nations:
“For too long the world, ignored the plight of the Iraqi people. That was wrong. We know and understand 
that many of you live in fear of Saddam. We promise that the events of 1991 will not happen again. We have 
pledged to remove Saddam. A nd we will deliver. Once he is gone, we will help Iraq rebuild itself and become 
once more a member of the internationalfamily of nations. ’*74
In the case of President Bush, several statements from the immediate aftermath of 9/11 
(including his State of the Union Address for 2002) while relying primarily on tropes of 
civilisation against barbarism, the strength and heroism of the American victim and so on, 
introduce, almost incongruously, comments relating to the need to maintain American 
strength and purpose starting from roots in the family.
'Terror, unanswered, can not only bring down buildings, it can threaten the stability of legitimate 
governments. A nd  you know what -  we're not going to allow it. Americans are asking: What is expected 
of us? I  askyou to live your lives, and hugyour children.>i75
And further:
'We learned a good lesson on September 11th, that there is evil in this world. ...it’s essential that all moms 
and dads and citizens tell their children we love them and there is love in the world, but also remind them 
there are evilpeople.,676
674 The Guardian (2003) ‘Full Text: Blair’s Open Letter to Iraq’, 4th April 2003. Available at: 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics /20 0 3 /apr/0 4 /iraq.iraq. Accessed on 08/08/2009.
675 Bush, G.W. (2001) Address to a Joint Session o f Congress and the American People, September 20th 2001. 
Available at: http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001 /09/20010920-8.html. Accessed 
on 14/05/2009.
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In the contexts in which these remarks appear — warlike pledges to hunt down the enemy — 
they are certainly unexpected. They seem to imply that so long as the American family 
institution remains good and strong, all super-structural political conflicts can be won based 
upon this foundation. In turn it allies American life with care, compassion and love in 
opposition to the evil of terrorism. It is certainly an emotional way of pushing Americans to 
believe in the core ‘goodness’ o f their society, and once more we see kinship correlated with 
an unquestionable sense of the ‘good’. Furthermore, Bush invoked family relations to inspire 
pride, a sense of unity and a sense of outrage bome of making the events of 9/11 into 
personal grief.
“Some will cany memories of a face and a voice gone forever. A nd I  will cany this: it is the police shield of a 
man named George Howard, who died at the World trade Centre tying to save others. It was given to me by 
his mom, Arlene, as a proud memorial to her son. This is my reminder of lives that ended.. . ,£77
“Evey day a retired firefighter returns to ground Zero, to feel closer to his two sons who died there. A t  a 
memorial in New York, a little boy left his football with a note for his lost father: Dear Daddy, please take 
this to heaven. I  don't want to play football until I  can play with you again some day. ..Byond all differences 
of race or creed, we are one county, mourning together and facing danger together. ’*78
More powerfully perhaps than in the hand-wringing of Darfur, the use of kinship to unite is 
seen when faced with external threat. Moreover, the instances we have described in this 
chapter have shown the limits of the use of kinship discourse. While it is openly used to 
invoke unity and in a variety of very different constructs (compare the statements by Bush 
above to some of the more formulaic statements referenced in previous chapters) it is less 
widely used to justify or describe exclusion. Exclusion is more commonly done in different 
(and in some senses more radical) ways such as the bestialisation of the ‘other’. In 
exclusionary discourses meant simply to denigrate the ‘other’, no self-reference may be 
explicidy necessary. As will be discussed in subsequent chapters, kinship instead performs a 
double movement in re-affirming the value of the in-group while addressing injustice outside 
the group. This is not necessary if discourse about the other is simply used pejoratively. 
Crucial caveats are also placed upon the use of kinship discourse by dint of both its
676 Bush, G.W. (2001) Press Conference, The East Room, Washington DC, October 11th 2001. Available at: 
h ttp ://www .pbs.org/new shour/terrorism/combating/bush 10-llc.htm l. Accessed on 16/05/2009.
677 Bush, G.W. (2001) Address to a Joint Session o f Congress and the American People, September 20th 2001. 
Available at: http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001 /Q9/20010920-8.html. Accessed 
on 14/05/2009.
678 Bush, G.W. (2002) State o f the Union Address. Available at: h ttp ://www.washingtonpost.com/wp- 
srv/onpolitics / transcripts /sou012902.htm. Accessed on 08/08/2009.
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emotionality and its flexibility. It is often used by high ranking leaders only by virtue of a 
context of crisis or because of a personal (rather than a controlled) choice of rhetoric. In 
other cases, such as when a leader speaks to an audience to whom s/he does not really feel 
accountable (Blair’s letters to Darfur/Iraq) or holds a position of superiority over, a subject 
position o f ‘high-statesman’ is often occupied in grand statements regarding the possibility of 
gaining entry into the family of nations.
When kinship is invoked to damn and to exclude, it often embellishes messages of genuine 
emotional anger and despair. Wole Soyinka’s admonition o f the Sudanese government is a 
case in point, as also the words of Al-Faisal quoted above. Al-Faisal, in addition to his 
speeches in the UK in 2005, produced, with the former Archbishop of Canterbury, Lord 
Carey, and King Abdullah of Jordan, a message to the world’s Islamic community. The first 
citation below is taken from Al-Faisal’s afore-mentioned speech in Oxford in 2005, the 
second from the joint Amman Message:
“Their twisted vision is alien to the healthy body of the faith that holds the world's Muslim community 
together. It is a wicked perversion of the common values of all faiths. But however hard it is, we have to 
acknowledge that there are those among our human family who are committing these deeds of horror and 
devastation and who do not see how evil and terrible thy are — and they call themselves Muslims.,679
‘There is no faith that condones the taking of innocent life and that celebrates suicide. The killing of innocent 
people is prohibited by all faiths. Thou shalt not kill' is one of the 10 commandments passed down to us all 
from the Prophet Moses in the Holy Bible. 'Whoever kills a person has killed the whole of humanity,' says 
one of the best-known Koranic verses. Suicide is a sign of an individual's alienation from God and their 
alienation from the human family to which we all belong. This shared human bond, on which we are all so 
widely and clearly agreed is a bond that can transcend other divisions. Our deeply shared humanity unites 
us."680
Chief among the observations that might be made here is that those who are deemed to have 
alienated themselves from God and the human family, are also, with reference to the first 
quotation, part of it. The boundary between the inside and outside is more complex than 
simply the product of decision. To even speak of it is deeply political, and what is more, it is
679 Al-Faisal, T. (2005) Address to the Oxford University Philosophy, Politics and Economics Society. Topic: 
"Terrorism Threats and Challenges." October 11, 2005. Available at: http: / /wu^w.saudi-us-relations.org/fact- 
book/speeches /2005 /0 5 1011 -turki-saudi.html. Accessed on 03/09/2009.
680 Al-Faisal, T. and Carey, G. (2005) T h e  Islamic Community Needs to Root Out the Cancer Within’, 24th July 
2005. Part o f the Amman Message, Appendix No. 2, Available at
h ttp ://  ammanmessage.com/index.php Poption^com content&task=view&id=:47&Itemid=35. Accessed on
09/07/2009.
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crucial to note that in the main uses of kinship to denounce and exclude (Soyinka and Al- 
Faisal/Abdullah) it is a fellow African or Muslim who feels able to tread these highly charged 
boundaries. Their comments are extremely powerful, even incendiary by virtue of their 
outraged invocation of the rupture of kinship, and one might argue that a notion of a genuine 
kinship broken that inspires them. Two factors limit the use then of kinship as a rhetoric of 
exclusion. Firsdy, if  used by a white politician concerning Africans or Muslims, it is likely in 
our postcolonial world that such comments would prove unacceptable. The case o f Crane 
acting as UN Special Prosecutor is slighdy different in that his position is given added 
impartiality by its institutional status, and his statements, while temporarily excluding, offered 
the olive branch o f re-incorporation even to a dictator on trial. Secondly, the resonance of 
genuine kinship or commonality between the Muslim Faisal and the hardline Islamists for 
instance, could not meaningfully apply.
These examples demonstrate in some way the hollowness o f the aspirational use of kinship 
to describe an imagined human commonality. They also demonstrate, as Johns argued, the 
careful hedging o f the responsibility to decide upon the exception. Kinship either provides 
tools for the most bitter condemnation and exclusion of ones we feel have a close 
connection to us, or else a resource for focusing on positive unity while deploying other, less 
politically charged discourses for the purposes of othering. Kinship, as an expression of 
Active human and political unity then, cannot be drawn upon or analysed without reference 
to our current social milieu. The notion of the denial of personhood is so strongly correlated 
with those atrocities which inspired the creation of our current international institutional 
philosophy, that a return to such discourses is potentially highly politically inflammatory. 
Only when a consensus upon denunciation has been formed may those in privileged subject 
positions like Woyinka or Al-Faisal invoke a breakage o f kinship. Some of the purposes and 
rules of the use o f kinship discourse then, have been outlined. The subject positions of 
kinship discourse and the unity of the notion of kinship, and hence its political value, still 
require a fuller sociological explanation.
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6.5. Negotiated Practices of Kinship Discourse to Include and Exclude:
A Rejoinder to Schmitt
A clear lesson from the discursive examples highlighted in this chapter must be that the 
establishment of Guantanamo say, or the justifications for torture methods during the War 
on Terror cannot be simply conceived as the return of a singular mode of sovereign decision­
making. In fact, a plurality of attempts to create different types of exclusion, to envisage 
different states o f exception, has been made during the War on Terror era.
Unquestionably, the alliance of the notion of kinship with an unequivocally positive moral 
valuation aids its applicability for defining the in-group in cases where such a group is 
threatened and also, because of this valuation, it implicitly heightens the potential for the out­
group to be perceived as evil or wrong in their very essence. This meshes with Schmitt’s 
expectations of the liberal era and Schmitt shows us better than any other theorist how the 
immutable valuation o f kinship sits at the heart o f the UN-era liberal order. Chris Brown 
summarises Schmitt’s position as follows:
“Liberalism, he argues, seeks to moralise and legalise politics, reducing the politicalprocess to a set of morally 
authoritative rules, attempting, as it were, to take the politics out of politics. This is a doomed enterprise — in 
any political constitution what is crucial is the ability to decide upon the ‘exception ’, the point at which the 
rules no longer apply — but it is also a pernicious enterprise, because it involves covering particular political 
interests with a cloak of morality, pretending that a political decision emerging out of the friend-enemy 
distinction is actually the product of a moral judgement that cannot be opposed without falling into moral 
turpitude.
This moralising is inflamed by the use of kinship discourse, which is implicitly and immutably 
valued as a positive moral category in its usages in international politics. In other words, the 
in-group, when discussed in terms of kinship is immutably given a ‘good’ moral valuation and 
thus the out-group implicitly acquires a bad/wrong/evil moral valuation. As will be fully 
discussed in subsequent chapters, this is an important ‘double work’ which separates kinship 
discourses from other discourses of exclusion. The potential danger of this moralisation of 
politics is aptly pointed out by Chantal Mouffe’s argument that moralising closes down the 
possibility of legitimate disagreement with the hegemonic order in international society and 
that “when the channels are not available through which conflicts could take an ‘agonistic’
681 Brown, C. (2007) ‘From Humanitised War to Humanitarian Intervention: Carl Schmitt’s Critique of the Just 
War Tradition’ in Odysseos, L. and Petito, F. (eds.) The International Political Thought o f Carl Schmitt: Terror, 
Liberal War and the Crisis o f Global Order p61
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form, those conflicts tend to emerge on the antagonistic mode”682 such as terrorism. She 
argues, following Schmitt, that under liberal moral hegemony, “moral condemnation replaces 
proper political analysis...the post-political perspective, by hindering the creation of a vibrant 
agonistic public sphere, leads to envisaging the ‘they’ as ‘moral’, i.e. ‘absolute enemies’”.683 
There is plausibility in Mouffe’s argument and in the notion that moralising disguises 
politically motivated decisions on we/they groupings. However, in critique of this view, and 
as developed earlier, the case studies examined so far do not support the notion that 
discourses of exception and exclusion necessarily lead to the action of following through to 
embodying the decision.
Consider for instance, that thousands of Sunni Iraqis who formerly fought as insurgents 
against US forces and then changed sides to actively fight alongside the US-led coalition have 
recently been accepted into positions as policemen, officials and soldiers in the American- 
backed Baghdad government.684 Part of the incongruity o f Schmittian perspectives for 
explaining such political episodes as the War on Terror or the Darfur crisis, lies in their 
peculiar temporality. In essence the Schmittian decision relies upon a political moment 
appearing to be suspended in time and singularly influencing the development of politics 
thereafter. In fact, while Schmittian decisions such as Bush’s military order of November 
2001 referred to above, may pave the way for exceptional politics, a multiplicity of actions 
will succeed such an order and sets o f actions and policies carried out on the ground will 
develop with reference to their own internal logics as well as to the sovereign command. 
Discourses and modes of action inevitably mutate faster and in more numerous directions 
than can singular sovereign decisions.
Moreover, the temporality of Schmitt’s characterisation of liberalism can be critiqued with 
reference to kinship as a mode of creating we/they distinctions in world politics. As explored 
further in the following chapter, world kinship discourse, especially in its religious 
incarnations, exists at the heart of the moralising modem liberal order but also dates back at
682 Mouffe, C. (2005) O n The Political p5
683 Ibid. p76
684 Kruzel, J. (2009) US Central Command Forces Press Service Report, August 27th 2009 - ‘Former Insurgents 
Gain Employment in Iraq’. Available at: h ttp :/Avww.centcom.mil/en/news/former-imurgents-gain- 
employment-in-iraq.html. Accessed on 06/09/2009.
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least to the pre-liberal order under Schmitt’s ius publicum Europaeum685. Schmitt lauded the 
respect that existed between European states in the post-Westphalian era when princes were 
said to recognise “the opponent as an enemy on equal grounds — as a iustis hostis.”686 
However, notions o f the in-group of the family of nations at that time, while preventing wars 
of annihilation in Europe, were tied to the limits of Christendom and the righteous 
exportation o f the dominion of Christian nations, and thus gave rise to brutal and devastating 
colonial practices. While the notions of the morality of world kinship endure, the in-group is 
now vasdy expanded and international agreement on equality of rights has removed such a 
space of exploitation as was plundered by colonial powers. Schmitt’s linkage of a change in 
political order, with a change in the mode of conducting politics and a change in morality is 
therefore problematic. The mode and expression of world kinship as a sphere of morality has 
changed little in terms of its content and character and the bases upon which the positive 
moral valuation of kinship has been made has altered little. Yet, the uses to which this 
discourse can be put in making rhetoric and policies o f inclusion and exclusion have vastly 
changed in the post-colonial and post-world war eras.
The preceding case studies demonstrate that kinship may be taken to be an immutable moral 
symbol in world politics but its flexibility in usage means that the consequences of its 
deployment are not necessarily as dire in action as they are in discourse. The ‘agonistic’ 
disagreement that Mouffe highlights has not been quashed if one takes the full scope of these 
case studies in mind. In the War on Terror case, one might focus upon the sovereign 
decision to inter at Guantanamo, but one might also focus upon the barrages o f criticism, the 
climb-downs, apologies and eventually the desire to close the camp. All this pressure has told 
upon the world power most able to act out its sovereign will without fear of backlash.
Further, while a certain ‘fire and brimstone’ appearance is often attached to exclusionary 
kinship rhetoric, unlike tropes of bestialisation for instance there are not necessarily 
suggested practices inflicted upon the ‘other’ which follow on from its use in discourse. This 
is due to its multivalence as a symbol — it can suggest too many practices to actually dictate a
685 See Schmitt, C. (2003) The Nomos o f the Earth in the International Law o f the Tus Publicum Europaeum
686 Odysseos, L. and Petito, F. (2007) ‘Introduction’ in their edited volume The International Political Thought of 
Carl Schmitt: Terror. Liberal War and the Crisis o f Global Order p7
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predictable path o f policy. In many ways, human kinship, or the lack of it, is particularly hard 
to operationalise due to the many meanings of kinship, as we saw in Chapter Four.
This multiplicity of meanings is, as argued in the following chapter, due to the long 
sedimentation of world kinship discourse in Western consciousness. O f course, kinship 
discourse endures the changes, even reversals, in policy of such crises as Darfur and the War 
on Terror. Policies can rarely be proved to be caused by such broad discourses. Nevertheless 
in order to maximise the productive potential of kinship discourse and to minimise its 
potential to add to stark othering in world politics, a greater appreciation of the Westem-ness 
of those notions of kinship used in international political discourse, is required.
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PART FOUR - Analysing the Impact of Kinship 
Discourses
CHAPTER SEVEN - Western Paradigms of the ‘International5: 
Politics, Religion, Community and Kinship
7.1 Terrains of Discourse in the Practice of World-Making: A 
Recapitulation
The groups of statements collected in the preceding chapters represent a diverse set of 
artefacts from an investigation of the use of kinship metaphor in discussing projects o f post- 
Enlightenment ‘world-making’.687 World-making entails the creation and dissimulation of a 
notion o f the ‘world’ or a state of affairs to be created, and the successive elaboration of this 
notion into a doctrine, a set of rules values and beliefs, and then practical actions to attempt 
to bring this ‘world’ into being in the midst of the anarchy of international affairs. These 
statements thus far have orbited around a nexus of international world-making in the body of 
the UN and the international community. These institutions are both ‘world-makers’ in our 
own times, and also the manifestation of the grand projects o f world-making undertaken as a 
result o f the two world wars.
At this stage, two further crucial points must be kept in mind concerning the notion of the 
Westem-ness of the discourses in question. Firstly that, despite the purported universal truth 
inherent in the discourses o f world unity investigated, there is nothing ‘necessary’ or ‘natural’ 
about the character of the formulations in which such ideals are expressed. The form of the 
discourse o f the family o f nations, for instance, is not expounded because it is necessarily the 
most ‘obvious’ or the ‘best’ representation of a notion o f world unity. Secondly, though many 
differences between the expressions of Western versions o f world kinship discourses have
687 See Karagiannis, N. and Wagner, P. (2007) Varieties o f World-Making: Beyond Globalization for expositions 
o f the relationships between projects o f political transformation and their legitimising discourses. In this volume 
especially see Girard, C., ‘Contracting and Founding in Times o f Conflict’.
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been noted, comparison with radically opposed projects of world-making point up some of 
the commonalities which adhere in these statements, in terms of the way in which the world- 
as-kin vision is structured and articulated. As an example, the world-making rhetoric of 
perhaps the greatest contemporary challenge to Western models of world politics, political 
Islam, might be considered.
Two contrasts are especially useful. Firsdy we have noted the deployment o f metaphors such 
as the family of nations or the human family, as ways o f idealising international society. In 
these tropes, harmony and unity o f purpose and substance are espoused but the fundamental 
individuality o f nation states (in the family of nation idiom) or persons (in the human family 
idiom) is not questioned. A family in the Western sense we have become accustomed to 
dealing with, is comprised of separate persons. What is not proposed is a more 
comprehensive or ontological melding o f the disparate parts of international society, only 
that they should embody common values in bringing a genuine family of nations into being. 
In the thought o f political Islam following Sayyid Qutb however, such an international 
ontology is to be radically opposed. As Bernard Lewis wrote of Muslim scholarship in the 
mediaeval period, “(T)he division o f the world into countries and nations, so important in 
the Western world’s perception o f itself and definition o f its loyalties, is of comparatively 
minor importance in the world of Islam.”688 Qutb’s later rejection of the division of the 
world into nations is based upon the radical Oneness of the divine and the natural 
respectively. Just as there is one God in Qutbist thought, there can only be one Creation and 
the sovereignty o f God over that unified creation should not be fragmented by the 
establishment of individual forms of authority such as nation states. Albert Bergesen frames 
it succinctly:
“The Western idea of a separation of institutional spheres, leaving Caesar's sovereignty to Caesar and God's 
sovereignty to God, is, for Qutb, a direct challenge to God. Such an assumption has tremendous consequences, 
for now ordinary, stable, non-aggressive political institutions, say an ideal pefect democraty, is not only not 
ideal or perfect, but is an aggressive act of taking worshippers away from God by establishing another deity 
(the State) that demands worship (obeying its laws). '689
688 Lewis, B. (1982) The Muslim Discovery o f Europe p60
689 Bergesen, A. (2007) The Sayvid Qutb Reader: Selected Writings on Politics. Religion and Society p i 9
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Thus, idealising a family of nations is antithetical to this type of political thought. We can 
secondly compare the way idealisations of future world society models are used. As we have 
seen, the world kinship metaphor is deployed in a variety of institutional contexts but no 
program of action for bringing it about has been formulated. Indeed the notion is arguably 
too vague for that, and the sense o f the discourse is more attuned to persuading sets of 
behavior or passively acculturating the family of nations as a common political emblem. 
Instead, the image o f a unified community under God o f Qutbist thought “cannot be 
achieved only through preaching”690 but the religious vision is to be brought about by direct 
political action. As Roxanne Euben notes of Qutb’s philosophy, contrary to a Western 
separation o f religion and politics, “political life is not distinct from the realm of belief but is 
part of a divine and unitary substratum of existence.”691 In other words, as Qutb himself puts 
it, “Islam has a right to remove all those obstacles which are in its path so that it may address 
human reason and intuition with no interference and opposition from political systems.”692
Whilst formative conclusions have been offered at each stage in our analyses of world unity 
discourses, it will be impossible to approach general statements as to the place of kinship in 
Western, liberal projects of world-making until the groups of statements collected are 
compared. Across the periods under consideration (pre-war, wartime, postwar and 
contemporary), the discursive terrain at all points is made up of descriptions of, and 
aspirations for, the state of international order. Many of these statements have not been 
made using metaphors of kinship at all, but kinship metaphors are still observed within the 
discourse, and thus a space for the use of kinship is present in each of these overlapping 
discursive fields. It is critical to note that the samples of discourse presented in the preceding 
chapters have been produced by men and women across time and occupying different 
subject positions. Also, it is important to remember that a discourse of ‘universal’ human 
values and aspirations presents the subject with a broad and elastic series of potential 
selections for making statements. While discourse and subject positions do constrain, the
690 Qutb, S. (2008) Selection from ‘Milestones’ in Bergesen, A. (2007) The Savvid Qutb Reader: Selected Writings 
on Politics. Religion and Society p37
691 Euben, R. (1995) ‘When Worldviews Collide: Conflicting Assumptions About Human Behaviour Held by 
Rational Actor Theory and Islamic Fundamentalism’ in Political Psychology 16(1) p i 63
692 Qutb, S. (2008) Selection from ‘Milestones’ in Bergesen, A. The Sayyid Qutb Reader: Selected Writings on 
Politics. Religion and Society p40
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dependence upon metaphor in making sense of an arena as vast and diverse as the 
‘international’, in itself lends flexibility to discoursing subjects. In addition, as remarked 
previously, the cognitive modality of kinship, in particular Western notions of kinship, 
permits flexibility of expression and emotion.
In the statements thus collected then, we have noted a greater diversity of expressions 
present in the earlier discourses. The idea of discussing such a grand and presumptuous 
notion as ‘world opinion’693 or the values for which humanity might strive was only ever 
current in political debate in times of crisis up until the institutionalisation, after World War 
Two, of an organisational machinery where ‘world opinion’ could be constituted and 
debated. Thus, from Paine and Hamilton to the urgings o f Wilson at Versailles, to the 
collections of scholarly and political debate in isolationist America in the 1930s, the subject 
positions o f such discourses shared a common character. The discourse experimented with 
ways o f fostering common aspirations and values and of appealing to an apparently parochial 
and recalcitrant world populace.
In this sense, the appearance of a diverse range of metaphorical expressions is not surprising. 
N ot only, in its formative stages, were the standards and expectations (or ‘rules’ in a more 
Foucauldian take) of such discourses as yet only weakly formed, but also in attempting to 
cajole governments and foster a sense of international responsibility against the backdrop of 
centuries o f imperialist conflict, variations in the discourse may be expected as subjects 
sought more effective ways of putting their cases. Thus, prior to the foundation of the UN 
architecture, visions of ways of unifying sets of principles for the guidance of international 
affairs ranged from a standard of ‘international morality’694, to asking for the world to follow 
the example o f the American Federalists and seek out W orld Union’695 or W orld 
Federation’. America appealed to its ‘brothers across the sea’696 to emulate the peaceable 
relations of the states of the American hemisphere to embrace a ‘new idea’ of a ‘community
693 Jaeger> H- M. (2008) ‘“World Opinion” and the Founding of the UN: Govemmentalizing International 
Politics’, in European Journal o f International Relations 14(4)
694 From  Franklin Roosevelt’s 1937 ‘Quarantine Speech’, see Donovan, F. (1966) p i 5. Full text available at: 
http: /  / www.sagehistory.net/worldwarS/docs /FDROuar.htm . Accessed on 10/12/2009.
695 See for instance Streit, C. (1939) Union Now
696 See Butler, N.M. (1938) The Family o f Nations: Its Need and Its Problems p365
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o f nations’697. The postwar planning committees sought a ‘universal’ solution to the problems 
they perceived in the international system. The Allies portrayed their war being fought by a 
‘brotherhood698’ standing up for the righteous principles o f ‘common humanity’ and the 
metaphor of a ‘family of nations699’ was commonly used to envisage the inclusive world order 
to be built after the end o f the war, and especially to include newly enfranchised colonial 
populations.
In comparison, the contemporary discursive arena concerning the metaphorisation of an 
international collective bound together by common humanity and associated human values is 
more uniform. The UN, especially in times of crisis, still portrays itself grandly as ‘humanity’s 
instrument700’ but the notional ‘international community’ has largely replaced more diverse 
references in political circles to the human family, the community of nations and other such 
tropes. Where kinship replaces such dominant forms in discourse affirming the solidarity or 
aims o f the ‘international community’, we have noted generality, future-orientation and 
emotional content as three predictive markers for the selection o f this particular metaphor. In 
instances where kinship is invoked in denying membership of the human family, the 
politically incendiary nature of such a remark seems to require legitimating by virtue of the 
speaker sharing some common social identity with those to be outcast.
My analysis of this transformation of the discursive terrain here draws upon the notion of 
norm entrepreneurship701 advocated by several prominent small states theorists within IR. 
N ot only relevant with regard to the historical context above, the experience of 
commentators surveyed in Chapter Four also supports the notion that the UN remains a 
more successful forum for generating agreement on international standards than it does on 
turning the norms it would espouse into common and unified action and policy. The UN and 
commentators advocating the high-minded values which have been institutionalised in the 
UN architecture, share some of characteristics that are notable in those states which may
697 From  Roosevelt’s address to the Pan-American Union, 1933, see Donovan, F. (1966) p i2.
698 For instance in the UN Prayer, Chapter Three.
699 For instance in Eleanor Roosevelt’s Speech in Paris, 20th September 1948. See Chapter Three.
700 Annan, K. (2004) Address to the UN Commission on Human Rights, Geneva, April 7th 2004. Available at: 
h ttp : //wAvw.un.org/News/ossg/sg/stories/statments search full.asp?statID=13. Accessed on 01/04/2008.
701 Scepticism of the conceptual value o f ‘norms’ as an object o f analysis was aired in Part One. As will be 
gathered from the discussion here however, I am merely considering ‘norms’ as standards o f discursive usage. A 
‘discursive norm ’ then, is simply the most common formulation in discourse.
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pursue norm entrepreneurship as political goal. As Christine Ingebritsen writes, it is 
“militarily weak, economically dependent”702 nations such as Scandinavian countries who fill 
international social roles as norm entrepreneurs. This description fits the UN just as well as 
Scandinavia. Unable to compete in the field o f military competition for status, resources and 
territory, the ‘realist’ weakness of small states or militarily dependent organisations like the 
UN may, in the words of Neumann and Gstohl, predispose them to “favour discourses that 
institutionalize rules and norms”703 — in other words to advocate at least the regularisation 
and improved normative ethics o f the social relationships in which they find themselves at a 
default disadvantage.
Two further observations can be drawn from this school of thought to reinforce our analysis 
o f the development o f UN world unity discourse. Firstly, as such scholars such as Rushton704 
and Kille705 have argued, the position of high officials (particularly the Secretary-General) in 
the UN who command significant global media and political exposure, may often be one of 
moral and ethical leadership — creating, promoting or sustaining new and existing global 
discourses and ideals. Secondly, as described above, we see a process o f whittling down of 
modes of expressing the world unity discourses over time. A broad set o f referents were 
mobilised by a diverse and disjointed collection of academics, politicians, religious and 
judicial commentators in the mid twentieth century to describe an amorphous dream of a 
new world order. Many of these referents have been jettisoned to leave a group of more 
stable terms favoured by speakers in highly entrenched, bureaucratic subject positions within 
the political sphere, NGOs and INGOs. Such a transformation corresponds to the typology 
o f norm life-cycles advocated by Finnemore and Sikkink706. Between their stages of norm 
emergence and acceptance, a so-called ‘tipping point’ is either passed or not passed 
depending upon the acceptance of the norm, or, in this case, the language (and form) in
702Ingebritsen, C. (2002) ‘N orm  Entrepreneurs: Scandinavia’s Role in World Politics’ in Cooperation and 
Conflict 37(1) p l3
703Neumann, I. and Gstohl, S. (2006) ‘Introduction: Lilliputians in Gulliver’s World’ in Ingebritsen, C. et al. (eds.) 
Small States in International Relations p20. This argument takes partial cues from Risse-Kappen, T. (1995) Co­
operation Among Democracies: The European Influence on US Foreign Policy
704Rushton, S. (2008) ‘The UN Secretary-General and N orm  Entrepreneurship: Boutros Boutros-Ghali and 
Democracy Promotion’ in Global Governance: A  Review o f  Multilateralism and International 
Organizations, 14(1), 95-110
705 Kille, K. (2007) The UN Secretary-General and Moral Authority: Ethics and Religion in International 
Leadership
706 Finnemore, M. and Sikkink, K. ‘International N orm  Dynamics and Political Change’ in International 
Organization 52(4) p897
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which a norm is expressed. Tied to the emergence of an international institutional 
architecture which was, at the time embryonic, many expressions of norms failed to cross the 
tipping point of international acceptance which is now fully formed in the mature set of 
institutions.
Naturally, though several generations separate the scope of statements covered in the 
preceding chapters, it is interesting to note that where kinship is invoked, or where in the 
contemporary cases, deviations from the hegemonic ‘IC’ formulation are recorded, we have 
often seen this to be in the case of comments made by individuals rather than organisations. 
Common to many o f the instances of the invocation o f kinship metaphors throughout the 
twentieth century is a subject position where discourse on international unity is employed in 
advocating improvements to the working of international society. Both the absence of 
international control by the failing League of Nations, and the stagnation and lack of will of 
the present day United Nations places individual politicians in the position o f advocating 
change, and attempting to manipulate the possible options of discourses concerning visions 
o f world order for maximum effect.
On the other hand, the most rigidly uniform discourse is produced today by NGOs and UN 
reports. Obviously in the 1930s and 1940s such a broad and deep bureaucratic discourse did 
not exist and in some ways then, when looking only at the statements made by individuals, 
the reduction in diversity of metaphorisations over time may not be quite so extreme. Today, 
the dominant formulation (IC) for discussing universal values and opinions holds its position 
based upon a number of factors. Once a linguistic formulation of a norm is reiterated in 
discourse by a cross-section of major actors707, its legitimacy may become stabilised as the 
formalised nature o f bureaucratic discourse leads to an infrequent cycle of re-evaluations of 
discourse. That is to say that the production of discourse in N GO  and UN bureaucracies 
may indeed represent an instance of theoretical path-dependency. Taken in a broad sense, 
path-dependency may simply imply the conditioning o f present circumstances by the 
decisions of the past. However, it may be more specifically defined as implying a cost of 
deviating in the present from the path set out by the decisions of the past. Following this
707 See Finnemore, M. and Sikkink, K. ‘International Norm  Dynamics and Political Change’ in International 
Organization 52(4) p897. What I describe here is close to Finnemore and Sikkink’s characterisation o f a ‘norm 
cascade’.
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more particular mode of definition, Paul Pierson notes that institutional discourse can often 
become self-reinforcing in that, once established as norm, increasing returns accrue upon the 
use o f the hegemonic discourse or modus operandi. He writes:
“(T)his conception of path dependence, in which preceding steps in a particular direction induce further 
movement in the same direction, is well captured hy the idea of increasing returns. In an increasing returns 
process, the probability of further steps along the same path increases -with each move down that path... the 
costs of exit — of switching to some previously plausible alternative — rise. ”708
Partly, then, a discursive norm709 is selected for its functionality, but once this is coupled with 
a sense that it is not only the functional option, but the legitimate option, reversing the 
train o f discourse is difficult710. Perpetuation of increasing returns in the context o f NGO 
reporting for instance, might involve the success of one mode of framing a crisis in garnering 
support and funding for crisis management plans. With historical proofs accruing to ‘prove’ 
the success of one mode o f reporting, it becomes less and less likely that approaches of 
reporting or advocacy will change. Not only this, but, as has been noted previously, the 
unequivocal moral value accorded kinship in political rhetorical usage can only lead to 
incurring costs for questioning or disavowing the essence of the sentiment expressed.
The place of kinship within the discursive field and the character of its usage then, has 
changed over time in part due to institutional factors. Literature produced in the early-mid 
twentieth century on the supposed coming of ‘world government’ or some other variation of 
new world order, commonly and liberally invoked such notions as the human family, the 
family o f nations and the brotherhood of nations as a latent reality which today would 
probably seem hopelessly Utopian and naive. In part, of course, this can be put down to 
hopeful enthusiasm for a new way of conducting politics, but also, we should remember that 
the epistemic community responsible for much of this commentary was hardly a genuine 
representation of ‘the international’ but instead merely a manifestation of Western visions of
708 Pierson, P. (2000) ‘Increasing Returns, Path-Dependence and the Study o f Politics’ in American Political 
Science Review 94(2) p252
709 Again, we refer to a norm in discourse simply as that which becomes ‘normal’ — a dominant pattern or 
formulation.
710 For further explanation see Mahoney, J. (2000) T ath  Dependence in Historical Sociology’ in Theory and 
Society 29(4)
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world order711. As the community debating visions of world order has widened through the 
institutionalisation of the UN architecture, so the conditions for communication of such 
ideas have altered and this fact sheds light not only upon the use of kinship metaphor but 
also upon the relationship of kinship metaphor to blanket notions of the ‘international 
community’.
As noted in previous chapters, many invocations of kinship metaphor in the early twentieth 
century are situated in contexts where the sense of the metaphor is given resonance by 
association with either Judaeo-Christian religion on the one hand, or with a parental and 
pastoral imperialism on the other. In practical terms, the formulations of international 
brotherhood in the UN Prayer, and the association of kinship metaphors with the benevolent 
incorporation o f colonial territories into the family of nations after the 1948 Declaration of 
Universal Human Rights, serve as prime examples. Conversely, references from 
contemporary case studies to kinship metaphors are more homogenous than those of the 
wartime period. As the potential audience for the proclamations of politicians has been 
increasingly widened, so the standardisation o f discourse has increased. Just as it proves less 
incendiary (and also more meaningful) to have a Muslim deny the ‘humanity’ of other 
Muslims, or to have an African urge the human family to punish fellow Africans, so those 
metaphorical representations used by Western (and other) political figures in addressing a 
genuinely international audience, draw less explicitly on parochial cultural referents. We have 
noted already that the notion of ‘international community’ is a more value-neutral concept 
than those metaphors involving kinship, and thus finds itself fit for widespread 
dissemination.
In addition however, when kinship is invoked in the present day by Western figures, often, as 
demonstrated with Blair’s hopes for Iraq, it reproduces exactly an earlier form. To compare 
directly, Eleanor Roosevelt commented in 1948, “(w)e believe that all possible assistance and 
encouragement should be given to them to the end that they also may play their full part in 
the family of nations.”712 Such sentiments were echoed almost exactly by Tony Blair in the
711 A fine representation o f this Western parochialism might be Walston, Sir C. (1919) The English-Speaking 
Brotherhood and the League o f Nations
712 See, Speech in Paris, 3rd Draft, September 20th 1948’. Eleanor Roosevelt’s Papers, Roosevelt Library, Hyde 
Park, NY. Box 4565 — UN General Correspondence 1947. Folder — Speeches, 1947.
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War on Terror: “we will help Iraq rebuild itself, and become once more a member of the 
international family of nations.”713 In effect, part of the sense of this statement is a form of 
phatic communication714 - an attempted establishment of positive relations to which 
aspirations (though empty and thus phatic) of human kinship are well suited — its function is 
simply in its reassuring sentiment. Or else, forms today are chosen which are tied less to 
Judaeo-Christian concepts of the building of a human community under God. The notion of 
brotherhood for instance has largely fallen away as Western discourse has become more 
attuned to gendering, to be replaced more commonly by the notion of the ‘family of nations’. 
Where ‘brotherhood’ as an aspiration for international politics does still dominate, is, as we 
have seen, in groups such as the Islamic rebels of Sudan whose enmeshment in international 
circles is incomplete, and to whom the connotations o f equality embedded in the notion of 
brotherhood appeal.
Over the course o f the history o f the development of an institutional framework wherein a 
representation o f ‘world opinion’ is enacted, an archive of statements concerning aspirations 
for human unity has been built up. This archival sediment is a discursive resource and, in 
part, constraint upon present day actors, and the constraining effects of bureaucratisation and 
the diversification o f the audience of the ‘international community’ have certainly contributed 
to a demonstrable level of discursive homogenisation. In effect, the discursive 
experimentation o f the pre-war period has been partly ossified and detached from its cultural 
roots in its institutional setting. When world leaders talk of human kinship then, to what 
extent is their discourse still representative of the values, meanings, functions and 
possibilities of a culturally ‘Western’ understanding of kinship? To put the question another 
way, it is certain that the political leaders making the statements so far examined are not 
representative examples of ‘Western’ culture, but rather of high level international political 
culture. To finally address the intricacies of what is at stake in the deployment of kinship
713 See The Guardian (2003) ‘Full Text: Blair’s Open Letter to Iraq’, 4th April 2003. Available at: 
http://-www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2003/apr/04/iraq.iraq. Accessed on 08/08/2009.
7,4 Malinowski, B. (1923) T h e  Problem o f Meaning in Primitive Languages’, in Ogden, C.K and Richards, IA ., 
The Meaning o f Meaning: A Study o f Influence of Language Upon Thought and o f the Science o f Symbolism. 
p296-336. Malinowski’s notion o f phatic communication is his functional explanation for all those instances of 
discourse between people when very little meaningful content is exchanged. His anecdotal comparison is the 
British obsession with discussing the weather. We do not do it in order to exchange meteorological information 
but merely to strike up conversation and engage human attention and contact.
238
metaphors in international politics it is necessary to pick apart the characteristics of W estern’ 
kinship and then in turn, the meanings latent within the metaphors used in political circles.
7.2 Kinship Studies and ‘Western* Kinship in the Anthropological Canon
David Schneider, in his pioneering 1968 text American Kinship: A Cultural Account, argued 
that the essence and uniqueness of American and Western kinship lay in its separation from 
other modes of acting and being in the social universe. As Schneider saw it, most o f Western 
life (unlike many other cultures), was not kinship. He wrote:
‘The kinship systems of modem, western societies are relatively highly differentiated as compared with the 
kinship systems found in many primitive and peasant societies. By ‘differentiated’ I  mean simply that kinship 
is clearly and sharply distinguished from all other kinds of social institutions and relationships... in many 
primitive and peasant societies a large number of different kind of institutions are organised and built as part 
of the kinship ystem itself. Thus the major social units of the society may be kin groups — lineages perhaps. 
These same kin groups may also be the property-owning units, the political units, the religious units and so on. 
Thus whatever a man does in such a society he does as a kinsman of one kind or other.
Schneider is a vital source, perhaps the first anthropologist to provide tools by which the 
West could study and find interest in its own kinship systems. As Feinberg notes, Schneider 
was also responsible for insisting upon viewing kinship primarily as “a cultural system, not a 
set o f biological facts. Americans use biological relatedness as a symbol in terms o f which 
kinship is defined.”716 In other words, kinship is more properly analysed with relation to the 
symbols and meanings and behaviours which natives of the culture attach to it, than as a 
fixed system o f social rules necessarily tied to a biological ‘reality’. In this sense, Schneider 
intended to critique the earlier functionalist analyses of the kinship systems o f less complex 
societies wherein attempts were made to unravel the connections between kinship terms as 
used, and underlying biological reality, in order to understand how ‘kinship’ structured social 
roles and obligations. While Schneider’s focus on kinship closer to home helped to 
reinvigorate the subject within anthropology, the logic by which he set up a notion of
715 Schneider, D. (1968) American Kinship: A Cultural Account p.v
716 Feinberg, R. (2001) ‘Introduction: Schneider’s Cultural Analysis o f Kinship and Its Implications for 
Anthropological Relativism’ in Feinberg, R. and Ottenheimer, M.(eds.) The Cultural Analysis o f Kinship: The 
Legacy of David M. Schneider p8
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Western kinship as opposed to other forms of kinship systems in some ways reproduces 
previous orientalising notions of non-Westem ‘others’ whose lives were governed not by 
individual choice, but by their birth within a kinship system. Early to mid-twentieth century 
anthropologists saw kinship as an “irreducible principle on which...organized social life 
depends”717 in the non-Westem societies they studied. By the mechanistic logic of structural- 
functionalism, anthropologists assumed that the presence of complex kinship accounts must 
point to a potent need for strong kinship structures in a given society. Notions of kinship 
clearly had a function — to organise a society wherein individuals could not organise 
themselves. This early fixation upon the kinship systems o f non-Westem societies placed 
these cultures subtly into a role as benighted throwbacks in relation to the modem West. 
Hereditary transmission of status, power, privilege or property in the contemporary West 
carries negative connotations of unfairness, corruption and nepotism. Thus, the 
‘individualism’ of the West is supposedly characterised by meritocracy and rationality wherein 
members o f society live “following the dictates of one’s conscience and not the dictates of 
one’s kinship group.”718
This evolutionary trajectory from kinship to individualism, while problematic in 
anthropological accounts, is nevertheless relevant to a discussion of Westerners’ own ideas 
about their kinship system. Certainly most would recoil from the notion that kinship should 
once more be the organising principle for business or politics. Instead, kin relations are 
restricted in classic accounts to two planes, and in more current accounts, to three. In 
Schneider’s words “the cultural universe of relatives in American kinship is constructed to 
elements from two major cultural orders, the order of nature and the order of law. ’*19 This is to 
say that the cultural categories of Western kinship are based upon ties of consanguinity or 
affinity, birth or marriage, and these are reckoned in social situations as ‘natural’ expressions 
o f identity and as legal expressions of right and responsibility. This duality has since been 
superseded in more recent work on cultural accounts o f Western kinship. These latter have 
highlighted informants’ descriptions of the creation of ‘kinship’ and ‘family’ through 
affection and nurture parallel to, and quite separate from, notions of ‘blood’ relations by
717 Fortes, M. (1949) The Web o f Kinship Among the Tallensi p340
718 Schneider, D . (1968) American Kinship: A Cultural Account pp. vi
719 Ibid. p27
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‘nature’. Especially enlightening in this field have been studies of surrogate motherhood720 
and the family arrangements of lesbian and gay couples721.
In a sense then, more contemporary work has overturned the long-held assumption that 
cultural classifications of kinship are built uniformly from the bases of self-evident natural 
and legal ties. However, many of the principle symbols, associations and meanings of kinship 
are not altered in situations where kinship is consciously created out of affection and 
nurturance. Since Western kinship builds its cultural understandings of consanguinity from 
notions of the biological ‘facts’ of sexual intercourse, the sexual act defines, primarily, the 
elements of the kinship structure. This is the case of the archetypal nuclear family. In such 
cases, but also more strikingly in less ‘traditional’ arrangements of relatives722, it is important 
to remember that the terms of kinship structures are normative as well as descriptive. 
In Western contexts, this normativity revolves particularly around the ‘family’. As Schneider 
puts it: “the family as a symbol is a pattern for how kinship relations should be 
conducted.”723 Thus in American and Western kinship, sexual intercourse symbolises and is 
metaphorised in discourse as an expression of ‘love’ and in contradistinction to the public 
domains of work and money. ‘Love’ paradigmatically expresses a cultural standard for the 
expectation of the character o f relationships within a family. This then, is the inbuilt root in 
Western kinship systems for the unequivocal positive valuation of kinship that we have 
discussed on numerous occasions in previous chapters. From this association, the derivation 
of chosen ‘kin’ — Kath Weston’s kinship of affection724 — is simply taking the normative part 
of the symbolic complex of the nuclear family and reproducing it without the biological 
connections, for example in the case of adoption.
A significant part o f what makes such a move possible, is the way that understandings of 
kinship in the Western world pivot between, on the one hand, derivations (supposedly from 
‘nature’ or biological reality) of status and identity, and on the other hand of the normative 
‘content’ of kinship as a specific type of social relation and enduring bond of solidarity. Part
720 See Ragone, H. (1994) Surrogate Motherhood: Conception in the Heart
721 See Weston K. (1997) Families We Choose: Lesbians. Gavs. Kinship
722 Such as in Ragone’s studies o f surrogacy or Weston’s work on lesbian and gay couples and their families, 
referenced above.
723 Schneider, D . (1968) American Kinship: A Cultural Account p45
724 W eston K. (1997) Families We Choose: Lesbians. Gays. Kinship
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of the revisions of anthropological studies of kinship after Schneider dealt with the realisation 
that all societies, whether their folk culture recognises the existence of ‘kinship systems’ or 
not, balance, in varying degrees, accounts of personhood and social relations that are 
sometimes fixed and sometimes contingent. In Levy’s account of Solomon Island kinship, 
the existence o f a household based on biological parents and children is conditionally formed 
based on the choice of the parents whether to keep and raise the child.725 On the North 
Slope o f Alaska, kin bonds can be formed by cohabitation regardless of notions of blood ties, 
and can be unmade by the effect of time spent apart.726
Early anthropology had assumed that all kinship meaning and function derived in some way 
(as the Western system supposedly does) from the facts o f nature. The misleading study of 
kinship was, according to Strathem, “the tracing of natural ties”727 as overlaid by cultural 
description. As contemporary anthropology both of Western and non-Westem kinship or 
relatedness argues, the natural model is often an unnecessary distraction when seeking the 
meaning o f the practices and discourses of kinship. While contemporary studies now 
acknowledge that all societies, Western and non-Westem, manipulate and stretch notions of 
kinship beyond the scope of familial or biological relations, ideas of Western kinship are 
uniquely organised around dual key cultural poles relevant to the use of kinship metaphors in 
global politics.
Contrary to systems where kinship is stricdy made and unmade through action, or more rigid 
systems where kinship denotes political roles and rights, Western models of kinship are 
capable of being used at the same time to denote feelings o f permanent unity and also 
contingent expansion of the kin group based upon the fulfilment of the behavioural 
enactment o f a relationship appropriate to the ‘family’. The tension between Western 
kinship’s dual poles, of permanent relations by virtue of shared substance, and contingent 
enactment of kin relation, aligns with the uneasy proclamations of human unity in political 
discourse. Conceptually, this is an aspirational unity contingent upon humanity behaving as
725 Levy, R. (1970) ‘Tahitian Adoption as a Psychological Message’ in Carroll, V. (ed.) Adoption in Eastern 
Oceania
726 Bodenhom, B. (2000) ‘He Used To Be My Relative’ in Carsten, J. (ed.) Cultures o f Relatedness: New 
Approaches to the Study o f Kinship
727 Strathem, M. (1992) After Nature: English Kinship in the Late Twentieth Century p52
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one, but at the same time what is expressed is the concrete notion that in fact, despite our 
differences and failure to act as kin, humanity is indeed a kin universe.
Compartmentalised as a domain of affect, the manipulability of the notion of kinship-as- 
affection has enabled the transmission of the emotive form of the kinship metaphor to 
aspirational statements about world politics. In many ways this has been said to derive from 
the particular focus on individuality at the heart of Western, and especially English and 
American kinship structure. As Strathem has remarked, individuality, or treating persons as 
individuals first rather than as occupiers of places within an overarching system, is “the first 
fact o f English kinship.”728 High levels of independence and individuality have been noted in 
relation to the weakness of the influence of kinship ties upon English families surrounding 
such aspects o f life as residence patterns, household economy and inheritance even in the 
Middle Ages.729 Further, as Olivia Harris notes, drawing on Alan Macfarlane’s history of 
English kinship in the diaries of the seventeenth century Essex vicar, Ralph Josselin, kinship 
terms, roles and sentiments have long been interchangeable with those associated with non­
kin in a flexible understanding of the notion of ‘household’. Josselin treated and spoke of his 
close friends as kin, while also conversely taking in his genealogical sister as a servant at one 
point.730 As Harris writes: “kin terms in early modem England carry a moral and affective 
load; but on the one hand these meanings are not exclusive to genealogical kin, and on the 
other, even close kin could be incorporated in the household in a way which partially denied 
the special relation o f kinship.”731 Thus there is no need to mobilise causal notions of the 
influence of Enlightenment rational individualism or modem declines of religious influence 
upon society to explain this compartmentalisation of kinship, merely to note the probable 
additions these social changes may have effected upon a flexible set of kinship traits and 
naming practices already present.
At the same time, from the notion that true, permanent kinship is bound up with shared 
substance derived from ‘nature’, statements about world kinship may be lent gravity,
728 Strathem, M. (1992) After Nature: English Kinship in the Late Twentieth Century p l4
729 See Macfarlane, A. (1978) The Origins o f English Individualism: The Family, Property and Social Transition
730 Macfarlane, A. (1977) The Family Life o f Ralph Josselin. A Seventeenth Century Clergyman p i29
731 Harris, O. (1982) ‘Households and their Boundaries’ in History Workshop Journal, 13 p!47
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especially in contexts where they are attached to Judaeo-Christian conceptions of the 
derivation o f human kinship. The dual legal and ‘natural’ bases of the ideas o f kinship at 
stake reinforce the applicability of those ideas to institutional settings like UN discourse. In 
contrast to modes o f othering such as bestialisation explored in Chapters Five and Six, the 
legal and institutional framework of the international arena is discursively based upon the 
defence o f shared human kin. The UN speaks of itself as representing humanity against 
inhumanity committed by other humans, but not humanity against beasts. Thus kinship is 
able to re-affirming the value of the in-group whilst simultaneously addressing the other. 
While accusations of barbarianism or bestiality are aggressive and sometimes shocking, the 
international organisational architecture is not set up with reference to human and 
barbarians, but is set up as a protection o f the human kin group defined conditionally upon 
‘human’ behaviour.
Western models then permit the discursive expression of kinship that is both supposedly 
‘naturally’ immutable and also, being conditional upon behaviour, flexibly able to be 
contracted and expanded. They permit us to feel that our world has a basic ‘natural’ 
coherence and kinship, but that this relation may be expanded or contracted to include those 
who can truly act as kin towards us. They enable simultaneously discourses of reassurance in 
the present and hope for improvement in the future.
7.3 Using ‘Western kinship* as an Explanatory Tool: Assumptions, 
Functions. Models
Central to the structural-functional analyses of kinship systems which dominated 
anthropology in the mid-twentieth century, was the notion that kinship functioned to 
perpetuate the order and organisation of society. Very much derived from the innovative 
methodology of participant observation and based upon a single ethnographer spending a 
considerable period of time immersed in native language and culture, the monographs732
732 Chief among these: Radcliffe-Brown, A.R. (1922) The Andaman Islanders: A Study in Social Anthropology, 
Evans-Pritchard, E. E. (1940) The Nuer: A Description o f the Modes of Livelihood and Political Institutions of a
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produced in this heyday of kinship studies have long been accused of representing 
synchronic snapshots of a functioning society, with no appreciation for how that society 
would change over time, or would cope with change. In such an explanatory methodology, 
aspects of social organisation were often ascribed a function, with the assumption implicit 
that no other social factor could possibly achieve the same necessary function. Every aspect 
o f society thus found a rational and necessary role — a stance which bred eventual criticisms733 
levelled at the authors for producing almost Panglossian tautologies.
Ascribing functions to the kinship metaphors used in the preceding case studies therefore 
cannot proceed blithely in the belief that such choices are always necessary and unavoidable 
in order for certain social functions to be achieved. The objects of study, it must be 
remembered, are articles of discourse not ‘social facts734’. Two points arise from this. Firstly, 
most discourses by their nature contain a range of possible options for communicating a 
certain set of ideas or propositions. Rather than attempting to explain why one social fact 
appears to achieve a given end, a broader analysis would place a set of propositions in 
relation to each other and attempt to account for the relative success or failure of ideas in 
given situations. In this, the influence of Sperber and Boyer’s work on the cognitive ‘fitness’ 
of representations is key. Secondly, discourse, particularly of the highly metaphorical and 
future-oriented type under consideration, cannot be viewed as a simplistic transaction of 
information or desire in return for a required response. Discourse, and the practice of 
discoursing, is a contest wherein the subject may weigh the symbolic capital735 associated with 
various ways of portraying one’s international intentions and aspirations in order to maximise 
the potential o f achieving, for instance, support or sympathy, or inciting action from the 
international community.
Nilotic People. Fortes, M. (1945) Dynamics o f Clanship Among the Tallensi. Firth, R. (1957) We. The Tikopia: A 
Sociological Study o f Kinship in Primitive Polynesia
733 For a guide to these see, for instance, Ortner, S.B. (1984) Theory in Anthropology Since the Sixties’ in 
Comparative Studies in Society and History 26(1)
734 A Malinowskian term, and his idea o f the proper object for the ethnographer’s analysis. In other words, 
something ‘out there’ in society which could be unproblematically apprehended by observation.
735 In Bourdieu’s sense, the use o f kinship metaphor attaches positive associations to the work o f international 
institutions. See Bourdieu, P. (1984) Distinction: A Social Critique o f the Judgment o f Taste transl. Nice, R., or 
Bourdieu, P (1991) Language and Symbolic Power
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That said, the preceding discussion of the character and traits inherent in Western modes of 
conceiving of the meanings of kinship and family bring us much closer to being able to 
ascribe potential functionality to the instances of metaphorical usage observed in the case 
studies. It should be clear that kinship metaphorisation often seems (apparently to discursing 
subjects due to their patterns of usage) an advantageous discursive move. It is also apparent 
that something o f the same sense of world unity can be expressed by notions of ‘community’ 
and that thus, kinship does not have an exclusive function in conveying visions of common 
human values, substance or purpose. What has also been apparent though is that 
contextually, kinship metaphors are unlikely to be found to be completely interchangeable. In 
predictable contexts kinship metaphors are selected, principally as a way to move to a more 
emotive register of discourse from conventional and more neutral expressions of 
‘community’. In such contexts kinship displays an exclusive usage in the case studies 
presented. There is no other metaphorical resource drawn upon in the same way to move up 
to a higher emotional register in contexts of discussing world opinion and unity.
As we will see in the following chapter in discussions of shifts within speeches to the use of 
the kinship metaphor, kinship performs a double role when used to change the emotive 
register. O f course, discourses such as that of the bestialisation of the enemy are highly 
emotionally charged. However, such rhetoric acts only to negatively denigrate the out-group 
by incensing the in-group and its anger. Kinship on the other hand, emphasises the positive 
values and feelings o f commonality of the in-group, directing these energies thence outward 
to address the injustices perpetrated upon it, or to reach out to the persecuted beyond its 
bounds. The suffering or evil on the outside is framed by the simultaneous affirmation and 
re-statement of the value of the in-group. To accomplish this kind of double-work, kinship is 
the prime resource in Western political rhetoric.
In contrast, one might think of what Michael Urban describes as the Russian ‘hero-victim’ 
complex as a similar rhetorical tool from a different social context. The heroism of the nation 
is affirmed by virtue o f its inward ‘spirituality’ and ‘selflessness’736 while at the same time 
righteousness is lent to the in-group by the injustices of Others turning it into a victim. Such 
a “cult of heroism” was noted by Mathewson in the Cold War as the prime trope used in
736 Urban, M. (1998) ‘Remythologising the Russian State’ in Europe-Asia Studies 50(6), p980
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Russia to “drive men to the fulfillment of their public tasks.”737 It was also deployed to 
honour not just individuals and the Russian collective as a whole, but in the case o f specific 
cities for their suffering and resistance during World War Two. Cities such as Leningrad were 
designated ‘Hero City’ for their bravery in the face of the Nazi offensive.738 As Mathewson 
points out, this deployment of the trope of heroism, often victimised heroism in Russia, has 
“roots deep into the Russian past, specifically into the national literary tradition”739 which he 
traces back to the seventeenth century. A powerful alternative for kinship formulations then 
exists in Russian contexts for the double work of affirming the in-group and addressing 
problems beyond the bounds of that group.
This option is scarcely in play in Western contexts. The specific Western ‘fitness’ of kinship 
for use in certain discursive contexts, when combined with constraints upon the options 
available in subject positions for the production of discourse which will be understood, can 
lead to kinship discourse being a necessary and not just a probable or possible selection in 
rhetoric.740 Perhaps the easiest example to use to illustrate this necessity of selection is, once 
again, the UN Prayer. In the darkest days of World War Two, and the attempt to use quasi­
religious language to foster determination to believe in and work for the UN cause, only a 
small number o f metaphors of solidarity consonant with American religious language present 
themselves. One is the in-group as a family, following for example 1 John 3: “(T)he Father 
has loved us so much that we are called children of God. And we really are his children.”741 A 
second might be the metaphor of the in-group as a ‘flock’. This however, positions the 
speaker as superior to the addressees speaking to those who would blindly follow his/her 
words. Further, in a speech designed to encourage determination and resolve, comparison to 
sheep and connotations o f timidity would be scarcely apt. As another alternative, attempts 
might have been made to use the notion of the UN in-group as the ‘elect’. However, in this
737 Mathewson, R.J. (1953) T h e  Soviet Hero and the Literary Heritage’ in American Slavic and East European 
Review 12(4), p506
738 See Clapperton, J. C. (2009) ‘Conversations with Survivors o f the Siege o f Leningrad: Between Myth and 
History’ in Kurkowska-Budzan, M. and Zamorski, K. (eds.) Oral History: The Challenges o f Dialogue
739 Mathewson, R.J. (1953) T h e  Soviet Hero and the Literary Heritage’ in American Slavic and East European 
Review 12(4), p506
740 In this sense, the notion o f necessity described is not logical necessity — an automatic derivative of 
preconditions, but the necessity which derives from elimination o f other possible avenues. This latter ‘necessity 
by elimination’ is applicable to discursive investigations which deal with a limited menu o f sensible options for 
linguistic formulations.
741 See 1 John 3, New Century Version. Available at:
http://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=:l+john+3& version=N CV . Accessed on 12/09/2009.
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case, the Calvinist overtones are less than inclusive and connotations of contemporaneous 
Nazi Aryan superiority discourses would be highly distasteful. In this sense, and in such 
contexts it is possible for kinship metaphors to emerge as the only suitable way to draw 
‘we/they’ distinctions that would convey the requisite type of positive moral affirmation to 
the in-group in times o f crisis.
In other words, conditions of usage are generated when two sets of constraints are in play. 
Firsdy, the desired content of the proposition to be made must be quite specific, thus limiting 
discursive options. Secondly, the conditions of emergence, for instance the type of audience 
or political climate, must further constrain discourse options. When these two conditions are 
met, the flexibility and easy translatability of notions of kinship can often bring them to the 
fore over other, less flexible, discursive options.
As for kinship’s role as a sole resource for emotive variation on the theme of human 
community or unity, it would be easy to misinterpret this simply as self-evident. Other than 
the obsession with order required by the structural-functional paradigm, part of the 
explanation for early anthropologists’ fascination with kinship was the presupposition, or 
apparendy self-evident assumption that kinship, being kinship, mattered more than other 
types of social relation. As Schneider writes in a later critique of the methodology of the 
study of kinship: “the single most important assumption on which the premise of the 
privileged nature o f kinship and the presumed Genealogical Unity of Mankind rests...is the 
assumption that Blood Is Thicker Than Water.”742 As Schneider notes, this folk expression of 
the ‘thickness’ o f blood is a central notion of Western culture, and, in any cross-cultural sense 
cannot be taken as an explanation for reliance upon kinship metaphor.
However, from early anthropological preoccupations with working to understand aspects of 
non-Westem societies through comparisons of genealogies, it can be said that precisely 
because of the innate Western assumption about the ‘thickness of blood’, do the metaphors 
in our case studies gain meaning. W.H.R. Rivers’ famous charts of Torres Strait Island 
kinship743 sought out aspects of the characters of social relations and modes of organisation
742 Schneider, D. (1984) A Critique of the Study o f Kinship p l65
743 Rivers, W.H.R. (1914) Kinship and Social Organisation
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among the islanders, but translated native idioms into a structure based upon English notions 
of kinship and pedigree744. The basis of Rivers’ enquiry into indigenous kinship was thus the 
attempted establishment of relations of biological parenthood within a community, drawing 
up charts o f relationships from a central concern for this Western starting point. While 
problematic as a social science methodology, this belief in the translatability of kinship 
relations and terminology into cross-culturally comparable grids, is based wholly upon the 
assumption that fundamental meanings within relations o f kinship are universal. This 
assumption, Schneider writes: “is but a particular instance of the more general characteristic 
of European culture toward what might be called ‘biologistic’ ways of constituting and 
conceiving of human character, human nature, and human behaviour.”745
From the exposition of the traits of Western kinship in the previous section, it becomes 
clearer why kinship is fitted to a function as a heightened emotive register in discussing 
actions and aspirations of humanity. Western kinship notions, as we have said include 
derivations both from permanent biological ties and also contingent relations o f affect, 
though, as illustrated by the ‘thickness of blood’ metaphor, there is an implicit cross-over 
assumption that biology denotes or conditions (or should do, at least) appropriate feeling of 
affect. It is the coupling of the belief in the self-evidence of a special emotive closeness of 
kinship ties, along with a belief in the biological universalism of comparable kinship that 
permits kinship metaphors to be used without explanation, as if the whole of humanity might 
naturally understand the implications of such usage. As the UN Declaration of Human 
Rights holds as its first article: “(A)ll human beings are bom  free and equal in dignity and 
rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in 
a spirit o f brotherhood.”746 A certain form of cultural imperialism is at work here, assuming, 
based upon Western folk models o f the universality and naturalness of kinship relations, that 
the meaning o f relations o f ‘brotherhood’ should be self-evident. However, what is stake 
here are not notions of responsibility for providing a wife for your sister’s son (a primary role 
of brotherhood in many of the cultures studied in early anthropological kinship
744 For a wide-ranging critique, see Bouquet, M. (1993) Reclaiming English Kinship: Portuguese Refractions of 
British Kinship Theory
745 Schneider, D. (1984) A Critique o f the Study o f Kinship p i75
746 UN Declaration o f Human Rights (1948) Preamble. Reproduced in Appendix B.
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monographs747), but a complex of the more vague emotions o f affect symbolised in Western 
notions of the family: love, trust, respect, and especially equality. Also present in this loaded 
term is the quiet removal of women from these bonds to which the success of world society 
is to be entrusted. ‘Brotherhood’ is taken to mean all persons, but its reductive masculinity 
reveals vestiges of Christian andro-centric notions of the composition of the community 
simply by males.
N ot only, as we have noted previously, do kinship metaphors derive meaning from religious 
association, but also, especially with the notion of brotherhood, an intellectual undercurrent 
o f the mobilisation o f the common man (and not, originally, woman also) is present in this 
UN Declaration ideal. As we saw in Chapter Five, fratemalism has been harnessed since the 
Middle Ages as an organisational emblem of guilds, unions and political associations. One 
might also recollect in this context that the re-politicisation of the value of fraternity occurred 
during the French Revolution. As William Scott writes, while the dream of liberty inspired 
the intellectual elites, the histories of the Revolution by liberal historians like Michelet present 
the politicised French lower classes as “proud bearers o f their own uplifting values, notably 
those of equality and fraternity”, values which “grew from social roots, in the often grim 
experience of workers and peasants.”748 The poor man’s dream as well as the religious man’s 
vision, kinship metaphors employed in the institutional sites we have considered, present 
modes o f shaping a moral valuation of a type of world unity that may be doubly patriarchal — 
either drawing unity from a patriarchal religion or from a set of guarantees of masculine 
rights as world-citizen-workers. This maps onto the patterns we observed with relation to 
brotherhood discourses used by the Darfurian rebels desperate for aid and equality, and the 
‘family of nations’ discourse deployed in a patriarchal reassurance in Tony Blair’s Letter to 
Darfur749.
Thus, the kinship language used in such articles as the 1948 Declaration conceals Western 
liberal historical baggage which requires some unpacking. The hidden patriarchal, male-
747 O r even in Holy’s study o f the Berti, referenced in Chapter Five.
748 Scott, W. (2006) ‘From Social to Cultural History’ in Campbell, P. (ed.) The Origins of the French Revolution 
p l l3
749 See Blair’s Letter to Darfur in Full’ 17 th September 2006. Available a t 
http: /  /news.bbc.co.uk /1 /h i/u k  politics /5353348.stm. Accessed 16/03/08.
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oriented referents belie a language which is presented as if  it fairly and simply represented a 
self-evident set o f claims that are to be made on behalf o f all humans. It is valuable to note 
here in pursuing this example, that the Declaration of Human Rights is the most translated 
document in the world and is available in well over three hundred languages. An important 
discovery which anthropological methods should prepare us for, is that, while the language in 
which the Declaration was written speaks of the afore-mentioned liberal referents of 
brotherhood and the human family, these ideas, which are presented as universal, are not 
universally translated, even by the UN. In fact, while the English, French, Spanish and 
Mandarin versions, for instance, share references to the human family I  la famille humaine/ familia 
humana/ renlei jiating and spirit of brotherhood/ esprit de fratemite/  comportarse fratemalmente/  di guan ji, 
one does not have to go far from the Anglo-French cradle of these ideas for these referents 
to be dropped. Indeed, even the German version does not permit of a direct translation of 
the notion of human family, instead relying on der Gemeinschaft der Menschen — the ‘human 
community’.750 The assumption o f universality even on agreeable direct translation of such 
‘universals’ is misleading.
As a comparative exercise aimed at evincing the particularly Western, liberal characters of the 
understandings o f kinship that have been discussed, it is useful to consider the ways in which 
distant cultures learn to use kinship metaphors to express relations of identity and difference 
far removed from the usual confines of close family. Rita Astuti’s work on the learning of 
kinship discourse by children of the Vezo culture of Madagascar provides an excellent foil 
for the preceding discussion. Among the Vezo, Astuti tested the transmission from adults to 
children o f folk discourses of Vezo kinship identity. The Vezo, a coastal fishing people, live 
in close proximity to the inland Masikoro, predominantly farmers. Children are socialised in a 
context where Vezo and Masikoro are presented as opposites. Children are praised when 
their actions show that they are learning Vezo traits and skills (mending nets, beachcombing, 
catching fish) and reprimanded by being accused of ‘becoming Masikoro’751 when they stray 
from these ‘positive’ activities or misbehave in some way. Further inland, occupying urban
750 For details see Office for the High Commissioner for Human Rights, translations o f the Declaration of 
Human Rights. Available at: http://www.ohchr.org/EN/UDHR/Pages/SearchBvLang.aspx. Accessed on 
13/09/2009.
751 Astuti, R. (2001) ‘Are We All Natural Dualists? A Cognitive Developmental Approach’ in Journal o f the 
Royal Anthropological Institute 7(3) p441
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position as traders, and scarcely registering in the Vezo self/other schema (certainly not for 
children) are the Karany, inland urban traders and merchants.
Vezo folk culture holds that “people are what they are because of the place where they live, 
which in turn determines the activities they perform.”752 Astuti posed a series of scenarios to 
her informants in which members o f different groups were to be adopted by other groups. 
She aimed to test the power o f Vezo folk culture after having already demonstrated that 
Vezo can distinguish between traits passed on physically at birth and those learned in culture. 
Vezo adults displayed a capacity to reason consistently according to their folk culture that 
even in a hypothetical case where a Karany (by birth) was adopted into Vezo culture, they 
would, according to the adult respondents, become Vezo. On the other hand, children, 
socialised in a context o f Vezo/Masikoro praxis, reasoned fairly consistently that a Masikoro 
child would ‘become’ Vezo by adoption. However, they significantly failed to be able to 
apply this cultural logic to the unknown Karany753. In essence they had learned to mimic 
cultural kinship, but not to understand its extensible logic.
Two levels o f understanding of ‘proximity to ego’ in social personhood are in play here. A 
primary mode o f distinction appears to exist based simply upon the knowledge of not being 
bom  in one’s familiar locality and kinship group. Only after the age of approximately seven 
years, Astuti argues, do the conditions of cultural models o f creating kinship consistently 
override the early developmental instinct to ally status and personhood simply to whatever 
traits birth and place may be thought to confer. In other words, the earliest cognitive models 
hold that humans have consistent rather than flexible identities.
This argument has been made in a more familiar capacity by Lawrence Hirschfeld in the 
context of an investigation of ‘human-kind competencies’ in American children. This term in 
effect denotes the ability o f children to firstly recognise types of ‘kindhood’ such as race, 
gender or kinship, and secondly to understand differences between the transmissibility or 
variability of ‘kind’ characteristics. In Hirschfeld’s studies for instance, American 
preschoolers affirmed that “(A) substantial portion of children living in the United States
752 Astuti, R. (2001) ‘Are We All Natural Dualists? A Cognitive Developmental Approach’ in Journal o f the 
Royal Anthropological Institute 7(3) p437
753Ibid. p440
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believe that behavioural proclivities, specifically those associated with occupational 
categories, are as intrinsic, deep, and heritable as race.”754 He argues that this is due to the 
fact that “children’s social categories are...constructed around physically prominent, 
epistemically superficial, and politically naive features” and thus “reasoning about different 
kinds of kinds tends to be quite similar.”755 In short, gender, race, kinship, and even 
occupation are differentiated similarly and may be loaded with a great deal of intrinsic and 
immutable value if the physical markers seem to set that characteristic apart as being a 
prominent example of a ‘kind’.
This leads to two further points concerning the applicability of Western kinship models to 
grand political discourse. Firstly, the recourse to such kinship metaphor either to include and 
welcome or to exclude and condemn therefore can in no way be said to be ‘natural’. 
‘Naturally’, such complex cognitive steps are highly improbable. Instead it is a manifestation 
of the particular flexibility of understandings of kinship. Secondly, looking closer at the adult 
responses of Vezo informants, it proved more likely that they would follow their folk culture 
of ascribing personhood to successful performance of role in the case of the Masikoro 
adoptee than the Karany. A greater stretch of folk metaphor is required the more distant the 
‘other’ is. Thus, the prevalence of statements in international discourse about the kinship or 
potential kinship of all mankind demonstrates a highly elastic understanding of kinship. 
What is more, by stretching such a notion to its widest extent, the speaker aims at the most 
impactful cognitive leap. Also, the conditionality of kinship expressed in such statement 
matches a Western model for the creation of kinship. Unlike the Vezo, where the ‘other’ 
must learn practical skills to become kin, Western models merely require subscription to the 
values and character of relationships implicit in being kin.
754 Hirschfeld, L. (1996) Race in the Making: Cognition. Culture, and the Child’s Construction of Human Kinds 
p l93
755 Ibid. p i 91
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7.4 Chapter Data Compared To Western Models
In making a point-by-point analysis of the statements collected in the case studies, it is 
important first to recognise that what has been described thus far are certain of the 
archetypal characteristics present in kinship models as described by Westerners, but not a 
model purporting to be a structural unity or rigid system. Some defence of the notion of 
Western kinship models is clearly required.
By virtue of the narrowing of discursive input into the creation of the UN system as 
described in Chapter Three, reliance upon a notion of Western kinship may not be quite so 
difficult to defend. Many of the principle contributions and amendments proposed by non- 
Westem allies were dismissed, and most of the amendments passed in debates prior to San 
Francisco were made by Western partners of the US and were, in any case, on matters of 
procedure and not philosophy. The drafting in particular of the preambles to the great UN 
documents, was solely conducted by Westerners. These documents, whether present day 
speakers are themselves Western or not, have, by their claims to universal value and validity, 
become hugely influential upon the emergent epistemic community of bureaucrats, the 
politicians and the international media.
As a new wave of kinship studies based on the relationality of Westerners has come to the 
fore in anthropology, a sharp analytic split between the types of ‘person’ supposedly present 
in Western and non-Westem contexts has been recognised and problematised. Prior to this 
new wave in the 1990s and 2000s, a supposition was that there existed a “strong contrast 
between Western individualism and non-Westem dividualism”756 though aspects of creative 
relationality have since been explored in Western contexts, famously in studies of New 
Reproductive Technologies.757 As another example, Strathem for instance, has considered 
the acquisition o f ‘identity’ in Euro-American contexts through the practice of tracing of 
one’s ancestry. As she notes: “knowledge creates relationships: the relationship come into 
being when the knowledge does.”758 Picking up on this movement, it seems that the very
756 Carsten, J. (1995) After Kinship p i 08
757 See for instance, Robertson, J. (1996) Children of Choice: Freedom and the New Reproductive Technologies
758 Strathem, M. (1999) ‘Refusing Information’ in her Property, Substance and Effect: Anthropological Essays on 
Persons and Things p78
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duality of Western modes of kinship understanding — the insistence on individuals defined by 
scientific biology but also the practice of extensible relationality, is the key to the work done 
by kinship discourse. Prior to the individualisation of the Western person, two of the key 
cognitive moves in the process of metaphorising world politics in terms of kinship were 
highly unlikely. Firstly, the recognition of human shared substance based on biological 
understandings o f humans as a common species, laid open the potential for finally 
overturning historical discourses on the isolation o f races. Secondly, and somewhat 
paradoxically, it is the Western individual who is at the heart o f many of the more creative 
modes of ‘making’ kinship in ‘non-standard’ family relationships — a practical demonstration 
of the potentiality latent for the creation of kin of affect. Only by partial freedom from the 
constraints o f kinship structures can the metaphorical and practical notion of ‘choosing’ to 
becoming kin be meaningful. Though this has been recendy brought out in studies of 
homosexual couples or adoption, it was already latent in Western society with the increasing 
choice given to all individuals over time with reference to marriage and kin creation, the 
abolishment o f practices of the arrangement o f kinship and kinship as commodity exchange.
Thus a notion of Western kinship models bearing a duality of scientific individualism derived 
from ‘nature’, and freedom of extensibility by virtue o f ascribing to the symbols of the 
character o f proper kin relations, is a useful encapsulation of the heart of the discourses we 
have studied. This is particularly true given the power generated by these discourses in the 
thoroughly Western institutional settings in which they are espoused. However, I do not wish 
to try to portray an unchanging unity. At all points, I am concerned with ‘models’ and not ‘a 
model’. This is because, as discussed previously, parts of the kinship models are unexplained 
or implicit even to Westerners, as we saw in Chapter Four; each actor will mobilise parts of 
various models and discursive recourse according to the aim of his/her speech. What 
particularities then, are evidenced by the preceding case study data of kinship metaphor usage 
compared to what sociological studies would predict for Western models and how do these 
two data sets align?
Most prominently, the referents and symbols used are deployed in patterns which are highly 
predictable given what we would expect from the archetypes o f Western kinship models. 
Numerous references are made, it will be recalled, to the symbol o f the ‘family’. Once more,
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akin to the example given above of the use of the notion of ‘brotherhood’ in the UN 
Declaration of Human Rights, the import of this symbol is taken to be self-evident. And yet, 
following Schneider, it is precisely those symbols most pregnant with implicit meaning in the 
constellation of symbols in Western kinship folk culture, that are chosen for use in such 
discourse. No references exist for those modes of kinship organisation that are no longer 
pertinent in Western society. There are no mentions of the human ‘clan’ or ‘lineage’ in the 
large quantities o f political statements, NGO reports and official grand discourses that have 
been reviewed; instead the archetypal unit of organisation o f Western culture, the ‘family’ is 
invoked. Though I have made a similar point previously, I will stress again that when a 
kinship metaphor is invoked to substitute for a notion o f community, it is ‘brotherhood’ or 
the ‘family’ (implicitly headed by a man) rather than ‘sisterhood’ or even ‘brotherhood and 
sisterhood’, which is most commonly seen.
The markers o f the loci within discourse where kinship is likely to be invoked (generality, 
aspirational and emotive content) match quite closely with the characters of Western models 
of kinship outlined thus far, and tally with the discursive purposes of the statements made. In 
effect, the international architecture which strives to create and represent world unity is still 
incomplete, and the frustrations with the current ineffectiveness of some of its aims place 
discoursing subjects in the same type of subject positions as those who earlier advocated 
world organisation as a remedy to international ills. At all points, the kinship metaphor is one 
of advocacy. It is used as a higher, and more powerful register of advocacy for the 
transformation o f international anarchy into a state o f unity. The markers of discourse usage 
studied map onto particular characteristics of the meanings inherent in Western kinship 
models.
Firstly, the emotive contexts in which kinship metaphors are invoked, tally with the position 
of kinship within Western notions of the location of social modes of organisation. Kinship is 
assigned an anti-political position and the family used a symbol of positive, affirming 
relations of care and inclusion. Consider as an example the statements by President Bush 
shortly after 9/11 - brimful of somewhat incongruous kinship references designed to re­
affirm the goodness of the American way o f life. Secondly, the generalised statements made 
using kinship metaphors are made in accordance with the unspecific nature of the creative
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ways latent in Western kinship for ‘becoming’ kin. The ideals o f the UN Declaration of 
Human Rights are the ideal illustration of this. How does one evaluate a ‘spirit of 
brotherhood’? As an emotive discourse, kinship statements are not suited to rigorous styles 
of factual description. Thirdly, the potential for poesis in Western kinship, attached to the 
manipulation o f symbols of ways of being, rather than actual actions, lends itself to flexible 
expansions and contractions of the putative kin group (the notion o f the family is taken up 
heavily by the nation-state759 as well as in invocation of world unity) and also to highly 
speculative fiiture-orientation in discourse. Fourthly, the positive attributes supposedly 
inherent in kin relations make the discourse highly suited to the self-affirming discourses of 
the UN and others (such as the statements of Emyr Jones Parry seen in Chapter Five), who 
feel themselves to represent the human family. Fifthly, practices of ostracism using kinship 
seem to be conditional upon both (mundanely) a political right to ostracise, and also (more 
interestingly) upon some perceived kinship commonality with the condemned which is closer 
than simply common humanity.760 The power of, and reluctance to use such metaphors is 
connected to the institutional framework which presupposes universal personhood but also 
is linked to the particular ways in which Western kinship models are able to be expanded and 
contracted. One would initially think that the flexibility repeatedly outlined would negate the 
power o f a denial o f kinship. Kinship, it would seem, can be remade. This flexibility does 
indeed permit such statements and prevents a Schmittian policy o f destruction of the non-kin 
‘other’.
However, this flexibility turns on the paradoxical duality o f the notion of ‘nature’ that is 
central to the Westem-ness’ of the kinship models at stake. On the one hand a particular 
understanding of ‘nature’ furnishes a scientific claim to identify all humans as of common 
substance. On the other, ‘natural’ relations of kinship in the private sphere are opposed in 
Western political thought to the political relations of society and because of the way such 
natural relations are positively valued, ‘affect kin’ can be produced by virtue of appropriate 
behaviour and emotional feeling. These very Western notions seem on the one hand to make 
human kinship a fixed group consisting of every biological human, and on the other hand a 
group that may expand and contract depending upon behaviour in social relations. This
759 Especially enlightening on this subject is Herzfeld, M. (2005) Cultural Intimacy: Social Poetics in the Nation- 
State
760 See statements by Al-Faisal or Soyinka, Chapter Six.
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internal contradiction is key to the paradoxes of kinship discourse observed. While we have 
noted that kinship discourse may be widely employed due to the flexibility given to it by 
these contradictory impulses, this internal paradox may also be destabilising and may limit 
the effectiveness of the discourse. For instance, how can discourses of exclusion on the basis 
of failing to act like kin be taken seriously when a contrary part of the same discursive 
complex insists that all humans remain kin by virtue o f biology, and regardless of behaviour 
in international society? Such discourse, which appears to work against itself, may not, 
especially given the views of UN workers themselves in Chapter Four, be anything close to 
as useful as one would hope either in cases of motivating positive action or disciplinary 
measures in international society. Thus, with this understanding of the limits o f these 
discourses which the world has internalised since World War Two, we can look to complete a 
critical appraisal o f the continuing presence of world-kinship ideals as central visions of the 
end-goal of international politics in the UN-era.
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CHAPTER EIGHT - Conclusions
8.1 Is the ‘Human Community’ or the ‘Family of Nations’ a Helpful Aim 
in International Politics?
Thus far the discoveries of the inquiry may be summarised as follows:
i) Multiple modes o f world kinship discourse exist to espouse universal standards to 
push towards world unity in the contemporary period. The diversity of types of usage is 
though, narrower than in the earlier years of the League and UN projects. Particular modes 
o f usage include liberal inclusionary modes which draw on linkages between kinship and 
nurturance in Western social thought. This usage may also be used patemalistically to solidify 
a parent/child relation between nations within and without the functioning core of the family 
o f nations. It may also be employed in hawkish conservative modes of excluding nations or 
individuals in order to deny rights.
ii) The ‘international community’ description of world unity has become a bureaucratic 
standard, but kinship discourse has emerged as a prominent alternative, especially employed 
in emotive contexts to argue forcefully for action or the defense of values in global politics. 
Kinship discourses are a powerful way of delineating we/they groupings in world politics, 
but, valued unequivocally positively in Western political thought, find more potential usages 
in discourses which are inclusionary than exclusionary. Inclusionary kinship discourses 
perform the double work of bolstering the moral standing o f the in-group while addressing 
the Other. Based on the flexibility of the Western notion of kinship deployed in UN 
contexts, it is not necessarily a mode of Schmittian destruction of the Other, despite the 
theoretical denial o f personhood that is implicit when kinship is employed to exclude.
iii) Kinship discourses were crucial motivators both in the War efforts of the era of UN 
planning, and in the values that the planners thought were vital for the success of the new 
UN organisation. Contrary to this perspective, it is the political role of the UN, rather than its 
specific value as a moral arbiter, that UN staff today prize. Many, while praising the moral
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values o f the UN, find the explicit formulations of the founding documents can actually 
hinder negotiation with non-Westem groups, seeming anachronistic and ethno-centric.
iv) The complexity of the notion of kinship employed in these discourses leads to 
certain paradoxes and flaws which make it a vision of world unity which is hard to 
operationalise. Kinship pivots on a dual understanding of the concept of ‘natural’ human 
relations. It is at once taken to be measured by the action of affectionate behaviour and 
proved by biological substance, in other words, is contingent and universal at the same time. 
While the values which inspire the discourses have been increasingly globalised, the 
discourses themselves are contradictory and lead to contradictory applications.
From the birth of the UN-era to the present day, an insistent hope of a single united Vorld’ 
has been a cornerstone of political discourse at the international institutional level. In the 
wake of the destruction of fascism, the bases of a new liberal consensus were set down in the 
founding documents of the United Nations. Nazism had allied with Italian fascism and 
aggressive Japanese nationalism to enflame a truly global conflict and long-range weapons 
destroyed forever the hope that geography could provide any genuine isolation and 
safeguard. In response, the project of international organisation turned on the hope that a 
conception of the world as one connected locality could be allied to a rhetoric of shared 
values — a human community, and, one step further, of shared substance — a human family.
This grand discourse espouses a set of goals and visions so vague and so Utopian that it is 
hard to seriously imagine them ever being realised. More problematically though, many of the 
uses o f discourses o f human community or the human family do not speak of the future, but 
speak about supposed international consensus or opinion in the present when often to do so 
is an inaccurate (even fanciful) representation of the diversity and complexity of opinion in 
international society. It is such usage that Inderpal Grewal has termed ‘catachrestic’ 
discourse. That is to say that “the literal and the imaginary are confused deliberately”761 when 
speaking of the will of the putative international community. Gravitas is intentionally added
761 Grewal, I. (2007) TJnderstanding “Global Community” in Cultural Studies’ in Comm unication and 
Critical/Cultural Studies 4(3) p333
260
to unilateral statements by the speaker claiming to speak for the global community, in this 
way “presenting an imperial threat (or warning, or desire) as a moral, global consensus.”762
Such a language of false unity is politically problematic when it leaches from international 
institutional circles, or emanates from a US President or Secretary o f State, for instance. The 
following example formed part of the US reaction to the Israel/Lebanon war of 2006. A 
press conference was given by George W. Bush and Tony Blair in the White House with the 
pair pushing for the deployment of a multinational force in Lebanon to help the government 
control Hezbollah and secure the concessions required for an Israeli withdrawal. As Bush put 
it:
“Prime Minister Blair and I  agree that this approach gives the best hope to end the violence and create lasting 
peace and stability in Lebanon. This approach will demonstrate the international community's determination 
to support the government of Lebanon, and defeat the threat from Hezbollah and its foreign sponsors.>f6}
The continuing use of such catachrestic discourse perpetuates the entrenchment of the UN 
project within a closed circle (geographically and philosophically). Unfortunately, given the 
systematic constriction of input into the philosophical underpinnings of the UN, (Chapter 
Three) the more political interventions that are made by that organisation, or worse, by 
Western leaders in its name, the more this can seem to other nations as a form of Value 
globalisation’ — the exportation o f a system of moral principles purporting to supersede local 
variants. As George Perkovich writes: “the general alienation of Muslim societies from the 
international mainstream may be the most pressing foreign policy challenge facing the United 
States today, but they are related to a broader disaffection with globalization, which is seen as 
a largely American project.”764 Writing to Bush in 2006, shortly before the outbreak of the 
Lebanon war, Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad argued:
“Don't Latin Americans have the right to ask, why their elected governments are being opposed and coup 
leaders supported? Or, why must they constantly be threatened and live in fear? The people of Africa are 
hardworking, creative and talented. Thy can play an important and valuable role in providing for the needs of
762 Grewal, I. (2007) ‘Understanding “Global Community” in Cultural Studies’ in Communication and 
Critical/Cultural Studies 4(3) p333
763 Office of the Press Secretary, White House Press Briefing July 28th 2006. Full statement available at: 
http:/  /wuw.whitehouse.gov/news / releases /2006 707/20060728-1 .html Accessed 01/12/2008.
764 Perkovich, G. (2005) “Giving Justice Its Due” in Foreign Affairs, July/A ugust 2005 p86
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humanity and contribute to its material and spiritual progress. Poverty and hardship in large parts of Africa 
are preventing this from happening. Don’t they have the right to ask why their enormous wealth — including 
minerals — is being looteddespite the fact that they need it more than others ? ... The people of the world are 
not happy with the status quo and pay little heed to the promises and comments made by a number of
influential world leaders The people of the world have no faith in international organisations, because their
rights are not advocated by these organisations. ’*65
Naturally, the political incentives for such a message on behalf of the Iranians at that time 
were considerable given the concern over the possibility of nuclear weapons development in 
Iran. However, just as pressing is the rhetorical space and hence political leverage, opened up 
to a figure like Ahmadinejad by the recourse to universalising on behalf of the Westernised 
discourse of the UN and its major powers. Such moralising discourse escalates the 
stakes of conflict by portraying the behaviour of nations opposed to U N  thinking as 
an attack on the universal values of a moral human family. Further, the meaning of 
terms such as ‘international community’ and ‘family o f nations’ helps, in Grewal’s eyes, to 
constitute “the negotiated and complicated notion o f the ‘West’ as a space for coalitions and 
agreements among nations.”766 In other words, because the W est’ has dominated both the 
initial dissemination of this rhetoric and the linguistic standards of its later usage, whilst also 
managing the UN in its own image as the epitome of international cooperation, it has centred 
itself as the producer of a new regime o f (arguably neo-colonial) international ‘truth’ and 
morality767. While this argument dovetails neady with the findings of the historical 
investigations o f Chapter Three and the dissemination o f family of nations discourse to non- 
W estem ’ speakers such as the Soyinka and al-Faisal in Chapter Six, it is still necessary to be 
cautious.
There is a significant difference between pointing out the traits of discourse that have 
Western referents in the context o f international politics and claiming that the
765 Ahmadinejad, M. (2006) Letter to President George W. Bush 8th May 2006, Accessed at: 
http: /  / www.cfr.org/content/publications / attachments/Ahmadinejad%201etter.pdf on 0 4 /1 2 / 2008
766 Grewal, I. (2007) in Communication and Critical/Cultural Studies 4(3) p332/3
767 Grewal’s designation o f the space o f the ‘W est’ is attractive and superficially but not completely substantiated 
or defended in her own writing. Her argument here takes its cues from postcolonial perspectives on world 
development during the UN-era and perhaps is seduced into marking the international com munity/UN as a 
cipher for the W est without proper analysis. Throughout the course o f the preceding chapters, we have 
demonstrated Western influence on the discourses that inspire the UN and have been adopted by the 
international community. This may well be argued to have created a regime o f truth and morality, but to assert 
the unified political control o f ‘the West’ over the agendas o f vast multiplicity o f different international decision­
making bodies and regional organisations is unrealistic.
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UN/international community is a cipher for the W est’ in all senses. While we can isolate the 
influences o f Western opinions on the UN in its creation and foundational discourses, it is 
difficult to look upon the UN today as being fully politically dominated by Western powers. 
This would be to present only part of a complex picture. The increasing power of the G77 
for instance, is not only pushing for wide-ranging structural reform, but actively shaping the 
agendas of the General Assembly in particular.768
To return to the wrangling over Iran in 2006, its supposed nuclear development was 
harnessed with its connections to Hezbollah to cast its president temporarily as the bete noire 
of the international scene. In response, Israel’s Foreign minister addressed the UN in a 
highly-charged speech:
“We (Israel') share the same values as the community of democratic states. .. there is a critical moral difference 
between the terrorists that hunt down civilians, and the soldiers that target terrorists, while tiying to avoid 
civilian casualties. To protect its integrity, the international community must uphold this basic moral 
distinction... There is no greater challenge to our values than that posed by the leaders of Iran... The 
international community is faced with no greater responsibility than to stand against this dark and growing 
danger - not for Israel's sake, but for its own; for the sake of the values it claims to embrace; for the sake of 
the world we all wish our children to inherit... There is no place for such a regime in the family of nations.,p69
Concurrent with the discursive markers noted in previous chapters, it is in the emotive, 
culminating sentiments of passages of speech wherein kinship metaphor is relied upon. Livni 
implicitly encourages action on regime change in Iran as a way of uprooting support for 
Palestinian terrorists in the wider context of the ongoing conflict with Israel. At a less tense 
juncture the following year, Livni built upon the assumptions present in her condemnations 
of 2006. Speaking of the implementation of a new ‘road map’ for peace she commented: 
“(A)s the parties take the risks for peace, we look to the international community and the 
Arab and Muslim world, to offer support, not to stipulate conditions.”770 The hidden 
disjunction between universal visions of a human family and community, and the political
768 See for instance, Zartman, I.W. and Rubin, J. (2000) Power and Negotiation
769 Livni, T. (2006) ‘Address by Vice Prime Minister and Minister o f Foreign Affairs Tzipi Livni to the 61st United 
Nations General Assembly 20th September 2006’. Available at
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Government/Speeebes+by+Israeb+leaders/20Q6/Address%20bv%20FM°/o20Liv 
ni%20to%20the%20UN%20General%20Assembly%2020-Sep-2006. Accessed on 03/12/2008.
770 Livni, T. (2007) ‘United Nations 62nd Session of the General Assembly Address by H.E. Tzipi Livni Vice 
Prime Minister and Minister o f Foreign Affairs State o f Israel, 1st October 2007’. Available at: http://israel- 
un.mfa.gov.il/m fm /Data/123377.doc. Accessed on 06/12/2008.
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reality o f a closed circle of the West and its allies is laid bare — the international community, 
the ‘moral’ world, cannot be thought to include the ‘Arab and Muslim world’.
This is a revealing and telling statement and the patterning of the usage of kinship discourse 
fits long-standing models for how this discourse is used. Livni reserves it until the final parts 
of her address, and kinship metaphors are used change to a more emotive tone to set out the 
general principles upon which she believes politics must move forward. Exactly this change 
of gear affected by using kinship metaphors in the closing parts of wartime speeches have 
been noted with the UN Prayer in Chapter Three. They were also a central feature of some 
of Woodrow Wilson’s greatest wartime oratory. In his Second Inaugural address in 1917, the 
first two thirds of the speech concerns dry, resigned catalogues of the burdens borne by the 
US at sea and by the Western Powers due to the aggression of Germany. After extensively 
listing these troubles, Wilson’s tone undergoes a huge shift to outline an uncompromising, 
searing manifesto of American principles as he paved the way for the war declaration that 
was to come just a month later. Wilson began this conclusion to his address by affirming a 
historic statement o f liberal American principles using world kinship discourse. He spoke o f 
“political stability of free peoples”, the “essential principle of peace”, and the belief that 
“peace cannot securely or justly rest upon an armed balance of power” . “Governments” he 
concluded, must “derive all their just powers from the consent of the governed, and...no 
other powers should be supported by the common thought, purpose, or powers of the family 
o f nations.”771
Reaching out to the notion of the backing of the family o f nations for his ideas, Wilson’s 
speech pivots at this point into a more emotive register:
‘We are being forged into a new unity amidst the fires that now bla%e throughout the world. In their ardent 
heat we shall, in God's Providence, let us hope, be purged of faction and division, purified of the errant humors 
ofparty and ofprivate interest, and shall standforth in the days to come with a new dignity of national pride 
and spirit.,f72
771 See, Wilson, W. (1917) ‘Second Inaugural Address’ to the United States Congress, March 5th 1917. Reprinted 
in Grey. E., Viscount o f Fallodon (1917) America and Freedom p41/2
772 Ibid. p43
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“The shadows that now lie dark upon our path will soon be dispelled, and we shall walk with light all about 
us i f  we be but true to ourselves-to ourselves as we have wished to be known in the counsels of the world and 
in the thought of all those who love liberty andjustice and the right exalted.,97i
More clearly than in Livni’s address, and others that we have discussed, the family of nations 
discourse is here displayed as a moral support for the self-identity of the speaker. The 
principles of the American nation are directly affirmed by the implicit consent of the family 
o f nations in the linkages made in Wilson’s speech. This metaphor then is used to pivot into 
an emotive register to attempt to inspire action. Brent Steele774 has argued (though for 
different purposes), that discourses of the values of international community — the very 
bedrock of Wilson’s and Livni’s claims to the moral and political high-ground in the above 
examples — may be tied more closely to the ontological security of the speaker who claims to 
represent the international community, than the desire to carry out in practice the Utopian 
aims of such a discourse. Such ideals provide a sense o f “biographical narrative”775 for many 
of the global North states at the heart of the value community of the ‘family of nations’, and 
would seem to accord with the rhetorical positioning and ‘double work’776 role of kinship 
discourse in the statements above. In other words, attempts to motivate states to save others, 
or to condemn and act against others may be rooted in a sense of collective responsibility or 
a duty derived from the expectations of the ‘community’. Indeed, perhaps the greatest meta­
narrative of commentary upon the UN (and also League o f Nations) era has been the failure 
o f this supposed international consciousness to overcome the self-interest of nation-states.
Upon this fact, Steele builds the convincing argument that “using some assumed 
responsibility a targeted state has to ‘collective identity’ commitments...as the basis for 
persuasion (towards policy decisions internationally) can actually serve to distract the 
argument and stall action” as powerful states will often “scoff at”777 the notion of 
subordinating their vital interests. Instead, Steele claims that a more effective method of
773 Wilson, W. (1917) ‘Second Inaugural Address’ to the United States Congress, March 5th 1917. Reprinted in 
Grey. E., Viscount o f Fallodon (1917) p44
774 Steele B.J. (2008), Ontological Security: Self-Identity in the IR State or Steele, B.J. (2005) “Ontological Security 
and the Power o f Self-Identity: British Neutrality in the American Civil War.” Review of International Studies, 
31 (3), 519-540
775 Steele, B.J. (2007) ‘Making Words Matter: the Asian Tsunami, Darfur, and ‘Reflexive Discourse’ in 
International Politics’, International Studies Quarterly 51, p901
776 The notion explained in Chapter Seven, that kinship discourses re-affirm the value in-group at the same time 
as addressing the other.
777 Steele, B.J. (2007) “Making Words Matter: the Asian Tsunami, Darfur, and ‘Reflexive Discourse’ in 
International Politics.” In International Studies Quarterly 51, p911
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inciting states to act may be to point out the disjunction between their supposed international 
principles and their lack of supporting action, thereby making powerful states seem to be 
failing their own ideals and lacking in resolution or the strength to alter international affairs. 
In the wake of the Asian tsunami of 2004, Jan Egeland778 accused the wealthy nations of 
‘stinginess’ in their aid donations. Immediately after these comments, which did not refer to 
the US specifically, American TV and print media and then the Bush administration sprang 
into defensive overdrive regarding contributions to UN aid efforts. Within days the 
government pledge for tsunami relief had been multiplied by a factor of twenty. In Steele’s 
words, Egeland’s comments “generated American insecurity over America’s actions 
compared with America’s historical biographical narrative.”779 This mode of using ‘reflexive 
discourse’ (addressing the self-identity claims of a state) to generate international action may 
be a quicker and more useful way of speeding up international cooperation.
Time will tell whether Steele’s argument as to the efficacy of reflexive discourse approaches 
in the debating chambers o f the UN may hold water in future crises. It seems persuasive in 
terms of the inaction over the tsunami and Darfur crises for instance. However, Steele deals 
exclusively with the notion of the values of the ‘international community’ which, as we have 
seen is a standard, amorphous bureaucratic discourse often eschewed in moments when 
speakers really desire to lay out their emotional commitment to an issue. Certainly it is key to 
note that in the crucible of a wartime existential threat, the most powerful motivational 
speeches we have seen (the UN Prayer, Wilson’s Inaugural) made liberal use, not of 
bureaucratic standards, but alliances of kinship, religion and highly emotive discourse, driving 
the US rapidly into the conflict in 1917 and providing the backdrop for US advances in the 
Pacific following success at Midway.
Nevertheless, Steele’s issue of biographical narratives is crucial. More starkly than in the cases 
of modem humanitarian interventions which Steele discusses, the UN philosophical 
framework drawn up in the 1940s by a small State Department circle can certainly be said, on 
the basis of the work done in Chapter Three, to chart the limited input to the founding UN 
documents. This framework exists primarily as a statement of the particular articulation of
778 At the time, the UN Under Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordination.
779 Steele, B.J. (2007) “Making Words Matter: the Asian Tsunami, Darfur, and ‘Reflexive Discourse’ in 
International Politics.” In International Studies Quarterly 51, p916
266
values held by a narrow group of Westerners. It cannot be said to be either the result of 
consensual principles derived from global discussion, or a particularly focused address to 
those ‘Others’ outside the embrace of the purported value system. Also, while clearly the 
influence o f nationalist tyranny haunts the great UN documents, as does the spectre of those 
to be ‘saved’ from colonialism, much the greater parts o f these texts are not addressed 
directly, as a peace treaty at the end of a war would be, to those ‘others’ who (along with their 
values) have been vanquished or those who may be liberated. Rather the texts self- 
referentially affirm the rectitude of the values of the writers and catachrestically 
universalise the supposedly inevitable liberal dawn of those values. This, of course, was 
in the face of a world where authoritarian rule remained in the statistical majority of the 
nation states of the wodd. From this perspective, the paradox at the heart of this discourse is 
more evident. The self-referential nature of the wording of the discourse lends it the sense of 
being impossibly singular and difficult to operationalise. On the other hand, the boldness of 
making such statements, in spite of the manifold opposition at the time in the state of global 
politics, is part of their inspirational appeal as noted in Chapter Four.
The potential negative impact of the catachrestic nature of such discourse is particularly 
sharpened when the linguistic choices are those of kinship. Firstly, the kinship metaphor 
draws the supposed ‘unity’ of the international collective tighter, emphasising commonality 
not only o f those values and expectations upon which ‘community’ may be built, but also of 
the personal ‘substance’ which builds kinship. This is especially apparent given the noted 
emotive contexts in which the kinship metaphor is invoked — a greater propensity to use the 
most emotive o f kinship registers occurs in times of existential threat (viz. Bush after 9/11, 
Wilson in this chapter). This presents a more complete way of excluding the Other by 
denying his/her human personhood and as such can fuel inflammatory discourse such as that 
of Livni above. We should not forget that the flourishing of the discourse of the family of 
nations, in the context of the colonial encounter, defined a global sphere of a European 
based ‘family’ with “semi-sovereign, unequal or uncivilised”780 states on the periphery. As
780 See, Simpson, G. (2004) Great Powers and Outlaw States: Unequal Sovereigns in the International Legal 
Order p20
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Gerry Simpson notes, colonial policy towards the non-family periphery was to respond with 
the “terrors of the law781” to reform such states, including legally justifying colonial warfare.
Secondly, such linguistic choices reinscribe an association between the most universal 
positively valued marker of identity (membership of the family of nations) with a set of 
Western political beliefs which purport to present the ideal type for contemporary political 
organisation. In other words, centring the human family on itself, the UN is discursively 
fixed, due to the power and influence o f its prominent members and their rhetoric, as a 
physical and philosophical nexus which perpetuates a Western claim to produce more 
complete truths about the needs, values, and indeed the taxonomic782 knowledge of the actual 
extent o f humanity. Though one might object to this theoretically, the UN commentators in 
Chapter Four praised the UN’s dissemination of standards and expectations about the 
common standards of behaviour that would constitute world kinship.
Thirdly, the use of kinship metaphors renders accurate exposition o f what really unites or 
divides the UN community and those outside it of secondary importance. This meshes with 
Schmitt’s critique of the tendency to unhealthy over-moralism in liberal political society and 
its denial o f necessary antagonism. Specific issues of contention, or the accurate elucidation 
of principles of alliance are elided in discourses with as much moral baggage as those o f the 
human community or even stronger, the human family. As Michael Donelan writes, in an 
early consideration of the notion of the community o f mankind, “sentimental aggregation 
takes the place of reasoning.”783 Precisely this tendency to gloss over the substance of 
supposed ‘families’ and ‘communities’ in world politics emerges due to the unthinking and 
unequivocally desirable valuation of the notions of community and family in Western social 
philosophy. An unhelpful pervasion of meaningless community statements is generated in 
Western contexts as Miranda Joseph notes: “(B)ecause it carries such positive connotations, 
community is deployed by any and everyone pressing any sort o f cause.”784 Stripped of 
meaning by their vagueness, such discourse still has instrumental value. Western “capitalism
781 Simpson, G. (2004) Great Powers and Outlaw States: Unequal Sovereigns in the International Legal O rder p. 
ix
782 See Foucault, M. (1970) The Order o f Things ch 1-3. Taxonomy here refers to a Foucauldian concept o f 
producing ordering schemas for dividing up the world and telling ‘truths’ about its component parts.
783 Donelan, M. (1982) T h e  Community o f Mankind’ in Mayall, J. (ed.) The Community o f States: A Study in 
International Political Theory
784 Joseph, M. (2002) Against the Romance o f Community p.vii.
268
and, more generally, modernity depend on and generate discourses of community to 
legitimate social hierarchies.”785 Joseph’s assertion accords well in cases of blanket statements 
purporting to speak for the international community or stand up for the values o f the family 
of nations as conceived in the unquestioningly positive light of their place in Western social 
philosophy. Practical notions of how to bring the political goals of, for instance the Islamic 
world and the West, closer together are subordinated by the value-focus of community and 
human kinship statements particularly given the general and emotive usages o f the latter. 
Kinship discourse is perhaps more at fault than IC discourses due to the double work of 
kinship in automatically re-affirming the values of the in-group whenever it is invoked. 
Instead of speaking about the present and solutions to its problems, kinship discourses 
simply posit an unattainable future and seduce the speaker by affirming the positive valuation 
of his/her in-group.
Fourthly, kinship language (rejected as unhelpful by UN workers as we saw in Chapter Four) 
does not contribute to furthering the UN ’s other laudable foci on securing individual liberty 
and rights. Since the image of world kinship in play in UN discourse is a Western 
construction, attempting to build that kinship value system cognitively, focuses thought on 
valuing ‘those who think like us’ — those who can act towards us as Western notions of 
kinship prescribe. Such valued ‘others’ are the building blocks of a wider kin group.786 In 
contrast, many o f the UN’s most valuable messages as an organisation cross-cut this 
cognitive move of valuing similarity of thought by celebrating the development and 
nurturance of a diversity of world-views.
785 Joseph, M. (2002) Against the Romance o f Community p. viii. This point is taken up again with reference to 
the work o f Keally McBride in the latter part o f the chapter. By prefiguring kinship as a positive anti-political 
domain we conceptually perpetuate the injustices o f the public sphere by requiring it in order to define by 
contrast our notion o f caring kinship.
786 An introduction to the Western ethnocentricity of the kinship images in play was presented in Chapter One 
and elaborated in Chapter Seven. The full explication is completed in chapter seven. By endowing the UN with a 
motive for the construction o f a world order o f human kinship based on Western ideas, the organisation is 
intellectually set up to favour those who replicate in word and action, these discourses -  who speak and act as 
willing family members. By participating in these Western discourses and echoing their sentiment in action, the 
human family is embodied and widened since a substantial part o f the process for creating ‘kin’ in this model is 
behavioural. I t is conditioned upon the display correct (caring, supportive) affective relations. In this way, a 
discursive tyranny operates. The only way to be a part o f the overarching project o f bringing about a new 
international order is to utilise these discourses and, in doing so, become included. The discourse group is 
coterminous with the kin-group. One practices being kin by talking about being kin.
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Consonant with this observation, Mousseau and Mousseau have argued that using organising 
notions of sodal relationships with strangers based upon kinship logic, unfortunately returns 
speakers to a cognitive modality with a “stronger interest in discriminating against strangers 
from out-groups and abiding by the orders of group leaders.”787 While critiques of 
individualist capitalism may associate market societies with the competitive 
institutionalisation of inequality, Mousseau and Mousseau demonstrate that the economic 
expectations of capitalist Westerners788 may pre-figure more o f a respect for strangers than 
do social logics of reciprocal exchange based on kin, not contract groupings. On the one side 
of their dichotomy is an archetype o f contractual exchange. This is said to be “explicitly quid 
pro quo, voluntary by all parties without coercion and unfettered by social obligation. 
Contract terms set by a market using the impersonal forces of supply and demand are equally 
available to all strangers.”789 On the other hand, they characterise reciprocal kinship exchange 
thus: “individuals are in some sort o f social relationship...transactions include favours among 
groups o f friends or family members and among common members of clans, tribes and 
religious groups.”790 The behaviour said to arise from this arrangement is highly exclusive of 
outsiders: “(individuals dependent on reciprocity with an in-group will routinely look 
foremost to the in-group for choices and opportunities...However, it is informal and depends 
not on the enforcement of any contract...but on the lasting strength of the individual’s 
relationships with the group...The individual member thus has a strong incentive to share the 
values and beliefs of the group and do whatever he or she can do to strengthen its power.”791
In sum, recourses to dependence upon in-group logic (epitomised by the closest possible in­
group o f the family) deprives speakers steeped in Western (and especially Anglo- 
Saxon/American) traditions of one of the most useful conceptual tools which the West can 
call its own. Instead of playing to the strengths of social conceptions which encourage
787 Mousseau, M. and Mousseau, D. (2008) T h e  Contracting Roots of Human Rights’ in Journal o f Peace 
Research 45(3) p328
788 Their assignment o f the term ‘Western’ to one mode o f capitalist economy is problematic. Anglo-American 
individualistic capitalism might well mesh into their argument correctly. However, European corporatist 
capitalism, often centred around family businesses, mixes kinship and capitalist logics.
789 Mousseau, M. and Mousseau, D. (2008) T h e  Contracting Roots o f Human Rights’ in Journal o f Peace 
Research 45(3) p3 3 0 /1
790 Ibid.
791 Ibid.
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neutral, rationalised mediation of the expectations o f the atomised self and stranger, too 
often those languages are resurrected which encourage partisan in-group logics of practice.
Fifthly, kinship discourse, by offering a symbol and promise of the very best and most 
positively valued sets of behaviour for international society, can lead to a credibility gap 
opening up between discourse and reality which can mean that allies lose faith in the UN 
project. In 1997, the year that China re-took control of Hong Kong and the Clinton 
Administration made a succession of commercial overtures to Beijing, Taiwan complained to 
the US and UN: “(W)e were told that the UN would be the family of nations, bringing peace, 
and helping the former colonial countries in Africa and Asia gain freedom and 
independence”792, and demanded to know why the UN and US were not standing up for 
Taiwan’s independence in the face of aggressive Chinese posturing.
Parallel to the practical reasons why kinship metaphors can often be distinctly unhelpful in 
international discourse, there exists a profound philosophical tension in the insertion of in­
group logics into a philosophical system informing the UN, which is essentially fixed upon 
the individual and the state-as-individual. This has been hinted at in the discussion above of 
the tension between the emphasis on singular kinship discourse tending towards uniformity 
in the world, and much of the UN’s work to help retain the diversity of the world’s nations 
and cultures. These tensions were initially noted in the responses of UN staff in Chapter 
Four, but the deeper philosophical tensions can now be examined.
792 See, Taiwan Communique no. 75, April 1997. ‘Open Letter to Vice President A1 Gore’. Available at: 
http: /  / www.taiwandc.org/twcom /75-nol .htm. Accessed on 09/09/2009.
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8.2 Does the ‘Human Community* or the ‘Family of Nations* Represent 
a Cohesive Philosophical Goal for International Politics?
Scholarship793 concerning the inconsistencies of the UN and its Charter, and the practical 
difficulties faced by the UN in retaining influence and relevance in the Cold War era and the 
post 9/11 era, has provided prisms through which to interrogate the viability of principles of 
the institution. Rather than rehash these lines of inquiry, the issue here is to confront the 
outcome of the exclusive authorship of the founding documents where a thorough 
presumption of the primacy of individual needs is overlain with an incongruous 
cosmopolitan moral framework which poses as communitarian. Specifically, the UN is 
concerned to be the champion of the individual human rights of people everywhere as 
human beings. However, the UN was designed and still operates not as a body with direct 
responsibility for the rights of the world’s citizens, but in a world dominated by sovereign 
states. The UN explicitly respects the rights of sovereign states in a classically communitarian 
sense o f permitting the communities of the world to be self-regulating. Despite these liberal 
individual and communitarian bents to the Charter, the kinship discourse we have looked at, 
(and other more general moral principles and aims of the Charter) constitutes a set of deeply 
cosmopolitan hopes for unification of values, purpose, even substance of the human 
community as the end goal of the UN project. This paradoxical mixture is graphically 
demonstrated by the following Articles of the Charter. The desire for a communal consensus 
against human rights abuses falls between the two stools of the individualism o f the human 
person to be protected, and the individualism of the sovereign state to be respected — the 
authors could countenance the abandonment of neither:
“Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorise the United Nations to intervene in matters which 
are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such 
matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of 
enforcement measures under Chapter V ll.,y04
‘ With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which are necessary for peaceful and 
friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of
793 For instance: Pollis, A. And Schwab P. (1979) Human Rights: Cultural and Ideological Perspectives. Murphy, 
S. (1996) Humanitarian Intervention: The United Nations in an Evolving World Order. Slaughter, A.M. (2005) 
‘Security, Solidarity and Sovereignty: The Grand Themes o f UN Reform’ The American Journal o f 
International Law 99(3), 619-631.
794 Charter o f the United Nations, Article 2:7. Available at: http://unyw .un.org/aboutun/ charter/chapter! .shtml. 
Accessed on 15/12/2008.
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peoples, the United Nations shall promote universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and 
fundamentalfreedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion. ’*95
“A ll Members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in co-operation with the Organisation for 
the achievement of the purposes setforth in Article 55.,y%
Unlike the League of Nations, the UN has never been catastrophically hamstrung by this 
patent inconsistency such that overall belief in the organisation has collapsed. In this, the 
UN-era perhaps has Great Power Security Council support to thank. Certainly litde 
philosophical innovation at the level presendy under discussion, marks the UN project as 
being of gready improved conceptual robustness. The continued presence o f these 
contradictions has opened a path for a history of storms of criticism which has tracked the 
UN in the same way as the League, though with less damaging effect. Such criticism is 
especially apparent when (as in the Darfur example) the UN’s actions, while often providing 
global public goods which have no other possible provider in the world of self-interested 
nation-states, still fall short o f the grand sweep of its moral mission. Writers and advocates in 
the early twentieth century, as we have seen, attempted to resolve this problem by arguing 
that the successor to the League ought to be an organisation aimed at world government. In 
other words, they aimed to resolve the philosophical inconsistency of attempting to unite 
concern for individual and communitarian particularist rights, with Utopian cosmopolitan 
discourse. They saw a means to this end in removing the major practical obstacle to the 
building of a human political community — the nation-state. In order to better understand the 
philosophically compromised hybridity o f the UN structure that emerged from the planning 
process, the following sections investigate further the historical treatments o f the problems 
of world community that formed the immediate backdrop to the planning process in the US, 
particularly the aforementioned debates between John Dewey and Walter Lippmann on the 
necessity o f a global community and a global public. While the character of the system of 
states may have altered over the lifetime of the UN due to increasing economic and 
globalisation and the broadening and deepening o f what Roland Robertson terms 
“consciousness of the world as a whole”797 through the development of international media,
795 Charter o f the United Nations, Article 55c. Available at: 
h ttp :/Avww.un.org/aboutun/charter/chapter9.shtml. Accessed on 16/12/2008.
796 Charter o f the United Nations Article 56. Available at h ttp ://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/chapterO.shtml 
Accessed on 16/12/2008.
797 Robertson, R. (1992) Globalisation: Social Theory and Global Culture
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little has been attempted at the international institutional level to hasten a thorough revision 
o f the oligarchic anarchy of state power. Though international presences in the field of 
health, education and peacekeeping are tolerated by states, the toleration is always 
conditioned upon the temporary nature of these forms of intervention. The UN remains, all 
the way down to its name, an association of states-as-individuals.
Accepting the limits upon the active capacity of the organisation in such a way, while still 
retaining a moral philosophy centred around an unsurpassable cosmopolitan set of principles, 
embeds into the organisation a contradiction most vividly visible in times of crisis. Precisely 
at times of crisis when the moral mission of the UN is held up as the brightest beacon to lead 
the international community, the disjunction between the promise of its cosmopolitan ideals 
and the limits o f the UN’s acceptance of state individualism, produce wrangling and 
accusations which often prove highly cosdy in terms of stalling potential action. Using kin 
metaphors to hyperbolise the cosmopolitan reach of UN ideals widens this disjunction and 
further stretches the expectations latent in discourse to unrealistic levels, as noted in the 
impassioned but unrealistic Taiwanese complaints against the US above.
Moreover, the kin metaphor, being located on the cosmopolitan side of the international 
vocabulary of the UN-era, is a powerful and emotive aid, not only for advocating 
humanitarian assistance, but also may be mobilised by nation-states (the UN having no 
independent offensive forces) for military expeditions which state their missions in 
humanitarian terms. As a bystander to such adventures, but touting the banner of the 
philosophies which inspire them, the UN is backed by its own contradictions into a comer 
where it appears toothless compared to its constituent parts and is reduced to managing the 
fallout. Fairly, or not, the UN is frequently crucified for not organising action, for instance 
over Darfur, and failing to live up to its ideals. On the other hand, when a nation state such 
as the US takes these matters into their own hands, for instance over Iraq, the international 
community and the UN must look carefully at the contradictions of their own philosophies 
when attempting to distance themselves from the consequences of unilateral military 
intervention. In justifying invading Iraq after all, the US did not invent a panoply of new 
discourses, nor use exclusively American ones. As well as striking out in defence of its own
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‘security’, it revamped those global humanitarian discourses enshrined in the UN, which were 
designed by Americans sixty years ago.
Grand UN rhetoric, after all, purports to be the values of the human community and is 
derived from historical attempts to reconcile liberal individual and global cosmopolitan 
impulses in the desire to organise the world as it has globalised technologically and 
economically over the course of the twentieth century.798 The project of the UN planners can 
be thought of in terms of Michael Walzer’s characterisation of the communitarian (as 
opposed to liberal) political philosophy: “interpreting) to one’s fellow citizens the world of 
meanings that we share.”799 This ‘community’ has been posited as a fact of international life 
and metaphorised in multiple hyperboles since the founding of the UN and in the decades 
before, as the League crumbled. The First World War had seemed to prove the fruitlessness 
of managing world politics by means o f unstable alliances wherein common purposes were 
only negative (the prevention o f conflict) rather than positive (the sharing of ideals). In 
interwar America, the cradle o f the UN planners of the 1940s, the idea of fostering wider 
senses of public community culminated in a high profile debate between Walter Lippmann 
and John Dewey. In an age of the introduction of mass-production and global corporations, 
increasingly interconnected global commerce and international travel, Lippmann argued that 
the ‘public’, that idealised institution that had been the scales of judgement for the first 
American communities of the eighteenth century, was now a phantom, a “spectator in the 
back row.”800 Lippmann reflected the concerns o f Rousseau’s republican ideal: “ (W)hat 
people, then, is a fit subject for legislation? One...already bound by some unity of origin, 
interest, or convention, has never yet felt the real yoke o f law; one that has neither customs 
nor superstitions deeply ingrained...one in which every member may be known by every 
other.”801
798 One might argue that the economic and technological globalisation occurred under the noses o f the world’s 
politicians and the international organisation’ attempts to institute common human values are the concomitant 
push towards political globalisation.
799 Walzer, M. (1983) Spheres o f Justice: A Defense o f Pluralism and Equality p. xiv
800 Lippmann, W. (1925) The Phantom Public p i3
801 Rousseau, J-J- (1762) The Social Contract or Principles of Political Right (trans. G.D.H. Cole, public domain) 
Book II, Ch X. Available at: h ttp ://www.constitution.org/jjr/socon 02.htm#010. Accessed on 01/01/2009.
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Dewey similarly opined the degeneration o f the public based on the assumption that, as 
Daniel Trohler notes, “politicians no longer governed, but that ‘Big Business’ did.”802 On 
account of this impersonal force severing the public from those who represented it, no true 
community (bound by shared moral agreements) existed any longer because the will o f the 
people was not able to be enacted. Dewey took it that modernity had built a ‘Great Society’ 
based on the “ideology of individualism, the dominance o f capitalism, (and) the uniformity of 
human beings.”803 Unlike Lippmann, Dewey did not believe that the erosion of 
communitarian politics and the public was permanent, but instead sought ways to transform 
the ‘Great Society’ domestically, into a ‘Great Community’ worldwide.
Predictably, as a great theorist o f education, Dewey stressed the need for communication and 
development o f pedagogic and humanising social organisation as central to building any sort 
o f community. This was, in some ways, based upon a nostalgic images of American 
communities o f the eighteenth century and a forerunner to Habermas’s models of idealised 
communicative democracy804. Clearly however, such a community at a global level cannot be 
formed on the basis of actual face-to-face communications. None of the experience of being 
a community can be replicated, in Dewey’s eyes, at the global level, simply by asserting that 
such a human community exists. “Fraternity, liberty and equality isolated from communal life 
are hopeless abstractions. Their separate assertion leads to mushy sentimentalism or else to 
extravagant and fanatical violence which in the end defeats its own aims.”805 Instead Dewey 
reinforced the implicit link between kinship and community, working not simply at the level 
o f metaphor, but in the practical formation of humanised individuals — “(D)emocracy must 
begin at home, and its home is the neighbourly community.”806 And further: “(I)n its deepest 
and richest sense a community must always remain a matter of face-to-face intercourse. This 
is why the family and the neighbourhood...have always been the chief agencies of nurture.”807 
Dewey argued that the surest basis o f community was neither liberty (“independence of 
social ties...dissolution and anarchy”808) nor equality (“a creed of mechanical identity”809) but
802 Trohler, D . (2000) T h e  Global Community, Religion and Education: The Modernity o f Dewey’s Social 
Philosophy’ in Studies in  Philosophy and Education 19 p i  67
803 Ibid. p l60
804 See for instance, Habermas, J. (1984) The Theory o f Communicative Action
805 Dewey, J. (1927) The Public and Its Problems p l49
806 Ibid. p213
807 Ibid. p211
808 Dewey, J. (1927) The Public and Its Problems p i 50
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bonds o f “ fraternally shared experience.”810 Dewey wrote: “(I)t is more difficult to sever the 
idea of brotherhood from that o f community, and hence it is either practically ignored in the 
movements which identify democracy with Individualism, or else it is a sentimentally 
appended tag. In its just connection with communal experience, fraternity is another name 
for the consciously appreciated goods which accrue from an association in which all share, 
and which give direction to the conduct of each.”811
Though Dewey bound kinship metaphors to his idealisations of local communities, he 
recognised that the character of the global Great Community could never aim to be a grand 
replica of fraternal local communities writ large. Instead he envisaged only “free and mutual 
communications between informed people, who thus form a public and regulate the 
relationships between local associations.”812 At this level, interwar scholarship, news media 
and politicians’ calls for a closer knit family of nations or human community, and the UN 
grand rhetoric which echoed and solidified these sentiments, stretched the connection 
between kinship and community to the extent of philosophically exceeding the 
communitarian notions they supposedly relied upon. In the contexts o f the original questions 
asked by Dewey, Lippmann and others, aiming to unite a ‘human family’ is absurd while 
aiming to create a global public, “a diffuse and seminal intelligence”813 based on 
communication, is not.
Through the supposition of a human community (and further through the supposition of 
unsurpassable moral authority), the UN planners rolled out a forcible cosmopolitan doctrine 
purporting to apply principles to all people as ‘human’ individuals. As David Mortice states, 
such philosophy is concerned with the “objective justification of universally applicable 
political principles.”814 In fact, the UN documents rarely hint at any need for justification at 
all, so ‘objective’ are the principles and so “inherent” are the “equal and inalienable rights of
809 Dewev, J. (1927) The Public and Its Problems pl49
810 Ibid. p218
811 Ibid. p l50
812 Trohler, D. (2000) T h e  Global Community, Religion and Education: The Modernity o f Dewey’s Social 
Philosophy’ in Studies in  Philosophy and Education 19 pl74
813 Dewey, J. (1927) The Public and Its Problems p217/8
814 Morrice, D. (2000) T h e  Liberal-Communitarian Debate in Contemporary Political Philosophy and its 
Significance for International Relations’ in Review o f International Studies 26, p238/9
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all members o f the human family”813 taken to be. As we have seen in the case of the 
Lebanese conflict however, the language of family and community is still used to divide the 
world into ‘us’ and ‘them’. By providing a language purporting to universal validity and 
morality, the import o f these claims is potentially extrapolated to the highest degree. O f 
course, the UN’s founding rhetoric was formed in response to the atrocities of the Axis in 
World War Two, while Livni’s exclusion o f the Iranians in the statements at the start of the 
this chapter is a we/they distinction made on the basis of somewhat less dire division. 
Nevertheless, it is Livni’s choice to invoke precisely the rhetoric institutionalised in response 
to World War Two that maps these discourses together and brings echoes of the universal 
import of the moral founding of the UN into her condemnation of Iran. What Morrice refers 
to as the “communitarian meta-ethical claim, that morality is relative to community”816 is 
taddy acknowledged in world politics where we can use universal human community/family 
discourses to position certain portions of humanity as being outside that ‘universal’ group.
Its cosmopolitan overtones and assertions notwithstanding, the world the UN confronts is 
still one where the following Rawlsian question and problematic remains relevant:
‘‘how is it possible that there can be a stable and just society whose free and equal citizens are deeply divided 
by conflicting and even incommensurable religious, philosophical and moral doctrines?...In such a society, a 
reasonable comprehensive doctrine cannot secure the basis of social unity, nor can it provide the content of 
public reason on fundamentalpolitical questions. ’*17
Recognition of separate, existing, community-based doctrines of moral action is still present 
in UN and global political discourse despite assertions that what purports to represent moral 
orthodoxy is universal. Rawls, though this may be contested, argues that the necessary action 
for ending this disjunction between the ‘truth’ of cosmopolitan discourse and the ‘truth’ of 
community based moral beliefs, would be oppressive: “(I)f we think of political sodety as a 
community united in affirming one and the same comprehensive doctrine, then the 
oppressive use state power is necessary for political community.”818 He refers to the
815 Universal Declaration o f the Human Rights (1948) ‘Preamble’. Accessed on Jan 6th 2009, accessed at: 
h ttp : //w w w .un.org/Overview/rights.html. See Appendix B.
816 Morrice, D. (2000) T h e  Liberal-Communitarian Debate in Contemporary Political Philosophy and its 
Significance for International Relations’ in Review of International Studies 26, p244
817 Rawls, J. (1993) Political Liberalism p l3 3 /4
818 Ibid. p37
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Inquisition’s defence of Christian orthodoxy by way of example, but invasive projects of 
democratic state building today such as in the War on Terror may fit just as well.
The closed circle of the UN planners produced a discourse wherein the principle tenets are 
more completely sensible and justifiable when taken as products of the community of ideas 
o f which the authors were a part. Introducing languages of universality borne out in 
metaphors of community and kinship which, in spite of their benevolence, stand antithetical 
to the liberal individualism of the UN-era world, has not been wholly productive, especially 
when we bear in mind the frustrations of UN staff themselves as outlined in Chapter Four. 
While such people generally expressed allegiance to, and admiration for, such universal 
values, seldom do they find them to be useful in the way the planners expected and moreover 
often they find them counter-productive in convincing governments and citi2ens around the 
world to back or participate in UN projects. The same frustration may be noted over cases 
such as the inactivity during the Darfur crisis. These languages may be used to cut across 
respect for difference and diversity, whilst also closing down channels for debate on the 
philosophical fundamentals of the UN mission which members of UN staff have often 
lamented as inflexibly Western. On the positive side, as the speakers in Chapter Four also 
noted, the UN has also presided over a period without total global war in which its grandest 
principles have gradually been entrenched as political norms in increasing numbers of new 
and old democratic states across the globe, while reliable partners of these international 
values have been made even in some of the world’s remaining autocracies. The institutional 
stability and greatly broadened membership of the UN has certainly increased its ability to act 
as a forum for generating consensus on international norms. It is far from clear however, 
given the similarity of the normative visions of the League and the UN, that the grand 
principles of the latter can be directly credited with such successes. Overall political stability 
is too historically contingent to be attributed wholly to normative lessons of international 
politics, even those painfully leamt not once, but through two world wars.
The Charter, presented as a fa it accompli by the Sponsoring Powers at San Francisco, was 
problematic to many middle and lesser ranking states, but, due to the continuing global 
conflict, only token opportunities for debate were granted. As David McKendree Key wrote 
in 1954 during proposals for Charter review, “many states had accepted Charter provisions
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to which they had strong objections on the understanding that there would be opportunity to 
review these provisions at the end of ten years.”819 The 1945 Charter made provision that 
“(I)f...a conference has not been held before the tenth annual session of the General 
Assembly...the proposal to call such a conference shall be placed on the agenda of that 
session.”820 However, “disillusionment”821 with the UN, especially over Soviet ability to veto 
much of its work, while initially leading to widespread desire for reform, did not eventually 
lead to such a conference being held. As Shirley Scott notes, having consulted public opinion, 
US political leaders, especially John Foster Dulles, began to express doubts as to whether 
Charter review would amount to anything other than giving rein to “starry-eyed amateurs 
who wish to advance the millennium of which they were deprived by the bungling of the 
Founding Fathers in San Francisco.”822 In the event, in a climate where the major powers had 
great reservations about review (the US feared enflaming tensions with the Soviet Union, the 
UK feared having to make further concessions over decolonisation) the review that had 
originally been keenly desired by the smaller powers was discussed in muted debates in 1955, 
put off, and never seriously taken up again.
Parading the supposed dawn of a ‘new world order’ using grand languages o f unity in 
documents which have never been submitted to revisions from the whole UN membership, 
the UN-era has asserted as present and existing, a global political and moral consensus which 
is an end goal but not yet a reality. Consonant with this grand rhetoric and the absence of 
global wars o f the devastation witnessed prior to the UN’s formation, the appearance of a 
seismic shift towards consensus has been presented in international discourse. Closer and 
more widespread consensus on many issues certainly has been enabled by the presence of a 
large scale international institutional network. However, grand rhetorics of the universal UN 
family and community open up languages for the overestimation of the transformation of 
politics in the UN-era. The UN’s first forty years were overshadowed by the great
819 McKendree Key, D. (1954) ‘United States Planning for Charter Review’ in American Academy o f Political 
and Social Science 296, p i52
820 Charter o f the United Nations, Article 109(3). Available at: 
h ttp : /  /  www.u n . org /  aboutun / charter / chap ter 18. sh tml. Accessed on 10/01 /2009.
821 McKendree Key, D. (1954) ‘United States Planning for Charter Review’ in American Academy o f Political 
and Social Science 296, p i53
822 Dulles in conversation with Canadian diplomats: ‘The Permanent Delegate of Canada to the United Nations, 
New York to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa, 4 February 1954, A AA1838 851/10/1 Pt2’ 
quoted in Scott, S. (2005) T h e  Failure o f the Unto Hold a Charter Review Conference in the 1950s: The Future 
in the Past’ in Australia and N ew  Zealand Law and History E-Joumal 2005, p75
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geopolitical and ideological conflicts of the Cold War, and numerous wars have proliferated 
in the post-colonial Global South, often involving powers from the North. Only the restraint 
of the exercise of power between the nations of the functioning core might be safely 
attributed to the sense of community touted as characteristic of UN era.
Even this closed ‘family’ of Western democracies, springing from the Western core of the 
wartime allies, may be thrown into question. As Christopher Layne shows823, pre-UN 
conflicts between democracies were avoided perhaps more based on realist concerns than the 
solidarity of common democracy. Post-UN, the solidarity of anti-communist fear and a 
closer intertwining of economic fortunes have been more commonly advanced rather than 
notions of ‘community’ for such a functioning core o f peace.824 Theories of the democratic 
peace provide multiple explanatory mechanisms which avoid any notion of emotive bonds or 
community. Rasler and Thompson825, for instance, list prominent explanations of democratic 
peace such as economic growth and interdependence826, satisfaction with the status quo 
which has favoured them in the past827 as well as several variants based on the notion of 
avoiding war due to the restraining power of an enfranchised citi2enry.828 Citizens in liberal 
democracies may benefit from strong civil society which can lobby against warlike policy, 
they have the ability to punish the makers of rash and cosdy foreign policy by electoral 
rejection and the transparency o f open democracy means that unpopular decisions cannot 
easily be taken without public outcry. Even in strands of democratic peace theory which 
emphasise normative, shared-value contributions to creating zones of peace, this is almost 
always given as a partial, not full explanation. John Owen, for example, strongly argues for 
the contributions of liberal values to democratic peace. His model however, shows the 
effects of values in producing not only direct anti-aggressive ideological constraints on policy,
823 Layne, C. (1994) ‘Kant or Cant? The Myth o f the Democratic Peace’ in International Security 19(2). Layne
uses 19th century examples and also the French invasion o f the Ruhr in 1923.
824 Even works such as Risse-Kappen, T. (1995) Co-operation Among Democracies: The European Influence on 
US Foreign Policy which focus on the common identity bonds forged between the Western Allies do so in 
context o f more realist explanations for solidarity.
825 See Rasler, K. and Thompson, W. R. (2005) Puzzles o f the Democratic Peace: Theory,. Geopolitics, and the 
Transformation o f World Politics chi.
826 See Lipset, S.M. (1959) ‘Some Social Requisites for Democracy: Economic Development and Political 
Legitimacy’ in American Political Science Review 53, Thompson, W. R. (1996) T)emocracy and Peace: 
Putting the Cart Before the Horse?’ in International Organization 50.
827 Modelski G. (1999) ‘The Short and Long o f Global Politics in the Twenty-First Century: An Evolutionary
Approach’ in International Studies Review 1.
828 For example Doyle, M. (1986) ‘Liberalism and World Politics’ in American Political Science Review 80(4)
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but also institutional constraints.829 Liberal values establish institutions which promote debate 
or lobby against government.
Attempts then to mobilise change (‘to stir men’s minds’ as Archibald MacLeish desired) on a 
global scale through such rhetoric as human kinship has proven much more difficult and 
complex than the planners imagined. Even in Owen’s argument, which heavily privileges the 
contribution of value statements, the transmission between statements of value and ‘men’s 
minds’ is only a small part of the picture. Philosophical confusion dogs such rhetoric even 
within the functioning core and only peace within that core has been fostered, though 
whether this can be attributed to such sentiments is unlikely. Transmitting such a 
comprehensive doctrine in a meaningful way outside o f the functioning core without a 
broader consensus upon the value system at its heart, has proved problematic especially in 
the latest round of militaristic adventures (such as Iraq and Afghanistan) in the name of the 
values at the core of the UN/W estern mission. Further, in recent times, the language of 
kinship specifically has been appropriated by organisations which have radicalised its 
meanings, rather than making them more universally viable.
8.3 The Flourishing of the Human Family Discourse -  Religious 
Retrenchment
Despite the charted decline of references to world kinship in NGO  and political circles in the 
recent and contemporary period, kinship discourses have remained central and flourished in 
religious circles, especially Christian circles. By situating kinship discourses as the prime 
referent o f religious circles, this contributes to the reluctance (observed in Chapters Four to 
Six) of political and NGO speakers to use these referents, isolating them in a religious zone 
of anachronism and at the extreme fringes of politics. Kinship discourses again decline in 
usefulness to political actors as, through the patterns we have observed, they have become a 
less common formulation in the political mainstream in the UN-era. We might then take a 
wholly negative view o f the founding entrenchment of kinship metaphors in the UN project
829 Owen, J.M. (1994) ‘How Liberalism Produces the Democratic Peace’ in International Security 19(2).
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as unnecessarily tying symbolic referents of the Western Christian model of the patriarchal 
family to the international architecture o f the new world order. We might see the 
contemporary trends of increasingly selective and cautious usage of kinship rhetoric in 
political arenas on the one hand, and increasingly visible radical kinship rhetoric used by 
religious institutions and fringe organisations on the other, as a path into revision of the 
language of the founding documents in a positive way. If the religious adoption of kinship 
discourse eventually leaves documents such as the UNDR and the Charter seeming 
sentimental, anachronistic and politically unsound because of their ties to discourses with 
substantial religious resonances, then perhaps the documents can be redrawn to find more 
inclusive, realisable, practical goals for united efforts that will better suit and better motivate 
the world to address the new challenges of the twenty-first and twenty-second centuries.
Bearing out the notion of the problematic lack of review of the Charter and the core 
philosophies o f the Declaration of Human Rights, allied to the narrow (almost exclusively 
American) original authorship, 1990 saw a parallel declaration of human rights adopted by 
forty-five o f the foreign ministers of the Organisation o f the Islamic Conference - The Cairo 
Declaration of Human Rights in Islam.830 This outcome had stemmed from the resurgence of 
statements of unique Islamic identity in particular on behalf of the new Islamic Republic of 
Iran in the early 1980s. In 1981, their Ambassador to the UN, Said Rejaie-Khorassani, called 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights “a secular understanding of the Judeao-Christian 
tradition”831 which could not be fully adopted without trespassing upon Islamic law. He later 
expounded at the UN General Assembly’s Third Committee in 1984:
“In his delegation's view, the concept of human rights was not limited to the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights. Man was of divine origin and human dignity could not be reduced to a series of secular norms [...] 
certain concepts contained in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights needed to be revised. [Iran] 
recognised no authority or power but that of Almighty God and no legal tradition apartfrom Islamic law. A s  
his delegation had already stated at the thirty-sixth session of the General Assembly, conventions, declarations 
and resolutions or decisions of international organisations, which were contrary to Islam had no validity in the 
Islamic Republic of Iranf...] The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which represented a secular
830 Cairo Declaration o f Human Rights in Islam, (1990). Available at: 
http:/  / www.religlaw.org/interdocs/docs / cairohrislaml990.htm. Accessed on 10/01/2009.
831 See Littman, D. (1999) ‘Universal Human Rights and “Human Rights in Islam’” in M idstream  F eb /M a r 
1999. Available at: http://www.dhimm i.org/Islam.html. Accessed on 10/01/2009.
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understanding of the Judeo-Christian tradition, could not be implemented by Muslims and did not accord with 
the system of values recognised by the Islamic ~Republic of Iran.>e}2
These outbursts, and the Cairo declaration which crystallised them, presented a criticism of 
the legitimacy o f single set of principles on human rights which echoed earlier Soviet 
criticisms of a lack o f cultural tolerance833. While it might seem easy to dismiss Islamic 
challenges as an mingling of religion and politics which the UDHR was designed to avoid, 
the criticisms were sufficient for the UN to sponsor a conference on ‘Islamic Perspectives on 
the UDHR’ for the 50th anniversary o f that document in 1998834.
The import of the critique can be taken in two ways. Firsdy, the wide-ranging nature of the 
Islamic disaffection may be taken as proof of the offensive Western Judaeo-Christian bias of 
the UN system. Particularly, one might tag the use of kinship rhetoric as having specific links 
to Judaeo-Christian religion. However, it is interesting to note that the Islamic document 
itself has a slight reformulation of the familiar kinship rhetoric of the UNDR as its own 
Article One: “(A)ll human beings form one family whose members are united by submission 
to God and descent from Adam. All men are equal in terms of basic human dignity and 
basic obligations and responsibilities, without any discrimination on the grounds of race, 
colour, language, sex, religious belief, political affiliation, social status or other 
considerations.”835 Further, aside from this Islamic critique it is worth noting that the 
organisations such as the Red Crescent work in tandem with the Christian Red Cross and 
judiciously maintain their ‘Seven Fundamental Principles’836, adopted in 1965, as highly 
pragmatic statements avoiding any world kinship discourses, aspirational ideals or any 
discourse which could be construed as being Judaeo-Christian in inspiration. N ot only does 
this demonstrate that the Islamic critique of the Cairo declaration is not sufficient to prevent 
Islamic cooperation in large scale INGO work, but also that international institutions with
832 Littman, D. (1999) ‘Universal Human Rights and “Human Rights in Islam’” in Midstream Feb/M ar 1999. 
Available at: h ttp ://wwwxlhimmi.org/Islam.htrnl. Accessed on 10/01/2009.
833 See Morsink, J. (2000) The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Origins. Drafting and Intent for details o f 
Soviet criticism. In essence the Russians emphasised that Western individual and political rights clashed with 
Communist social and economic rights.
834 Littman, D. (1999) ‘Universal Human Rights and “Human Rights in Islam’” in Midstream Feb/M ar 1999. 
Available at: h ttp :/ Avww.dhimmi.org/Islam.html. Accessed on 10/01/2009.
835 Cairo Declaration o f Human Rights in Islam, (1990). Available at: 
http://www.religlaw.org/interdocs/docs/cairohrislaml 99Q.htm. Accessed on 11/01/2009.
836 See, International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. ‘Seven Fundamental Principles.’ 
Available at: h ttp : //www.ifrc.org/what/values/principles/index.asp. Accessed on 03/09/2009.
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highly moral missions do not, to be successful, require grandiose and unrealistic 
rhetoric of world kinship or unity of values to accomplish great improvements in the 
welfare world society.
This is not to dismiss outright the need for a sense o f mission. As Stephen Hopgood charts 
in his investigation into Amnesty International, the challenge for such organisations is 
precisely balancing sacred, disinterested respect for their values, with active interests in the 
profane world of politics to maintain moral and political authority. Hopgood describes the 
ethos o f Amnesty and its founders as a “secular religion” of bearing witness to the abuses of 
human rights. This disinterested ethic, refusing to take sides or give political advice, has, he 
argues, “helped to make and shape morality”837, and by their example, the initial ‘keepers of 
the flame’ have drawn political activists to the cause. He cautions however that “impartial 
morality must become consequential to be practical”838 but notes also that as soon as an 
organisation seeks political authority and interests, it becomes wedded to a particular 
conception of those interests which may alienate others. This is the position we have 
acknowledged with reference to UN values. Both Amnesty and the UN are treated as sacred 
objects and as spurs to practical action. As Hopgood notes, an organisation only concerned 
with timeless, disinterested values would become a “museum piece”; one only concerned 
with the contemporary tides of politics would “ossify...from within.”839 Precisely these 
tensions open up the space for the Islamic critique o f the UN and also the ability of religious 
organisations to cooperate with the UN.
At the heart o f the Cairo Islamic critique are two factors. Firstly, especially in the Iranian 
case, is the desire to establish the supremacy of shari’a as the fount of decisions upon the 
rights o f the individual and the community. In a sense, this decision is inward-facing - shari’a 
represents an ideological system all o f its own — and there is little other than compromise on 
meanings, semantics and thereafter policy, that the wider international community can 
contribute to such a turn. If the UDHR and the UN more broadly is deemed illegitimate 
because of its not being rooted in shari’a, then there is very little possible dialogue or 
refutation available on this point. Concerning the second factor, the issue of the UDHR
837 Hopgood, S. (2006) Keepers o f the Flame: Understanding Amnesty International p216
838 Ibid. p213
839 Ibid. p223
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being a secular version of Judaeo-Christian theology, the question o f debate across cultures 
opens up again, and the situation of kinship discourse once more becomes central since, 
more than anything, it is in using the language of kinship that the secular (and therefore 
supposedly universal) aims of the UN become retrenched in Judeao-Christian discourse on 
world-making.
As Brent Nelsen argues with relation to the rhetoric surrounding the establishment of the 
European Community in the decades after the Second World War, the Catholic Church 
institutionally and philosophically provides a strong tradition of notions o f supranational 
authority, both moral and political:
“Catholic universalism — with its desire to bring the whole of humanity into the Christian community, its 
insistence on the visible nature of that community, and its reliance on universalpapal authority backed by 
medieval notions of universal empire — provided the ideological justification for a world without sacrosanct 
national borders.,m0
Allied to this observation, it has been the Holy See which, over recent decades, has been the 
most consistent high-profile advocator of the notion o f the human family, the world-as- 
family and the need for the strengthening of family-like ties among the disparate and 
conflicting groups in the world. Unlike in the cases of debates on UN policy and 
international crises involving political leaders, ambassadors, NGOs and news media, wherein 
languages of kinship formed an exceptional alternative to prevalent notions o f international 
community, in the contributions of the Holy See, kinship discourse is almost ubiquitous, and 
squarely rivals the prevalence of IC references.
In the case o f the Darfur crisis, the Vatican representative to the UN called the humanitarian 
disaster a “deep scar on the human family.”841 At the start of the War on Terror, the Vatican 
strenuously advised against the US prosecution of invasive war. The pope sent a mission to 
Baghdad in February 2003 under Cardinal Roger Etchegaray. In discussion with La 
Repubblica that month, the cardinal stated: “(T)he war would be a catastrophe in all senses. 
In the first place it would have serious consequences for the people of Iraq and further, it
840 Nelsen, B. (2005) ‘Europe as a Christian Club: Religion and the Founding o f the European Community, 1950- 
1975, The Ideological Dimension’, conference paper delivered at the Annual Meeting o f the American Political 
Science Association 2005, p3.
841 Msgr. Fortunatus Nwachukwu (2005), Speech to the General Assembly, March 10th 2005. Available at: 
http: /  / www.catholicnewsagency.com/new.php?n=r3348. Accessed on 11/01/2009.
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would render more and more difficult the completion of the UN’s efforts towards unifying 
the human family.”842 John Paul II also turned on the terrorists in his Easter message of 
2003, demanding “an end to the chain of hatred and terrorism, which threatens the orderly 
development of the human family.”843
For many years the Vatican’s most public messages have been saturated with references to 
the building o f the ‘human family’ to the extent of becoming a marked motif o f the discourse 
o f the Holy See when addressing world affairs. Multiple addresses on World Peace Day in 
the pontificates of John Paul II and Benedict XVI have stressed the fostering of a sense of 
the world as a ‘human family’ as critical to strengthening zones of peace across the globe. 
Benedict’s most recent address844 in 2009 referenced the notion liberally, while his 2008 
message took for its theme, ‘The Human Family, A Community of Peace845’. This address 
reinforced the ‘natural’ transmission upwards and outwards of the positive associations of the 
Western/Christian notion of the nurturing nuclear family to a model for nurturing a peaceful 
world family:
“The language of the family is a language of peace... The social community, i f  it is to live in peace, is also 
called to draw inspiration from the values on which the family community is based. This is as true for local 
communities as it is for national communities; it is also true for the international community itself, for the 
human family which dwells in that common house which is the earth... A  family lives in peace if  all its 
members submit to a common standard: this is what prevents selfish individualism and brings individuals 
together, fostering their harmonious coexistence and giving direction to their work. This principle, obvious as it 
is, also holds true for wider communities: from local and national communities to the international community 
itself.’*46
Benedict’s later address to the UN General Assembly in April 2008 made numerous 
references to the notion of human family including the guarded assessment that “(t)hrough
842 Etchegaray, R. (2003), author’s translation. Original text: “La guerra sarebbe una catastrofe sotto tutti gli 
aspetti. Innanzitutto avrebbe gravi conseguenze per il popolo iracheno e poi renderebbe sempre piu difficili gli 
sforzi che l'Onu compie per l'unita della famiglia umana”. Available at: 
http: /  / www.repubblica.it/online/esteri/ Iraqventiquattro/ cardinale /cardinale.html. Accessed on 15/01/2009.
843 John Paul II (2003), Urbi et Orbi Message, 20 April 2003. Available at: 
http://wuqy.vafican.va/holy father/john paul ii/m essages/urbi/docum cnts/hf jp-ii mes 20030420 easter- 
urbi en.html. Accessed on 12/01/2009.
844 Benedict XVI (2009), ‘Fighting Poverty to Build Peace’, 1st January 2009. Available at:
http:/ /www.Vatican:va/holy father/benedict xvi/m essages /p eace/docum ents/h f ben-xvi mes 20081208 xlii- 
world-dav-peace en.html. Accessed on 10/01/2009.
845 Benedict XVI (2008) T h e  Human Family: A Community o f Peace’, 1st January 2008. Available at:
http://www.vatican.va/holy father/benedict xvi /messages/peace /documents /h f  ben-xvi mes 20071208 xli- 
world-day-peace en.html. Accessed on 10/01/2009.
846 Ibid.
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the United Nations, States have established universal objectives which, even if they do not 
coincide with the total common good of the human family, undoubtedly represent a 
fundamental part o f that good.”847 John Paul II’s address to the UN in 1995848 using similar 
language of building a shared awareness of being a family of nations and many other 
addresses by the late pope, particularly on World Peace Day in 1998, 1994 and 1979 employ 
strong usage of such language.
Further, the Vatican has addressed such events as the establishment of the International 
Criminal Court and the recent 60th anniversary of the signing of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights in the same terms. In debates on the setting up of the ICC, the papal legate 
Archbishop Renato Martino commented that:
‘The Holy ^ ee supports every  eff°rt to establish effective juridical structures for safeguarding the dignity and 
fundamental rights of individuals and communities. Such structures however can never be sufficient in 
themselves; they are only mechanisms which need to be inspired by afirm and persevering moral commitment to 
the good of the human family as a whole. ...Those who are responsible for violations of the most heinous crimes 
which offend the conscience of the human family, the crimes which willfall under the jurisdiction of this Court 
must be made to accept their responsibility in accordance with universal norms. ..I t is indeed the right of society 
to manifest, by means of law and juridical structures, those objective and eternal values which protect and order 
the human family and human dignity. A s  an instrument of justice, such a Court must be conceived as a 
means of seeking not revenge but the restoration of that right relationship within the human family which will 
lead to reconciliation.,£49
In a similar vein, the Permanent Observer of the Holy See to the Office of the United 
Nations and Specialized Institutions in Geneva took the opportunity of the 60th anniversary 
of the UDHR to re-affirm the kinship language o f that original document. As the Catholic 
News Agency reported:
‘The prelate then encourage(d) the U.N. and its specialised agencies "to faithfully translate the principles of 
the Declaration into action by supporting States in the adoption of effective policies truly focused on the rights
847 Benedict XVI (2008), ‘Address to the General Assembly o f the United Nations, April 18th 2008’. Available at: 
www.cfr.org/publication/16065/pope benedict xvis speech at the united nations.html. Accessed on 
17/01/2009.
848 John Paul II (1995) ‘Address to the General Assembly of the United Nations, October 5th, 1995’. Available at: 
http://www.vatican.va/holy father/john paul ii/speeches/1995/october/docum ents/hf jp-
ii spe 05101995 address-to-uno en.html. Accessed on 10/12/2009. Many similar addresses such as those listed 
on various World Peace Days can be found at http://www.vatican.va.
849 Intervention o f Archbishop Martino, Head of the Vatican Delegation to the Diplomatic Conference on the 
ICC, Rome June 16, 1998. Available at: http: / / www.amicc.org/docs /Vatican del stmt.pdf. Accessed on 
13/01/2009.
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and sense of responsibility of everyone.” "Every human being, ” he went on, "has the right to an integral 
development and 'the sacred right' to live in peace ” Human rights are not solely the “entitlement to 
privilegesbut are rather the expression and the fruit of what is noblest in the human spirit: dignity, 
aspiration to freedom and justice, search for what is good, and the practice of solidarity. ” <eln the light of the 
tragic experiences of the past and of today, ” he concludes, °the human family can unite around these values 
and essentialprinciples, as a duty toward the weakest and needier and toward future generations. ”8S0
Such consistent usage of the kinship metaphor points back towards the aspirational markers 
identified in earlier chapters. The Catholic Church (and also other Christian groups851) is 
naturally better placed to speak of vague, future-oriented hopes than are politicians. Whilst 
Islamic and other critiques of the UDHR might founder due to the weakness and similar 
ethnocentrism of the alternatives proposed, the replication of the kinship discourse of the 
founding UN documents by religious groups serves to vindicate the charge that parochial 
(local and theological) religiosity is woven into what are supposed to be secular and universal 
statements. Whether the inspiration for such replication is to be found in the local religion 
itself (in this case Islam) or in the globalisation o f UN rhetoric, such that it is now difficult 
for other cultures to think outside its premises, is not o f real importance here. What is of 
importance is the act of replication of a discourse which aspires to be, but cannot be, 
universal. In fact, one might even argue that the common monotheism of Christianity and 
Islam, each with a requirement to conceive of one people (God’s people), predispose them to 
replicate each other’s notions of a universal human community.
Further, these kinship discourses, with their propensity to be used for expressing a new dawn 
o f unqualified hope and benevolence (due to the unequivocally positive connotations of 
kinship in this discourse) are further deployed in more extreme contexts. Notions of the 
centrality of the human family to divine planning for the world are at the heart of the creed 
o f the Prelature of the Holy Cross and Opus Dei: “(T)he family—the great human family, 
and each of the families that make it up—is one of the natural instruments desired by God so
850“‘New” human rights at risk o f becoming source o f ‘self-serving ideologies,’ cautions archbishop’, Dec 17th 
2008. Report o f Address by Archbishop Silvano Tomasi, Permanent Observer o f the Holy See to the Office of 
the United Nations and Specialized Institutions in Geneva. Available at: 
http:/ / www.catholicnewsagencv.com/new.php?=14649. Accessed on 11/01/2009.
851 See for instance, The Millennium World Peace Summit o f Religious and Spiritual Leaders’ Commitment to 
Global Peace which is permeated in almost every article with kinship discourse. Available at: http://www.wcc- 
coe.org/w cc/what/interreligious/ cd36-12.html. Or, the Archbishop o f Canterbury’s recent address on the U N ’s 
Millennium Development Goals, 24th July 2008. Available at: http://www.archbishopofcanterburv.org/2101. 
Accessed on 15/01/2009.
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that men and women could cooperate in an orderly way with his creative decree. God’s will 
in counting on the family in his plan o f salvation was confirmed, as time went on, through 
the various covenants that Yahve established with the ancient patriarchs: Noah, Abraham, 
Isaac, and Jacob.”852
The discourse o f the human family also finds itself expressed in a plethora of religiously 
oriented organisations, some simply pastoral in nature, others making real efforts to build 
memberships and funding for the bringing about of a true spirit of ‘kinship’ among the 
peoples o f the world. Articles and appeals disseminate this discourse online, DVDs and CDs 
o f sermons are sold and classes of spiritual self-improvement offered853. The following 
extended example from the charitable/spiritual organisation ‘World Blessings’ forms a 
perfect illustration of the ends to which this discourse can be put, mixing notions of the 
human family with UN-esque espousal common individual rights on the one hand, and 
dreams o f ‘spiritual light’ and ‘destiny’ on the other:
‘There are pivotal ideas that have changed the destiny of mankind and shaped its future...Such is the 
understanding of the oneness of the human family, of mankind - an idea that has been part of human 
consciousness for ages, yet one that has not attained its fu ll status as being real or relevant until today, when 
the planetary body itself is in danger, and when new possibilities appear within the hearts of many who are 
being influenced by expanding spiritual light upon the Earth. The idea of the human family relates not only to 
its essential oneness in terms of the basic needs and rights of every individual upon the Earth - the need and 
right to food, shelter, and a way of life free from fear. The idea of the human family relates also to the 
understanding that there is a basic kinship among mankind, a basic essence that we share together so that in 
heart, mind, body, and spirit, there is more that joins us than that separates us. ”
Revealing the dual markers of Western notions of kinships detailed in the previous chapter, 
the writer links notions of oneness to the biological commonality of needs and substance 
highlighted by a scientific outlook, with the deployment of kinship not as a nexus of 
inside/outside distinctions based solely upon status, but on truth of commonality ‘emerging 
from the heart’.
852 Romana: Bulletin o f the Prelature o f the Holy Cross and Opus Dei, ‘Editorial: A Divine Plan’ N o.43, July- 
Decem ber 2006. Available at: h ttp://en.rom ana.org/art/last 1.0 1. Accessed on 19/01/2009.
853 See for instance: Bell, R., Apprising Ministries, ‘Divine D irt Clods and the Emerging Global Family’ 
available at: http://apprising.org/2008/12/rob-bell-divine-dirt-c.lods-and-the-coming-global-family-of-god or 
The H um an Family Movement, www.humanfamilyrnovement.org. or The Real Presence, 
www.therealpresence.org. or PG Coaching — Humanity in the Workplace, Human Family Coaching, 
www.pgcoaching.co. uk. All accessed 20/01/2009.
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‘This perception, when taken to a deeper level of truth and reality, has radical consequences. For it means 
that we cannot separate the world any longer into those we love and those we hate, those who are with us and 
those who are against us. Indeed, we must find a way to achieve common ground even with those we hold 
profound differences with, recognising their humanity, recognising, that they, too, have the same underlying 
structure of needs and desires that define all that is human. We are in the process of discovering today, not a 
new truth about the physical, biological, or chemical structure of what it means to be human - although 
advances in science are revealing a great deal in these areas as well. Today, we are discovering a truth that 
emerges from the heart. ”
This discourse then explicitly bridges from the notion of the human family in two 
simultaneous directions. Firstly, in mirroring the hopes of the UN documents and the 
political discourse in the crisis case studies considered earlier, the writer links the positive 
connotations o f family relations within the world community to notions of the defence of 
liberty, rights and individual freedom consonant with the points of value-commonality of UN 
‘mission5 and American ‘values5 which have been recendy advanced in the War on Terror.
‘This truth emanates a sense of compassion, a desire for peace, a longing for honesty and an end to deception, 
an aversion to all that limits or restricts the rights of individuals to live freely. These ideals, illuminated by 
spiritual light, are glowing more brightly within the human heart, so that structures and policies that are 
detrimental to the right of individualfreedom are being questioned, policies that have been long established that 
have contained hidden motives or agendas are being uncovered, and practices that are restrictive to human 
liberty are being exposed. 55
The discourse finally pivots back into religious and spiritual tones in assertions of great 
vagueness. In these contexts, the invocation of the yawning metaphorical chasm between the 
family and the world, perhaps shows up best its potential power at the same time as its 
profound hollowness. Overlain with unequivocal positivity, it is appealing to both speakers in 
mainstream contexts like the UN, but also in more radical wings of debate such as in the 
writings of the spiritual and religious groups referred to here. Shot through at the same time 
with multiplicities of meaning and litde coherent political application, it can seem simply 
escapist. Reliant upon a particular construction of kinship as a sphere opposed to the public 
world of politics in Western social thought, this is precisely how this discourse functions to 
lead us out of the compromises, failings and divisions of politics towards a transformed 
future. It is in such contexts where the political work of nations and the UN imperils 
itself, by opening a credibility gap between its words and actions. This is due to, firsdy, 
the very ambition o f its moral mission, and secondly, the use of kinship metaphor which 
pivots so easily into Christian/new-age ethnocentrism and anti-political escapism:
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“A n  idea whose time has come may have been present in awareness long before this. It may even have been one 
commonly referred to, yet without understanding the fu ll consequence of its emergence into the light of day. Such 
is the idea of the 'human family', one in mind, heart, and spirit, waiting to recognise itself as one in body as 
well. For this 'body' of the human family is nothing other than the essence of Divine life and Divine energy 
that has lived within each human soulfrom the beginning of time. It is the essence of truth and of purity that 
has remained at the core, no matter what the exterior self has displayed. This Divine essence which links all 
in 'body' as well as in mind and heart, means that there is no longer an 'outsider' or 'other' that we may 
declare as such. This is the new and radical truth whose time has come. It has not yet fully arrived on the 
human scene, but is waiting in the wings. It is waiting for each one to awaken to the fu ll meaning of being 
One.’*54
It should not be supposed that this example is unique. Hundreds of Christian organisations855 
from the United States to Africa, employ the same referents. Moving beyond Christianity, we 
noted already the Islamic Cairo Declaration’s adoption o f the notion o f the human family. It 
is also a favourite referent of the Dalai Lama in many o f his global addresses along with the 
notions (equally dispersed), of brotherhood and sisterhood856. With regard to these non- 
Christian sources, the question is raised as to whether their replication o f these discourses 
means that they are still being used in the same Western Christian way that they were 
originally set down from older historical referents by the UN planners. In some ways, given 
the spread o f the English language through globalisation, it is difficult to make a precise 
judgement. One may for instance, delineate several prominent symbols o f the Western 
Christian ‘family’ and attempt to map them onto instances o f discourse. The emphasis in 
Euro-American discourse of brotherhood and not sisterhood (compare to the Dalai Lama’s 
equal and complementary use of these terms) suggests the patriarchy and andro-centricity 
characteristic of Christianity. Parental discourses (such as Blair’s messages to Iraq and 
Darfur) placing less developed states in the position of children, again suggests pedagogical 
patriarchy. The valuation of kinship and the human family as a nurturing sphere connotes 
with the valuation of anti-political femininity in Western political thought.
While the spread of English globally means that syntactically, non-Westemers often 
replicate the forms o f kinship discourse as derived from Western Christian ideas, it is 
impossible to claim that all replications of these modes of discourse are instances of the
854 All preceding excerpts from Redstone, J. ‘The Human Family — A n Idea Whose Time Has Come’. Available 
at: h ttp ://www.worldblessings.com/the-human-family.html Accessed on 02/01/2009.
855 Several are listed at note 853, this chapter.
856 See for instance, his Nobel Prize acceptance speech. Available at: 
http:/  / www.tibet.com /P I.,/nobelaccept.html. One might also see his ‘Buddhism and Democracy’ (1993), 
available at: h ttp : //www.dalailama.com/page. 164.htm. Both o f the above, accessed on 07/09/2009.
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deployment of Western Christian symbols. What we can show is that specific pathways exist 
for the symbols of the archetypal Western Christian family (dominant patriarch, nurturing 
mother, children brought up within a nuclear family mould under parental tuition) to be 
mobilised frequently. Furthermore, regardless of which religion replicates such discourses, if 
this replication continues concurrent with the continued favouring of IC discourses instead 
by political speakers, there may be scope for redrawing the terms of the UN founding 
documents both to reflect political culture and to better motivate practical action rather than 
espouse visions of kinship which increasingly seem only suited to religious discourses.
This is not to say that altering the UN’s ways of formulating its sense of mission would be a 
path to solidifying a secular/religious divide in global discourse about the future shape of 
world order. As Hopgood857 reminds us, drawing on Durkheim’s Elementary Forms o f the 
Religious Life, sacredness and religiosity are bome out of collective attitudes towards social 
ideas and phenomena. Thus the mundane emblem of the family can be turned into a sacred 
value. ‘Secular’ speakers and organisations may always treat their own motives and ideals with 
a kind o f religious respect. One may treat the notion of universal human rights or the rational 
authority o f the international community with a kind of religious awe. However, the Western 
political circumstances of the UN ’s founding are betrayed in its retention of discourses of 
human family in its touchstone documents. A similar ideational soil gave rise to these 
discourses as to those used in the institutionally religious discourses above. To alter the UN’s 
mission statements away from replicating these quasi-religious formulations would open up 
space for either more inclusive formulations based on genuine world debate, and/or more 
practical ones. Negative political capital could be removed from the UN organisation while 
opening space for new sentiment to crystallise around a set of value formulations actually 
formed by inclusive world support.
857 See Hopgood, S. (2006) Keepers o f the Flame: Understanding Amnesty International ch i, and Durkheim, E. 
(1915) Elementary Forms o f the Religious Life
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8.4 Moving beyond the 1945 ‘Consensus* -  What is Possible and What 
Difference Would it Make?
Critiques then o f the discursive framework of the UN founding documents, both in its 
purporting to universality and its deployment of notions of fostering human kinship, have 
been advanced. To summarise: firstly, the ‘consensus’ o f 1945 was, and remains only partly 
consensual and sometimes, as in the Islamic and Soviet cases, even the importance or 
relevance of central notions in the mission statements of the UN cannot be agreed upon. 
Allied to this, because of the largely Western and American basis of the UN’s values, when 
questions like US unilateral action over Iraq arise, the replication that occurs between UN 
and US ‘values’ gives the world community little ideological (to say nothing of political) 
footing upon which to refute calls for unilateral action, unless they are somehow to speak in 
UN debates but eschew UN discursive formulations. Legal channels of course remain, but 
these are often too laborious to make an impact in immediate political debates.
Secondly, adding aspirations o f kinship to UN mission statements, with the attached 
connotations of indefinite virtue and religious overtones, only widens the credibility gap 
opened up by the catachrestic disjunction between lofty ideals and political problems which 
are hard to reconcile. These metaphors in their particular character of allying aspirational 
tones o f the affective character o f social relations to be forged, with a presupposition of the 
universal individual, also reinforce the ethnocentricity which we saw cause frustration among 
commentators in Chapter Four who are involved intimately with the organisation.
Thirdly, kinship discourse, marked by generality, emotive tones and future-orientation lends 
itself as we have seen, not only to uses rooted in Christian notions of the flock-as-family, but 
also to more extreme discourses of general spiritual unity. All poles o f this continuum, from 
mainstream to extreme are, by use o f a kinship which opposes politics in Western thought, 
escapes from the entanglements of political discord. This tendency for kinship discourse to 
become flighty, idealistic and impractical does the authority o f political discourse containing 
these languages few favours.
Fourthly (as discussed in Chapters One and Seven with reference to the work o f Keally 
McBride), the prefigurement o f a modem Western notion of idealised kinship as a polar 
opposite o f public political and economic activity is problematic if this ideal vision is then
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supposed to be used to model an ideal state of international relations. Because o f this 
dependence on particular notions of public politics and economics “revalorizing the family, 
as it is currently imagined, is not an effective way to offer an alternative to liberal capitalism.”858 
In other words, idealised relations of kinship as posited in the UN documents as models for 
the healing o f the fractured world of 1945, require the sort of paternalistic, aggressive 
capitalism (which today renews tensions based upon widening income inequality and 
environmental degradation) to have any meaning. We cannot understand world kinship as 
being a valuable state o f affairs without its antithesis of competitive, grasping politics and 
economics playing a major role in world politics and giving a constitutive sense of contrast. 
Kinship could not conceivably mean anything positive without these negatives existing. The 
ideal must have the evil in order to have meaning and thus can never replace it but must 
always remain in constitutive tension with it. Thus, the paradox of the incompleteness of 
these UN discourses finds another explanation. By their patterns of valorisation of kinship as 
opposed to politics and economics, none of these valorised ideas can ever find resolution 
because of their constitutive tension.
All these problems then result from the ossified, unsurpassable discourse of the UN 
documents. Further, the cognitive facility and positive valuation of kinship metaphors, allied 
to English linguistic spread in the UN-era, keeps speakers returning to problematic world 
kinship discourse. Such discourse, hamstrung as it often is by its vagueness and inoperability, 
can be used, as in Brent Steele’s example (and also the speeches made by Emyr Jones Parry 
noted in Chapter Five, not to mention the earlier Wilsonian use of these discourses) to 
motivate the members of the nation states or the international community at the UN, to act 
to retain their self-image as proponents of humane politics around the globe. This remains 
of colossal benefit, though its beneficence, reliant upon particular notions of humanity, 
remains incomplete, and the tendency for kinship discourse to depolitidse current politics by 
overwriting them with self-affirming and deluding Utopian visions, is problematic.
If  we also consider a rival version of the use of world-as-kinship metaphor in the Cairo 
agreement, the failings of the UN version may not seem so grave. The Cairo document holds 
that the human family can only be inclusive as far as a community o f believers extends. To
858 McBride, K. (2005) Collective Dreams: Political Imagination and Community p57
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recall the kinship metaphor usage of Article One cited earlier, “(a)ll human beings form one 
family whose members are united by submission to God.”859 For all the difficulties in 
extending a meaningful notion of the UN’s Western version o f the notion of world kinship 
around the globe, it is far more flexible than this Islamic version which would require 
wholesale religious conversion. Thus, those modem traits of Western kinship, in particular 
the insistence on the possibility of creating ‘kin’ relations just as much by performing the 
proper actions of affection as by inhabiting proscribed status relations, serve the UN 
discourse well. This allows condemnation of a rogue power to be followed by redemption - 
options for reforming the world are kept open and may be pursued in tentative increments. 
It makes sense in this logical system to cast out and allow back in, based on changing 
behaviour. While this leads to cross-cutting condemnations and welcoming over time, contra 
Schmitt, never does a decision made in discourse necessarily find a way to follow its logical 
conclusion in terms of operationalising policy based on statements in discourse.
Part of the difficulty of acting upon the critiques made above is hinted at by the failure of the 
review conference of 1955, wherein most of the key issues to be debated were practical 
concerns on the running o f the institution rather than questions of adding to the 
philosophical underpinnings. That proposed conference was deemed to be impossible 
because of the lack of belief that new consensus could be smoothly reached without further 
enflaming Cold War tensions. Attempts at wholesale review of the philosophy o f the UN 
remain, even today, difficult to envisage though many advocate it.860 N ot only are the 
principles o f the UN supposed to be unsurpassable and designed to provide a steady 
compass through the tempests of history, but also as Kent Kille writes, “(t)he UN-Secretary- 
General has long been viewed as a vital source o f moral authority.”861 As the UN struggles 
once more for credibility amid inaction over Darfur, Lebanon and most recently the war in 
Gaza o f 2009, to question its own proudly held moral framework would be tremendously
859 The Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam (1990) Available at: 
h ttp:/ / www.religlaw.org/interdocs / docs /cairohrislaml990.htm Accessed on 06/01/2009.
860 See for instance, Malloch-Brown, M. (2008) ‘Can the UN Be Reformed?’ in Global Governance 14(1). The 
former Deputy Secretary-General argues that perhaps a full scale global conflict is required to trigger a similar 
zest for international reform as was apparent in 1945. For a wide-ranging analysis o f institutional reform 
encompassing structural and philosophical topics see, Weiss, T. (2009a) W hat’s Wrong With the UN And How 
To Fix It
861 Kille, K. (2007) (ed.) The UN Secretary-General and Moral Authority: Ethics and Religion in International 
Leadership p24
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difficult, especially, as we saw in Chapter Four, according to those enmeshed in the UN 
bureaucracy. This though, is a credibility gap that the organisation has many times over failed 
to bridge.
The allure o f a single, steadfast morality has been strong throughout the UN’s history. The 
Western powers have craved its backing to their own ontology in the face of threats from 
Communist and Islamic challenges, but still grievous compromises have to be made in the 
name of extending such a unitary standard. In an article commenting upon the failure to 
protect human rights abuses in Darfur, Joseph Loconte, writing for the conservative Heritage 
Foundation think-tank notes that: “(T)he United Nations prides itself on its ethos of 
universalism: It is a body with no standards for membership— and no penalties for betraying 
its highest ideals. It gives equal voice to dictatorships and democracies. So brutish states such 
as China, Zimbabwe, Saudi Arabia and even Sudan (widely accused o f ethnic cleansing and 
genocide) serve as members in good standing on the Human Rights Commission.”862 
Loconte quotes Shashi Tharoor, UN undersecretary-general for communications, in defence 
o f this: “(Y)ou don’t advance human rights,” he argues, “by preaching only to the 
converted.”863
This much would seem to be true, though Loconte’s aversion to ‘brutish’ states impeding or 
corrupting the UN is perhaps wide of the mark, and the delays over Darfur for instance, 
cannot be blamed solely on this point. What criticisms, in the final analysis, can be securely 
fixed upon such discourses are perhaps less of the damage they have done, than the good 
they have never been able to do, despite their grand promises. The terrain of discourse has 
shifted quite considerably in the lifetime o f the UN and, by institutional rules, as well as by 
dint o f the unchallengeable character of those founding documents devised by those few 
planners, the UN’s guiding principles have not changed with wider discourse. As we have 
seen throughout the preceding empirical chapters, kinship discourse has been displaced in 
the political mainstream, and, as the commentators in Chapter Four confirmed (backing up 
the patterns observed in political discourse in subsequent chapters) kinship discourses are 
today seen as unrealistic, anachronistic, and may be avoided by those seeking to make
862 Loconte, J. (2005) ‘End the UN’s Human Rights Hypocrisy’, Heritage Foundation, June 16th 2005. Available 
at: h ttp ://www.heritage.org/press/ commentary/ed061605b.cfm. Accessed on 17/01/2009.
863 Ibid.
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progress on UN projects. Their persistence in the political domain is now confined to 
emotive, aspirational and general statements, often quite disconnected from policy-making 
and often unable to motivate action when political interests or factions oppose it. Further, 
their substantial entrenchment in religious discourse can afford negative political capital in 
secular organisations like the UN. These transformations in discursive terrain would suggest 
that when, finally, in fifty, or one hundred and fifty years, the Charter and other founding 
UN documents are reviewed, it would seem likely that kinship references will decrease or 
remain the same rather than increase, unless world politics in the meantime becomes a matter 
for figures o f religious authority once more. Perhaps that general world consultation and 
consensus which was conspicuously absent in the planning process in the 1940s, could be 
mobilised to generate more representative and more politically current modes of expressing 
the practical and practicable goals of the international architecture as it faces up to the urgent 
needs for partnership, not necessarily kinship, over issues such as long term nuclear 
disarmament, poverty reduction and environmental and population challenges.
The world kinship discourse at the heart of the UN project for the last three generations has 
held out to the world an unfulfilled promise — a promise which it is difficult to even 
understand how to fulfil. It is a reminder that aspects o f politics, by their conceptual nature 
are often incomplete and incapable of being completed. This insight is an important addition 
to considerations of the thought of Carl Schmitt in international political thought. His 
concept of the moment of decision is also left incomplete by kinship discourses where 
closing the loop o f inclusion and exclusion is impossible. The way that these notions of 
kinship have been shown to operate -  opening kinship to everyone based on ‘natural’ 
biological sameness, while at the same time being able to close off the in-group based upon a 
lack o f ‘natural’ ‘kin-like’ behaviour — denies the possibility of authoritative sovereign 
decision because the dual simultaneous modes of constructing the boundary to be decided 
upon mean it is never static. For IR in more broad perspectives, the contradiction and 
incompleteness o f these discourses that are at the centre of the ethical principles of a great 
part o f the globe and its most prominent international organisation, show us a great deal 
about the notions o f interests and identity. Many schools of IR thought from realism to 
radical constructivism base their enquiries upon the assumption of the fixity of notions of 
interests and identity. As we have seen however, grand statements of universal global
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principles may be produced under fickle circumstances and the complexity of discursive 
inputs which contribute to such principles may fill their articulation with contradiction. 
World kinship discourse thus arguably shows that the world is sometimes (even in the 
instances when it purports to be the most certain) incapable of defining its interests, identity 
and principles in ways that can be coherendy acted upon.
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APPENDIX A
Selected Articles of the Charter of the United Nations864
PREAMBLE 
WE THE PEOPLES OF THE UNITED NATIONS DETERMINED
• to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has 
brought untold sorrow to mankind, and
• to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human 
person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small, and
• to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from 
treaties and other sources o f international law can be maintained, and
• to promote social progress and better standards o f life in larger freedom,
AND FOR THESE ENDS
• to practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbours, 
and
• to unite our strength to maintain international peace and security, and
• to ensure, by the acceptance of principles and the institution of methods, that armed 
force shall not be used, save in the common interest, and
• to employ international machinery for the promotion of the economic and social 
advancement o f all peoples,
864Author’s selection. Full document available at: http://www.un.org/en/docurnents/charter/index.shtrnl.
Accessed on 17/10/2009.
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HAVE RESOLVED TO COMBINE OUR EFFORTS TO ACCOMPLISH 
THESE AIMS
Accordingly, our respective Governments, through representatives assembled in the city 
of San Francisco, who have exhibited their full powers found to be in good and due form, 
have agreed to the present Charter of the United Nations and do hereby establish an 
international organization to be known as the United Nations.
CHAPTER I: PURPOSES AND PRINCIPLES 
Article 1
The Purposes o f the United Nations are:
1. To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective 
collective measures for the prevention and removal o f threats to the peace, and for the 
suppression o f acts o f aggression or other breaches o f the peace, and to bring about by 
peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, 
adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a 
breach of the peace;
2. To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle 
of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures 
to strengthen universal peace;
3. To achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an 
economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging 
respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to 
race, sex, language, or religion; and
4. To be a centre for harmonizing the actions o f nations in the attainment o f these 
common ends.
Article 2
The Organization and its Members, in pursuit of the Purposes stated in Article 1, shall act 
in accordance with the following Principles.
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1. The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality o f all its 
Members.
2. All Members, in order to ensure to all of them the rights and benefits resulting 
from membership, shall fulfill in good faith the obligations assumed by them in 
accordance with the present Charter.
3. All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a 
manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered.
4. All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of 
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other 
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.
5. All Members shall give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes 
in accordance with the present Charter, and shall refrain from giving assistance to any 
state against which the United Nations is taking preventive or enforcement action.
6. The Organization shall ensure that states which are not Members of the United 
Nations act in accordance with these Principles so far as may be necessary for the 
maintenance o f international peace and security.
7. Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to 
intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or 
shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; 
but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under 
Chapter Vll.
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APPENDIX B
Selected Article of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights865
PREAMBLE
Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all 
members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the 
world,
Whereas disregard and contempt for human rights have resulted in barbarous acts which 
have outraged the conscience of mankind, and the advent of a world in which human 
beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear and want has been 
proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common people,
Whereas it is essential, if man is not to be compelled to have recourse, as a last resort, to 
rebellion against tyranny and oppression, that human rights should be protected by the 
rule of law,
Whereas it is essential to promote the development of friendly relations between nations,
Whereas the peoples of the United Nations have in the Charter reaffirmed their faith in 
fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person and in the equal 
rights of men and women and have determined to promote social progress and better 
standards of life in larger freedom,
Whereas Member States have pledged themselves to achieve, in co-operation with the 
United Nations, the promotion of universal respect for and observance of human rights 
and fundamental freedoms,
Whereas a common understanding of these rights and freedoms is of the greatest 
importance for the full realization of this pledge,
Now, Therefore THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY proclaims THIS UNIVERSAL 
DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS as a common standard of achievement for 
all peoples and all nations, to the end that every individual and every organ of society, 
keeping this Declaration constantly in mind, shall strive by teaching and education to 
promote respect for these rights and freedoms and by progressive measures, national and 
international, to secure their universal and effective recognition and observance, both 
among the peoples of Member States themselves and among the peoples of territories 
under their jurisdiction.
865 Author’s selection. Full document available at: http: /  / www.un.org/en / documents / udhr/indcx.shtml#ap.
Accessed on 18/10/2009.
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Article 1.
• All human beings are bom free and equal in dignity and rights .They are endowed with 
reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.
Article 2.
• Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without 
distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other 
opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. Furthermore, no 
distinction shall be made on the basis of the political, jurisdictional or international status 
of the country or territory to which a person belongs, whether it be independent, trust, 
non-self-goveming or under any other limitation of sovereignty.
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APPENDIX C
Selection from Covenant of the League of Nations866
THE HIGH CONTRACTING PARTIES,
In order to promote international co-operation and to achieve international peace and 
security
by the acceptance of obligations not to resort to war,
by the prescription o f open, just and honourable relations between nations,
by the firm establishment of the understandings of international law as the actual rule of
conduct among Governments, and
by the maintenance o f justice and a scrupulous respect for all treaty obligations in the 
dealings of organised peoples with one another,
Agree to this Covenant of the League of Nations.
ARTICLE 10.
The Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external 
aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the 
League. In case of any such aggression or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression 
the Council shall advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled.
866 Full document available at: http://avalon.law.vale.edu/20th century/leagcov.asp. Accessed on: 18/10/2009.
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APPENDIX D
UN Protocol June 3rd 1943: Annex I, Proposal for an 11 
Member Council867
United States, Great Britain, USSR and China as permanent members plus:
2 from Group of 9 European States: Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Greece, Iceland, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Yugoslavia.
2 from Group o f 19 American States: Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, 
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, 
Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela.
1 from Group of 5 British Dominions: Australia, Canada, India, South Africa, New Zealand. 
1 from Group o f 5 African/Middle Eastern States: Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Iraq, Liberia.
1 from Group o f 1 Asian State: Philippines.
867 Annex I o f ‘UN Protocol’, a report o f June 3rd 1943. See Sumner Welles Papers, Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park 
NY. Box 189 — Postwar Foreign Policy Files 1940-43, Folder 2 — UN Protocol. The version o f the list o f nations 
to be included in plans for the security council which is reproduced here had already undergone six revisions. 
The protocol first appears in Welles papers on April 22nd 1943 and was amended on May 1st, May 5th, May 6th, 
May, 13th, and May 20th.
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